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SUMMARY
An investigation into the trajectory of river water quality as a strategic issue for the
water industry was conducted within two water organisations. This research traced the
profile of this issue on the agenda of the water authorities over twenty years and
within the industry over a century. The aim was to gain insights into processes of
strategic agenda building and organisational development and change, linking process
to performance in the achievement of river quality.
A contextualist theory of method was adopted in a comparative case study approach
which sought to assess the performance of the two organisations in attaining
improvements in river water quality during the time frame. The contextualist
methodology necessitated examining the agenda building process from multiple levels
and over time. To this end extensive archive research and 40 interviews were
conducted.The influence of the wider social environment and the sector in the long
term were found to be important in the formation of sector and organisational
ideology which conditioned organisational developments. A structurationist approach
demonstrated the key social structures and their properties implicated in the formation
of organisational ideology and its change, as the water authorities were privatised.
A process model of strategic agenda building was developed and extended, based on
an earlier model by Dutton (1988). This emphasised the influence of multiple
contexts, the role of organisational ideology, issue related activities and the actions of
sponsors as important additions to the original model. Further, the use of structuration
theory, underpinned by a Realist perspective, outlined a conception of agency based
on the causal powers granted by the necessary relations of the organisational structure
or ideology, and that agency was granted by organisational members' access to
alternative structural systems outside the organisational context.
This research concluded that the links between structure, process and performance are
implicated in incremental and transformational change, and that the properties of
structure were instrumental in the propensity for adaption and change. Finally,
organisational processes should accurately reflect the rules of the system for change to
work.
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1. INTRODUCTION: STRATEGIC AGENDA BUILDING AND
CHANGE IN THE WATER INDUSTRY
This study sets out to gain insights into processes of strategic agenda building within
organisations by exploring the trajectory of one strategic issue over time. Greater
analytical force was seen to be gained by a comparative study between high and low
performing organisations in relation to the issue. It was hoped thereby to gain fresh
perspectives on the management of organisational change. In particular, this research
is concerned with managerial agency, its aetiology and implication within structural
relationships. To this end,two UK water companies were selected for high and low
performance in achieving river water quality standards. The water industry proved a
good focus of study because it provided over 20 years of organisational development
during which to track the issue. River water quality had been an issue of concern to
the industry at the formation of the water authorities in 1973 and became their
responsibility for the following 15 years. The self-regulating status of these
organisations was a continuing source of controversy, both inside the industry and
outside, amongst the various stakeholders with an interest in rivers. As such, river
water quality was considered to have the attributes of longevity and controversy
necessary for the long term tracking of a strategic issue.
The research compares the pattern of interest and exposure in river water quality
between Severn Trent and Thames Water, based on their performance in maintaining
quality and achieving river quality objectives. That is, it is concerned with how the
administrative systems and decision processes influenced the strategic position
adopted by the case studies. In this sense, the study falls within the sub-field of
strategy process research (Huff and Reger, 1987; Chakravarthy and Doz, 1992). It is
however distinctive from much process research in including, like strategy content
research, the external environment within the remit of analysis, at both industry and
macro-environmental levels. In this way the effect of context on process is explicitly
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considered (Peftigrew, 1985c; Huff and Reger, 1987). Moreover, this research is
concerned with time and so adopts a historical approach. Thus the scope of the study
is both temporally and contextually broad, for it includes an analysis of the river water
quality issue since the beginning of the industry in the mid nineteenth century. While
the narrow focus on a single strategic issue enables an understanding of the contextual
variables and links which make a difference. Thus reflecting the context of the
strategic decisions and issue under analysis. As Huff and Reger (1987) make clear, the
nature of process is sensitive to the subject being considered and so the content of
strategic decisions is important: their industry, historical contexts and the anticipated
future of other decisions.
This study therefore follows the tradition in strategic process research that seeks to
examine several administrative systems simultaneously but focus on a narrow
strategic problem (cf Bower, 1970; Miles and Snow, 1978; Guth and Ginsberg, 1990;
Van de Ven, Angle and Poole, 1989). Such a holistic approach attempts to track
simultaneously over time, multiple contextual factors, strategies, decision processes,
administrative systems and outcomes. The aim was to produce an account of
management processes that was rich in description and would provide new conceptual
lenses to observe important phenomenon and challenge extant beliefs (Chakravarthy
and Doz, 1992). In this respect the research aimed for some non-intuitive but
supportive hypotheses and was open to surprising conclusions (Huff and Reger,
1987).
In line with strategy process research, this study calls on a broad set of disciplinary
bases (Chakravarthy and Doz, 1992) including concepts and research from the longer
traditions of related social sciences (Huff and Reger, 1987). The work on
organisational agendas and issue attention builds on insights from theoretical
treatments of attention allocation from a diverse set of literatures. For example,
economists (Simon, 1971; March and Olsen, 1976), have shown an interest in
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resources (Radner, 1975; Radner and Rothschild, 1975; Winter, 1981). Psychologists
have been concerned with perception (Taylor and Crocker, 1980) and the
characteristics of the stimulus (Norman, 1976). Decision making theorists (Mintzberg,
Raisinghani and Theoret, 1976) and advocates of the garbage can model of decision
making (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972; March and Olsen, 1976) have been
interested in political and perceptual processes. The work on issue definition (Cobb
and Elder, 1972; Edelman, 1964), issue formulation and diagnosis (Dutton et al, 1983;
Lyles and Mitroff, 1980) has been important. The political view of organisation
science (Pfeffer, 1981; Smircich and Morgan, 1982) has looked at the motivations of
decision makers and the attention of decision makers (Bauer, 1968). The public policy
perspective (Cobb and Elder, 1972) has been concerned with the external political
environment.
The interest in multiple contexts has drawn on writers of the external context (Aldrich,
1979; Bendix, 1956; Child, 1968; Meyer and Rowan, 1977), the influence of time on
organisations (Sztompka, 1991; Whipp, 1995), of structures on organisations (Ranson,
Hinnings and Greenwood, 1980; Whittington, 1988; Sewell, 1992), industry recipes
(J-C Spender, 1989), and industry ideology (Selznick, 1949; Reynolds, 1986; Gordon,
1991). Further, organisational ideologies have been discussed by a range of authors
(Meyer, 1982; Johnson, 1990, Pettigrew, 1979; Brunsson, 1982, Clark, 1972; Wilson,
1973; Pfeffer, 1981) to name a few. The study's concern with organisational
developments over time has called upon organisational change theorists (Pettigrew,
198 5c; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985: Johnson, 1990) and industry level change
theorists (Meyer, Brooks and Goes, 1990).
Finally, the overriding concern with managerial agency, implicated in the strategic
agenda building process has drawn insights from sociology (Giddens, 1984; Sewell,
1992) and organisational theorists (Whittington, 1988, 1990, 1992; Tsoukas, 1994).
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Chakravarthy and Doz (1992:6) suggest three distinct and fundamental questions for
strategy process research: first, knowing the relationships between a firm's
administrative systems, decision processes and its competitive andlor resource
positions. This has been attempted in this study by analysis of interconnected
contextual features which have an impact on the agenda building process. The
organisations' performance on river quality has been assessed in terms of the issue
context, managerial perceptions, structure, function, issue sponsorship and
organisational ideology. Second, how does a firm achieve and maintain effectiveness
in the above relationships, is answered by comparison of the internal contexts of the
high with the low performing organisation. Third, how does a finn modify its
administrative systems and decision processes both in response to environmental
changes and through its own proactive actions, is answered by an analysis of
managerial agency and from whence h derives its inspiration and power.
Strategic process research requires a range of more intrusive measures (Chakravarthy
and Doz, 1992) and to this end, in-depth interviews were conducted in both
companies and industry related organisations. As the above questions are more
properly answered through longitudinal studies, detailed historical work was carried
out in its place, given that long term fieldwork in a study of this kind was
impracticable. The historical work was based on documents such as annual reports,
internal company reports, industry literature, professional articles, government reports
and historical writings. In this way, the researcher could avoid the traps of erroneous
assumptions about organisational processes: that is, not allowing theory to blind
observations of process and avoiding overly simplistic assumptions about the strategic
process or its boundaries and the misuse of simple dependent variables that may have
little to do with the process. By considering all contexts over time, including the
historical context of the issue, one attempts to avoid over reliance on obvious causal
links by exploring an issue from multiple perspectives. More importantly, the framing
of the case studies within a punctuated equilibrium model of change (Tushman and
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Romanelli, 1985) allows for the continuity and fluctuations which characterise long
term organisational developments. This provided the crucial dynamic context for the
tracking of a strategic issue, thus avoiding the assumption of the steady state implicit
in so many cross-sectional studies (Chakravarthy and Doz, 1992). The combination of
contextual analysis and intrusive measures with historical analysis is an innovation in
the agendas and attention area, by which it is hoped to add more to the ongoing
research stream (Huff and Reger, 1987).
A key aim of this research was to derive insights into the processes of organisational
change by an understanding of how it was that organisational agendas were shaped
and issues gained or declined in importance. That managing changing organisations
remains a top research item is supported by the work of Bower and Hout (1988) on
top performing companies; Keats and Hitt (1988) on structures and environment and
Porter (1987) on restructuring. In her review of the strategy field, Lyles (1990)
concluded that managing changing organisations, transformation and the
implementation of strategy, were the second group of maj or issues after globalisation
for a research agenda in the 1 990s, and that this also held true for future agenda issues
for research into strategic management. However, transformational change processes
have seldom been researched comprehensively (Chakravarthy and Doz, 1992) and this
research is a small attempt at righting this imbalance in the field.
Also, the area of agendas and attention is seen to be populated with a morass of
independent articles, written in isolation from each other, which has hampered
research progress (Huff and Reger, 1987). By building on existing theory and research
in this area, specifically Dutton's (1988a) model of strategic agenda building, it was
hoped to extend and develop the current work. In particular the research aim was to
address the central processes driving change via agenda building. To consider the
nature of managerial agency implicated in the change process and in so doing, to
become relevant to managerial practice (Chakravarthy and Doz, 1992). Indeed
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managers might be particularly interested in the work on agendas and attention which
has focused on why and how managers attend to some strategic issues better than
others (Huff and Reger, 1987). To this end, this work aims to explore the nature of
managerial choice: its possibilities, how it is that managers derive the power of action
and what is necessary for them to do to render certain strategic outcomes.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
This research concerns the evolution and transformation of two water companies over
20 years. It seeks to understand organisational development in multiple contexts and
through varying temporal modes. The focus is upon the trajectory of a single strategic
issue over time. But the research interests are broad, encompassing both the social
origins of this issue and its internal manifestation in organisational life. In tracing the
history and trajectory of one strategic issue through multiple contexts, the focal points
multiply, to include the overall strategic agenda, decision-making, organisational
culture and change, and ultimately, the place of these focal organisations in society.
The research questions center on how organisational members derive and implement
their agency and with explaining both the patterns and processes of organisational
development. It is these plural and wide ranging concerns which have informed the
content and structure of this literature review.
It is with the research questions in mind, that this review seeks to expose some
common themes in the literature on organisational science and to suggest the
inclusion of newer ones from work done in the fields of sociology and history. In
particular, the more recent concerns with synthesis of traditional theories, such as
structuralism and functionalism, so evident in the focus on paradoxes (Merton, 1948),
dialectics (Blau 1964), and mediating concepts such as habitus (Bourdieu, 1986),
historicity (Touraine, 1977), figurations (Elias, 1987), mobilisation (Etzioni, 1986),
anomie (Merton, 1968), duality of structure (Giddens, 1976), and agency (Archer,
1986). As Sztompka (1991) so lucidly elaborates, it is unclear what exactly these
referents are because they are neither people nor things. It is this very difficulty which
is a signal that the traditional dichotomies of individual and society, as well as of the
social static and social dynamics, are intuitively felt to be insufficient. This disquiet
has emerged only relatively recently in organisational science and is largely confined
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to the sub-group management studies (Whittington, 1992), a direct result of the
influence of the related fields of history and sociology.
It is the intention of this chapter to follow in Sztompka's (1991) footsteps and explore
the twin dichotomies of modern social theory as they apply to organisations: that of
agency and structure and continuity and change, for they are the central questions
implied in the subject of this research. Transformation and change concern the
evolution of organisations through periods of both continuity and change while
strategic agenda building plays a fundamental role in managerial agency. The
existence of these dichotomies side by side must of necessity require synthesis
whereby the duality of agency and structure occurs over time. The research biases
conceive social phenomena as contextualist, temporal and processual and seek
research outcomes which have significant explanatory force for organisational
phenomenon.
The structure of this chapter will flow from macro to micro processes of
organisations, beginning with the most enduring and pervasive of notions for
organisational enquiry, that of social role, then to the temporal and processual, those
of history, organisational development and strategic issues. These subject areas are in
reality tightly interwoven but their discrete study should alert theorists to be mindful
of perspective: In short, the closer the "horizon ", the more visible the actor but
constrained by his context; in the longer time perspective, actors become less
"visible" but the irframes of meaning, the product of their structuring, more
determinate: constituted structures have become constitutive (Ranson et al, 1980:14).
It is this question of perspective which has been so influential in the one sidedness of
much organisational theorising. The task here will be to highlight what has been made
"visible" by key theorists in each subject area and examine the dichotomies arising out
of the different approaches. In particular, the possibilities offered by an integration of
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the twin dichotomies, agency and structure and continuity and change, will be
explored. The chapter closes with an attempt to synthesize these critiques into a
framework for further analytical enquiry.
2.2 Organisations and Society
In this section a selected review is made of the literature concerned in different ways
with the role and place of organisations in society, beginning with the work on
organisational environments and the concern with understanding the nature of the
profound changes which have taken place in the 20th century. It then turns to the way
in which organisational links are forged with the environment: in particular, the
contingency, cognitive, dialectic and realist models. In making a case for a realist
conception of organisational action, the institutionalist and contextualist positions are
studied in the context of social structures. Finally, as an example of a realist
interpretation, the body of work known as the new public sector management,
exemplified in Pollitt's (1991) work, is re-examined in the light of structurationist
principles and for its particular relevance to this study.
2.2.1 organisations and environment
It has been well documented that the nature of organisational environments has
changed dramatically since World War II (Ansoff, 1969; Emery and Trist, 1965;
Drucker, 1969; Bracker, 1980; Stubbart, 1985; Richardson and Richardson, 1989).
Organisational theorists have been keen to specify the nature of these changes
although the degree of historical application, with exceptions (Bell, 1973; Ansoff,
1987), has been minimal.
Early attempts (Merton 1957; Gross, Mason & McEachem, 1958) sought to specify
the environment by describing its elements. Hood (1962) noted the increased
complexity and accelerating rate of change in organisational environments.
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Businesses are perceived to have moved from a relatively stable environment into a
more rapidly changing and competitive environment (Bracker, 1980). Ansoff (1987)
has attributed this change to a marked acceleration in the rate of change within firms,
as well as the accelerated application of science and technology to the process of
management. This, Ansoff (1987) argues, has put a premium on the ability to
anticipate change, take advantage of new opportunities and take timely action in
avoiding threats to the firm. This environment-organisation-effectiveness paradigm
was utilised to understand organisational phenomena but was problematic in tapping
the important aspects of the environment (Downey & Ireland, 1979). Other authors
argued the opposite, that the kind and extent of present-day change precludes
prediction of the future (Drucker, 1964; Gardner, 1963; Dun's Review, 1963).
More historical approaches labeled the late twentieth century as the post industrial era
(Bell, 1973; Ansoff, 1987). It is uniquely characterized by change as well as
turbulence, having increased complexity and loss of social centrality. Toffler (1981)
saw this as the coming of the third wave, Rifkin (1981) mentioned the societal effects
of entropy and Naisbitt (1982) characterised it by megatrends.
From a more theoretical perspective, organisational environments have been
conceptualised as both levels and dimensions. It was Dill (1958) who first drew the
distinction between the general and task environments, later developed by Fahey and
Narayanan (1986) into a prescription for how organisations might attend to the four
main features (political, technological, demographic and social) of the macro-
environment. Dill (1962) suggested that a full specification of the nature of the
environment was not possible for a modem complex organisation. He suggested that
the environment be treated in terms of the effects upon the organisation. Generally
interpreted in terms of the concepts of environmental uncertainty and complexity,
Dill's work became a catalyst for important research but engendered the biggest
controversies. These concerned the perceptual measures used to operationalise
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environmental attitudes, the possibility of employing objective measures and the
effects of subjectivity in their analysis.
The most widely quoted environmental dimensions are Emery and Trist's (1965)
'causal texture of environments' and 'turbulence'. Causal texture is the area of
interdependencies belonging within the environment. This theme was expanded upon
in Terreberry's (1968) landmark paper which focused on the effects of
interorganisational dependencies. Her main thesis was that contemporary changes in
organisational environments are such as to increase the ratio of externally induced
change to internally induced change and that other formal organisations are
increasingly important components of the environment of any focal organisation.
Thus, strategic issues from the task environment are likely to affect competitor and
supplier/buyer type relationships, as in Porter's (1980) industry structure model. While
the macro-environment is likely to throw up issues from government, regulatory and
consumer protection groups. In this way, Terreberry went some way to reconciling
concerns with levels and dimensions.
Turbulent field environments are conceived of as tightly interconnected and rapidly
changing, with too much information. Emery and Trist (1965) have argued that it is
the combined effect of previously unrelated influences, arising from within an obscure
general environment, which poses the greatest organisational threat. Organisations are
not typically in touch with elements in the general environment on a day-to-day basis
and yet these are the very areas which are most difficult to spot and understand, and
often the root cause of many organisational problems (Richardson and Richardson,
1989). Further, it is the essential characteristics of turbulent fields which result in
cause and effect confusion - a difficulty in isolating two variables, due to tight
interconnectedness and rapid change. This leads to unpredictable change because
these patterns of change stimulate further changes. Thus, according to Emery and
Trist, individual business units will experience goal aggravation as turbulence
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intensifies and a lack of control, as the patterns of reaction and interaction become
impossible to decipher.
Ansoff (1987) sees turbulence as due to the new affluence within society which has
meant consumers' demands have changed. Thus the aim of the industrial firm now is
to maintain affluence and differentiation, as well as social responsibility. This is
supported by Richardson and Richardson (1989) who cite the growth of consumer law
in the past couple of decades. The era of caveat emptor has now given way to caveat
vendor. They identify increased merger activity as contributing to the complexity of
the environment. This has resulted in firms being responsible for many products and
markets with the inherent difficulty of management. Additionally, they list a growing
range of enviromnental forces, such as technical innovations, economic activity,
social attitudes, government policies, culture, international relations and climate
which are ever more active in attempting to influence all types of enterprises.
Related to turbulence is Duncan's (1972a) concept of 'uncertainty' which owes much
to Terreberry's (1968) earlier work. This is comprised of the dimensions of
complexity and dynamism (a great number of factors to be taken into consideration)
alongside rapid change within the environment. Duncan does not distinguish between
levels in the environment but conceives of it as: the totality ofphysical and social
factors taken directly into consideration in the decision-making behaviour of
individuals in organisations (1 972a: 314). What he does make explicit, however, is
that uncertainty, complexity and dynamism are not constant features for an
organisation, but dependent upon the perceptions of organisational members. Thus,
the nature of environmental characteristics is a subjective one, dependent upon
individual differences.
This recognition of the subjective nature of environmental perception, implicit in the
work of contingency theorists like Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) and Duncan
(1972a,b), has been made explicit in the cognitive literature's phenomenological
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approach (Weick, 1979; Stubbart, 1989; Huff, 1990). Much less attention has been
paid to assessing the degree of fit between managers' perceptions of the environment
and 'objective' measures. It is assumed that organisational perceptions of internal and
external events are never accurate. Environmental signals become distorted through
the organisation's reception system. This system incorporates a decoding mechanism
or 'repertoire' (Shrivastava and Mitroff, 1983), 'template' (Pondy, 1984), or
'programme' (Starbuck, Greve & Hedberg, 1988).
The objective-subjective dichotomy is a constant theme in the literature and,
according to Downey & Ireland (1979), had at least two dysfunctional effects on
organisational research. First, it tended to a priori push research away from qualitative
data. The objective-subjective dimension equated objectivity and thus scientific
enquiry, with quantification, thereby avoiding, qualitative assessments. Second, the
objective-subjective dimension equated subjective measures with perceptions. This
was based on a confusion over whose subjectivity was involved. When qualitative
measures are equated with subjectivity, subjectivity is ascribed to the assessor. When
the measurement of perception is equated with subjectivity, subjectivity is ascribed to
the assessee. Thus, subjectivity can apply to the way something is measured or the
object being measured. The current usage of the objective-subjective category to
describe the assessment of organisations' environment, however, fails to distinguish
properly between these two attempts at assessment.
Various attempts have been made to reconcile the objective-subjective dichotomy.
Downey and Ireland (1979) propose an alternative approach in which the environment
is measured using two dimensions: what is being measured (participant interpretation
or environmental attributes) and how they are measured (quantitatively or
qualitatively). In this way previous research may be categorised along these two
categories. While useful as a taxonomic tool, this does not get at the heart of the
concern with what is being measured or its validity. An integrative approach was
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proposed by Bourgeois (1980). He suggested that the objective task environment is
'real', measurable and external to the organisation while perceptions of the
environment, although equally real, are events taking place within the organisation as
part of the strategy making process. Thus primary or corporate strategy was linked to
'objective' analyses of the general or macro-environment. While secondary or
business strategy had as its prime input 'subjective t perceptions of the task
environment.
Although Bourgeois' integration effort is useful, it assumes organisational assessments
can be objective: a claim denied by cognitive theorists who assume bias is inherent in
the interpretation of environmental events. Also, depending upon the resources
available to an organisation for scanning, knowledge of the task or industry level
environment will be more 'accurate' given a greater level of interest and
organisational experience of interaction within its industry. Many organisations,
particularly of small and medium sizes do not attend formally to the macro-
environment (Orminski, 1991). This has even found to be true of large organisations
(Brauchlin and Coisman, 1991). This is particularly true where rapid changes at the
industry level are consuming their attentional time. Individuals' perceptions of the task
environment tend to have the status of informed observations and information
gathering is informal. Despite these practical objections an even greater problem is
presented by the instances of organisational irrationality in ignoring environmental
signals. Nowhere in this vast field of literature, whose chief aim appears to be the
search for organisational effectiveness, are there explanatory accounts powerful
enough to convey the strategy process. For this we must turn to the literature on
organisation-environment interaction and examine the more explicit attempts at
capturing that Holy Grail of strategic success.
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2.2.2 organisation-environment links
This body of work is chiefly characterised by four main models of organisation
environment interaction: contingency, cognitive and dialectical. They each contribute
to a variety of hybrid models such as organisational learning, strategic choice,
population ecology and resource dependency. The strategic choice and dialectical
models have striven to overcome the determinist-voluntarist dichotomy but are seen to
be inadequate. A synthesis of the choice and constraint dilemma is proposed via a
Realist model of agency.
The contingency perspective springs from much of the work discussed in the previous
section on the nature of the environment. Contingency theorists view the environment
as an encompassing medium from which information is received and monitored by
organisational members. Although researchers place different emphases on the degree
to which organisations react or enact their enviromnents, the role of organisations is
seen chiefly in adapting and responding to constraints imposed by the environment.
This view suggests a certain degree of "fit" is appropriate between the internal
organisation structure and the degree of environmental uncertainty facing the
organisation (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967).
An alternative view is presented by cognitive models which view the environment as
an 'enacted' process (Weick, 1979), arising in retrospect out of managers cognitive
experiences. Weick emphasises that organisations do not simply react to information
in the environment but "enact" that environment by the selective attention of decision
makers to only some parts of the environment. The so called "irrelevant" parts of the
environment are defined out of existence in an operational sense, as lying outside the
organisation's "domain" of legitimate activity (Levine & White, 1961). An
organisational learning approach views cognitive models as a good basis for
practitioners to enhance environmental analysis and the strategic decision making
capacity of their organisations (Lenz and Engledow, 1986). Still others have used
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cognitive models as a basis for understanding organisations as interpretation systems
(Daft and Weick, 1984). Here the mode of interaction with the environment is
determined by assumptions as to the analysability of the environment and
organisational intrusion.
The concept of organisational "domain" derives from specific goals which decision
makers wish to pursue and functions which they cause an organisation to undertake in
order to implement goals. This process, whereby organisations for example come to
select certain products and markets as their domain, is one of strategic choice (Child,
1972). Decision makers' frame of reference has to take into account some constraints
on their activities, but there will normally be considerable leeway within these
constraints for expression of such strategic choices: the implication being that albeit
an imperfect information processing ability, managers make rational deliberate
choices within the boundaries of individual and external constraints.
The contingency and strategic choice views appear mutually exclusive. The first sees
environmental constraints as impinging upon organisations, whereas the second sees
organisations as impinging upon environments through choices that are made by
decision makers. We are left to believe that either nothing is chosen or everything:
either the environment has immutable effects, or its effects are felt because decision
makers' preferences have directed attention toward it. Hickson, Astley, Butler and
Wilson (1981) reconcile contingency and strategic choice views by the addition of the
temporal dimension. In this way choices are made in sequence over time, the
environment is both chosen and constrains choices. It then becomes possible to
replace mutual exclusivity by a continuum ranging from complete organisational
autonomy to complete environmental restraint. Borrowing from Aldrich's (1979)
conception of the environment as an interorganisational exchange network, they then
conceptualise organisation-environment relations in terms of relationships of power
existing between different organisations. A resource dependence view thus enables the
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location of organisation on a continuum of power, indicating the degree to which they
are autonomous or constrained.
This type of theorising borrows from the resource dependency models of Pfeffer and
Salancik (1978) and human ecology theories (Hawley 1968; Hannan and Freeman,
1977; Hannan, 1989 and Aldrich, 1987). These in turn are influenced by the earlier
work of Emery and Trist (1965) and Thompson arid McEwan (1958) with their
interest in the increasing interdependence of organisations within turbulent fields.
What they all share is the premise of the fundamental role which the environment
plays in shaping organisations. As Gordon (1991) writes of the relationship between
environments and organisational cultures, it is obviously related to the claim that
organisations, in general, are affected by their environments. Such relationships are
central, for example, to the open-systems perspective advanced by Katz and Kahn
(1966). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) also present a strong argument for the proposition
that companies depend on the resources allotted to them by their environments for
their survival and effectiveness. These authors suggested a model whereby the
environment affects the distribution of power and control within an organisation,
which, in turn, affects the selection and removal of officers and, finally, the
organisational actions and structures. However, the ties between organisation and
environment are far from perfect, and, indeed, they have been described as loosely
coupled (Weick, 1979): Loose coupling is an important safely device for
organisational survival. If organisations were completely determined by every
changing event, organisations would constantly confront potential disaster and need
to monitor every change while continually moding themselves (Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978:13).
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Where Hickson et al (1981) depart from this work is in the notion of power as a
crucial link explaining the dynamics of population ecology theories. Here the exertion
of power in and between organisations rests on the institutionalisation of those
organisations as systems of power. Institution building is thus a construction of a
balance of power. The legitimisation of organisations as institutionalised systems of
power is formally noted by acts and decrees and regulations of governments. Power is
conceived as a holistic dialectical process in which induction and resistance
simultaneously condition and exclude each other in a cyclical relationship (Rus,
1980). Thus organisations are at one and the same time jostling coalitions of diverse
internal and external interests, in which power of one constrains the power of another,
and institutional hierarchies, in which power runs up as well as down. In this way,
Hickson et al (1981) conclude, organisations are composites of what Rus (1980)
would see as unending Hegelian contradictions.
In Zeitz's (1980) dialectical model, organisations construct major portions of their
environments through the production of resources and the control of interaction
networks. Dirsmith and Covaleski's (1983) empirical research supports this notion.
They found that approaches used to understand organisational action are negotiated
over time, in an interactive process that roughly corresponds to the strategic norms of
organisational action, which are in turn negotiated. Implicit within these views is the
notion of the organisation as inseparable from the environment under study. An
organisation fashions and is fashioned by (task) environmental elements.
Both dialectical and cognitive models have been criticised as having dangerous
consequences for accounts of strategic choice (Whittington, 1988). Both suffer from
interpretive voluntarisni which views organisations as constrained by the way they
socially construct reality. Dialectical models suffer from historical and structural
determinism, where the structure is continually reproduced by agents in a
simultaneous dialectic which determines organisational action. Cognitive models
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alternatively, have the tendency to dissolve away environments, the implication being
that researchers are liable to neglect structures beyond actors' immediate experience or
understanding. Ultimately, both approaches fail to recognise the social as an essential
precondition of human agency.
What Whittington (1988) is proposing instead is a Realist model derived from Roy
Bhaskar's (1978; 1979; 1986) critique of Positivism and the hermeneutic tradition.
This critique is founded upon an ontological distinction between laws or structures
and the events or experiences actually accessible to empiricism. According to Bhaskar
(1979 chi), positivists confuse regularities of experience with structure, while for
interpretivists, structures are fused continuously in events. This position insists upon
the recognition of both structure and agency as an explanation for human activity.
Thus, pre-existing structures are essential to the constitution of humans as both
sufficiently complex and powerful to exercise agency. In this conceptualisation of
strategic choice, the world is stratified, social structures are deeper, constituting
enduring powers or tendencies which are only contingently realised in actual events. It
is the 'ontological gap' between structure and action that preserves the possibility of
agency. Structures merely provide the powers which agents must mobilise in their
activities (Bhaskar, 1978:110-12). Moreover, agents apply these powers selectively
according to their particular purposes. Thus these structures enable actions, defining
their limits but not their contents.
The reality of structures derives exclusively from the actions they enable: they are
present simply in their effects. Social structures are only produced and reproduced
through the activities they permit and are transformable through the intentional
exercise of human agency. The crucial distinction from the voluntarist position is in
denying the dialectical reproduction of structure. For agency presupposes structure, as
without it agents would lack the powers so essential to action. Choice is possible
because of the stratification of social and human reality. For instance, not only are
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capitalist structures themselves subject to internal contradictions, but the human actor
too is constituted psychologically, sociologically and physiologically. It is the tension
between these three strata which ensures the exclusion of any unambiguous internal
determination. Further, these internal structures are no more than tendencies, for they
must be acted upon according to the beliefs supplied reflexively by the actor. The
stratification of human actors constitute a complexity that provides the basis for
actors' independent construction of their own purpose. The Realist emphasis upon
structure as precondition for agency discounts voluntarism and relativism on two
counts. First, the unequal access to resources prevent humans from being equal in
their agency. Second, these pre-existing structural inequalities are open to critique
despite the interpretivist claim for the priority of the subject's own perceptions, for
there is no reason to grant the actors privileged understanding of conditions they did
not make. Thus Realist social science does not take agency for granted: ... we never
start, cognitively or more generally socially, any more than we can begin biologically,
from scratch: that we are always in the predicament of the tinker, having to mend our
cognitive tools on the job; that we learn to swim in the water not on the beach
(Bhaskar, 1986:162). By exposing the structural inequalities that inhibit them, it aids
actors in the structural transformations by which they may make themselves free.
The implications for organisation-environment links are that organisations constantly
face constraints in the form of pre-existing structures such as government or
monopolies. The inherent contradictions within such structures allow for lobbying and
alliance building to dilute or countervail their power. Choice remains possible because
capitalist structures are subject to internal contradictions and because they remain
tensely engaged with other structures such as ethnicity and gender (Walby, 1986). For
instance, Miles' (1982) account of the tobacco industry's response to consumer
protection legislation showed how the Big Six undertook collaborative ventures to
counter such restrictions as increased taxation. Thus structures present the actor with
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no unambiguous imperatives, but rather with a confused range of constraints apd
resources from which to pick and choose (Whittington, 1988: 532).
Social structure is also involved in constituting the internal drive of the individual that
is the other precondition for agency, and hence for strategic choice. The invasion of
the social with its inherent contradictions into the construction of the personality
creates, through its conflict with the physiological and the psychological, an inner
complexity that releases the actor from any unique imperative. Here Whittington
argues for support of Bhaskar's (1979) concept of the stratified human actor with
examples from Hyman ts (1987) focus upon the social structural contradictions
essential to strategic choice and Whitley's (1987) appreciation of the social
constitution of management teams as critical to explaining firm behaviour. In these
kinds of examples .. . social structures are signifIcant because they make a difference
to strategic choice. This dfference is felt both in what agents seek and in what they
can realise. (Whittington, 1988:533). Just how particular actors will deploy their
various structural advantages depends upon the resolution by each of their internal
complexities. However, each member resolves these internal conflicts uniquely
according to a reflexive play of all their peculiar social, psychological and
physiological constituents. Thus, even from common social structural conditions,
actors construct for themselves codes and objectives for conduct that are independent
of any singular structural determination and are personal to themselves.
It is proposed that a Realist model provides the greatest explanatory account of the
tension between choice and constraint in organisation-environment links. Crucial to
this account is the inextricable involvement of structures, both in how agents construct
their strategic goals and then realise them in their strategic choices. Environmental
structures are not necessarily antagonistic to strategic choice; rather they both form its
precondition and inform its content. It is the specific role of social structures that is
the subject of the next section.
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2.2.3 organisations and social structures
In this section the review is concerned with exploring the treatment of social structural
influences within the sociological and management literature. The management
literature is represented by two major planks of thought in the institutionalists and
contextualists. Of concern in this section is how organisations deal with structural
changes and the utility of these accounts in providing explanatory force. A critique of
this literature will propose an alternative perspective in structuration theory (Giddens,
1984) and its chief advocates in the management field, followed by some implications
for management research. This section will end with an example of a social structural
phenomenon of particular relevance to this study, the new public sector management,
in which the potential for structuration theory will be explored.
The sociological literature provides many examples of attempts to establish links,
both implicit and explicit, between social structure and organisations. Bendix (1956),
for example, explored the relationship between dominant political ideology and how
authority of managers over subordinates was legitimated in an industrial context.
Abegglen (1958) found that certain features of the Japanese social structure were
reflected in the social organisation of the factory. And Crozier (1964) examined how
certain characteristics of French society were embedded in the French bureaucratic
system. These examples demonstrate that there are systematic relationships between
social structure and organisations; they do not, however, provide any evidence about
how changes in organisational structure might be related to changes in social
structure.
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From the organisation science literature, Stinchcombe (1965) noted the relationship
between organisational inventions and available social technology, an argument that
was more fully developed by Hall (1973). Burns (1967), in a discussion of a
comparative study of organisations, noted the links between the value system of
society and the pattern and structure of organisations. The capabilities of a society to
meet demand and use resources were related to the kinds of organisations brought into
being. Kimberly (1975), on the basis of propositions advanced by Stinchcombe (1965)
and Burns (1967), took a system-theoretic approach to organisational analysis in
conceptualising the problem. Thus, as open systems, organisations engage in various
transactions with their environments. These transactions are complex, variable across
organisations and environments, and reciprocal. At a given time, however, there are
various environmental constraints which limit the structural form that organisations
can adopt. Thus the aetiology of organisational configurations is, at least in part, a
function of environmental influences, and variability in these configurations should be
predictably related to variability in environmental influences. In a sample of 123
sheltered workshops, Kimberly found evidence of a relationship between
environmental constraints in the form of funding and organisational structure.
This kind of empirical support for the relationship between social structure and
organisational structure suggests the utility of a general theoretical perspective, which
views organisational structure as a product of a set of interacting constraints, both
internally and externally, which are subject to various degrees of direct control by
organisational members. It would appear that factors over which organisational
members have very little direct control are very important in determining structural
outcomes. This research also concludes on the possible impact of changes in
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individuals and agencies in society who control essential resources, and the
differential rates of organisational response to changes in values and technology.
What this research does highlight is the importance of taking changes in external
constraints into account when attempting to explain differences in organisational
structure.
The structural and open-systems approaches are somewhat barren in their
explanations of organisational members' behaviour. The focus on form and exchange,
while fundamental, merely shows us the rationale of what is on the surface. They are
deterministic in their accounts of the agency attributable to organisational members
and present these as diminished in the face of reified structures. What is needed are
explanatory accounts of societal influences on plural rationalities within organisations.
The contribution of institutional theory has been to highlight the importance of social
rather than just economic rationalities for organisations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977;
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). As in cases of multi-divisional form (Fligstein, 1985) or
corporate bureaucracy (Hinnings and Greenwood, 1989), the adoption of new
organisational structures may be driven as much by peer group mimicry as by
performance maximisation. Institutional theory emphasises the social embeddedness
of organisational action and the tendency towards conformism and isomorphism
between large organisations that dominate any given sector. The paradox of the
prescriptive nature of strategic management theory (Simon, 1948; Mintzberg, 1990) is
that the ability of organisations to make strategic choices is emphasised, yet these
prescriptions, applied uniformly across a sector, lead to a herding tendency with an
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ultimate isomorphic outcome, whereby organisations in that sector look increasingly
alike. The forces towards isomorphism are many: performance norms, transfer of
common norms by informal management associations, formal qualifications, strategic
planning methods (Hurst, 1986; Alvesson, 1991; Gimpel & Dakin, 1984; Mintzberg,
1994). Typically, institutionalists focus on the influence of the state or professions,
but a recent important study of direct sales organisations has also demonstrated the
role of societal ideals of family and ethnicity in organisational integration (Biggart,
1989).
Insightful though the incorporation of social structure might be, institutionalists give it
too dominant a part. They emphasise social pressures for homogeneity rather than
variation, imitation rather than idiosyncrasy (Scott, 1987). Institutional theory is good
at explaining homogeneous strategies but finds it much harder to accommodate
socially inspired resistance to change. Indeed, it ignores the reflexive ability of
organisational actors to comprehend their situation. To explain conservatism that is
simultaneously embedded in and opposed to society, one needs a less overwhelming
account of environment. What is required is 1, the plural and potentially contradictory
nature of social structures and 2, the capacity of actors to draw upon these structures
selectively and creatively. Actors can resist pressures for change from one part of the
social or economic environment by mobilising a selection of alternative norms,
ideologies and resources from other parts. Thus, in terms of Giddens' (1984) 'duality
of structure' society does not only constrain actors to conform, it can enable them to
resist.
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It is this perspective that informs the contextualist concern for processes of strategic
change. Pettigrew (1987:657) explicitly invokes Giddens (1979) when he argues both
that structure and context should be conceptualised ... not just as a barrier to action
but as essentially involved in its production and that aspects of structure and context
are mobilised or activated by actors and groups as they seek to obtain outcomes
important to them. Unlike institutionalists, for whom actors are basically conformist
and society is only a reference point for imitation, contextualists endow actors with an
essential integrity of purpose and propose society as a supplier of diverse means
towards individual, even eccentric ends. Thus the contextualist perspective can
recognise the possibility of resistance to economic rationalities and conservatism that
is at once based on and in opposition to the social environment (Whittington, 1988).
The contextualists' pluralistic and enabling conception of the environment is,
therefore, more sympathetic to a socially embedded account of both strategic change
and resistance to change. According to Whittington (1992), however, the
contextualists have conceived context rather modestly. The focus has been very much
on industry sectors (ie Whipp & Clarke, 1986; Child & Smith, 1987), with only
passing reference to broader social structures (ie Whipp et al 1989). Moreover, the
primary concern has been with how leaders mobilise contexts to bring about
realignment with environments (Pettigrew, 1985a). The issue of how leaders may
refuse to realign has been of secondary interest.
Whittington (1990) combines the contextualists' appreciation of structural diversity
and enablernent with the institutionalists' systematic recognition of broader social
structures (family and ethnicity). Change and resistance to change are thereby treated
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not as an engineering process abstracted from society, but rather as a matter of
successfully enlisting pluralistic social structural principles to causes of either reform
or conservatism: Organisational change is often so dfJIcult because conservative
forces continue to draw reinforcement and legitimacy from a social context barely
touched by change strategies internal to the firm itself(Whittington, 1990:202).
Control over strategic direction will go to those best able both to mobilise necessary
structural resources for political supremacy and to manipulate structural rules that
guide and legitimise action. Drawing on these two theoretical positions, Whittington
(1990) demonstrates how socially entrenched strategic inertia drove two British
manufacturing finns into first crisis and finally takeover. Whittington's focus is on
three sets of social structures: capitalist, familial and ethnic. These structures provided
a diversity of social rules and resources through the tensions both between and within
these structures, the most interesting finding being that managers were able to build
and protect their particular power bases and corporate cultures by exploiting this
pluralistic intersection of structural principles.
Whittington concludes from his research that the practising manager requires not only
institutional emphasis on society but also the contextualist's strong sense of human
purpose, plurality and process. The somewhat faint recognition of purpose, plurality
and process that institutionalists do concede (eg Meyer & Rowan, 1977) needs'
development. Meanwhile, it is a contextualist perspective that offers managers the
best insight into how diverse structural rules and resources can be mobilised in change
processes that are, in practice, full of conflict. However, where the contextualists are
less useful is their neglect of broader social processes which make a difference to
organisational outcomes (Whittington, 1992). What is called for is a more rigorously
structural approach which combines the purpose, plurality and process of the
contextualists with the diversity of institutionalist insights within a single framework.
This framework must be consistent in language and compatible with agency and for
further insight Whittington (1990) turns to Giddens' (1984) structuration theory.
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A structurationist account of managerial agency is founded on the contradictions
within and between different social systems. Giddens' work projects a world that
possesses structure, but is neither so monolithic nor so determined as to preclude
deliberate and effective action. His 'multidimensional' characterisation of the modern
world brings capitalist production together with the issues of ethnicity, gender,
knowledge and the state. Conflicts between these dimensions, and the possibility of
reflexivity and knowledge, open up a space for human agency. It is this concern to
underpin agency by social structure that inspires Giddens' more abstract work on
structuration theory.
To supersede the 'dualism' of structure and agency, Giddens inserts the distinct
concept of 'system' between the two to create an interdependent 'duality'. Social
systems are constituted by the activities of human agents, enabled and constrained by
social structural properties of these systems. Structures define both the rules -
techniques, norms and procedures- guiding action, and the resources - authoritative
and allocative - empowering action (Giddens, 1984: 21, 258). However, while
structural properties make action possible, structures themselves have no reality
except as they are instantiated in activity or retained mentally as remembered codes of
conduct or rights to resources: According to the notion of the duality of structure, the
structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices
they recursively organise (Giddens, 1984:25).
As outcome of their own activity, these structures exercise no necessary dominion
over human actors. Any particular actor confronts a diversity of structures that seem
quite independent of whatever they may do (Giddens, 1985:168). Moreover, the need
for 'ontological' security leads to routinised patterns of behaviour that unintentionally
reproduce the structures of their worlds. Nevertheless, the possibility of agency is ever
present, as we have potential to choose our actions deliberately and carry them
through, even in defiance of established rules and prevailing powers. A diffused
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notion of power is crucial to Giddens' (1984:14) concept of agency: ...to be an agent
is to be able to deploy (chronically in the flow of daily life,) a range of causal powers.
An agent ceases to be such if he or she loses the capability to "make a difference ",
that is to exercise some sort ofpower. Although structures distribute resources
asymmetrically, Giddens (1979:149) nevertheless takes a very strong line on agency,
insisting that all power relations involve some sort of 'dialectic of control'. So long as
actors retain the capacity to refuse, even in suicide, they remain agents.
Giddens provides a theoretical scheme with considerable potential for understanding
managerial agency. Although subject to routine and unintended consequences,
organisations are capable of being governed purposively and reflexively through time.
Their structural properties, the rules of conduct and allocation of resources, are drawn
from the social systems in which their members participate. In line with the possibility
of agency, capitalist structures of resource allocation and conduct are central, but do
not have complete dominion. All organisational members participate in a dialectic of
control that allows them at least the power of defiance. They also participate in other
systems of activity from which they may carry into their firms quite different and
often contradictory structural principles. This availability of alternative structural
principles, combined with the dialectic, makes possible the deliberate and effective
direction of business orgarlisations in contradiction to capitalist rules.
Sewell (1992) critiques Giddens' definition of structure as underspecified and
containing an obscure account of rules and resources. He challenges the emphasis on
empirically observable social practices as comprising the "virtual" existence of
structures. Instead he proposes that it is the principles that pattern these recursive
practices which constitute structures, thereby lending structures their "virtual"
property. This is in accordance with the Realist notion that the natural and social
worlds consist of complex structures independent of empirical evidence (Bhaskar,
1978; [-larre and Secord, 1972).
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The notion of rules is adapted further by Sewell (1992) into that of schemas. These are
defined as not formally stated prescriptions but the not always conscious schemas,
metaphors and associations presupposed by such formal statements. Sewell argues
that publicly fixed codifications of rules are actual rather than virtual and should be
regarded as resources rather than rules in Giddens' sense. Further, given the
conceptualisation of structures as virtual, resources (both human and non-human) do
not sit easily as part of structures. By reformulating structure as referring only to
schemas, then resources must be thought of as an effect of structures.
By incorporating a processual conception of time into Sewell's critique, one can view
public rules as becoming acceptable, routinised and unconscious over time, much in
the same way that a child learns the rules of social behaviour, so that over time non-
human resources may become rules. Put another way, structures can reformulate
themselves by the gradual transformation of resources into schemas. In this way, it is
not just the enactment of the principles (schemas) that perpetuate structures but
additionally the transformation of the subsequent effects of those principles into
further principles governing enactment.
Whittington (1992) proposes an account of managerial agency that exploits Giddens'
insight into organisations' engagement with plural and overlapping social systems. He
argues that the structurationist conception of structural rules and resources offers a
common framework for analysing disparate social influences - political, ethnic,
domestic and professional - on managerial action. The concern for individual agency
widens the research focus from concern for monolithic institutions to include both
their evolutionary processes and tenacious properties. Structurationist acceptance of
conflict and tension gives leverage on the problems of uniqueness and change.
Finally, the relationship of particular actors to society becomes less one of passive
embeddedness, and more a matter of active engagement.
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In a similar vein, Sewell (1992) has proposed five key axioms to show how the
ordinary operations of structures can generate transformations. These are the
multiplicity of structures, the transposability of schemas, the unpredictability of
resource accumulations, the polysemy of resources and the intersection of structures.
Firstly, given the multiplicity of structures at different levels and the conflicting
properties even within a given sphere, agents are capable of applying a wide range of
different and even incompatible schemas and have access to heterogeneous arrays of
resources. It is by active exploitation of the tensions between divergent structural
principles that managers gain their agency (Whittington, 1992).
Second, the structural properties to which agents have access can be applied across a
wide range of circumstances, even outside the context in which they were initially
learned (Whittington, 1992). Therefore agency is defined by Sewell as entailing the
capacity to transpose and extend rules to new contexts. Sewell sees the inherent
knowledge of cultural schernas as characteristic of all minimally competent members
of society.
The third axiom acknowledges that the resource consequences of the enactment of
cultural schemas are never entirely predictable. Thus if the reproduction of schemas
depends on their continuing validation by resources, this implies schemas will be
differentially validated when put into action, and therefore will potentially be subject
to modification.
The polysemy of resources suggests an array is capable of being interpreted in
different ways and therefore of empowering different actors and teaching different
schemas. This is inherent in the definition of agency as the capacity to transpose an
extend schenias to new contexts. Thus agency is the actor's capacity to reinterpret and
mobilise an array of resources in terms of cultural schemas other than those initially
constituted in the array.
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Last, the intersection and overlap of structures allows arrays of resources to be
interpreted in more than one way. The intersection of structures takes place in both the
schemas and resource dimensions. Not only can a given array of resources be claimed
by different actors embedded in different structural complexes but schemas can be
borrowed or appropriated from one structural complex and applied to another. This
second sense of agency is argued by Whittington (1992) as the greater, for here the
issue is no longer one of choosing which is the appropriate rule in particular
circumstances, but potentially of defying immediate system logics altogether.
Managerial agency in the second form is possible because managers have a range of
structural rules and resources by which to inspire and empower their actions. This is
not a wholly voluntaristic position as managers must be able to access these
alternative structural principles. Equally, it is important that those they wish to
influence actually acknowledge the legitimacy of these alternative principles. Thus the
social identities of both influencers and influenced do constrain. There is economic
constraint as well, for if choices over structural principles are to be effective,
managers need to secure for themselves sufficient autonomy or organisational slack.
But as long term inefficiencies in organisations testif', managerial action need not be
directed to capitalist ends. The mobilisation of other acknowledged structural
properties allows the firm to be transformed into a vehicle for realising a much wider
range of socially legitimate values (Whittington, 1988).
2.2.4 implications for management research
In this section a case has been made for a Realist conception of social science to
resolve the dichotomy between choice and constraint in managerial action. In drawing
upon the insights from Giddens' theory of structuration, writers such as Whittington
have utilised the Realist paradigm as a fully explanatory account of the nature of
managerial agency. There are a number of implications for managerial research which
follow from this position. An account of managerial agency based upon plural social
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structures entails a more explicitly sociological commitment by managerial research.
Instead of treating the organisation as a discrete entity within its environment, each
firm and its activities should be examined as the expression of potentially diverse
structural principles. This kind of analysis is also appropriate for idiographic research
into individual organisations (Tsoukas, 1989). It becomes necessary to identify the
intersection within the firm of structural properties imported through multiple
organisational memberships and superimposed by overlapping system boundaries.
The character of key organisational actors needs to be explored, not only in terms of
the internal hierarchy, but also in terms of their positions within and relations to
external structures stretching beyond the organisation itself (Whittington, 1993).
Identification of the firms' dominant structural properties would be the basis for
understanding which pre-existing structures are actually being selected for action, and
which ignored.
Understanding managers' plural social statuses, rather than just their organisational
positions, should enlarge our perspective on issues of organisational leadership as well
as strategic choice. From the structurationist point of view, leadership is not simply a
matter of individual managers' personal psychological qualities but also dependent on
the resources - capital, professional status, ethnic or gender privilege - made available
by their specific social identities. Because in a plural world actors' social statuses
differ, leadership is not a quality that all can equally 'learn'. Managerial qualities to
'lead' are uneven and leadership qualities have no universality. As Tsoukas
(1994:299) writes from a Realist perspective: The causal powers of management
derive their existence from management incorporation into the industrial structure.
They 'reside' in the real domain and, taken together, their logics are contradictory.
The concrete e/jècts of the exercise 0/management causal powers are dependent upon
prevailing contingencies at the organisational or inrerorganisational levels.
Whittington (1993) calls for research into how individual leaders constitute and
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sustain their authority within different social systems, sensitive to variations in
national culture, ethnicity, political context and gender relations.
The structurationist perspective on plural social systems should also enlarge accounts
of strategic choice. More than just decisions of economic efficiency, various strategic
options are informed by and legitimised by differing structural principles: notions of
patriotism in international decisions, different sources of social support on questions
of structural codes of conduct. In this way, managerial agency can boil down to quite
fundamental questions of social identity. Analysis of social structure is therefore as
important as industry structure in understanding managers' choices.
The following sub-section looks at a social trend which changed a system's rules and
is of key importance to the current research. It concerns the rise of the new public
sector management in the UK following the Tory election victory in 1979. This trend
was to prove significant in the management of water companies, particularly after
nationalisation in 1983. A brief review of Pollitt's (1990) work will demonstrate the
validity of a structurationist approach and suggest a framework for research.
2.2.5 the new public sector management
One of the most potent examples of the social 'embeddedness' of organisational'
phenomena in the last decade has been the rise of managerialism in the public sector.
Described as a megatrend (Hood, 1991c), a cluster of public policy authors have
embarked on analyses of the last 15 years of public sector management under the
Conservatives (Pollitt, 1990; Marsh, 1991; Walsh, 1991; Stewart and Walsh, 1992;
Carter, 1991; Hood, l991c; Farnham and Horton, 1993; Ferlie, 1994, 1995; Ferlie et
a! 1996).
Pollitt (1990) writes of the advent of managerialism on both sides of the Atlantic and
its application to the welfare state. It is his work which I shall concentrate on here, for
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although not explicitly structurationist, he draws on a range of social structures in
support of his general argument. By managerialism, Pollitt means the set of beliefs
and practices at the core of which burns the seldom tested assumption that better
management will prove an effective solvent for a wide range of economic and social
ills. He demonstrates how the standard beliefs and practices of management have been
taken up by government in a political context which: .. . was against 'planning' in
favour of the market, and was accorded the highest political priority to the reduction
ofpublic expenditure. Indeed, Pollitt terms these beliefs around managerialism an
ideology in themselves, an ideology which expressed itself in opposing public sector
bureaucracy and unions, and the advo cation of managerialist principles in the public
sector (Kooiman and Eliassen, 1987).
Of interest to the present study is the way in which Pollitt traces the history of
management thought from the late 19th century to the I 990s. In particular, he traces
the consequences of different managerial movements and techniques on the
government thinking of the day. More specifically, Pollitt goes on to propose that the
particular species of managerialism which Reaganite Washington and Thatcherite
Whitehall sought to introduce to the public services in the I 980s had a certain 'neo-
Taylorian' character. In this way he demonstrates how government may invoke the
power of a management intellectual tradition to justify government policy.
As time has gone by, managerialism has become a steadily more prominent
component in policies adopted by right wing governments towards their public
services. The Reagan and Thatcher administrations both came to power expounding
'new right' principles: the idea that government had grown too big, too expensive and
too inhibiting of individual enterprise. The most obvious outcome of this belief would
be cuts in government functions. Some of these have certainly taken place. In
particular, nationalised industries and some of the more capital intensive/less 'face-to-
face' public services (such as BT) have been sold off to the private sector:
Managerialixin i.s' the 'acceptable face' of new-right thinking concerning the state. It is
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an ingredient in the potpourri which can attract support beyond the new right itself
For that wider constituency 'better management' sounds sober, neutral as
unopposable cis virtue itself(Pollitt, 1990). Here Pollitt puts his finger on the
persuasiveness of the managerialist argument. Its attraction of support from beyond
the new-right rests in the logics of capitalism which endows management with a set of
causal powers intrinsically related to its nature. The notion of 'better management',
while appearing neutral, is really concerned with management control, implicit as the
most salient characteristic of management in market economies (Tsoukas, 1994).
As Pollitt points out, given the recent history of public service expansion, the
productivity logic has a power of its own which stands independently of the political
programme of the new right. Yet simultaneously, for new right believers, better
management provides a label under which private sector disciplines can be introduced
to the public services, political control can be strengthened, budgets trimmed,
professional autonomy reduced, public service unions weakened, and a quasi-
competitive framework erected to flush out the 'natural' inefficiencies of bureaucracy.
Thus, the productivity logic, so inherent of managerial control, may be located within
neo-Taylorist inanagerial thinking. To show that such notions had a wide currency,
Pollitt draws on the recent history of public service failures which provided the Tories
with a justifiable context from which to gain electoral support. Moreover, with the
label of management being extricably intertwined with capitalist logics, this is a
compelling foil from which to reassert government influence over the public sector.
Given the diversity of management theories and approaches, the crucial question for
Pollitt (1990:49) becomes that of which strands of managerialism are actually to be
adopted and implemented. A structurationist perspective would seek to understand the
various management practices and thinking which had influenced government policy
and to demonstrate how this was manifest in policy outcomes.
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A framework for research into the effects of the NPM upon organisations and sectors
should have a historical perspective, whereby the structural principles, key
organisational members and the firm's structural properties were set in the context of
both traditional and new public sector systems. In this way, a public sector
organisation would be investigated at two points in time, within the context of
historical changes at the sector and wider societal levels.
In the first instance, the social influences upon the sector level would be explored. The
basic structural principles inherent within the NPM trend and those fundamental to the
traditional public sector management (TPM) would be compared, so that, for instance,
the key social systems of both being located in the intellectual social system, the
dominant structures of academic managerialism in NPM and professionalism in TPM
could be compared. These structures would each have their own unique rules and
resources to draw upon highlighting their different orientations. In order to understand
the political shifts from one system to another, one would need to investigate the
overlapping system boundaries for TPM, eg the political and economic, and to explore
how developments within these systems led to contradictions, both internally and
between each other, which paved the way for a new intellectual system for the public
sector. Additionally, one would be interested in the rules and resources exploited from
other systems to empower or legitimise the institution of the NPM. Ultimately, these
investigations would reveal the differences between the two systems, viz the structural
resources available to act according to particular systems' rules and the particular rules
and practices which gave inspiration to these social systems.
At the organisational level we are interested in key organisational members and the
dominant structural properties of the firm. Key organisational members are not only
important in the positions they hold but also in their relations and positions to external
structures beyond the organisation. So, for instance, how do managers' experience and
affiliations differ under the NPM compared with the TPM? To this might be added
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questions about the management styles these engendered and the resultant working
practices. If leadership depends upon resources, how do leaders from within each
system constitute and sustain their authority? Then at a deeper level, what are the
characteristics of the social identity of the two types of managers which provide the
structural principles to inform and legitimise strategic choice?
Also at the firm level, we need to assess the dominant structural properties called into
play during resistance and/or uptake of the new managerialism. So as the new social
system was proposed, which of its elements were initially embraced or discarded? If
there was resistance to the new system, what structural properties were invoked to
challenge and which contradictions highlighted? Conversely, during the change
period, which structural contradictions were exploited by the change agents and to
which wider social structures did the use of symbolism make an appeal? In this way
one can systematically explore the social structural influences which may contribute
to organisational change and engender resistance. Furthermore, a structurationist
account is conducive to an understanding of social change and its ramifications within
individual organisations.
2.3 Organisations and Time
The emphasis of this research is historical and processual and, as such, the influence
of time is vital. An early interest in the historical development of organisations
appeared in the writings of Chandler (1962) who gave an account of the evolution of
strategy and structure in American business. His key finding that strategy follows
structure is still an issue of debate within management studies. Of less account is any
concern with the effects of the multidivisional structure on power relations, or the
endurance of the multidivisional form despite organisational inefficiencies. In a later
study, Chandler (1977) concluded that the historical conditions which prevailed in the
United States accounted for a pattern of development of managerial capitalism which
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differed from that experienced in other industrialised countries such as Britain,
Germany and Japan.
Several other organisational researchers have noted the importance of history in
determining future organisational actions. Stinchcombe (1965), Kimberly (1979),
Lawrence (1984) and ZaId (1987) argue that an organisation's history is crucial to its
future development and that organisatioris can only be understood in light of their
early phases and subsequent evolution. Selznick (1957) described how early political
and social processes largely determine organisational strategy and patterns of
subsequent activities. Boeker's (1989) research into the founding strategies of semi-
conductor manufacturers and events subsequent to founding showed these original
strategies play important roles in either limiting or encouraging strategic change.
Much of this writing stresses the importance of understanding events, strategies,
political and social processes at founding, and that organisations or industries
perpetuate the characteristics prevailing at the time of their foundation. This research
echoes these calls by investigating two Water Authorities at their formation. If past
organisationa! strategies have a bearing on the present, the logical place to begin an
investigation of the determinants of strategic change is the earliest phase of an
organisation's history, its founding (Romanelli and Tushman, 1986). Directing
attention to an organisation's founding also highlights the importance of history in
determining future actions (Hannan and Freeman, 1977).
Further, in touching on political and social processes Selznick is referring to the
amalgam of concepts known as culture. The importance in understanding the
influence of predecessor organisations in the water industry has been key in this
research and, as such, the influence of culture is of significant interest. In particular,
its importance to organisational history as the seat of memory has been highlighted by
Walsh and Ungson (1991). They note how culture embodies past experience that can
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be useful for dealing with the future. This learned cultural information is stored in
language (Donellon. 1986), shared frameworks (Duncan and Weiss, 1979; Shrivastava
and Schneider, 1984), symbols (Dandridge, 1983: Wilkins, 1983), sagas (Clark, 1972)
and the grapevine (Davis, 1953). The fact that this information is collectively retained
in the transmission process (ie, the sharing of interpretations) is an important aspect of
the retention facility. Information, then, is housed in this supraindividual collectivity
(Douglas, 1986; Halbwachs, 1950/1980). It is this facility for shared information in
the ongoing influence of the predecessor organisations which will prove so significant
in subsequent chapters.
Information about the past can therefore be stored in an organisation (Douglas, 1986;
Kantow, 1987) which has important implications for research into organisational
histories. Earlier theorists postulated organisational memory as embodied in standard
operating procedures (March and Simon, 1958). Later theorists viewed organisational
memory in terms of structural artifacts (eg roles) that, over time, lose their efficacy
and become obstacles to change (Starbuck & Hedberg, 1977). A number of theorists
have attempted to list its contents (Argyris & Schon, 1978; Daft & Weick, 1984; El
Sawey, Gomes & Gonzalez, 1986; Hall, 1984; March & Olsen, 1976).
Walsh and Ungson (1991) take an information processing approach to organisational
memory in which interpretative systems (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Daft & Weick,
1984; Weick. 1979) or beliefs are responsible for differences in organisational action.
The ontological basis underlying Daft and Weick's (1984) concept of interpretation
systems is the oiganisation as a network of intersubjectively shared meanings that are
sustained through the development and use of a common language and everyday
social interactions (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). In this way memory is a concept that an
observer invokes to explain a part of a system or behaviour that is not easily observed
(Krippendort 1975). rather than a variable that is interrelated with other variables to
produce particular outcomes. It is organisational memories, not variables with
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dispositional properties, which have discrete causal effects on, say, structure and
technology.
In Walsh and Ungson's (1991) approach, memory is seen in terms of information
acquisition and to take place at both the individual and collective levels, thereby
accounting for both forms of agency. Further, the structure of organisational memory
is seen to be composed of individuals, culture, transformations, structures, ecology
and external archives. These 'internal bins' vary in their capacity to retain decision
information and the relative sophistication of form which this takes. The significance
of this work is the direct link it draws between memory and subsequent organisational
action, as opposed to the more common attribution of causal powers to situations (eg
roles), objects (eg balance sheets) or events (eg competitor moves). In this way,
memory is placed above these things to occupy a more significant role in the
production of agency. Less clear is the relationship between the individual
'information bin' and the cultural or structural. For instance, memory of administrative
systems may be a mechanism for impounding and preserving knowledge (Jelinek,
1979:162) but what is the process whereby the individual acquires the power of
agency? As Whittington (1988:531) critiques of the Carnegie school's action
determinism: Action is programmed according to past events imposed upon actors by
an uncontrollable environment. In this way choice is constrained because this type of
theorising: . . .fails to interrupt the ineluctable process of its feedback react' systems
by any possibility of autonomous control over either programme or environment. Its
actors possess neither the essential integrity nor the internal complexity capable of
supporting genuine human agency.
Thus, individual actions are explicable purely in terms of the internal states they bring
to their situations and the environmental stimuli generated by these situations. There
is no account for creativity, innovative or conservative choices. Much of this kind of
literature is really historical and behaviourally deterministic, giving neither adequate
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accounts of agency or the wider social context. Moreover, all these studies in their
micro-perspective on history neglect the critical element of time. We are no wiser
about the effects of the rate or pace of change on organisational life, or of the actions
of organisational members through time. Additionally, the emphasis on the constraints
imposed by history lock organisational members into a deterministic past.
What is called for in historical analyses is less of a preoccupation with the content of
organisational action at two points in time (eg at founding and future time), and more
concern with organisational processes through time. A process view of organisational
history needs to recognise and distinguish between temporal modes to account for
Ranson et al's (1980) concern with perspective. For this it is appropriate to consult the
eminent historian Braudel (1973), who has distinguished between three temporal
modes: "eventments", the events, incidents and episodes, the contemporaneous pieces
of flotsam which "blind the eyes" and dominate the present (Braudel, 1981:560);
"conjunctures", the medium term movements of population, trade cycles, transitions
in political domination; and "structures", long-term durations of geographical and
cultural patterns. Thus, in organisational terms one would be as much interested in the
micro-events of decision making and product development as the medium term
developments in industry structure and the long term durations of capitalism and
social culture. What does require emphasis is the interconnectedness of events or the
"dust of history":... little/acts which do it is true, by indefinite repetition, add up to
form linked chains. Each of them represents the thousands of others that have crossed
the silent depths oft/me and endured (Braudel, 1981:560).
This conceptualisation echoes Sztompka's (1991) careful exposition on the nature of
human history. However, he goes further in conceptualising human history as the
combination of everitisrn and developmentalism, thereby arriving at a dialectic he
terms processualism. Here no reified or metaphysical qualities are ascribed to history
and no specific substance. Its ontological existence is located solely in the area of
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events whose causal interrelation and influence on each other produce a pattern or
regularity among them. Moreover, these events are sequentially ordered, linked in
multiple chains of causally related episodes over time. The sequences are cumulative;
earlier episodes leave a residuum, imprints or memory traces, which enter into initial
conditions for later episodes and are passed on in a new context. Therefore the present
is always not merely chronological but linked to the past.
The dynamics of history is explained by the definition of an event, which Sztompka
interprets as an actual manifestation of the social fabric and borrows from Marx,
Gramsci and Lukacs, the term 'praxis'. This is where operation and action meet, the
confluence of operating structures and acting agents, the momentum of the operation
being caused by the actions of social members. As Archer (1986:22) has written of
agency . ....tructure and action operate over different time periods.. .structure logically
predates the actions that transform it and structural elaboration logically post-dates
those actions. History may therefore be seen as an endless sequence of: social events
(Ti) influencing structures and agents (T2) which in turn modify agency (T3) and
result in the potential for changed praxis (T4) and so on, in the incessant cumulative
transformation of society. Continuity is due to the indirect mediation of conditions
produced by earlier praxis as the foundation of later praxis. Change is the gradual
transformation of praxis over time. Braudel's differing temporal modes may now be
seen as arising out of this cumulative process of history.
In adopting a Realist perspective which insists upon the importance of pre-existing
structures, we must also be mindful of their inherent dynamics over the course of
time. Structures, having no reified status, are subject to the influence of agents whose
changed form in turn influence agents and structures. In this way: . .. history loses its
imposing structure as something fir above the mundane realities of everyday life.
Quite simply it is everyday lfe, coalescing in sequential patterns of gradually
growing complexity (Sztornpka, 1991:71).
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Researchers must be sensitive then to the processual, cumulative nature of history, to
the levels of analysis and the differing temporal modes, by which events form
patterns. Whipp (1995) has outlined some examples of the plurality of time at
different levels in the context of organisational change. The implications for
organisational analysis lie in ascertaining the significance of temporal modes or
praxis, about which events make a difference to the long term pattern. The task of the
researcher lies in tracing the interconnections between events and between temporal
modes, thereby ensuring that organisational processes are analysed in context and
through time. The limited cross-sectional nature of what passes for much historical
research has as its chief failing the capacity for distortion, either of the capabilities of
actors, or of the determination of the environment. It is therefore important to be
aware of perspective in the single level study. Researchers must be honest about
sacrificing depth of context for a micro study, or the foreground of action for a macro
analysis and own up to the limitations of their research design.
2.4 Organisational Development
A concern with time must of necessity include organisational development and the
tracing of developmental patterns through time. This section will focus on the
processes of organisational dynamics and with the temporal patterns in organisational
continuity and change. In particular, the punctuated equilibrium model is shown to
have a powerful descriptive and analytical force when combined with a process theory
of history. Next, the role of culture and its subset ideology will be explored as
implicated in the development process. In keeping with a structurationist approach,
the concern will be to assess the explanatory force of the literature and its relevance to
social phenomena.
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2.4.1 continuity and change
In understanding organisational development a theory of organisational evolution is
required. There have been a number of different approaches in the research literature
around the theme of birth, growth, and evolution of organisations. Pettigrew (1979)
notes three approaches: change with organisational size, phases or crises of
development and processes of character formation in birth and evolution. Although
the latter has been covered in the previous section it is intended to focus on the second
approach as well as the development of organisational character.
Greiner (1972) notes the existence of periods of revolutionary and evolutionary
change. Tichy (1983) identified three organisational cycles in a dialectical
relationship. Starbuck (1968) distinguished metamorphic from oscillatory theories,
Mintzberg (1978), Miller and Friesen (1982) and Miller (1982) distinguished quantum
from revolutionary and evolutionary change. All see strategic change occurring in
spurts, revolutionary periods, or quantum leaps, each followed by a period of
continuity. Pettigrew's (1985a) ICI study provided confirmatory data, both of the
waxing and waning of particular strategies in the firm and for the tendency of strategic
changes to occur in radical packages, interspersed with longish periods of absorbing
the impact of revolutionary action and then coming to terms with the fact that further
changes are eventually necessary. What all these authors acknowledge is the fact that
organisations are continually changing (Child and Kieser, 1981). But as Pettigrew
(1986) notes, what such: ...authors do less precisely is to develop a process theory
which links together the periods of high levels of change activity and low levels of
change activity and thus begins to explain the liming, content and real time intensity
of those periods.
A more precise theory of orgariisational evolution is provided by the work of
Tushman and Rornanelli (1985, 1986 and with Newman 1986) who propose a
punctuated equilibrium model in which organisations evolve through convergent
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periods, punctuated by reorientatiolis or recreations which demark and set bearings for
the next convergent period. The value of the punctuated equilibrium paradigm has
been highlighted by Gersick (1991) who draws on six models from diverse domains
which reflect its basic premise. Its value is in reconciling conflicting theories of
organisation environment interactions, particularly the incremental, transformational
and ecological approaches to organisational evolution. Meyer, Brooks and Goes
(1990) have also used the punctuated equilibrium paradigm to explain industry level
changes in the hospital industry.
Convergent time periods refer to relatively long time spans of incremental change and
adaption which elaborate structures, systems, controls and resources towards
increased coalignment. Tushman and Romanelli (1985) show how strategic
orientation, particularly in the new firm is maintained in convergent periods by
alignment with internal activities, thus providing the inertial properties of these
periods. Similarly, Johnson (1988) attributes inertia during incremental strategy
making to the current organisational paradigm. Further, Tushman and Romanelli
(1985) argue, where change is incremental and strategy adaptive, middle management
is seen to be the pivotal force for organising.
Discontinuous change in strategy, manifest in the distribution of power, the firm's
core structure and the nature and pervasiveness of control systems, disrupts the
convergent period to form a reorientation. Reorientations are relatively short periods
of discontinuous change where strategies, power, structure and systems are
fundamentally transformed towards a new basis for alignment. Where middle
management interpolates structures and systems during convergent periods, executive
leadership mediates between internal and institutional forces for inertia and
competitive forces for fundamental change. It is executive leadership which initiates,
shapes and directs strategic reorientations. A reorientation is distinguished from the
more fundamental changes engendered by recreations. This type of discontinuous
next.
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change has more profound consequences for the organisation by changing core values
which govern decision making. Thus reorientations, in punctuating the ongoing
processes of convergence, define the end of one convergent period and usher in the
The punctuated equilibrium model is of value to this research, not only because it
provides a more precise description of evolution, but also because it establishes a
patterned framework from which to orient organisational processes. Even greater
explanatory force for temporal sequencing may be found in wedding this model to a
processual theory of history. Iii this way the founding of an organisation may be
conceptualised as the agential outcome of the influence of social events upon
structures and agents. For example, social interest in entrepreneurism during the
1980s, influenced by Tory ideology and small business investment grants, may well
have inspired would-be entrepreneurs to found their own business. In a similar vein,
organisational continuity will be influenced by the founding experience, such that
entrepreneurial learning and positive experiences may influence subsequent praxis and
result in actions which increase the coalignment of internal systems.
Reorientations could be seen to occur where the interactions of the entrepreneur and
their business produce effects dissonant with outcome expectations, thereby resulting
in the potential for changed praxis and subsequent discontinuous change. A recreation
is change of a different magnitude, involving fundamental shifts in core organisational
values. One could postulate, in this instance, a sequence whereby entrepreneurial
actions in maintaining organisational continuity were changed by a social event such
as new legislation. The threat of legal retribution mobilises a changed praxis whereby
radical changes to organisational systems, and subsequently culture, are implemented.
These changes in themselves effect further changed praxis, thereby reaffirming
changed values.
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2.4.2 culture and organisational development
A developmental model which is explanatory of agency requires a more detailed
investigation into the character and significance of convergent and change periods and
the role of organisational members. Much of the literature in this area has focused on
the notion of culture and ideology, concepts which are helpful in introducing a wider
society into organisational processes. One of the implications of the punctuated
equilibrium model is the 'naturaP tendency of organisations to converge: that is, to
seek stability and incremental change. The change literature makes explicit that much
resistance to organisational change is to the change process itself rather than what it
entails. Clark and Starkey (1988) characterise these as 'slow change models', thus as
Gersick (1991:18) elaborates: The sunk costs incurred during a period of equilibrium
andfears of losing control over one '.s' situation f the equilibrium ends, contribute
heavily to the human motivation to avoid signijIcant system change.
The nature of organisational inertia has been discussed widely in the change literature
in terms of cultural resistance. As Tushman and Romanelli (1985:177) suggest: ...even
a system overcomes its own cognitive and motivational barriers against realising a
needfor change, the networks of interdependent resource relationships and value
commitments generated by its structure ofien prevent it being able to change. Here,
Tushman and Romanelli hint at motivations not purely economic, although these are
located firmly within the sphere of the organisation and the sector. The resistance to
organisational change may be seen in the light of the dismembering of organisational
values, assumptions and paradigms - in effect ideologies or belief systems which
underpin organisational members working practices and working life (Pettigrew,
1986; Jonsson and Lundin, 1977; Starbuck, Greve & Hedberg, 1978 and Brunsson,
1982). It remains to describe the nature of these belief systems with greater analytical
force.
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Culture has been the subject of much interest (Allaire and Firsirotu, 1984; Smircich,
1983) but is an amorphous concept and needs defining and analysing if it is to be used
to explain phenomena more precisely. It has been defined as a learned way of
perceiving, thinking and feeling about problems that is transmitted to members in the
organisation (Schein, 1984). Wilkins and Dyer (1988) define organisational culture as
socially acquired and shared knowledge that is embodied in specific and general
organisational frames of reference: a view consistent with a stance toward culture
developed by symbolic interactionists, such as Becker, Geer, Hughes, and Strauss
(1961), Blumer (1969), Strauss (1959) and Silverman (1970), and reflected in the
more recent writings of Van Maanen (1979a), Louis (1983) and Schein (1984), Barley
(1983), Whipp, Rosenfeld & Pettigrew (1989) and others. Wilkins and Dyer
distinguish between specific and general frames of reference, or situation-specific
frames and general organisationally relevant concerns between groups and the
organisation as a whole. Wiener (1988), in a similar vein, views culture as a shared
value system in which internalised normative beliefs are held in common by
organisational members. Shared meaning is emphasised by Pettigrew (1979) in
defining culture as a system of terms, forms, categories, and images which interpret a
people's own situation to themselves.
2.4.3 ideology
An analysis of cultural forms of expression in organisational development has been
tackled in the management literature in various ways. From an organisational
perspective cultural dimensions have been explored by Ackerman (1984), Deal and
Kennedy (1982) and Sethia and Von Glinow (1985) using two-by-two matrices made
up of organisational variables such as decision-making style, organisational structure,
leadership style and reward system. Johnson (1988) sees it as an amalgam of the
cognitive, cultural and political in organisations. Other writers have borrowed from
anthropology (Pettigrew, 1979; Whipp, Rosenfeld & Pettigrew, 1989) and emphasise
logics oiactioii, language, metaphor and myths.
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Pettigrew (1979) has pointed out the lack of analytical bite in the cultural literature.
He sees an analytical route in cultural analysis by regarding culture as the source of a
family of concepts: symbol, language, ideology, belief, ritual and myth. Under symbol
can be grouped language, ritual and myth, being the most inclusive category. Ideology
is defined after Wilson (1973:91) as a set of beliefs about the social world and how it
operates, containing statements about the rightness of certain social arrangements and
what action would be undertaken in the light of those statements. Clark (1972)
highlights the potential of ideology to reinforce beliefs: Stories about organisations'
histories contain ideological parables that express, enhance and codify beliefs, and
ideologies provide rationales for repeating and embellishing the stories. Dunbar,
Dutton and Torbert (1982:9 1) see ideologies as shared beliefs which reflect the social
experiences in a particular context at a particular time. Ideologies are used to interpret,
evaluate and understand all ongoing activities, so their importance is pervasive. They
make the strong point that: Indeed, ideologies are to social organising as paradigms
are to scientIc practice. Similarly, Pfeffer (1981) and Johnson (1988) describe the
common perception of reality by organisational members as a shared paradigm.
Further, organisational ideologies provide historical continuity in the way they: .. .link
the past and the future, lend dignity to everyday activities, and elicit members'
commitment by transforming formal organisations into beloved institutions (Meyer,
1982:47).
The role of language in supporting shared beliefs has been highlighted (Pettigrew,
1979; Pondy and Mitroff, 1979; Meyer, 1982; Pfeffer, 1981; Whipp et al, 1989).
According to Meyer (1982) organisational ideologies manifest themselves in
linguistic symbols and his research educed ideologies from language in the metaphors
and analogies that organisational members evoked. Similarly, Pfeffer (1981) has
pointed to the professions as an example of the use of specialised language to develop
a common identity in the socialisation process. Whipp et al (1989) make the important
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observation that the implicit rules of order in organisational beliefs are embedded in
language.
Both symbol and language have as one of their key attributes their potential for
compelling action (Pettigrew, 1979). Ideology too can play a significant role in the
processes of organisational creation because it has the potential to link attitude and
action. According to Pettigrew, ideology can mobilise consciousness and action by
connecting social burdens with general ethical principles. The result is that a
commitment is provided to perform everyday organisational tasks on the way to some
grand scheme of things. Pollitt (1991) also argues that ideology can, and often does,
provide the justification for some particular course of action. In a similar vein,
Brunsson (1982) sees ideologies as fulfilling the function of decisions. In doing so
they simplify choice and liberate actions. The interest for this study is the role played
by ideology in organisational development.
2.4.4 ideology and organisational development
Meyer (1982:60) emphasises the advantages of potent ideologies: They engender
devotion, create elan, lend drama, and accord dignity to everyday activities. He goes
on to distinguish their function as an internal gyroscope during tranquil periods, and
as enabling unorthodox manoeuvres during a crisis. Meyer also makes the link
between ideology and organisational structures. Simple structures are accompanied by
harmonious ideologies while elaborate structures are accompanied by discordant ones.
Ultimately his research suggests that coherent ideologies can supplant structures.
The literature suggests that the more heterogeneous an organisation's ideology, the
more likely organisational change will be radical (Meyer, 1982; Friedlander, 1983).
Thus, organisational ideologies act as both inhibitors and precipitors of change.
Jonsson and Lundin (1977) argue that organisations periodically jump from one
predominant ideology to another in myth cycles, and that radical changes have to be
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preceded by and initiated by ideological shifts. Belief in a dominant ideology is strong
under normal conditions and a dominant ideology questioned only during a crisis. As
Johnson (1990) has pointed out, the problems of managing major change are closely
linked to the cognitive and cultural dimensions of an organisation. Wilkins and Dyer
(1988), in distinguishing between revolutionary and evolutionary change episodes,
link these to high and low frames of organisational reference to produce eight patterns
of cultural change.
Ideological change occurs as a result of a combination of externally driven crises,
shifts in leadership and the properties of ideologies themselves (Brunsson, 1982). The
most stable ideologies are those which are vague and widely applicable; sharper, more
definite and particular ideologies are easier to question and eventually debunk in face
of changing reality. Further, an ideological shift has to be completed before radical
action in the change sphere can begin. Thus in Pettigrew's (1985a) study of ICI, he
shows how crucial in the precrisis period, is the process through which the dominating
ideology nurtured in earlier contexts is first challenged and then changed. Therefore,
changing business strategies has to involve a process of ideological and political
change which ventual1y releases a new concept of strategy which is ideologically
acceptable within a newly appreciated context.
A common theme in the literature is of culture as a shared organisational construct
and the product of consensus. This has been criticised by Knights and Willmott
(1987) who argue for a critical study of culture and symbolism. In this way, they
conceive of culture as the precarious outcome of a continuous process of contestation
and struggle. Thus organisational researchers should concentrate their analyses on
issues of power arid control. They utilise structuration theory to show how culture and
symbolism may express asymmetries of power in their meaning. From this
perspective researchers are interested in understanding how, in the production of
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culture, actors draw upon the properties of structure (rules and resources) and, in
doing so, reconstitute both these structures and themselves.
What all these cultural writings allude to but are less clear about is the specifically
social nature of culture. Although defined in social terms, culture is concentrated at
the organisational level. As Whittington (1990:201) points out: Rarely, however, do
these accounts trace the roots of such organisational phenomenon out to their origins
in society at large. Similarly, Willmott (1987), Meek (1988) and Mills (1988) have
variously complained, the foundations of organisational power and culture in such
structures as capitalism or patriarchy are particularly neglected. Wbittington argues
that the failure to recognise the social 'embeddedness' (Granovetter, 1985) of
organisational phenomena has serious implications for the management of strategic
change. It risks underestimating the force of organisational conservatism at the same
time as circumscribing the search for appropriate 'levers' (Tichy, 1983) for change.
Moreover, Whittington (1990) emphasises the plurality of social systems from which
symbolic and cognitive structures are drawn, thereby accounting for the holding of
highly diverse values and beliefs within any one organisation. This view is supported
by Whipp, Rosenfeld and Pettigrew (1989) who see culture as a collective term, but
eschew the notion of homogeneous organisational cultures, seeing it instead as a
collection of concepts which embrace the diversity of expression. Further, they
acknowledge the existence of different cultures within organisations (Gregory, K,
1983; Pettigrew, 1985a; Whipp & Clark, 1986:42).
Whipp et a! (1989) make the important point that culture is more than simply the
conditioning device of much of the change literature. Rather, it has a dynamic quality
as both the shaper of human action and the outcome of a process of social creation and
reproduction. The interactions between the members of an organisation reshape the
structures within which they take place (Knights and Willmott, 1987). Culture thus
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appears not necessarily as a barrier to action but 'essentially involved in the
production of lif& (Dunbar, Dutton and Torbert, 1982; Gregory, D. 1982; Thompson,
1968; Whittington, 1990). The temporal dimension is important here as this
production relies on a 'continuous re-creation of shared meaning' (Jelinek, et al,
1983:335). But in order not to dissolve into historicism a sructurationist perspective is
necessary to acknowledge the possibility of agency via the contradictions inherent in
social structures.
In the context of a structurationist perspective, the aetiology of organisational
ideologies is of particular interest. From which social structures do organisations draw
the inspiration, logics and value systems which inform their particular sets of
ideologies? How are changes in the wider social environment implicated in
organisational change? As has already been made clear, it is the sociological literature
which has made the most attempts to establish cultural links between organisations
and the wider society. Much of the management literature on cultural influences
external to the firm has concentrated at the industry level.
2.4.5 industry and culture
Reynolds (1986) has decried the lack of systematic studies of the factors affecting
organisational culture. He has suggested that one of the key factors to be considered in
studies of organisational culture should be distinctive industry norms: . .. different
technologies and organisational structures... develop in different industries. Relative
success in a given industry may be associated with a distinctive organisational
culture, but may be quite dUferent from the culture found in successful organisations
in other industries. To expect the same sociostructural system, cultural systems, and
organisa(wnal participants to foster success in all industries seems quite naive
(p3 44).
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The significance of Reynolds' work lies in his attempt to account for the diversity of
cultural expression and hence the futility of prescriptive studies on the successful
culture. He is not explicit in suggesting the existence of an industry culture per Se,
rather, he has utilised sociostructural system concepts (Allaire and Firsirotu, 1984),
based on his review of contemporary writings, to arrive at a set of dimensions by
which to test for cultural differences between industries. In this way he has worked
back from the organisation to the industry but has not extended his writing to include
industry-level influences.
Gordon's (1991) central argument is more explicitly industry related. Organisations
are founded on industry based assumptions about customers, competitors, and society,
which form the basis of the company culture. From these assumptions, certain values
develop concerning the "right things to do" and consistent with these values,
management develops the strategies, structures, and processes (forms) necessary for
the company to conduct its business. Otl1er values, which are unrelated to the basic
assumptions, may develop. In order for a new company to survive, both culture and
the forms that it develops must be appropriate to the industry imperatives, and under
these conditions the company's survival and prosperity are limited only by that of the
industry's.
This notion of industry-level culture is supported by the work of Whipp, Rosenfeld
and Pettigrew, (1989) who argue that the concept of culture can be linked to a sector
because if an industry is a collective categorisation of firms, then it is entirely logical
for certain shared beliefs and assumptions to emerge from the relations between
enterprises. This is supported by the work of Grinyer and Spender (1979), Huff
(1982), Spender (1986) and the cognitive based work on strategic groups by Porac,
Thomas and Baden-Fuller (1989), Porac and Thomas (1990). Some authors have
discussed organisational development and change in the context of industry level
developments and the influences from one level to another. Huff (1982) emphasises
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an industry oriented view of strategy in which a pooi of strategic concepts is held by a
group of organisations in common at any one time. Pettigrew (1986) echoes this in
contending that business strategy is likely to be rooted both in idea systems
institutionalised in an industry sector (Grinyer & Spender, 1979) and represented in
the values and structures of powerful groups who control the finn in any sector.
Spender (1989) coined the term 'industry recipe' to account for the behaviour of firms
in three different industries. Not only is the 'recipe' a means of coping with
uncertainty but also part of the overall organisational response to practices,
technology, public policy, legislation, etc. Spender makes the important point that
recipe change occurs because of what happens to companies, not the industry itself,
thereby giving agential primacy to individual organisations. Shortell, Morrison, and
Friedman (1990) offer a different perspective in terms of the impetus for change.
Their analysis of the American hospital industry over a three year period explained
organisational behaviour under periods of rapid environmental change. The findings
of this research show industry level changes to be tightly interwoven with
organisational change and furthermore that the aetiology of organisational recreations
have their genesis in external political and ideological influences. From these
researches one could conclude that organisational change may be instigated at the
industry level but that a change in organisation idea systems required the subsequent
transformation of the organisation. This reinforces the process view of history (section
2.2) whereby an event at the industry level influences the praxis of organisations with
their industry, thereby creating the potential agency for organisational change.
Culture may be seen to serve as a mirror to beliefs prevalent within an organisation's
industry. Industry-driven assumptions lead to value systems that are consistent with
these assumptions, and these value systems prevent the company from developing
strategies, structures, or processes that would conflict with these assumptions and be
"antagonistic" to the culture (Gagliardi, 1986). However, within the context of
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industry assumptions, various compatible strategies, structures, or processes are
available. Thus, the culture is not deterministic of specific forms, but exerts an
influence upon the nature of the forms that will he developed.
The importance of sector research is to draw upon the wider social, political and
ideological influences from which agents may draw resources and inspiration. In
particular, Whipp et al (1989) have emphasised the importance of sector level cultural
features as an important source of alternative cultural traits to a monolithic national
culture. While the study of culture is a useful inroad into the social context of
organisations, nevertheless, current management studies suffer from considerable lack
of explanatory force. The focus tends to be on the nature of beliefs, assumptions and
value systems but little attempt to locate their social structural roots. Rarely do
notions of collective industry beliefs or recipes go beyond the circumscribed nature of
the sector, ie strategies, interorganisational relationships etc. Moreover, the agency of
individual managers is subsumed within the industry belief system. Little account is
given for a plurality of held beliefs or even beliefs held contrary to industry norms. A
structurationist perspective is required to account for industry values, say in terms of
professional codes or social ethics. For beliefs and assumptions to be traced out to
ethnic or familial structures and for recipes in the logics of capitalism. A
structurationist view holds that there can be no reified structure determining change
but that individual managers may face structural constraints. Nevertheless change
(agency) is possible because of the ability of agents to exploit the inherent
contradictions of and between social structures. The diversity of social structural roots
make for a plurality of beliefs as well as the possibility of change.
Whittington (1992) argues that a sociological perspective should add a societal
dimension to current interest in these writings, at both organisational (Johnson, 1990)
and even industrial levels (Spender, 1989). For symbolic and cognitive structures are
not created de novo within particular organisations or industries, but woven from the
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structural materials of local social systems. As a manager's particular status within
immediate social systems defines the symbolic resources at his or her disposal; studies
of organisational culture should, therefore, not be made in isolation from the broader
societies in which they are set, but rather explore the linkages between particular
organisations and the social structural positions of their members.
A meaningful account of the pattern of organisational development has been provided
by a synthesis of a processual notion of history with the punctuated equilibrium model
of change. The character and significance of continuity and change periods is marked
by the powerful influence of organisational culture and its particular expression in
ideology. Ideologies can be seen to derive potential for action from their inherent
dynamics which perpetuate belief systems. A shared ideology has been demonstrated
within organisations and between organisations at the industry level. Ideology can be
seen to be rooted in a plurality of social structures and as part of a dynamic dialectical
process. Thus ideologies are not static and within the context of organisational
development one can posit the trajectory of one or more cultural ideologies over time.
The waxing and waning of ideology must be seen in the context of the social
structural ruled and resources available to managers and their choice to exploit them.
2.5 Organisational Processes
This section is concerned with the micro-processes of organisational life: specifically,
how it is that important signals external to the organisation are interpreted and acted
upon, or not. This subject area brings together organisational environments with the
possibility of action and change, thereby coming full circle in this literature review.
Beginning with some definitions of strategic issues, this section then reviews the
various approaches to this topic and discusses a model for strategic agenda building.
A critique and suggested framework for research follow.
Chapter 2: Literature Review Page 59
2.5.1 strategic issues
Strategic issues are often conceptualised as an emergent property of the environment.
They have been defined as events, developments or trends that have potential
consequences for an organisation (Dutton and Webster, 1988:663). Much like
Braudel's eventrnents, strategic issues may be seen to contribute cumulatively to the
pattern of organisational development aid include opportunities, threats and problems
(Dutton and Ottensrneyer, 1987). Strategic issues are often ill-structured and
ambiguous (Lyles, 1981; Milliken, 1987) and require an interpretation effort (Daft and
Weick, 1984; Mintzberg et a!, 1976). They are external events which potentially have
a significant impact on an organisation's strategy (Ansoff, 1980), to which managers
must respond. In a similar vein Milliken (1990) has defined strategic issues as
environmental change, posing an on-going problem for top level managers. In order to
maintain a stable level of performance, managers must not only notice changes in
their organisational environment but also decide whether those changes are important
enough to merit some adoption in an organisation's strategy or design (Weick, 1987).
The above definitions are representative of teleological models which focus on
designing prescriptive techniques such as strategic issue diagnosis (Dutton et al, 1983;
Dutton and Duncan, 1987a, 1987b), environmental scanning and intelligence
gathering. The concept of strategic issues first appeared during the evolution of
strategic planning. By analysing environmental trends and prospects, forthcoming
developments either inside or outside the organisation could be incorporated into the
annual planning process (Ansoff, 1984). This activity later split from planning
altogether as being either too cumbersome or expensive. At this point strategic issue
analysis became an activity in its own right.
This logical rational approach to knowledge acquisition accords with contingency
approaches (section 2.1.2) for systems and structure to adapt to the environment
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). This is reflected in the prescriptive literature on crisis
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and issue management. This writing has focused on crisis prevention and preparation
(Marx, 1986; Gattorna and Day, 1986; Ramanujam and Venkatraman, 1985; Crane
1987; Miller 1987; Blair, 1986; Uliman, 1986; McDowall and Ladd, 1985), planning
to prevent crises (Tierno and Sonnenberg, 1988; Brandt, 1988; Morris, 1989; Ramee,
1987; Fink. 1986; Beaudoin, 1988; Starks, 1989; Dansker, Hansen, Loftin and
Veldwisch, 1987; Sampson, 1989) and risk assessment (Newman, 1989; Botswick,
1987; Meyers and Langhoff, 1987; Reilly, 1987). These studies usually assume crises
are negative events. This has been challenged by Meyer's (1982:535) study of hospital
reactions to a doctors strike. His crucial finding was that: . ..sudden changes are
ambiguous events that also benefit organisations. By plunging organisations into
unfamiliar circumstances, jolts can legitimise unorthodox experiments that revitalise
them, teach lessons that reacquaint them with their environments and inspire dramas
celebrating their ideologies.
If one accepts Dermer's (1990:70) definition of an issue as 'any proposal for stability
or change about which there is a difference of opinion', this recognition of the conflict
inherent in different interpretations of the environment is useful on two counts.
Firstly, ambiguous information such as state uncertainty is more prone to perceptual
biases leading to differences of opinion. Secondly, cause-effect ambiguity leads to
political maneuverings in organisations with different individuals or groups taking
positions on the alternative possibilities (Pettigrew, 1977). Therefore, any account of
organisational processes around strategic issues must make reference to cognitive and
political processes. The interpretative literature has largely focused on the diagnosis,
interpretation, and processing of issues. This is very much in the mould of
phenornenological and cognitive approaches, whereby understanding, interpretation,
or the process of translating data into knowledge and understanding, should hold a
prominent place in any attempt to understand organisational change or learning (Daft
and Weick. 1984).
Chapter 2: Literature Review Page 61
2.5.2 strategic issue diagnosis
Dutton, Fahey and Narayanan (1983) outline a framework for discussing strategic
issue diagnosis (SID) based on the literature from strategic management, cybernetics
and organisational theory. The critical components of SID (inputs, process
characteristics, outputs) are drawn from systems theory. The outputs of diagnosis
constrain the domain of strategic alternatives, they serve to mobilise behaviour or
political forces towards action and have potential impact on the course of future 	 *
diagnosis. On the input side they note the impact of enduring cognitive maps and
political interest of participants. These cognitive and political links influence the
involvement and motivation of SID participants and the interpretation of issue related
data.
The model suggests SID is a complex process: emergent, dynamic and fluid at the
individual and collective levels. The incessant interplay between these two levels is
captured by characterising SID as recursive, retroductive and hetarachic. Thus
implying a high degree of indeterminancy and non-linearity is inherent. This view of
diagnosis as patterned complexity, is amenable to empirical research provided the
researcher adopts a focus beyond the decision frame.
This systems framework for SID is taken up by Wallace and Cooke (1990) who utilise
the same critical components in an emerging issue diagnosis (EID) model of
accounting regulation. They theorise that the process by which emerging issues are
transformed from an idea to corporate disclosure is dependent on three factors:
assumptions and beliefs, political and economic interests and type of emerging issue.
A further examination of SID was undertaken by Dutton and Duncan (1987b) to
understand how and why organisations respond differently to strategic issues. They
suggest that by understanding the assessment process in SID and their interactions,
one can predict the magnitude and type of change which an issue initiates. Thus, they
draw links between interpretative activities, top level decision-makers and
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organisationa! change. Further, they suggest differences in an organisation's belief
structures and level of resources have a systematic influence on organisational
adaption. These relationships in turn build the foundations for predicting why
organisations respond differently to strategic issues. Dutton and Duncan suggest
organisations with prolonged periods of performance success have a less radical
response to a strategic issue than those which do not experience this success pattern.
They give as an example the American automobile industry's failure to identify the
need to develop small fuel-efficient cars in the late I 960s and 70s.
2.5.3 interpreting strategic issues
Past work has shown that how the top manager perceives a strategic issue affects the
range of solutions considered in an organisation (Billings, Milbume, Schaalman,
1980) and influences the amount of resources committed to a particular project (Staw
and Ross, 1978), and that CEOs primarily interpret strategic issues and act to coalign
the strategy, structure and environment of the organisation to address these
interpretations (Ritvo, Salipante, Notz, 1979). Dutton's (1988b) case study on the
processing of crisis and non-crisis strategic issues found the more an issue is
perceived to be a crisis, the greater the resources devoted to an issue and the greater
the centralisation of authority by top level decision-makers in tasks related to the
issue.
Using categorising theory as a framework, Dutton and Jackson (1987) suggest that
labelling an issue as either a threat or an opportunity affects both subsequent
information processing and the motivation of key decision-makers. This theorising is
supported by Sallivan and Noriaka's (1988) findings about the information processing
approaches of senior American and Japanese executives. Their findings suggest that
the labelling of strategic issues as problems or opportunities, influences the approach
to organisational information-processing instituted by senior executives. They also
found that cultural values are a major influence on Japanese executives' tendency to
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label issues as problems. For American executives the source of labels is less clear.
Labelling may depend on where the issue information originated and how it was
initially described.
Interest in issues is shown to decline with uncertainty and increase with perceived
feasibility of resolution (Dutton and Webster, 1988). This finding is consistent with
the view that decision-makers are opportunists, indicating theorists need to examine
the context in which decision and coalition groups form.
All of these studies reveal how perceptions of strategic issues shape organisational
action. Alternatively, organisational structures have been shown to shape perceptions
of strategic issues. Dutton and Duncan (1987a) have proposed that the strategic
planning process affects the sets of strategic issues that capture decision-makers'
attention, and that the content and form of the strategic issue array, facilitates or
constrains the political and informational dynamics taking place, during the initiation
and implementation of strategic change.
The implications for research from these studies is that the complexity of the agenda-
building process necessitates going beyond decision-making. That research must
focus on the interaction of cognitions, structures and political activities within
organisations. Further, that as these variables are dynamic and in constant interplay,
the emphasis must be on the processes which create agenda-building.
2.5.4 strategic issue processing
Dutton (1988b) discusses SIP from four different perspectives based on her 1986 case
study. These are: SIP as a performance programme, a control process, a channel for
learning and an agenda-building process. The implications of these disparate
perspectives are that it suggests outcomes are not the driving force behind action
taking place in SIP. Instead, the SIP pattern was a product of a complex web of forces
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occurring at different levels in the organisation. This underlines the importance of
process as opposed to outcomes in SIP.
Dutton (1988a) attempted to capture the complexity of these processes around
strategic issues, by formulating an agenda-building model based on the process
whereby decision-makers allocate attention to strategic issues. It is the only
comprehensive attempt of its kind in this area and therefore forms much of the basis
for the subsequent discussion in this section. The model seeks to answer three related
questions:
1. What makes different organisations attend to different strategic issues?
2. How in the same organisation do different issues command different amounts of
attentional resources?
3. What are the implications of the above for managing organisational change?
In this model, the process of attention allocation to strategic issues is conceptualised
as an agenda- building process. Agenda-building refers to the process through which
strategic issues gain decision makers' attention and are legitimised in the organisation.
Through a series of agenda-building episodes, a strategic agenda is built. A strategic
agenda or issue portfolio refers to a set of strategic issues receiving collective
attention. The evidence for allocation would include, naming of an issue, commitment
of managerial time, collection of information about an issue and that individuals are
able to converse about issues.
The agenda-building model draws on insights from theoretical treatments of attention
allocation to issues from a diverse set of literatures. These tend not to treat the
question of how issues first gain attention but assume rational criteria such as costs
determine attention allocation. The agenda building view departs from these
conceptions through the recognition that some issues are more socially acceptable
than others, Ic legitimacy forces constraint. It also highlights the interdependence
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existing between attentional events related through cognitive and political links. This
is expressed in the model by arguing that the inclusion of a strategic issue is affected
by the set of issues already under consideration.
2.5.5 the agenda-building model
The model assumes all organisations attend to a limited issue set. The agenda is a
structure which limits and orders the array of issues for top-level decision makers. The
fundamental proposition of the agenda-building model is that an issue is placed on the
strategic agenda when an individual is aware of an issue and interested. This
involvement is indicated by the amount of personal resources they are willing to
expend. Further, as top-level decision makers strive to maxirnise their legitimate
power, it is the high-exposure interest consuming issues that have the greatest
potential for demonstrating their abilities. Allocating attention to issues may be
manifest as a formal committee, departmental agendas, or public statements about the
issue etc.
The question is, what conditions increase or decrease the levels of issue interest and
exposure? The model proposes that the organisational context influences agenda
placement through its effect on the issue context. Thus any episode of agenda-
building is an-issue-in-an-organisational event and any outcomes relate to forces
operating at both the issue and organisational level.
The issue-specific context
The model implies that the probability that any particular issue will be placed on the
strategic agenda depends on the conditions of three factors at any one point in time:
1. a strategic issue gains force (interest and exposure) through the combined effect of
perceived attributes of an issue (issue salience) and
2. the political foundation of an issue (issue sponsorship), while
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3. the size and variety of items already on the issue agenda (agenda structure),
moderate whether or not these factors translate into awareness and interest in an issue.
These three factors are considered to be interactive (Fig 2.1).
Fig 2.1 Dutton's (1988a) Model of Strategic Agenda Building
An issu&s salience is related to a variety of issue characteristics. In this case, Dutton
(1988a) has chosen magnitude, abstraction, simplicity and immediacy, which affect
levels of exposure and interest. The perception of issue characteristics change as new
information and new interests define an issue in a different light. This subjective
nature contributes to the fluidity of the definition over time. Thus it is expected that
the meaning and significance of issues will change over time as they become targets
for debate, manipulation and politicisation.
Issue sponsors play a major role in building the organisation's agenda. Certain
individuals become attached to strategic issues which helps to intensify' interest or to
gain issue exposure, translating their concern into action. A sponsor's efforts are more
likely to be successFul if they are strategically located and have personal credibility.
Issue sponsorship and issue salience are likely to be closely related to one another. For
instance, those issues which are strongly promoted are more likely to be viewed as
higher in magnitude, abstractness, simplicity and immediacy. Further, an interactive
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effect occurs, where the act of issue sponsorship is likely to alter a decision-maker's
perception of an issue's characteristics. Thus, issue sponsorship and issue salience,
jointly and interactively, determine the level of interest and exposure directed towards
an issue. Both of these effects are dependent on the number and variety of issues
currently receiving attention in the organisation, ie the agenda structure.
The entry of a new issue onto the strategic agenda is facilitated or constrained by the
form or structure of an organisation's agenda at the time an issue is initiated; The
probability of placement is related to the size and variety of issues. Any time a new
issue reaches the agenda, it modifies the agenda structure operating during the next
agenda-building episode.
The process of agenda building is dynamic over time, making each new episode
contingent on the past. This means that by altering the agenda structure, an issue
sponsor can play a major role in the allocation of attention by top decision-makers to
future strategic issues. Also, the incorporation of a new issue cannot be understood
apart from the array of concerns that the organisation has already faced. Dutton's
hypotheses on the probability of agenda placement, focus on issue specific
characteristics and events, allowing prediction of how in the same organisation,
different strategic issues command differing amounts of attentional resources. To
predict organisational differences in issue attention, one must consider the
organisational context in which agenda building takes place.
The organisational context
This refers to the unique pattern of beliefs, values, resources and roles which influence
agenda building through their impact on issue context. The effects of the
organisational context are seen to be manifold and complex. Dutton illustrates her
point with the two organisational characteristics of strategy and culture.
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The organisalion possesses a strategic frame (Huff, 1982) or strategic umbrella, by
defining some issues as major, immediate and simple, while others are minor, long-
term and complex. The organisation's strategy poses a strategic requirement
(Hambrick. 1981), making some issues easier to concentrate on and others easier to
ignore. Strategy exerts an influence on agenda placement through its effect on issue
salience.
Organisational culture is defined as the set of shared beliefs and values of
organisational members. Culture plays a role in determining the variety of issues
included in the strategic agenda at any one point in time. Where culture is strong (high
consensus). agenda structure is likely to be less varied. As a result, any new strategic
issue gains rapid agenda status if consistent with the dominant concern of the
organisational culture, but not so if it departs from the dominant shared view. Thus,
organisational culture has influence through its role in determining high or low-
variety agenda.
2.5.6 implications of the agenda-building model
The implications of an agenda-building view are both theoretical and practical. The
strategic agenda-building (SAB) perspective implicitly assumes each new strategic
issue is dependent, in part, upon the set of issues already under consideration. Thus
researchers must understand the portfolio of issues already confronting decision-
makers. The model explains a bias towards incremental change in organisations by
uncoverin g the forces at work in problem setting. It implies the theoretical treatments
of adaption and change must consider how organisational and environmental
pressures translate into a particular issue context. In order to understand why
organisations initiate unique responses to the 'sam& strategic issues, one must
consider how the salience of an issue, issue sponsorship and agenda structure interact
to enhance or diminish attention to this environmental event.
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The components of the agenda-building model affect the political and cognitive forces
at work in shaping the strategic process. In this way the model is consistent with
attempts to wed these two forces to explain organisational change processes. It is
proposed that members can implement change by managing agenda-building, either
by increasing the probability of attention, or decreasing the probability of agenda
inclusion. This can be done by modif'ing an issue's salience, modifying issue
sponsorship or modifying the agenda structure. This is, however, a restricted account
of agency, being limited to the issue context with very underdeveloped links into the
organisational context. The model requires further development to include the
personal and organisational resources of sponsors which grant them causal powers,
and the alternative intersecting structures to which they may have access for resources
to act. Finally, more research is required to elucidate what it is that sponsors do to
modify salience, sponsorship or the agenda structure and whether there are similarities
of process between them.
The SAB model is a useful basis for conducting research into strategy which is both
contextualist and processual (Pettigrew, 1 990a). It allows for what Pettigrew has
described as vertical and horizontal levels of analysis. Thus, the model's explanation
of phenomena at the vertical level derives from the interonnectedness of dimensions
between the issue and organisational contexts. While the horizontal or temporal level
is best illustrated by the influence of the past and present agenda structure. The model
also goes some way to explaining the nature of causation about change, illustrated by
the management of agenda-building by organisational members.
The model of SAB was however, limited to two contexts: the issue and organisational,
whilst assuming their interdependence. This analytical separation is less useful for
research seeking to understand the whole organisational context. Also, the focus on
the issue context, as instrumental in predicting the amount of attentional resources
given to a specific issue is unproven. This implies conducting research which
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considers both contexts simultaneously. Further, the emphasis on prediction in the
model means there is little attempt to describe the process of agenda-building.
Dutton's analysis of issue context is more developed than the organisational context
which remains largely untheorised. The organisational context has the potential for a
vast array of variables such as structure, resources and operations, in addition to those
of strategy and culture proposed by Dutton. This enormous complexity, while no
doubt representative of organisational life, presents an onerous task for the researcher.
There is, therefore, a requirement for developing key links between the organisational
and issue contexts based on empirical research and theorising. In this way, the
researcher can hone in upon those organisational phenomenon which have the greatest
potential to make a difference.
This has more recently been attempted by Dutton and Penner (1994), who see the
interpretation of strategic issues being causally linked to the organisational context.
They utilise the cognitive and political dimensions in the notion of organisational
identity, described as: . . .sets of attributes thai individuals believe others share in
distinguishing one work organisation as a social group from another (p95). In this
way organisational identity becomes part of the belief system around organisational
culture. The limitations of this approach lie in its implications for agency. The
motivation to act on an issue is assumed to be directly related to issue perceptions
which are in turn influenced by organisational identity. A more direct link is also
posited between organisational identity and agency in the meaning which
organisations give to individuals as social beings. This places agency solely within the
remit of a homogeneous organisational context. No account is given of a plurality of
held beliefs within an organisation, nor of the social structures which give rise to
them.
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The SAB models preoccupation with prescription does not account for the influence
of maj or organisational change on the strategic agenda, nor distinguish between high
and low level changes. By the same token, there is no distinction made between issues
implicated in change and those on the periphery. For instance, might there not be a
discernible pattern to issues in the long term? There is a need for accounts of the long
term trajectory of strategic issues, and likewise, a need to describe some of the key
processes of agenda-building in order to bring out the richness of organisational life.
How, for instance, are strategic issues promoted and suppressed? From where do
individuals draw their power to set an organisation's agenda?
By far the greatest failing of this kind of model-building is its fixed location of
phenomena at the organisational level of analysis. Nowhere is there any attempt to
propose wider external influences upon this model. Indeed, its positivist construction
renders such notions as too complex to allow any predictive validity. In the context of
this study a structurationist approach would take the useful conceptual contributions
of this model: the political and cognitive dimensions, the agenda management process
and the historical development of the agenda; and show how they might be grounded
in a multi-contextual, processual framework. In the first place, the SAB process must
be seen over time and in multiple contexts. This type of approach is particularly suited
to idiographic studies (Tsoukas, 1989).
Secondly, the search for causation must be abandoned in favour of a Realist emphasis
on the generative mechanisms and causal tendencies of social structures. Bhaskar's
(1978) conception of action (section 2.1.2) implies research that is grounded in
sociological, political, cognitive and organisational theories. This necessitates an
interdisciplinary approach to understanding organisational behaviour. Also, an
emphasis on a plurality of held beliefs by decision makers and, as a consequence, of
issue interpretation, makes the necessity of exploring a diversity of social structural
influences. En particular, the role of organisational culture and ideology in agenda
Chapter 2: Literature Review Page 72
building would seek their social structural roots out in the industry and wider social
environment.
Third, the organisational processes of SAB must be seen as having their own temporal
dimension which may or may not align with those of the external environment giving
rise to strategic issues. These multiple temporal modes must be accounted for
alongside the rise and fall of strategic issues on and off the organisational agenda. For
instance, the failure of some companies might be explained in the mis-match between
environmental signals and the dominant agenda issues. The content of strategic issues
must also be seen in a wider context, not only of the current agenda, but the related
issues of the day. For instance, to use a previous example, the requirement of public
sector organisations to provide 'value for money' has to be seen in the context of the
New Right ideology of the Thatcher government. In view of the above, a research
strategy might be to either explore one strategic issue over time, or a cluster of related
issues. A more adventurous study could examine the whole of the strategic issue array
over the long term.
2.6 Conclusions
In this review a theoretical approach to the study of organisations, derived from
Giddens' concept of structuration and Bhaskar's Realist paradigm has been posited.
This approach takes as its premise a view of organisations as historical, social,
evolving and intentional. A research outcome is suggested which is concerned with
documenting and providing explanatory force for patterns within and between
organisational. contextual and temporal processes.
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The role of organisations in society is conditioned by a plurality of social structures
which lend them their purpose in the intersection of the rules and resources they
provide. It is this configuration of structural properties which grant organisational
members agency, alongside the rules and resources which they themselves bring to
the organisational context. At both collective and individual levels, then,
organisational members have a plurality of structures from which to make choices
about action. That there is a tendency for actions to become routinised is seen as one
manifestation of the dynamics of action in organisational life. Here rule enactment
serves to perpetuate those rules by granting them legitimacy. Further, the effects of
rule enactments may embody reinforcing resources which accumulate over time to
support and shape the organisational context. That routines are broken, often by
outsiders, gives credence to the existence of alternative social structural sources of
choice and to the tenacity of established ideas in an institutional context.
The importance of studying organisational histories has been highlighted, in
particular, in conceptualising temporal patterns in ways amenable to the conduct of
research. A processual approach is alert to the cumulative nature of history, that is, to
the way in which unfolding events accumulate, add significance and transform
phenomena (structures and agents) thereby changing the nature of agency and hence
praxis (events). Social research must document the dynamic nature of history and be
mindful of the ongoing process of change in the temporal dimension. Organisations
have their own internal dynamics and exhibit varying patterns of continuity and
change. The documentation of these developmental patterns is seen to be facilitated
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by the use of a punctuated equilibrium theory of change. Here, one might distinguish
between degrees of change and periods of relative continuity.
Organisational culture stands out in the decision making and change literature as
crucial to organisational development: most notably that subset of culture known as
ideology, or the organisational belief system, which so underpins action.
Organisational ideology is seen to have its aetiology in multiple contexts, both
external and internal to the firm. In particular, the importance of the sector context in
ideological expression deserves examination. In this way ideology is a force for
cohesion and rule interpretation within organisations, arising out of a synthesis and
expression of beliefs which draw their inspiration from diverse social structural rules
and resources. It is the very changing nature of social structures and individuals within
organisations which make possible a plurality of ideological expressions as well as the
wholesale transformation of organisations.
An organisational activity at the heart of decision making and change is strategic
agenda building. The process whereby organisations decide, debate and actively
pursue their destinies. A research design was suggested which traced the trajectory of
one or more strategic issues over time, where the emphasis was not on prediction but
of explanation, less on model-building than on patterned dynamics. The aim is to
locate the agenda-building process in modalities of structuration.
In the search br an understanding of organisational phenomena, it matters little where
one starts: he it organisations interacting with their environment, organisational
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change, or the interpretation of strategic issues. A structurationist perspective within a
Realist paradigm that is faithful to context and process will provide explanations
pertinent to all areas of enquiry. The present research draws on these theoretical
insights to propose a study of organisational phenomena which is historically,
processually and contextually connected. The aim is to document patterns within
multiple contexts, between contexts and over time, and to provide explanations which
ground phenomena in the generative mechanisms of their production.
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3. METHOD
3.1 Introduction
This research has been conducted under the broad banner of the qualitative tradition
within the social sciences. A tradition which has gained increasing support in recent
years as a counter to the disquiet felt with the positivist scientific tradition
(Mintzberg, 1979; Tsoukas, 1989; Silverman, 1994). The assumption that the logic
of hypothesis-testing is the primary basis of scientific enquiry (Glaser and Strauss,
1967) does not travel easily to the social sciences where social scientists: . . . have to
bear in mind that social variables are intrinsically more dffi cult to isolate and test
(Silverman, 1985). This is not to say that positivist methods have no role to play in
data gathering and analysis, just that their appropriateness is circumscribed by the
phenomena under study and levels of analysis. This last reveals the author's
epistemological bias, in which structures of the social world exist independently of
our knowledge of them. This realist perspective (Bhaskar, 1978) has also been
strongly influenced by interactionist approaches in the tradition of Weber (1947)
and Mead (1928) with their concern for the interpretation of meaning and
ethnomethodology's (Garfinkel, 1967) interest in everyday practices which order
social relations.
Specifically, the method adopted here derives from the more recent tradition of
process research in strategy (Chakravarthy and Doz, 1992; Pettigrew, 1992). Here
is included the longitudinal field research on organisational change, with its
contextualist theory of method, advocated by Pettigrew (1990a) at Warwick and the
innovation studies of Van de Ven et a! (1989) at Minnesota. In the best tradition of
qualitative research the strategy employed has been both iterative and
developmental. Rather than imposing a theoretical framework from the start, being
open to what the site had to say was deemed as most important (Glaser and Strauss,
1967). This did not mean operating in a vacuum, rather, a tentative framework was
Chapter 3: Method Page 77
created with propositions, which informed the initial research strategy. Being open
to what the data had to say also meant being flexible (Silverman, 1985) and
therefore prepared to change direction as the emerging data dictated. The
respecification of the research problem meant that the programme was not a linear
progression from fact-fmding to analysis. A forwards and backwards motion from
data to analysis, and back to the data again, more adequately describes the process.
In setting out this chapter I first discuss the epistemological underpinnings which
have informed my approach. I then go on to review the key issues of contextualism.
There follows the propositions and an account of the research strategy. The rest of
the chapter is then devoted to an in-depth discussion of the steps taken, their timing
and sequence.
3.2 Epistemological Underpinnings
The approach taken here to understanding knowledge derives from the philosophy
of phenomenology (Husserl, 1973) and expressed as a sociology of knowledge
(Berger and Luckmann, 1965). Here society is conceived of as an ongoing
dialectical process involving three moments of externalisation, objectivation and
internalisation. In this way, individuals create and are in turn created by society in
an eternal dialectic. The dissemination and acquisition of knowledge is social and
determined by history, via objectification in a dialectical process. This epistemology
has important implications for the conduct of research: not least that such a view
makes reality something constructed by particular societies and offers no basis on
which it can itself be validated (Trigg, 1991). If we are not to collapse into
subjectivism and ultimately solipsism, a realist conception of the world is necessary.
Thus a multiparadigm perspective is adopted (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Gioia and
Pitre, 1990), whereby an analysis of human consciousness with the assumption of
dialectical processes of socialisation (Interpretivist) is coupled with a functionalist
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paradigm. If one concedes that the boundaries between paradigms are blurred then
their conception as transition zones (Gioia and Pitre, 1990) to be bridged is
facilitated by the use of second-order concepts (Van Maanen, 1979a). The most
useful bridge between the interpretive and functionalist paradigms falls under the
rubric of structurationism (Giddens,1979) or Realism, which elsewhere is denoted
as a paradigm in itself (Bhaskar, 1978; Tsoukas, 1989).
In brief, structuration theorists focus on connections between human action (in the
form of structuring activities) and established organisational structures. Proponents
of this theory do not treat structuring as separate from structures; they consider
social construction processes together with the objective characteristics of the social
world. Simultaneously they recognise that although organisation members use
generative rules to produce organisational struëtures, such structures serve to
influence and constrain the structuring activities themselves (cf. Tsoukas, 1989 for
an example). Structuring and structures are thus placed on equal footing by showing
how social structures emerge from structuring activities and become external and
influential on subsequent structuring processes. Structure is therefore conceived
simultaneously as: . . .a flow of ongoing action and as a set of institutionalised
traditions or forms that reflect and constrain that action (Barley, 1986). Hence
structure is both the medium and the outcome of interactions (Giddens, 1979).
Structurationism serves as a means of bridging a gap between subjectivist and
objectivist views of related notions. It does this specifically via the notion of
modalities of structuration. A modality represents the individuals appropriation of
structure for use in a particular action context. The very appropriation of the
structure acting to reproduce itself. Structuration thus occupies an intermediary
position on the subjective-objective continuum and spans the interpretivist-
functionalist transition zone. Thus structuration resolves an apparent paradox
between action and structure (Poole and Van de Yen, 1989). However, it may also
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introduce other problems, such as the unclear conceptual status of modalities of
structuration (Poole, 1985). Archer (1982) has critiqued structuration on precisely
these grounds, arguing that modalities are complex constructions with obscure
empirical references. Giddens' (1979) own recommendations were few, beyond an
artificial separation of analysis of strategic action from the analysis of social
structure.
As Van de Yen and Poole (1989:575) argue: . . . the complexity of organisations
guarantees that theories cannot give a complete representation. However, there is
great potential to enliven current theory and to develop new insights if theorists
search for and work with inconsistencies, contradictions, and tensions in their
theories, and in the relationships between them. The difficulty of empirical
verification of modalities of structuration calls for a methodology which accepts
complexity, the partiality of truth and reflexivity. This implies a holistic and
multifaceted approach to organisational phenomena. Poole and Van de Yen (1989)
suggest clarifying levels of analysis as one of four different modes of working with
paradox in theory. Whittington (1992) has suggested adopting the institutionalist's
perspective of concern with the wider social influences on the firm, alongside the
structurationist's concern for individual agency. This combination of acceptance of
structural conflict and tension with the stress on structural diversity stored as
memory traces, avoids the conflation of action and structure by: .. .considering not
only structural properties actually mobilised, but also those left donnant
(Whittington, 1992:704). In separating the enacted system from the structural
potential one glimpses agency by insight into what might have been.
The theory of method implied by these epistemological assumptions is that of
contextualism derived from the work of Pettigrew (1985b). Broadly, this approach
falls under the rubric of qualitative research. Although the term qualitative has been
seen as a type of evidence rather than as a research design (Yin, 1984), much has
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been written under the term which encompasses all facets of methodology
(Mintzberg, 1979; Jick, 1979; Van Maanen, 1979b; Miles, 1979; Piore, 1979;
Manning, 1979; Silverman, 1985, 1994). What distinguishes these writings from
contextualism is a lack of emphasis on time and dynamics (Pettigrew, 1992) in
organisations. More recently (Pettigrew, 1992), this interest in dynamics and time
in the strategy field has focused on process research. The underlying assumptions of
this approach are of strategy as process rather than a state, with the emphasis on
renewal and growth. All suggest a concern for action and movement in the analysis
of the firm. The contextualist method which is the analytical foundations of this
study's approach will be discussed, followed by an account of this processual
research.
3.3 Contextualism
This theory of method conceives of the understanding of phenomena as holistic in
nature. More specifically, phenomena are analysed on multiple levels, or vertically
(processually), and horizontally. The vertical level of analysis is concerned with the
embeddedness of phenomena within macro and micro societal levels. Thus
organisational analysis would be concerned with at least three levels: the wider
social context, the industry level and internal organisational structures. The
horizontal level is concerned with both content and action. Thus organisational
analysis is concerned with both the content of strategic plans and how these are
formulated. Holism is achieved with the overlay of the horizontal upon vertical
levels of analysis, the two being interconnected through time. It is the temporal
dimension which gives the research its truly three dimensional character. In this
way one is approximating as closely as possible the capturing of Realism in social
phenomena.
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Pettigrew (1985a) outlines five prerequisites for contextualist analysis with key
assumptions derived from the conception of holism. Firstly, because phenomena are
studied in the context of interconnected levels of analysis, the researcher must
clearly delineate these levels. Secondly, the importance placed on temporal
interconnectedness requires a clear description of the processes, both historically
and in the future. This involves the use of language appropriate for the description
of dynamic systems as well as capturing change and action in relief, against the
ground of structure and constancy. Third, processual analysis requires a theory or
theories to account for the process, part of which requires the specification of the
model of persons and society underlying research. Fourth, the role of context and
action as conceived within a structurationist framework require the explicit linking
of structure and process. Thus the researcher must move from unidimensional to
multidimensional theorising about ongoing dialectical processes of structure and
context and the roles of individuals within this multifaceted reality. Fifth, causation
being neither linear nor singular but multiple and interconnected, explanations for
phenomena are sought at the level of convergent interactions and interconnected
loops. Thus causal reality is explained via an appeal to higher order or system level
concepts.
The practical achievement of these ends for the researcher is not easy and has
crucial implications for procedure, data collection and analysis. Before embarking
upon an in-depth discussion of these matters, the next section outlines the
propositions for this research as they have arisen out of an analysis of the literature
(chapter 2). The remainder of the chapter will discuss the key steps taken to employ
the contextual method in action.
3.4 Propositions
A set of generic propositions and questions were derived from the literature
concerning the two principle topics of investigation: strategic agenda building and
Chapter 3: Method Page 82
organisational continuity and change. These are listed along with relevant sets of
questions:
3.4.! strategic agenda building
1. SAB is a dynamic organisational process and must be understood within a diverse
multi-level context.
1.1 Therefore the issue context is interdependent with the organisational context.
What are the key links between the organisational and issue contexts?
What features of intra organisational context would one have to change in order to
increase or decrease the degree of issue receptivity in a particular setting?
1.2 A key intra organisational contextual feature must be the relationship between
issue sponsor and the organisation.
What are the important inherent features and actions by an issue sponsor in
increasing or decreasing the degree of issue receptivity in a particular setting?
2. The temporal dimension of the agenda structure must be an important influence.
What has been the size of the formal strategic agenda and the variety of issues
occupying it over time?
How has this process of agenda shaping developed over time?
2.1 Individual strategic issues will exhibit a career or trajectory over time.
How can one account for the particular trajectory of any one strategic issue?
3. The outer context will be an important influence as it links to the organisational
context.
What are the links between the outer context and the organisational context?
What features of the outer context are responsible for increases or decreases in the
degree of issue receptivity over time?
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4. The differences in the career and trajectory of issues between firms are likely to
be explained in terms of the above propositions.
3.4.2 organisational change
1. Organisations exhibit patterns of continuity punctuated by change events in an
ongoing process of evolution.
How can one account for particular patterns of development between organisations?
What was the rate and pace of change?
What were the important intra organisational and outer contextual influences over
time?
2. Processes of strategic agenda building are implicated in and affected by periods
of organisational change and continuity.
3.5 Research Strategy
The methodological approach adopted here meant that the research strategy did not
follow a logical sequence from research question, data collection, analysis and
output, characterised by positive methods. A much more iterative, reflexive series
of activities occurred as the researcher adopted an open stance to the data and was
attuned to the possibility of revision in the work. For clarity of reading, the
research process has been divided into discrete sections. It must be stressed that
each activity was dependent upon and infringed upon the other, so that, for
instance, the selection of a site involved data collection and written outputs aided
analysis as well as suggesting other data. The research strategy is described in the
following sequence:
3.6 Research method
3.7 Research parameters
3.8 Data collection
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3.9 Analysis
3.6 Research Method
3.6.1 strategy process research: comparative case study method
The contextualist theory of method has been employed by means of the comparative
case study method (Pettigrew, 1990a). Many of the criticisms of the case study
method have been based upon positivist assumptions of validity, reliability and
replicability as being problematic in this form of research design. The
methodological role of the case study has been as a precursor to further quantitative
data collection and analysis. Thus, the case study is most usefully depicted as a
means to suggest hypotheses, interpretations and empirical uniformities (Platt,
1988). The case study under these premises is relegated to the pilot study, trial or
demonstration project, prior to the main study taking place (Platt, 1988). As
Tsoukas (1989) makes clear, for realists, the above views of the role of case studies
in social empirical research are limited because they are based on the assumptions
that (a) the ultimate objects of knowledge are atomistic events, which constitute
facts apprehended by sense-experience, and (b) event conjunctions are the raw
materials for theory building. Consequently, any empirical regularities are fused
with the causal laws underlying them. Therefore, it is naturally concluded, that
since case studies by their very nature cannot point at any extensive regularities,
they are, as far as explanatory knowledge is concerned, epistemologically inferior.
By contrast, within the realist paradigm, explanatory idiographic studies are
epistemologically valid because they are concerned with the clarification of
structures and their associated generative mechanisms, which have been
contingently capable of producing the observed phenomena.
The comparative case study method was also chosen as it ideally suited the topics
under investigation. The understanding of micro organisational processes of
strategic agenda building and change required a method which captured the rich
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detail of organisational life within a multi faceted context. Comparative case study
analysis allows for intensive investigation of organisational phenomena, by
providing the opportunity to examine continuous processes in context and to draw in
the significance of various interconnected levels of analysis. Thus there is scope to
reveal the multiple sources and loops of causation and connectivity so crucial in
identifying and explaining patterns in the process of change and transformation.
This support of idiographic organisational studies goes beyond purely qualitative
descriptions and pattern seeking in data. Instead a realist approach is concerned with
what has produced the phenomena under study, what are the structures, the
generative mechanisms and the contingent factors responsible for the observed
patterns. This is similar to Pettigrew's (1990a) enjoinder to be mindful of the
"what", the "how" and the "why" of phenomena. Within a contextualist framework,
the realist paradigm is enhanced by the specification of levels of analysis within
which generative mechanisms may reside. In this way the researcher seeks to
postulate tendencies, rather than ironclad laws, which may or may not manifest
themselves in the empirical domain. From a contextualist perspective tendencies
may be seen to reside in the vertical levels of analysis. The overlay of the horizontal
level gives these tendencies their dynamism and indicate where indeterminate
outcomes are the product of a contingent link of a set of causal powers.
3.6.2 historiography
The contextualist method dovetails neatly with historical perspective (Lawrence,
1984) and historiography in its emphasis on the temporal dimension in multiple
contexts. In beginning with general questions rather than a theory, this method
borrows from historiography (Goodman and Kruger, 1988). The process of
historical research according to these authors involves four steps:
1) Evidence from both primary and secondary sources is examined and
authenticated.
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2) Its informational content is analysed.
3) Its suitability as evidence supporting or refuting an interpretation is evaluated.
4) The researcher then determines if these sources can be woven into an argument
answering the question at hand.
Historiography therefore includes the body of techniques, theories, and principles
associated with historical research, but as with historical perspective (Lawrence,
1984) need not be restricted to producing 'history' rather it informs the present. In
expanding research horizons the temporal dimension can provide alternative
explanations of phenomena. Lawrence (1984) argues that historical perspective
allows researchers to sharpen their view of the present as opposed to history which
concentrates on understanding the past. It does this in two ways: by elucidating
those elements in the findings or theory which are transhistorical and the time
period over which findings and theory may be generalisable. Thus historical
perspective becomes a way of distinguishing between "grand" and "mid-range"
theories. It is this perspective which is crucial to the method used.
Pettigrew (1990a) makes the important distinction between time as chronology and
time as social construction. This creates a certain tension between the historical
chronicalling of facts and understanding institutional time cycles. Thus the
researcher has to be attuned to the underlying logics which give events meaning and
significance as well as the events themselves. For instance, in this research, data on
key organisational events were linked to the cycles of national government. In this
way, organisational decisions such as capital expenditure could be linked to the
public expenditure policies of the particular political party in office. Similarly, the
researcher had also to be aware of differing temporal patterns in processes
occurring at different levels of analysis. So, for instance, one became aware that
commercial changes within the case study firms were occurring at a faster rate than
the industry sector as a whole.
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Time also provides a perspective by setting a frame of reference for what processes
are seen and how these are explained. A focus on current events highlights change
while a historical view highlights continuity. Empirically and theoretically change
and continuity are a matter of time. Any adequate empirical enquiry into change has
to be capable of revealing the temporal patterns, causes, and movements from
continuity to change and vice versa. In this study historical and real time data has
been collected which allows the present to be explored in relation to the past and the
emerging future.
3.7 Research Parameters
The research parameters are influenced by the nature of the theory of method
adopted. The contextual method examines the reciprocal relations between process
and contexts at different levels of analysis. While the realist perspective specifies
the nature of the causal reality by reference to generative mechanisms and the
contingent factors which link them. Processual analysis calls for an emphasis on
action as well as structure over time. Comparative and idiographic suggests more
than one intensive study within a sector. These studies are aiming for pluralist
accounts which calls for description and analysis of competing versions of reality.
Finally, a historical approach takes into account the historical evolution of ideas and
actions for change as well as the constraints within which decision makers operate.
The comparative method of research informed the starting point for the
investigation leading to a consideration of research sites and the unit of analysis.
3.7.1 choice of research sites
Pettigrew (1990a) lists four key issues for consideration when choosing research
sites. The first, to go for extreme situations, involved preliminary research and also
served to define the unit of analysis. The second and third issues, to go for polar
types and high experience levels, also involved the researcher in preliminary data
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collection and analysis. The fourth, that of gaining access, required both political
skills and social sensitivity.
3.7.2 sector choice
(1) Extreme Situations
When this study was initially conceived, the phenomena under study was strategic
agenda building and organisational change. The researcher's interest in
environmental issues suggested a choice of industry where such issues were
strategic and historical. It was felt that any element of real time research would be
small, as the research was not requested or funded by a sponsoring organisation.
Therefore an historical association with the issue was important in order to trace
developments over time: The point of studying a sequence of social dramas
longitudinally is that they provide a transparent look at the growth, evolution,
transformation, and conceivably decay of an organisation over time (Pettigrew,
1990a: 275).
Additionally, one was searching for an industry or company where significant
organisational change had taken place in connection with the issue: in other words,
that some change had occurred which made a measurable difference to issue.
salience. The oil and chemical industries were rejected as possibly too sensitive a
topic to allow access. The water industry was considered an interesting case because
it had been privatised in 1989 which provided an obvious transition point for
processual change. This transition had been highly publicised and so was an
example of a "highly visible case". Also, theoretical propositions about the political
nature of strategic agenda building suggested that the water industry would be rich
in such data. Therefore, it was decided to conduct research into the water services
companies who were responsible for water and sewage. This eliminated that part of
the industry made up of water only companies. The choice confronting the
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researcher now concentrated on the 10 water companies of England and Wales and
a general review of the history and development of that sector was conducted.
3.7.3 unit of analysis
Since the early 1 970s the water industry has been faced with concerns over water
quality and waste. This relates to both river and drinking water, and of itself throws
up a number of strategic concerns: costs, definition of standards, investment,
regulation etc. The quality issue was at the heart of the arguments for privatisation,
with the government emphasising the separation of the provider from the regulator.
This issue also underlies the massive capital investment requirements over the
remainder of the next decade to bring the water industry in line with EC standards.
After a discussion with the Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI), it was decided not
to choose drinking water quality as the strategic issue. This was for three reasons:
firstly, no statistics on drinking water were kept prior to 1989. Secondly, the
measures of water quality now are completely different from pre 1989. Third,
compliance is now very high and the differences between companies are
imperceptible.: There were, however, ample data on sewage quality which continued
to be an issue of considerable concern for the industry, but not in a form conducive
to comparative analysis. One would have to conduct an internal investigation into
the archives of all 10 companies to establish patterns in performance over the last
20 years. However, contingent upon sewage quality was the quality of rivers around
whose basins the water companies had initially been established as public sector
authorities in 1973. As guardians of the rivers the authorities had been self
regulating for 16 years. The performance of all the companies had been measured
since 1975 by the DoE. This authority had changed with privatisation into the hands
of the NRA, who now collected statistics. Therefore, data were available pre and
post privatisation with the added feature of the industry's different relationship with
the issue of river water quality.
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It was therefore decided to choose river water quality (RWQ) as the unit of analysis
in the research design. The focus for the research would be the trajectory of the
river water quality issue. At the micro level, river water quality meets many of the
criteria for issue salience as identified in the literature on strategic issues. It exhibits
high magnitude, has relevance to the core organisations, has internality and
controllability, and is related to other issues of concern to the water industry. At the
macro level, river water quality has had a long time horizon as a concern with the
water industry. It is connected with the social and political concerns of the day. It is
intimately bound up with issues of regulation which has been an ongoing theme for
the industry both prior to and since privatisation. It was concluded on all these
points that RWQ is a relevant topic for analysing the differences in organisational
responses to strategic issues. It was proposed therefore to make a comparative study
of two water service companies' response to river water quality.
The internal context of the study necessitates operationalising the agenda and how
issues come on to the agenda. It is recognised that at any one time there will be a
formal and informal agenda, or portfolio of concerns within the organisation. For
pragmatic reasons, this study will be chiefly concerned with the formal policy
committee agenda of the water companies and where possible, the informal agenda
held by members of the top management team. The first will be accessible by policy
documents and interviews. The second will require in-depth interviews of individual
members of the top management team. This should reveal each individual's own
agenda and perceptions of RWQ and related issues.
Issue placement on the strategic agenda will refer to the point at which water quality
issues are formally recognised in policy documents. The resulting policy decisions
representing the organisation's formal response to the quality issue. The outputs of
the organisational response would be determined by the measurable achievement of
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river water quality objectives. The research will document and analyse each
instance of the formal appearance of the river water quality issue and follow its path
from decision making to implementation.
In order to understand how water quality has been perceived and responded to over
time by water companies, it is necessary to conceptualise its trajectory. This can be
understood in terms of the internal responses of water companies, exhibited by
internal discussion, agenda placement, strategic planning, policy decisions, resource
allocation and measurable outputs over time.
The other key concept of this research is that of change and transformation. In this
study the concept of change is derived from the works of Pettigrew (1985a) and
Tushman and Romanelli (1985). Close readings of the literature by this group of
authors shows a strong similarity between Pettigrew's revolutionary and
evolutionary eras and Tushman and Romanelli's periods of convergence and
reorientation. For a fuller account of definitions of change and continuity adopted
here the reader is referred to the literature review. This research is therefore
concerned to document periods of convergence and change, their timing, sequence
and contextual influences.
3.7.4 choice of organisation
(2) Polar Types
Any research with an interest in outcome measures is advised to select sites which
are examples of polar types. Water companies' performance in terms of river water
quality have been measured by the DoE in 1975, the NWC in 1980, the DoE in
1985, and by the NRA in 1990, the figures being most comparable since 1980 (see
10.2.1). From these statistics one could infer a clear distinction in terms of
achievement between the companies. It was also decided to include contextual
decisions in the selection process. Bearing in mind that any strategic issue was
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assumed to be a multi-level dynamic phenomenon, it was important to consider
wider contextual features which might have an impact upon the performance
outcome. In the first instance, water companies with vastly different geographical
and topological regions could not be compared. This was because causes of
pollution were vastly different (farming vs industry) and had different expenditure
implications. Likewise the proximity to a coastline and the density of urban
conurbations had different implications for sewage disposal. In the first instance, it
was decided to select two companies within similar geographical regions having a
commonality of pollution factors to deal with. Secondly, those companies with the
clearest difference in performance would be compared.
Taking topographical and urbanlindustrial vs agricultural pollution into account one
arrived at several possible clusters of water companies, divided into coastal and
inland companies (Fig 3.1). Within each group it was possible to measure either
positive or negative broad trends, indicating the percentages of river length
changing class from 1980-1990 (NRA, 1991a).
Coastal
Largely agricultural with small urban conurbations
South West +19
Wessex -16
Welsh +1
Anglia -10
Agricultural with large industry and urban conurbations
North West +4
Yorkshire -7
Northumbria -6
Mixed agricultural and dense urban areas
Southern+8
Agricultural with large industry and urban conurbations
Severn Trent -2
Thames -11
Table 3.1 Typology of Water Companies
This grouping served in the first instance to eliminate Southern as having
idiosyncratic contextual features. When one took into consideration the NRA
(1991a) performance figures for 1980 to 1990, a figure could be arrived at for each
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company showing the net gains or losses achieved from one five year period (1980-
85) to the next (1985-90). This indicated the most likely polar types for comparison:
South West and Wessex, North West and Yorkshire and Severn Trent and Thames.
The researcher took full note of the advice that the practicalities of site choice is
best described as planned opportunism (Pettigrew, 1990a). The two inland
companies were chosen for reasons of time and cost limitations. Equally, for the
same reasons, the researcher was not at liberty to select additional pairs. The choice
of water companies was also helped by the presence of the chief executive of Severn
Trent on the Board of the Warwick Business School. The second choice was
facilitated by contacts within the Business School.
Both Severn Trent and Thames were amongst the largest in the industry. They had
adjoining boundaries which meant that they were not dissimilar in climate or
terrain. Both had large urban populations to service and faced similar technological
requirements to do so. But Thames showed a distinct deterioration from the mid
1980s in river water quality performance, compared to Severn Trent. As the study
progressed further polarities were discovered. For instance, historically the Thames
being a source of drinking water meant that it had received more stringent
monitoring (in the 1950s and 60s) than either the Severn or the Trent prior to 1974,
which had both acquired reputations as being badly polluted. (for a fuller account
see chapter 4). Thus one could ask questions about why Severn Trent had
performed comparatively better by the mid 1980s and why Thames had such a
dramatic decline from 1985 to 1990. Added to this it was discovered that Severn
Trent had kept a full account of their performance and produced a separate quality
report annually (the only company to do so in the industry), while Thames produced
data only within company reports. This in itself was considered to be an interesting
difference. Why was it that one company produced such extensive information for
the public domain while the other produced only what was minimally required?
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(3) High Experience Levels
The selection of the two cases also conformed to Pettigrew's suggestion to go for
high experience levels of the phenomena under study. Both Severn Trent and
Thames had different historical experiences of river pollution and both had chosen
to tackle the issue differently after 1974. Equally important was the role played by
the two companies in the privatisation process. Both were close to the centre of
political activity surrounding the last major transformation of the industry and could
provide unique insights into key developments.
3.7.5 access
As stated previously, access was obtained in Severn Trent because of their
connection with Warwick Business School. An interview was held with the MD
who granted access and provided a list of appropriate respondents. Gaining access
to Thames was less of an initial certainty and relied on a WBS contact with the
deputy Chairman. Initial contact was made by telephone and followed up with an
interview. Having already researched into the industry and conducted interviews
within Severn Trent, the cold call approach could be smoothed by demonstrating a
familiarity with sector issues and experiences (Pettigrew, 1990a). The deputy
Chairman then made available the names of persons he thought suitable for
interview. In both organisations further contacts were obtained from suggestions
made by the initial interviewees and the researcher's own investigations (see
3.8.4.1).
Negotiating library access was also an important part of the initial research process.
In Severn Trent, although granted at the outset, times had still to be negotiated with
the library staff and one relied on their goodwill to find a table and chair where
space was at a premium. Given the volume of archival material to be studied,
(known and possible) the researcher needed to spend whole days at a time in the
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library, thereby making heavy demands upon an overcrowded and busy library.
Similarly at Thames, access was negotiated with library staff separate from,
although with the full knowledge of, the deputy Chairman. Here again, one had to
be sensitive to the restrictions on space and respect the confidential tag on many
current documents. In both cases staff proved to be most accommodating. They
even allowed books and documents to be borrowed as well as providing
photocopying facilities.
3.8 Data Collection
A comparative processual study, aiming for pluralist accounts of historical and
contextual organisational reality, means producing case studies and not just case
histories (Pettigrew, 1990a). This involves going beyond chronology to develop
analytic themes. It also means collecting data at different levels of analysis and
demonstrating how actors mobilise features of economic and sectoral contexts to
legitiniise or delegitimise ideas for change and continuity at organisational
levels.This implies a triangulated methodology (Denzin, 1978; Jick, 1979), used to
gather different types of data which can be used as cross checking for reliability.
The aim is to draw on particular and different strengths of various data collection
methods. Crucially data collection is concerned with observation and verification,
and in comparative process research these are iterative processes. One observes,
follows themes and trails, identifies patterns, has those patterns disconfirmed or
verified by further data, and the process moves on.
3.8.1 timing
The difficulty of isolating the beginning and end of a continuous process is
highlighted by Pettigrew (1990a). Given that there are no absolute answers the
researcher must be guided by pragmatic considerations. In the present study the
theoretical framework, themes and research questions influenced when to start and
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stop collecting data. The framework focused on major social dramas or breakpoints
(Pettigrew, 1985a, Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). This suggested initially that one
began at the formation of the case study organisations in 1974. As the investigation
into river water quality proceeded it was revealed that the issue had a history prior
to the formation of regional water authorities. Indeed, as a social issue this stretched
back to the mid 19th century. In order to take an organisationally relevant view, it
was decided to look for antecedent influences on the character of the issue, which
informed organisational action from 1974 to 1994. This broadly meant collecting
data from 1948 with the formation of the first River Boards in the UK. This time
scale also coincided with the earliest organisational memories of the oldest
respondents in the sample. The stopping point for data collection was a subjective
decision on the part of the researcher that enough interview data had been generated
to reveal similarity of thematic content.
3.8.2 data types
This research involved three main types of data, in-depth interviews, documentary
and archive data and, to a lesser extent, observational material. These will be
discussed in roughly the sequence they were first employed, so that first a
chronology needed to be established from archival data, in order to construct the
first pro-forma, which then had to be tested in interviews. Meanwhile, observational
material was sporadic and ongoing. It is to be stressed that data collection was an
iterative process and two or more types of data were at times collected together.
3.8.3 documentary and archive data
As Glueck and Willis (1979) rightly point out, historians provide the best training
and justification for use of documentary evidence in research. Strategic management
analysts show less enthusiasm for these forms of data, perhaps because of the
possible biases. Firstly, the use of documentary evidence does not guarantee
objectivity, consistency, or even accuracy. The researcher needs to learn something
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about the preparation of the document which they intend to use as a source of
information. The selection process which precedes any summarisation of
information may be influenced by the interests of those who select what to include
and what to omit.
Secondly, bias may reside in the design of the information system which generated
the data. For instance, accounting systems differ from firm to firm and published
data which appears comparable may not be so at all. Public ownership makes
company reports from 1974 to 1989 very comparable, as all conformed to specific
sets of information and presentation designed for public consumption. There were
clear differences in reporting after privatisation which are dealt with below.
The possibilities of error are also present, including typographical and clerical. A
second source of error is deliberate distortion, either by a member of the
organisation to further personal ends, or the organisation to promote a particular
interpretation of the information. It may be impossible for the researcher to be
absolutely sure such distortion has not taken place, but they should always be aware
of how others will use the documents chosen and what effects these uses might have
bad on the way the information was prepared and presented (Glueck and Willis,
1979). For example, it was clear that the presentation and information content of
company reports was very different after privatisation. There was a far more
superficial treatment of internal events, a marketing led approach designed to appeal
to shareholders, which meant there was a focus on achievements with failures given
cursory mention. The approach taken here is not to assume that these are biases to
the integrity of the data but to represent in a powerful way differences brought
about by privatisation. These differences could then be exploited by the researcher
to demonstrate the culture change brought about by this transformational episode.
The changes in company report style were interpreted as the external symbolisations
of deeper internal changes.
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Glueck and Willis (1979) recommend awareness as the best safeguard against bias,
inaccuracy and distortion. This study takes as its premise that such "problems" with
data are in themselves interesting organisational phenomena and can contribute to
the overall research by posing questions as to why they have occurred: for instance,
the previously mentioned fact that Severn Trent were the only water authority to
produce water quality reports.
3.8.3.1 preparation phase
The aim of the preparation phase was to become acquainted with the history of the
industry and the organisations themselves, prior to site selection. All the water
companies were contacted for their company reports over the previous 2-4 years.
All companies sent at least one report and a general feel could be gained of the
different companies. A visit was made to the Water Services Association and
materials on privatisation and industry journal articles were acquired. Ancillary
organisations were also contacted such as the Association for Municipal Engineers,
who were able to provide a list of all their current articles. Technical information
on pollution was acquired from the British Reference Library. The NRA and
Drinking Water Inspectorate were contacted for information to decide the unit of
analysis (see 3.6.2).
It was decided to do historical research in both companies before any interviewing
took place to get a feel for historical events and pro-forma development. This
involved an intense period of one day company library visits. During this time all
company reports (1973-94) were read, initially, in order to get a feel for their lay-
out and the relevant parts photocopied. At Severn Trent all the Water Quality
reports from the period 1973-1989 were also read and photocopied. In addition a
library search was undertaken by the librarian for key documents on river water
quality. All the shelves of the library were scanned for other historical material of
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relevance. This material varied from the highly technical (scientific articles on
sewage and water pollution); to organisational and political (report on the MMC
enquiry); and historical texts on water and rivers in the UK. At Thames the
procedure was the same with a thorough search of company records prior to
interviewing.
A detailed chronology of industry and organisational events was drawn up to guide
thinking and subsequent interviews. It was also necessary to become acquainted
with relevant procedures, symbols and terminology (Moyser, 1988). This was
particularly necessary for understanding the RWQ issue, how it was assessed and
calculated, and the complex science underlying the various debates in the industry
(though not to a professional standard). Also, significant personalities in each
organisation were noted and the organisational charts from year to year. For this
company reports provided factual data, as well as a degree of opinion. The latter
was most readily found in the Chairman's preface for each year.
3.8.3.2 cross data referencing phase
This period was characterised both by the cross referencing of data for validation
and the acquisition of new data. Midway into the research access was gained to
OFWAT's library and a day was spent looking at material on privatisation which
had been donated by the former NWC. Other sources of documentary evidence
were provided by the interviewees themselves, such as stock market reports, policy
documents and copies of slides used in directors meetings. In this way interviewees
had predicted the sorts of information which would be of value and which could not
be gained from the companies. The process of cross referencing aided analytical
thinking and provided the basis for the early analytical writing.
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3.8.4 in-depth interviews
3.8.4.1 the preparation phase
In the first instance preparation is essential as Moyser (1988:123) notes: To that
extent, what is learnt while selecting potential respondents,. . . overlaps with and
contributes to the preparation for the interviews themselves. The archival
preparation formed reference points in the interview and the responses. It was
therefore important that the preparatory work was done thoroughly in order for the
researcher to respond to reference points quickly, to appreciate their significance,
and to use them in questions with an air of familiarity (Moyser, 1988). This will in
turn help both to build the necessary degree of seriousness and rapport with the
respondents and to avoid being fobbed off with trite, standardised or superficial
answers. The selection of interview candidates was a combination of referrals (see
3.6.4) and careful examination of company reports for those directors and MDs
who were significant from 1974. Thus one was interested in talking to directors and
managers with a responsibility for rivers, quality and sewage, and to others who
had been centrally placed in key divisions to observe structural and political
relations, and above all who had a long association with the company. As Huber
and Power (1985:175) advise: . . .choose informants whose unique biases or lack of
knowledge are likely to offset those of other informants.
3.8.4.2 access
At a practical level, gaining access to individuals in both case studies was by
networks which were established and exploited as fully as possible (Cassell, 1988),
so that once the MD of Severn Trent had given me an initial list of (8) interviewees
these were exploited to gain further contacts. Thus: Everyone who might possibly
know someone, or know someone who might know someone, must be contacted and
ask f they will give introductions, vouch for one, and otherwise, help one's
enterprise (Cassell, 1988:95). This had mixed results overall. In Severn Trent the
process was a fairly smooth one. Once the initial contacts had been made through
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the sanction of the MD, further names to contact were elicited. Having conducted
an initial set of interviews, credibility was then less of a problem. All potential
interviewees would be contacted by telephone in the first instance. This was often
the biggest hurdle as secretaries were found to be extremely efficient gatekeepers.
Sometimes an appointment could be made through the secretary immediately,
whereupon a letter of explanation would be sent confirming the time and date. At
other times I would be asked to send in a letter explaining my research and would
then be contacted by a secretary to fix an interview. Generally, the biggest problem
was explaining to potential interviewees why a sample of one was not sufficient for
the exercise.
Gaining access to Thames employees was more problematic. An initial list of six
from the Chairman gained further contacts, mainly from long serving members who
knew each other. Access to more senior executives such as the MD of the utilities
proved impossible. This was attempted by phone, letter and fax, but the general
resistance seemed to hinge on the fact that so many people had already gained or
wanted access since privatisation. Having been told by various managers that the
Chief Executive started early and was positioned next to his fax, the strategy of
faxing at 8am, rather than an initial telephone call, worked in this instance. Another
incidence of resistance occurred in the legal department where the executive
director was deemed too busy. An appeal to the secretary was made who took it
upon herself to contact the departmental manager and arrange an interview. Another
point of resistance in Thames was temporal. The Thames interviews were conducted
after most of the Severn Trent ones and after the preliminary period of archive
research. This meant that the first set of contacts were not interviewed until January
1994. As this was the year in which the regulator set new limits on price increases,
much activity was going on inside water companies to provide information to
OFWAT by the March 31 deadline. This meant almost half of Thames interviews
could not be contacted until the April, thereby slowing the interview process.
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Access to retired organisation members was also a mixed success. In Severn Trent
the pension administrator agreed to provide addresses of a preselected list of 7
retired senior managers and directors. These pensioners were sent a letter
explaining the research and asked to participate. Two refused, one a former MD
who had left after a short period under somewhat of a cloud and who did not want
to review the experience. Another former MD felt he was too old to remember facts
correctly. In Thames the pensions office agreed to contact a list of respondents for
me, none of which replied. An alternative contact was sought in a former PA to the
first Chairman of the TWA. He was able to tell me that quite a few potential
interviewees had in fact died. He also had the addresses of 10 retired or ex-
personnel and agreed to contact them for me. Again, none came forward and this
avenue remained closed.
A bureaucratic slowness and/or the wrong message probably worked against closer
contact: an example of what Schuller (1988) describes as the 'cul-de-sac t in case
study terms, where after a relatively short journey, a more or less insurmountable
barrier prevents further progress. It is probably no accident that many of the former
Thames employees on my list had been involved in acrimonious relationships during
the 1970s and early 1980s. It is possible that particularly for those who now had
new careers elsewhere (in two instances academia and consultancy), the demands of
their present occupations were preferable to reliving those of the past.
Interviews with members of related organisations were sought. Those of principle
interest were OFWAT, the NRA HQ, the DoE, the Water Services Association and
the Drinking Water Inspectorate. Interviews were obtained with three out of the five
organisations. The NRA's recently appointed director did not reply to a written
letter. The head of the DWI was the only member with any long term experience of
the industry. He initially granted an interview and was subsequently taken seriously
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ill. Four months later he had still not returned to work and, nearing the time of
writing up, one felt disquiet at badgering a by now probably unwilling respondent
who was recovering from a serious illness.
3.8.4.3 the sample
A total sample of 40 respondents were interviewed for the study (see appendix 3.1).
Thirty seven respondents worked or had done so previously for the case
Organisations: 20 from Severn Trent and 17 from Thames. The other 3 were
employed by OFWAT, the Water Services Association and the DoE and had long
experience of the industry. Of those respondents from the case study organisations,
all but one were or had been in senior management positions. Twenty five had
joined the organisations in 1974, 7 during the 1970s, 3 during the early to mid 80s
and 2 just prior to privatisation. This was to get as many long-term accounts as
possible alongside those senior managers who had joined later from outside the
industry and possessed alternative perspectives. Two respondents had worked in
both companies. Six of the respondents had retired, one was in the last month of
employment, two were working freelance and five were with the NRA; making a
total of 13 who were no longer with the case study organisations. As Walsh and
Ungson (1991) point out: Basically, former employees retain a great deal of
information about an organisation. . . they can retain a fairly accurate account of
their former organisation 's history, especially the history that transpired during
their tenure. Neustadt and May (1986) referred to such sometimes invaluable people
as "old hands". Indeed many of the retired interviewees had long histories of
employment with the industry and were important in recalling predecessor
organisations, personalities and culture prior to 1974.
3.8.4.4 the interview pro-forma
The interview pro-forma was constructed in such a way as to guide respondents
through a series of questions grouped around specific themes (Appendix 3.2). This
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way respondents could focus on different aspects of specific topics at a time,
thereby aiding recall. The intention was to ask all respondents similar questions but
in a semi-structured way, in line with a conversational interviewing style (Burgess,
1988).
3.8.4.5 the role of the researcher
Cassell (1988) makes the general point about the basic relationship between the
observer and observed, that the researcher has a crucial and irreplaceable way of
'knowing' the Other. This deep or (Polanyi, 1966) 'tacit knowledge' involves what
has been variously described as intuition, empathy, hunches. Devereux (1967),
using a psychoanalytic analogy, calls this method of knowing 'countertransference'.
What all these terms describe are the resonances set up within ourselves by the
behaviour of the people we are studying. This involves not only the practical
knowledge of gaining access and interaction but documenting one's own
involvement in the generation of knowledge. What Cassell does not make clear is
that the awareness of these resonances is a learned skill, so that much in the same
way that a psychoanalyst must engage in many years of self analysis, the social
scientist if she is to utilise such data must have a grounding in communication and
self awareness. This latter is the most problematic of all to demonstrate but is
perhaps best achieved by making clear the role of the researcher in the knowledge
generation process.
One can not deny that in all interpersonal research interactions a degree of opinion
forming takes place on both sides. Cassell advises that whatever our opinion we
must like those we study enough to remain open. Such openness allows us to
receive impressions, both favourable and unfavourable, so that we can use the
reverberations set up in us, by the behaviour of the people we are studying, to help
us learn who they are and what we are observing. A researcher rarely has anything
tangible to offer. One can, however, be an intelligent, sympathetic and non-
Chapter 3: Method Page 105
judgemental listener. This researcher took the view that both openness and
respectful empathy were essential in establishing and maintaining a dialogue. Each
interviewee was approached as a unique individual, with personal accounts to tell,
which the researcher was grateful to be allowed to hear.
As with self awareness, so social awareness was deemed to be an important aspect
of the interview process (Cassell, 1988, Burgess, 1988, Moyser, 1988). The
researcher had to be attuned to issues of security in gaining access, and respect the
confidentiality of certain materials. The social sensitivity extends to self-
presentation, to fit in to the organisational situation. It was deemed most appropriate
to dress and speak acceptably in the language of business. One also had to be
careful about scientific terminology and learn to use it correctly: The interviewer
has to be prepared to adjust his stance according to the needs of the situation in
order to promote the efficacy of the exchange (Moyser, 1988:126).
3.8.4.6 tape recording
Interviews were tape-recorded in all but one case. Goodman and Pryluck
(1974:311) describe the interview in tape recorded form as a primary source for the
researcher: Since it reproduces the direct statements of an individual, it is, in effect,
a memoir. This is a further strength of the oral interview, inasmuch as one purpose
of oral history is to "increase the quality and quantity of traditional source material
and the memoirs created are a supplement, not a substitute for them." . . .It offers an
important opportunity to evaluate not only what is said, but how it is said.
Interviewees were always asked if they objected to being tape-recorded and it was
stressed that all interviews would be confidential. One manager insisted on note
taking because he felt it would be easier to speak his mind. This particular interview
proved to be one charged with emotion and many complaints were made against the
company and OFWAT. This manager also reveaLed his ambitions for a director's
post and no doubt did not want to risk jeopardising his chances, however slight. In
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order to preserve as much of the data as possible, the missing gaps in the notes
were filled in on the train on the return journey, and the whole interview was
transcribed as fully as possible on getting back to the office. In two cases the
interview was conducted over the phone, one of which was taped. The interviews
lasted on average 77 minutes with a range from 20 to 150 minutes.
3.8.4.7 style of interviewing
The preliminary to the interview proper consisted of a brief outline of the research,
an option on the use of the tape recorder, and an assurance of confidentiality. As a
general rule, the interviews began in the same way by asking the respondent about
their current position and career history. Those managers who had considerable
organisational tenure were asked to give their impression of the overall development
of the company. It was felt that asking respondents to think long term at the outset
helped organise their thoughts for the remaining questions. Interviewees with
shorter time experiences were asked to reflect on the organisation when they joined.
The interview schedule then followed a chronology of events and personalities from
1974 (or whenever they joined), then moving on to themes around policy making,
river water quality, regulation, privatisation and culture.
In practice it was not always possible to stick to the schedule in any strict or rigid
way and still maintain the sort of conversational style that is required. For example,
it is often the case that in responding to one question another will also be answered.
Equally, a new line of questioning may open up unpredictably, that seems
promising enough to be followed, as in the case of post privatisation issues. By the
same token, in the rapport-building preliminaries, when the outline of the project
and the purpose of the interview are (again) being briefly outlined, the interviewee
may introduce a comment that provides an excellent hook on which to start the
interview proper - but at a point half-way through the written agenda order: or as in
the case of one director who began talking after the initial greeting and did not stop
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for 30 minutes! In short the researcher had to be prepared to work through the
schedule in a flexible and possibly idiosyncratic way.
This all adds to what is a heavy burden on the interviewer: first, to listen carefully
to the responses in order to sort out obscurities, inconsistencies or partial answers,
and simultaneously also fmding a way (preferably through comments made by the
interviewee) that allows for a natural progression to further topics on the agenda.
The interviewer must develop appropriate phrases on the spot and then formulate
questions that introduce, or probe, possibly sensitive topics, all the while
monitoring the coverage of the agenda (without seeming to do so), and keeping an
eye on the time, so as (if necessary) to try to curb verbose (and possible defensive)
responses. In many cases the time overran the allotted hour and this was usually due
to the willingness of the interviewee to talk. In particular, as may be expected,
retired respondents had more time on their hands and were happy to reminisce.
3.8.4.8 evaluation/limitations
The utility of the interview outputs was judged principally in terms of the quality
and relevance of the materials generated in relation to the substantive goals of the
project. Clearly some respondents were more revealing and reliable than others,
although this had generally more to do with their length of time and status within
the organisation than any resistance or lack of knowledge. For instance, certain
respondents had specialist knowledge in fields other than water quality or pollution
and had never been concerned with these issues. Such respondents were used mostly
to talk about issues pertaining to other aspects of organisational development and
change.
Being sensitive to time (Pettigrew, 1975 and 1985a) and the subjective
interpretations of actors, judgements can be contradictory, both between accounts
and historical data and between respondents. Where this occurred in the former, the
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alternative historical evidence was exposed and the respondent allowed to review his
account or expose the weakness of the historical data. For instance some
respondents were hazy on the precise dates of political interventions or specific
incidents, such as the MMC enquiry in Severn Trent. In all cases the respondents
acceded to the researcher's prior fact finding. In the case of contradictory
judgements, respondents were presented with alternative points of view and allowed
to hypothesise on the discrepancy. Thus former pollution control officers, with
differing views on the effect of structural change in their department, could explain
their alternative view in terms of differences in professional codes of conduct. In
general, this study threw up few conflicting accounts of either variety and so the
balance of the empirical evidence was not felt to be an issue.
Central to this exercise is the question about the veracity and reliability of
respondents even in matters of opinion. In part, this took the form of an internal
assessment of the interview. Personal recollections and judgements were noted
immediately after each interview about the respondent as an individual. For
instance, was there an impression of frankness, openness and spontaneity? In most
cases there was. Respondents did appear considered in their responses and
forthcoming. Some even thanked the researcher at the end for an opportunity to go
over past events and consider them in the context of the present. It was the
researcher's general impression of the water men that they were dedicated
professionals, with an objective and long term interest in and attachment to the
industry. Where possible, follow-up probes were used to ensure questions were
understood and for completeness. Also reference was made to earlier questions to
increase the likelihood of reliability.
3.8.4.9 transcription
All interviews were transcribed by the researcher and this phase was built into, and
run in parallel with, the interviewing phase itself. This was a lengthy process as it
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was felt necessary to capture every word and to be mindful of the nuances of certain
statements: particularly as in this type of research, where the themes and structure
of the analysis emerge as the research proceeds. At one stage the services of a
secretary was sought but this provided not wholly accurate transcriptions of the
tapes and necessitated the researcher going over them to double check.
3.8.5 observational material
The collection of observational data was slight in comparison to the other types but
contributed to a general 'feel' for current organisational life. The majority of the
time spent within the organisations when not interviewing was in the library. Here
there was an opportunity to have informal chats or experience chance incidents. In
one instance the library team were recovering from the shock of finding out their
Director had been planning to close them down. It was only the chance sighting of a
memo by the head librarian which allowed action to be taken in time. Fortuitously,
one criterion for remaining was the amount of use the library received (from both
staff and the general public), and as records to that effect had been well kept the
library was saved. It was remarked that my presence was useful in boosting the
figures. Thus in some way I was able to reciprocate their help. Additionally,
however, this gave one an insight into the dynamics of decision making post-
privatisation. The fact that the Director had never visited the library and was acting
on balance sheets alone indicated a key driver.
Informal conversations with librarians in both organisations gave one insights into
non-managerial perceptions of working life post-privatisation. It also gave the
researcher a general 'feel' for the organisational atmosphere. For instance, at both
companies security was very tight; a register, name badges and an escort were
needed when going to different floors in the building. These were procedures which
one organisation' s library staff said had escalated since privatisation and appeared to
them to denote a certain atmosphere of tension within the building. It also indicated
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to the researcher the degree of sensitivity within both companies towards industrial
espionage.
Staff who used the library were at times other sources of unexpected information.
One junior manager had been sent by his head of department to do research on the
urban waste water directive and was having some difficulty in finding information.
This gave the researcher an opportunity to engage in conversation by suggesting
likely sources and it indicated the degree of importance in which that particular
issue was held.
Other informal meetings with staff occurred, when for instance a respondent
organised a lunch for the researcher with his section staff. As this was the team
which had put together the periodic review for OFWAT, they were a valuable
source of information on current issues and attitudes towards regulation, and the
future of the industry in general.
3.9 Analysis
3.9.1 the analytic process
Much writing on the process of analysing qualitative data has been described by
other authors in terms more appropriate to novel construction: for example, as an
exercise in generating sophisticated description and building patterns (Van Maanen,
1988) and even as the craft of the crime writer (Mintzberg, 1979). Van Maanen
(1988) denotes a process of searching for rich and complex descriptions, building
them up using the skills of an investigative detective and then ordering and
presenting ideas in a finely honed narrative. Strauss (1987) is also concerned with
capturing complex descriptions, but is more explicit than Van Maanen (1988) in
how this is to be carried out. Like Huberman and Miles (1983), Strauss (1987) is
particularly strong on the operational elements of simplifying complex data through
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techniques of data reduction and display, but as a consequence Strauss underplays
the importance of some of the more strategic elements of the process, such as
making explicit the researcher's meta analytic framework and the character of
generic propositions being sought (Pettigrew, 1990a).
A more demanding role for analysis is implied by adopting the realist paradigm.
More than establishing patterns and relating these in sophisticated and novel ways,
the realist is concerned with what has caused the patterns: What are the structures
or generative mechanisms and the contingent factors responsible for the observed
patterns (Tsoukas, 1989:556). The analytic process involves a gradual transition
from actions, through reasons to rules, and finally to structures and causal powers.
A realist framework is adopted in the present study as it conforms to the
requirements of process strategy research to make explicit the generic propositions
and analytic framework, as well as making clear how one operationalises category
formation, pattern recognition and meta-level constructs (Pettigrew, 1990a).
3.9.2 analytical framework
The complexity of capturing social reality is a cyclical process involving periods of
alternating complexity and simplification. While complexity is necessary to
appreciate the diversity of the subject matter, so periods of simplification are
required to reduce the tension and aid cohesion. The simplification period is then
validated with further data collection and complexity and so on. With each cycle of
complexity and simplification comes greater analytical and conceptual power.
One important means of reducing complexity is to make written accounts of
emerging themes. In this case, several written accounts were made during the
course of the research in order to clarify thinking about analysis and the quality of
the data. At each writing the level of focus was different, moving from a historical
case study with initial themes of organisational development, to a paper exploring
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the micro political processes of strategic agenda building, to one which explored the
linking of macro political events to changes in organisational ideology. This process
of writing at various junctures in the research served as a feedback mechanism to
the researcher. They demonstrated the utility of the forms of analysis chosen and
enabled the researcher to test out new ideas. The actual writing of the dissertation
commenced when the researcher judged the quantity and quality of the data to be
sufficient for the final analysis.
Each of the different research outputs assisted the inductive process of pattern
recognition and theory building. Pattern recognition and category formation occur
throughout, the process being one of greater refinement and sophistication. Briefly,
the analytic framework involved three distinct phases, within which occurred data
collection, analysis and outputs. Each type of data, level of analysis and output,
informed the next stage. Briefly these can be summarised as a series of discrete
steps although in practice the process was iterative and at times opportunistic:
Preparatory Phase
1. Archive data on industry and organisations: visual aids: chronologies
2. Analytical schema for document analysis: visual aids: agenda analysis & issue
analysis: the case as analytical chronology
Cross Data Analysis Phase
3. Interview pro-forma: Interviews: analytical schema for interview analysis:
interpretative/theoretical case.
4. Analytical schema across cases: interpretative/theoretical case.
Meta-level Analytic Phase
5. Abstraction and conceptualisation across theoretical constructs.
These phases conform closely to the three stage realist framework proposed by
Tsoukas (1989). The first stage has two parts: resolving the actions of the
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phenomena under study into constitutive components, and theoretically redescribing
those components to reveal their inner constitution. In this case, the preparatory
phase involved resolving agenda building into the characteristics of strategic issues
and the agenda structure. Organisational developments were resolved into continuity
and change via chronologies. The theoretical redescription of agenda building was
manifest in relating the agenda structure to organisational phases. The accounts of
organisational evolution were theorised as a pattern of eras of continuity
interspersed with briefer periods of radical change (Pettigrew, 1986).
The second stage involves moving from actions to reasons. This means asking
actors to account for why the particular actions have occurred: as with the cross
data phase, where interviews developed out of archival work were tested to illicit
further explanation. The two interpretative cases which resulted from this phase
were important in exposing fundamental social rules around the suppression and
promotion of issues and the role of ideology in continuity and change.
The third stage is where abstract analysis and conceptualisation are employed to
reveal the structures and causal powers associated with the rules invoked by the
outputs of the previous stage. Here an account is given of empirically researched
contingencies alongside a definition of causal powers. In addition it must be shown
where these powers emanate from, or the structures which legitimise them. It is the
patterns of integration between these powers and contingencies which call for meta-
level analysis. In this way the researcher is able to demonstrate the precise manner
in which causal powers shape the organisation they help generate via their
interaction, and by their links to the prevailing contingencies. The meta-level
analytic phase thereby draws on the interpretative cases, to isolate the social
structural rules and resources accounting for strategic issue trajectory and
ideological change. Drawing on Giddens' (1984) theory of structuration provides
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the conceptual framework to explain the agency whereby issues are promoted and
suppressed and changes in organisational ideology.
3.9.3 preparatory phase
At this initial stage the aim was to understand the constitutive components which
make up the agenda building process and organisational continuity and change. In
particular an early impression of the horizontal and vertical dimensions was
considered important. To this end, techniques of data reduction and display were
crucial, both as aids to analysis and to deal with unfamiliar and plentiful
information.
3.9.3.1 chronological analysis
The primary purpose for initial analysis of archive data was to create an industry
chronology as well as organisational chronology. These could then be incorporated
into an interview pro-forma. In particular, the significance of organisational events,
personalities and key changes was emphasised. The industry chronology provided a
backdrop to sector level developments, the most important being the reorganisation
in 1974, nationalisation in 1983 and privatisation in 1989. The interest was in
ascertaining how these major sector level events reverberated inside the case study
organisations. A clearer understanding of executive opinion, and resultant
organisational action, on these issues could be gleaned from the Chairman's preface
of company reports and from articles written in professional magazines and
journals. The initial analytical exercise then was to ascertain a crude historical
context, against which to set the detail of further analysis. Thus the key political,
economic and social factors could be woven into the sector and organisational
contexts.
A flow chart of the organisations was constructed showing a time frame from 1974
to 1994. The vertical axis depicted natural events at the top, underneath appeared
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macro and sector level events. Beneath these were key features of the organisations
also running in parallel: executive control, Chairmen, CEOs, Structure (no of
divisions), RWQ influences and internal events (Appendix 3.3). These charts
helped to provide first impressions of vertical and horizontal linkages.
3.9.3.2 analytical schema for document analysis: company reports
Next, the internal context of the organisations was captured in more detail via the
coding of strategic issues. What were the key issues on the agenda and how were
they interpreted? The primary source of data for this was the Chairman's Preface or
Statement to the annual reports and accounts. This section of the report dealt with
the main strategic issues concerning the organisation while the main body of the
report tended to be divided up into functional areas. Where elaboration of an issue
was needed this could be found within the main report, provided it concerned core
functions. Only the Chairman' s Statement dealt with far ranging strategic issues.
A chart was created showing the set of strategic issues under consideration for each
year. These were colour coded into 11 broad categories: inheritance,
financial/resources, govt/legal, internal events, stakeholders, structure, water
resources, discharge consents, RWQ, external events, and weather. This exercise
was useful in three ways, first it enabled the researcher to become familiar with the
range of strategic issues over time and how they could be grouped. Secondly, the
chart enabled the researcher to ascertain at a glance the competing issues on a year
by year basis. Thirdly it provided a longitudinal perspective on the duration and/or
reemergence of particular issues over time.
3.9.3.3 the case as analytical chronology
The main objective of this output was to create a picture of organisational
development. Within this, the aim was to understand how the companies understood
and responded over time, to the issue of river water quality (RWQ). The prior
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analysis of strategic issues proved useful in displaying the range of strategic issues
confronting the organisation.
At first the principle theme in each report was ascertained to get a feel for
developments on a year by year basis. Also the initial work done on issue coding
allowed the researcher to see how sets of issues contributed towards the thematic
content of the reports. For instance, the first two years of STWA reports were
concerned with what they had inherited from their predecessor authorities and so
were labelled inheritance. This was followed by three years with an emphasis on
achievements, and so on. These yearly themes could then be grouped in order to
arrive at a larger category of eras or phases of organisational development.This
categorisation provided insights into the evolving identity of the organisation,
allowing an interpretation of broad phases and change periods.
The second step was to categorise the key issues in order to understand what
meanings these might have for the organisation. Research on issue dimensions by
Dutton, Walton and Abrahamson (1989) found by far the largest dimension of
issues cited as important was content: that is, if issues concerned the core business
such as mission, role or resources, or the general environment. Consequently all the
issues were categorised according to their content. It has been suggested by Dutton
(1988a) that the size and variety of the agenda structure plays a role in the eventual
placement of any one strategic issue. Perhaps the character and diversity of the
strategic agenda would provide insights into the rate of uptake of new issues? The
total number of issues were noted annually, their different content categories and
how often they reoccurred.
The emphasis on interpretation and labelling of issues in the literature (Dutton and
Duncan 1987b, Dutton and Jackson 1987, Dutton 1988a, Dutton et a! 1989)
suggested categorising issues according to how they were perceived, ie positively or
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negatively. The locus of an issue has been found to be significant in information
processing (Dukerich and Milliken, 1987). Also, it was considered important to
understand the connection between the inner and outer contexts of the organisation.
Therefore issues were classified according to whether they were internal or external
to the companies.
The importance of managerial beliefs about causality has been noted by Barr,
Stimpert and Huff (1992) and each strategic issue was categorised according to
whether it was attributed internally or externally to the organisations. Finally, the
links between issues have been debated (Dutton et al, 1989) and although there is no
clear evidence for the importance of this dimension, the type of interconnections is
deemed important, such that those causally connected were cognitively bundled
together, as in heuristics for problem solving Therefore it was recorded when any
individual issue was linked with RWQ and whether positively or negatively. This
also served to give an impression of how RWQ was linked to the agenda structure.
The above analysis was carried out using a separate form for each year divided into
the categories derived from the literature. The structure of the form was arranged
such that issues were listed vertically in the groups in which they were mentioned in
the reports. Across the top of the form were the categories: location
(internal/external), categorisation (positive/negative), causality (internal/external),
RWQ (positive/negative). Horizontally beneath each group of issues, a note of the
intended action was made. This method of categorisation could later be refined into
a graph of the agenda structure, depicting its size and variety over time. This type
of pictorial representation allowed one to see how the agenda structure contributed
to the pattern of organisational development. So, for instance, Thames showed a
broad pattern of decreasing size and variety of issues from a high in 1974 to the mid
80s, whereupon both measures begin to increase after the first privatisation debate.
One was also able to infer from the issue analysis the predominantly negative
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character of the issues until the nationalisation of the industry. Thereafter issues are
both negative and positive during the 1980s, while after privatisation they are
predominantly positive.
The second stage of issue analysis focused on the RWQ issue itself. The primary
data for this came from annual reports and in the case of STWA, additional
information was provided by Water Quality reports. The annual reports provided
separate chapters on RWQ and effluent quality (EQ), while the Water Quality
reports gave an overview from the Water Quality Panel with the Chairman's
Foreword and supplied more detailed commentary in the separate sections under
effluent quality and river water quality. The twin strands of effluent and river water
quality are by their interactive effects inseparable in understanding WA's response
to RWQ. Therefore they were given equal and joint analysis in each report.
The interpretation and labelling of an issue is said to have an influence on
organisational adaption to the environment (Dutton and Duncan, 1987b), the
information processing and motivation of key decision-makers (Dutton and Jackson,
1987), and the greater the resources devoted and centralisation of authority in tasks
re the issue (Sallivan and Nonaka, 1988). The companies' interpretation of RWQ
was established by noting how the company rated its own performance on RWQ and
EQ. For most years a general statement of trends in the performance was made as
well as a more precise statement regarding the year in question. The company's
own description acted as a guide to how positively or negatively RWQ was viewed.
This was usually supported by some measure of evaluation which varied in the
Foreword and annual reports from general terms, such as the presence or absence of
fish, to more precise measures using the classification scheme. Detailed measures of
performance were provided in the form of tables, graphs and diagrams within the
main body of STWA's Water Quality report and Thames annual reports.
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As with the previous stage, causality was considered an important dimension and so
it was noted whether performance in RWQ or EQ was attributed to internal or
external factors. Equally it was seen as important to note any constraints which
might be linked to the immediate causes and their locus. The causal dimension was
further developed by noting how companies attributed their future performance in
RWQ and EQ.
The action dimension has been found to have a greater utility for decision-makers
(Dutton et al, 1989), particularly attributes related to individual or organisational
control. It was therefore decided to establish the level of organisational control over
RWQ by noting the type of actions taken, including how these might relate to
company interpretation of their performance. This was expanded to include
statements about intended actions.
As in the strategic issue analysis, a form was devised for the RWQ and EQ issues
on a yearly basis. The first half of the form was divided vertically into RWQ and
EQ. Beneath each issue were 7 categorisations: overall and current performance,
their attribution, constraints, actions, future performance attributions, intended
actions. In keeping with the contextualist approach, the second half of the form was
devoted to external contextual categories: economic, social, governmental; industry
categories: industry wide (events), legislation, EEC, standards, classification (river
& sewage); and organisational categories: industrial discharges (including pollution
incidents), and internal actions. These yearly forms were reduced to more
abbreviated tables showing the information at a five year glance. In this way the
repetition and honing of information served to enhance familiarity and reduce
complexity (Pettigrew, 1990).
Analysis of RWQ tables showing classification of river lengths was translated into
graph form showing the trajectory of the 4 classification groups over time,
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alongside graphs of objectives and anticipated results. Similarly graphs were made
of EQ tables showing the degree of compliance with RQO5. These graphs were
valuable in providing a pictorial representation which could be analysed alongside
those of agenda structure and organisational phases.
The resultant combination of data display techniques: flowcharts of chronology,
graphs, tables; all allowed the researcher to write the first organisational
chronology, in which an attempt was made to deduce broad organisational eras and
transition points. This theoretical redescription of the strategic issue and
organisational evolution components, suggested early interpretations of chronology,
pointed to emerging conceptual frameworks and drew together theoretical ideas
(Pettigrew,1990). The career and trajectory of the RWQ issue could now be seen as
embedded in a multi-dimensional context and bound up in organisational
evolutionary processes, suggestive of periods of radical change interspersed by
longer periods of continuity (Pettigrew, 1986). Equally importantly, all data gave
useful lines of questioning for interviews, and were the springboard into pro-forma
construction and the testing of initial ideas in the field.
3.9.4 cross data analysis phase
This phase asked for manager's accounts of the chronological and developmental
phases of their organisation, and to explain the trajectory of the RWQ issue which
had emerged from archival analysis. In this way one could identify analytical
themes which cut across the data and get a sense of the emerging rules invoked by
respondents. Constructing the interview pro-forma was the first step in asking for
reasons, which generated more data gathering activity and further explanation in
turn.
3.9.4.1 interview pro-forma construction
Pettigrew (1990) sees the pro-forma in its creation and use as an instrument to link
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the deductive and inductive elements of analysis. This stage ties specifying theories
of method, the meta level analytical framework and the character of generic
propositions, with data reduction, display and theoretical elaboration.
Pro-forma construction was explicitly linked to the starting meta level analytical
framework, operationalised from historical and archive research and tested and
refined in the field in early data collection. The pro-forma operationalised the
context, content, process framework and linked it to the specific themes of the
study. The "what" level information having been verified by archival analysis, the
researcher moved out from the what (chronology of issues and change) to begin to
build up a picture of the "why" and "how" of these developments. The initial pro-
forma contained a set of broad themes: personal details, organisational
development, leadership, policy-making, regulation, pollution control, RWQ,
standards, EC directives, and privatisation (Appendix 3.2).
The initial interviews proved to be an important source of revision for these areas of
enquiry. For instance, some questions of a purely factual nature became redundant
as the interviewees filled in the knowledge gaps. Other areas expanded to include
topics which were introduced (such as the divisional context) and to build upon
points of view. Even areas of a factual nature could not all be taken for granted, as
in the case of the change in RWQ measurement from Imperial to the 95th
percentile. Some respondents regarded this as a neutral translation while others
regarded it as a loosening of standards. Very early on it became clear that
interviewees wished to talk about the changes which had occurred since
privatisation and the stark contrast this provided to Water Authority days, in some
cases having to be guided away from this focus to other topics. This seemed to be
an important topic for managers, largely because it provided substantial contextual
background for the way in which strategic issues were interpreted and/or acted
upon. It was decided, therefore, to include more detailed questions about the
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privatisation process and how this had manifested itself in concrete changes within
the organisations. Indeed much of the questioning in this area sought confirmation
or otherwise of previous reports. It was felt that privatisation could not simply be
talked about in terms of the regulatory changes on the organisation. Therefore it
was decided to explore the impact of this transition more fully to understand its
operational and decision making effects.
The interview pro-forma thus evolved to include questions about a whole range of
issues both directly and indirectly related to river water quality and organisational
change and culture. The interview schedule in its final state was the same for both
companies except for different names of directors and incidents specific to the
organisation. It was longer and more contextually embedded. As well as post
privatisation developments, it also explored more fully some of the scientific issues
and debates around standards which arose out of the initial interviews.
3.9.4.2 analytical schema for interview analysis
The first attempt to analyse the interview data was made after 12 interviews in
Severn Trent. The aim at this stage was to write an interpretative/theoretical case on
the packaging of strategic issues. This writing used as its basis the prior analysis of
the career and trajectory of RWQ and the chronological case. The interview data
was initially coded by going through the transcriptions to see the type of responses
which had emerged over the issue of RWQ. These responses could then be coded
via different colour markers until clear groupings emerged. Headings were devised
for each grouping and a list of quotes assembled under each, allowing easy
reference for comparison between individuals. Analysis of each group was
conducted via the constant comparative method Glaser & Strauss (1967), resulting
in individual themes being refined into categories, under which individual responses
could be compared. This reduced the volume of data to units of meaning. So for
instance, it became clear that former pollution control officers had different
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perceptions about the issue of RWQ compared to managers of sewage treatment
plants. This disparity was clarified in terms of organisational structure which
undermined the autonomy of the pollution control officers. In this way one arrived
at a category of issue suppression and its sub-headings, dilution of regulation
function and structure.
Further, one could link these organisational structural changes with the power
struggle at headquarters, which in turn had its roots in the industry arrangements
prior to 1974. In this way the analytic process involved making links between
interview categories, archival and historical data, so that each theme emerged out of
a juxtaposition of data sets over time. In this way further subheadings emerged such
as pre 1974 sector arrangements and leadership.
Additionally, one sought to contextualise the themes in order that the legitimising
processes of social action might be more fully understood. In this way one could see
how the undermining of pollution control was legitimised by the constraints on
capital expenditure imposed by central government. This led to several categories
under the theme of organisational response to pressure. The analysis was in this
way conducted along both horizontal and vertical dimensions with analysis of the
vertical dimension seeking patterns between multiple levels of context. In this way
one built up a pattern whereby links between the political and economic context and
internal structural change, resulted in consequent organisational ramifications to the
handling of the RWQ issue.
Further, more detailed propositions could then be derived from this overlay of the
vertical upon the horizontal dimension. Such prescriptive statements acted as an aid
to analytical generalisation. Also, greater interpretative powers could be given to
Dutton's (1988a) SAB model. These propositions, relating to the way in which
strategic issues were suppressed and promoted, could then be tested out in further
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data collection and analysis. It was after this first attempt at cross data analysis that
further interviews were conducted within Severn Trent and the Thames case study
began, following exactly the same procedure as outlined. The two organisations
showed very similar developmental patterns and strikingly similar stories were told
by Thames managers and directors. This led to some further induction around the
source and role of managerial beliefs and suggested the use of the punctuated
equilibrium model (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) as a useful theoretical framework
for describing continuity and change.
3.9.4.3 cross case analysis
This phase was triggered by writing a paper across the two cases in order to
consolidate the inductive process. Here the focus was on ideology and change
within the cases, involving a first attempt to link all the data along one theme.
Tushman and Romanelli's (1985) punctuated equilibrium model was utilised to
explain the similarities of organisational continuity and change. The focus on
ideology or managerial belief systems arose out of the similarity of accounts
between the cases about the content, context and rate of change. An analytical
schema across cases was devised to establish operational links between levels of
analysis. In this way an attempt was made to capture action and context over time.
The data reduction began in the same way as the preceding stage with the coding of
the interviews into categories. Here the burden of transcribing hundreds of quotes
was reduced by putting the page number under the respondent's name next to the
relevant category. In this way one could establish where all the relevant quotes were
in 37 interviews and select the best from each.
Analysis at the horizontal and vertical levels was conducted as described above.
This resulted in an emerging pattern of organisational development and action
within a contextualist framework of history, macro-environmental and sector
features. The resulting proposition about managerial belief structures linked these to
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a sector ideology which had been transformed under the macro-political ideology of
the New Right. In this sense, this paper approached organisational action from a
much more macro-perspective by tying it to broad sectoral and political influences.
More importantly, the investigation had shifted to include organisational ideology as
an expression of organisational evolutionary patterns.
3.9.5 meta analytic phase
The meta level phase utilises Giddens' (1979) structuration theory and an
institutionalist perspective. These together provide the conceptual building blocks to
explain the analytical themes and to join together the two polar aspects of the early
research fmdings. The water companies are conceptualised as temporal social
systems with intrinsic structural properties comprised of social structural rules and
resources (Whittington, 1992). A meta level analytic framework can then be
constructed, comprised of a horizontal level of analysis, showing the evolution of
the water companies from predecessor bodies, to the 1974 reorganisation, through
nationalisation and privatisation. Down the vertical axis are the social structural
rules and resources: dominant structures, basic resources, basic rules, and
organisations (Fig 3.2). During each organisational period the RWQ issue is
examined as an activity system showing the key influences:
Water Companies	 Predecessor	 1974 Reorg	 1983 Nationalisation 1989 Privatisation
Activity5vstem	 RIVER WATER OUALITY REGULATION
Dominant structures Communal
	 Communal	 Communal	 Communal
Judicial	 Judicial	 Judicial	 Judicial/EC
Environmentalists
Basic resources	 Scientific Expertise Sc Expertise	 Sc Expertise	 Legit coercion
Legit coercion
Basic rules	 Prof codes	 Mm cap exp RQOs	 Financial Controls	 Compliance
self-regulation	 self-regulation RQOs	 SRQOs
Organisations	 River Authorities WAs/DoE	 WAs/DoE	 NRA
Prof bodies	 Prof bodies	 Prof bodies	 Prof bodies
NWC	 WSA
KEY: WA: Water Authority; RQOs: River Quality Objectives; SRQOs: Statutory River Quality Objectives
Sc: Scientific; Prof: professional; Mm cap exp: Minimise capital expenditure
Table 3.2 Structural Evolution of the RWQ Issue
Adapted from Whittington (1992)
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This tabular display is but a crude example and there is much more scope for
developing more detailed and precise tabulations. However, it allows one to
integrate the phenomena of RWQ into a coherent framework thereby allowing for a
more powerful conceptualisation of both phenomena.
The demonstration of causal powers is possible by reference to the social structural
rules and resources influencing the phenomena. For instance, the RWQ issue prior
to 1974 was an important one in the sector, because it was managed within River
Authorities (RAs) set up for precisely that purpose, staffed by individuals with high
levels of scientific expertise, who regarded their work as a vocation and followed
professional codes of conduct. The empirically researched contingencies are the
contextual features of that era, so that these causal powers could be exercised in a
fragmented sectoral environment, where the power of Drainage Authorities was
low, where RAs had the sole regulatory power as endorsed by statute and their own
financial resources. The structures responsible for RA' s powers are the legislative
powers of the state responsible for their existence and the authority structure itself
which is vested with regulatory power. Also the professional bodies to which
pollution control officers belonged and which legitimised scientific procedures and
codes of conduct. Ultimately one might refer to the scientific method as an
academic structure legitimising procedure, or the type of actions taken to prove the
culpability of the polluter.
This analytic process is then applied to the RWQ issue over time which indicates
what has happened to the activity system responsible for this issue. In this way we
can see RWQ being subsumed into Water Authorities after 1974, coincidental with
lowered concern, and not reemerging as systems in their own right until 1989.
One can then look for linkages between phenomenon. So for instance the decline in
the salience of RWQ after 1974 can be explained by the loss of legitimate coercion
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being part of a monolithic water authority. With only scientific expertise as a basic
resource, this was easily countered by the dominant rule to minimise capital
expenditure which overrode even those of achieving river quality objectives and self
regulation. This arrangement served to undermine the autonomy of pollution control
officers, resulting in structural properties, such as professional codes of conduct,
being left dormant.
In the above manner, the phenomena under study can be accounted for in terms of
causal powers and the structures they emanate from. The contextual emphasis of
this research gives a grounding for understanding the patterns of interaction between
powers and contingencies. In particular a powerful contingency is that of time and
of understanding the development of phenomena through time. However, if we are
not to conflate structure with agency we must explain how organisational members
manage change. Here Giddens' (1984) stress on the intersection and contradiction of
social structures can reconcile the two concepts.
As Whittington (1992) makes clear, there are two principle forms of agency. The
first is achieved by managers recognising the internal ambiguity and plurality of
rules which govern the reproduction of a particular set of social structures. For
instance, the water authorities after 1974 were a plurality of functions: water,
sewage and regulation, each with objectives and modes of operation in conflict with
the overall public health ideal. Therefore, in the late 1970s when public
expenditure was tight, water managers were faced with Treasury controls to cut
capital expenditure, an authority mandate to provide an acceptable level of service
to the public and commitments to RWQ objectives (RQOs). Where managers are
faced with a variety of legitimate but conflicting rules of conduct, then choice is
possible, albeit constrained by the differing magnitude of powers inherent in the
structures.
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The second principle form of agency is more powerful in supplying options from
the contradictory overlapping of various structural rules and resources. Here
managers may exploit the external contradictions between the system's intrinsic
structural properties and alien rules and resources, either imported by others
through their multiple organisation membership, or introduced by necessary
relationships with other cross- cutting systems of activity. So for instance, we might
explain the way in which Roy Watts lobbied for privatisation of the water industry.
By evoking the New Right philosophy of the Tory government to create efficiency
and pay off government loans, he could then exploit the obvious contradiction in
government policy which increased the rate of return to the Treasury and raised
prices. By arguing government was a bad manager he could employ capitalist logics
to call for privatisation as the champion of the people. In this way, Watts was
exploiting not only the inherent contradictions in government policy, but also those
of the status of the water industry as both nationalised and regional body.
This analysis also explains the way in which the suppression or promotion of
strategic issues indicates managerial choice and agency. What contradictory or
external systems do managers call upon when they insist on maintaining standards?
What structural rules and resources are invoked or left dormant, to suppress
strategic issues? More importantly, for the comparative nature of this research, one
might explain differences in performance outputs in the same way. Both Thames
and Severn Trent had new Chairmen in 1983 who imported capitalist logics of
commercialism into their authorities. While John Bellak used the commercial
language of quality and customer care to argue for maintaining standards, Roy
Watts emphasised efficiency to rationalise downsizing and expenditure cuts. Thus
both Chairmen employed the logics of the same dominant structure to invoke the
promotion and suppression of RWQ. In this way structuration has proved a
powerful theory for understanding complex micro political and ideological
organisational phenomena in action and over time.
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3.10 Conclusion
This research has attempted to wed the contextualist and realist theories of method
in a comparative case study. Each theory serves to reinforce the others assumptions
and contributes new dimensions of analysis. The realist paradigm has enhanced the
contextualist's concern with levels of analysis by specifying the "what" in terms of
structures and causal powers, the "how" in terms of contingent factors and the
"why" in terms of the generative mechanisms underlying agency.
The contextualist theory brings dynamism to the realist perspective with an
emphasis on the temporal dimension. In this, the overlay of the horizontal level of
analysis upon the vertical gives causal tendencies their dynamism, and indicates
where indeterminate outcomes are a product of the contingent link of a set of causal
powers. Additionally, realism is enhanced by the contextualist emphasis on holism
and pattern seeking. This aids the analytical process of looking for patterns of
interaction between powers and contingencies. In this way these theories make the
distinction between causal laws and empirical generalisations, and real structures,
actual events, and experienced events (Tsoukas, 1989).
If these theories of method are to retain an epistemologically valid position, they
demand the researcher makes explicit their generic propositions and analytical
framework. This involves being explicit about pattern recognition, operationalising
category formation and meta level constructs. The contextualist and realist
interpretation here, involve a cyclical methodological process, where data collection
and analysis are intertwined, being both iterative and reflexive. They demand an
open and potentially revisionist perspective on the part of the researcher toward the
phenomena under study, and above all concrete empirical research.
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SECTION 2: INDUSTRY ANALYSIS
This section aims to provide an account of the development of the water industry
from its earliest beginnings in the public sector to the present day. The theoretical
basis is the punctuated equilibrium model (Tushman and Romannelli, 1985) of
change in conjunction with a process model of history. This history will follow
periods of continuity and change in the industry and will attempt to link the key
industry phases to the social, political and economic context of the day, and to show
the influence of organisations and individuals in shaping developments.
This section is divided into three chapters: the first, chapter 4, discusses the history
of the water industry in terms of distinct phases punctuated by discontinuous
change. The punctuated equilibrium theory of change (Gould and Eldredge, 1977) is
applied to the industry in what Meyer, Brooks and Goes (1990) term a revolution
model. This model focuses on second order change in industries and they apply it to
both the punctuated equilibrium and quantum speciation models, derived from
biological theorising. In the first place, industries are conceived to be restructured
and reconstituted during brief periods of quantum change which punctuate long
periods of stability. Secondly, quantum speciation has been proposed as a
mechanism whereby new organisational forms might emerge during such periods
(Astley, 1985). Within this second order change a distinction is drawn here between
changes that produce new organisational forms (recreations) and those which merely
instigate new industry practices and structures (reorientations) (Tushman and
Romanelli, 1985).
The next, chapter 5, will trace the trajectory of the issue of river water quality
within the industry over the same time frame and using the same developmental
model of continuity and change. River water quality is seen as a strategic issue
whose salience for the industry is shaped by both 'objective factors' of the condition
of rivers nationaLly and the political, economic and social context of particular eras.
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Of interest here are the tensions inherent, both within the industry and between the
industry and external contexts in establishing quality parameters and priorities.
The last, chapter 6, aims to describe and explain the development of industry level
beliefs, here termed an ideology, which were instrumental in shaping the industry's
response to structural and external contextual changes during the time frame of the
case study chapters in section 3. These ideological beliefs will have their roots
traced out to the wider society at large and in particular, to the impact of political
developments in shaping industry ideology during the transition from the public to
the private sector.
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4. HISTORY OF TIlE WATER ThDUSTRY
It is with such chains, such 'series', and with history in the long term that I have here been
concerned: they provide the horizons and the vanishing-points of all the landscapes of the past. They
introduce a kind of order, indicate a balance, and reveal to our eyes the permanent features, the
things that in this apparent disorder can be explained (Braudel, 1981).
4.1 Introduction
Beginning with the emergence of the industry in the nineteenth century as a
municipal undertaking, the industry developments and key changes are traced to the
present day in the private sector. This chapter explores each phase in terms of
industry trends, key developments, either in promoting or contrary to the main
trends and the strategic issues of concern to the industry. In BraudeU s (1981) terms,
developments may be seen as events of a short term duration, trends as conjunctures
of events, being continuous in the medium term; while issues occupy a position
midway between the two, being at times medium term and continuous and at others,
single short term events. Of particular interest here are the longer term issues of
water resources, river water quality, industry structure, status and regulation which
appear and reappear throughout the course of history.
After a slow and discontinuous emergence, the water industry has been
characterised by five main phases of continuous (adaptive) development punctuated
by two reorientations and two recreations, originating from both the wider social
environment and from the industry and organisational levels (see Appx 4.1 for an
overview).
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4.2 Pre-Industry Developments
The industrial revolution in its beginnings around 1750 had far reaching effects on
water supply and sewage disposal. Apart from the tremendous increase in
population and the redistribution of population between urban and rural areas, the
industrial demand for water increased rapidly. The gradual introduction of water-
borne sewage systems led to a rapid and serious rise in epidemics, particularly
cholera (Barty-King, 1992; Collinge, 1967; Hall, 1989; Kinnersley, 1988).
During 1843-45 the first Royal Commission sat to enquire into the water supplies of
large towns and populous districts in England and Wales. The Commission's
recommendations resulted in the Waterworks Clauses Act of 1847 and the Public
Health Act of 1848, the foundation of modern water law in Britain. These Acts
provided that water supplies were to be "pure, safe and constant", and of such a
pressure as to reach the highest house within the area of supply.
4.3 Emergence: 1867-85
The impetus for the emergence of the industry arose from widespread concern with
pollution and the control of water resources. The Rivers Pollution Commission
which sat from 1865 to 1867 recommended legally controlling the management of
rivers and their watersheds, to be placed under the superintendence of a central
authority. The Royal Sanitary Commission 1869-7 1 advocated the setting up of
Watershed areas each controlled by a Watershed Authority. Though it passed the
Public Health Act 1875, embracing many of the recommendations of the Royal
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Sanitary Commission, the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act 1876, and Public Health
(Water) Act 1878, which made it the duty of all rural authorities to provide a supply
of water to houses in their area. Parliament took no steps to implement the
recommendations of any of the Commissions with regard to the control of water
resources (Barty-King, 1992).
The 1867 Franchise Reform and 1875 and 1878 Public Health Acts gave local
authorities (LAs) powers which hitherto they could only obtain through Acts of
Parliament. Whereas in 1830 there were only 11 municipal undertakings, in 1878
there were 78. The Local Government Acts 1882, 1888 and 1894, together with the
Gas and Waterworks Facilities Acts of 1870 and 1873, resulted in Britain' s water
supply being taken into municipal ownership at an increasing rate. But for
resistance put up by private undertakings such as the Sheffield Water Company this
trend would have been even faster. The Royal Commission on The Housing of the
Working Classes 1885 stated that: Prolonged experience has proved that the
Vestries could not be relied upon to enforce the laws, and it was manifest that some
effective provision must be devised for preventing them perpetually thwarting the
intentions, and defeating the imperative enactments; of Parliament desi gned for the
welfare of the Community at large (Barty-King, 1992:138).
There was no dearth of well intentioned legislation. Disraeli' s Public Health Act
1875 set up a nationwide system of sanitary authorities responsible for water supply
and sewage, but the private water companies shared the doubts of the Housing
Commissioners that the elected representatives of the people at local level had the
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will or ability to carry it out. The Provincial Water Companies Association was
formed in 1885 with Percy Blakelock, Chairman and MD of Sheffield Water
company, as its first Chairman to voice its opposition. This later became the Water
Companies Association (Barty-King, 1992).
Proposals for regional water management in England and Wales were mooted over
a century ago. A series of essays was published in the Journal of the Society of Arts
in 1879 on Suggestions for dividing England and Wales into watershed districts, as
a competition. One proposal, the winner of a silver medal, called for 12 watershed
districts with boundaries not much different from those now adopted, each
containing one or more complete river basins, managed by commissioners who
would have charge of all the rivers and water works in their district, so that every
drop of water falling in their district should be more or less under their control,
from the time it falls on the land until it reaches the sea. This proposal
recommended conterminous districts, with separate commissioners for sewerage and
sewage treatment because .. . the Commissioners of Water Supply will be much more
likely to guard the rivers jealously from pollution if they have not themselves the
task of purifying the polluted waters of the sewers (Toplis, 1879: 696-709). Thus,
the 'poacher gamekeeper' conflict (see 4.8.7) was seen to be an issue from the start.
4.4 Continuity: Municipal Consolidation 1885-1944
This period of continuity is characterised by the emergence of professional industry
bodies which would push for a national water policy. The disruption of two world
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wars, political indifference and economic crisis would mitigate against any coherent
national policy. However, the number of water supply undertakings was halved
between 1910 and 1936.
By the end of the nineteenth century the business of providing fresh water was no
longer considered a boon but a prime necessity and a sanitary science. Progress was
now engineering led but still required public or private sector funding. The
significance of the formation of the British Association of Water Works Engineers
and the Association of Sewage managers was that water industry policy at the
beginning of the twentieth century, would be drafted with the advice of professional
bodies which understood the increasingly complicated technical issues.
Between 1900 and 1910 three Royal Commissions considered and reported on the
matter of sewage disposal, along with associated problems. All their
recommendations pointed to the need for a central authority to control Britain's
rivers for water conservancy purposes, as had been suggested 40 years previously.
All of them were ignored. The Joint Select Committee who considered Lord
Desboroughs' Water Supplies' Protection Bill in 1910, reported the need to
establish local boards for water supply under a central authority. Parliament was
dissolved before the Bill could be introduced. Before dissolution, Parliament called
for a return from every water undertaking in England and Wales. This survey
showed 2,160 water suppliers, comprised of Local Authorities, Joint Water Boards,
statutory and private suppliers (Hall, 1989). Three quarters of England and Wales
had piped water supply, of which two thirds were provided by municipal
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authorities. The sheer number and variety of undertakings worked against the ability
to exert influence on Government policy. This state of affairs prompted the
formation in 1911 of the Municipal Waterworks Association (Barty-King, 1992).
With the outbreak of war in 1914, all schemes for new water supply legislation
were halted. The Water Power Resources Committee, appointed as soon as war
ended, recommended setting up a Water Commission, responsible to the newly
instituted Minister of Health, to consider how best to conserve the nation's water
supply. This constituted an advisory committee of engineers who were members of
the British Waterworks Association, the Water Companies Association and the
Institute of Water Engineers. From 1922 this body (CAWC) became the driving
force behind the formulation, in the face of political indifference, of a national
water policy, until suspended in 1931 at the time of the economic crisis.
The issue of water scarcity was still a strong one in the question over who should
determine priority over the water supply. In 1934 the three driving bodies of the
industry felt Parliament should move further towards a national policy and convened
a Joint Conference on National Water Policy. Their report eventually resulted in the
resurrection, in 1936, of the CAWC by the government, under the Chairmanship of
Field Marshal Lord Mime. The aim was to help the government reach decisions
which were seen to be fair. The Public Health Act of 1936 enabled the Minister to
constitute a Joint Board to control the water supply of a district. Mime's committee
advised that the powers should be extended to enable the minister to authorise the
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amalgamation and acquisition (following a public enquiry) of water undertakings,
whether local authority or private.
In 1936 there were 1,000 water undertakings in England and Wales, including 50
county councils, 150 borough councils, 300 urban district councils, 300 rural
district councils, 33 joint water boards and 173 companies with statutory powers. A
population of 27 million was supplied by LAs and Boards and 6 million by private
water companies (Barty-King, 1992).
Preparatory studies leading to the 1945 and 1948 Acts were initiated and conducted
during the height of the military engagements of WWII. These studies revealed
several major concerns:
1. Adequacy of water supply, particularly in industrialised urban areas, was being
threatened.
2. The large number of local authorities, each responsible for providing its own
water supply and wastewater collection, was inadequate in addressing the problems
that often required joint action.
3. Government exerted little influence on the passage or implementation of local
acts for water management.
4. A confusion of authorities, responsibilities and controls over the water in the
river and the river itself prevailed.
5. No national strategy for water management existed and the necessary data upon
which such a strategy might be based were not available (Okun, 1977). In terms of
the national consciousness, attention to water supply at that time may have been
heightened because the war, and particularly the bombings, may have accentuated
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the need for more adequate water supplies for fire-fighting. But when peace came
the lack of labour and materials delayed any implementation of the scheme.
4.5 Reorientation: A National Water Policy 1943-48
Unheralded at the time, the Water Act 1945 was the essential first step leading to
the regionalisation of all water management in England and Wales, with the Rivers
Board Act 1948 being the second (Okun, 1977). Three elements of the 1945 Water
Act were most significant:
1. A single Minister, the Minister of Health was charged with the responsibility: to
promote the conservation and proper use of water resources and the provision of
water supplies in England and Wales and to secure the effective execution by water
undertakers, under his control and direction of a national policy relating to water.
2. The Central Advisory Water Committee was created to advise the Government in
matters related to water.
3. The Minister was authorised to order, without an application of any of the local
authorities concerned, the constitution of a united district of all or parts of LAs as
joint water boards for the purpose of providing water supply for areas larger than
that of any single LA. The Act empowered the Minister where it
appears:... expedient for the purpose of securing a more efficient supply of water
to.. .by order provide compulsorily for any of these matters (Okun, 1967:153-4).
The Water Act of 1945 made possible the grouping of smaller water undertakings
into Joint Water Boards, like Thames Water Board which was the biggest, under the
political control of the Minister of Housing and Local Government. This Act
replaced the 1847 Waterworks Clauses Act and laid the foundations of a new phase
in the history of water supply, the keynote of which was planning and coordination.
It put the government's national water policy on the statute books. The formation of
the water boards took time, however, and continued well into the 1950s.
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The government of the immediate post-war period took the advice of the CAWC
and passed the River Boards Act of 1948 to administer the River Pollution
Prevention Acts of 1876 and 1893. It also assumed responsibility for controlling
abstractions from underground sources. The legislators allowed themselves to be
guided by the engineers. To promote the advancement of technology and the
administration of knowledge as applied to the water industry, a number of
supervisors, foremen and inspectors formed the Association of Water Officers in
1945.
4.6 Continuity: Rationalisation 1949-1971
There was significant growth in all parts of the public sector after 1945. The
Labour government, elected on a programme of economic and social reform, was
committed to nationalising the major basic industries, to economic and physical
planning and to establishing a full programme of social welfare (Farnham and
Horton, 1993). Local government grew at an even faster rate than that of central
government, as it was the key provider of the new and expanded services in
housing, education and personal social services. It was also given responsibility for
environmental, physical and infrastructural development. It employed over one
million people by the late 1940s and over three million by 1979. Alongside the
increase in public employment went a corresponding increase in GGE. From 1901-
13 it was approximately 10% of GDP, from 19 19-38 around 13%; and it rose to an
average of 20% between 1947 and 1970.
The 1945 Act led to extensive regrouping or regionalisation of water supply
undertakings. Originally, the water undertakings were expected to initiate the
regrouping which was implemented very gradually by persuasion rather than fiat.
Following the 1950 election, the Labour government did not enact legislation
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compelling regrouping but, in 1956, because of resistance and its slow pace, the
Ministry of Housing and Local Government, along with leaders of the water supply
units (mostly in the British Waterworks Association) embarked upon an aggressive
and pragmatic program to accelerate the process. Only about 10 per cent of the
regroup ing orders were made compulsorily and from an original 1186 water
undertakings in 1945 and 1030 in 1956, the number dropped precipitously to 260 in
1968 (Okun, 1977).
Initially this regrouping had been bitterly fought throughout the water supply
industry. Organisations with long histories of service and positions of authority
within these organisations were to disappear. Local identification with local water
supply undertakings and the people operating them were to be replaced by the
anonymity of larger and presumably less responsive agencies.
Had there been more pressure for regrouping, the number of water supply
undertakings at the time of the 1974 reorganisation might have been halved. The
1951 Act, in Section 9, authorised the regrouping of sewerage functions. However,
except for a total of only 27 joint boards, sewerage and sewage disposal remained a
local authority function, with almost 1400 separate undertakings providing service
until the 1974 reorganisation (Okun, 1977).
4.6.1 1963 Water Resources Act
The post-war expansion of the population with higher living standards, the final
connection of rural areas to mains suppliers and the great increase in industrial use
began to make serious demands on water resources (Collinge, 1967; Woodward,
1967; Hall, 1989). Prodded by a most serious drought in the summer of 1959 that
caused severe restrictions on the use of water and threatened many industrial
operations, the CAWC came out with its Proudman Committee Report in 1962 that
drew attention to the need for national policy planning for water. The existence of a
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large number of authorities, each acting in an isolated fashion without regard to the
situation nearby or nationally, was deplored: what was required was the creation of
comprehensive new bodies, ie river authorities, to manage the water resources of
river basins as a whole. A government White Paper that same year (1962) accepted
most of these recommendations, excepting only the proposal for a central executive
body, substituting an advisory body with a mandate only for water conservation
planning but without the power to execute projects (Okun, 1977; Woodward, 1967).
The result was 29 new major authorities based on the old river boards, while
suppliers and local authorities remained independent (Hall, 1989). The most
innovative aspect of the Water Resources Act was the authority for the RAs to
initiate charges for abstractions: The charges. . . shall be levied at such rates. . . as
appear to the River Authority to be requisite for balancing their water resources
account (Okun, 1977).
Regrets were widely expressed that the government did not propose to centralise
power, recast the water undertakings, or combine water conservation and supply
and distribution. Denis Howell (later Minister of State for the Environment in a
Labour government) pointed out that it is administratively wasteful to have separate
water supply and wastewater disposal organisations, an idea that was somewhat
ahead of its time.
One of the most significant clauses of the 1963 act created the Water Resources
Board to oversee the authorities and to work out government policy for water
resources. It was to investigate and plan on a national scale the country's future
requirements. In the words of Lord Hastings, introducing the bill in the House of
Lords: . . . surely this is a Board of real strength, and one with the duly of taking the
initiative (Okun, 1977:22). However, the advisory status gave the Board no powers
to act and RAs seldom had the finances to follow through recommendations.
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Opposition to proposals for the WRB was vehement, with claims that it would lack
punch and drive and could not act as a substitute for a central water authority. A
change of government in 1970 and the creation of the DoE with its own Water
Directorate brought about the demise of the Board when the Water Act of 1973 was
introduced (Woodward, 1967).
The water resources issue continued to dominate the industry as one of concern
after the 1963 Act: Present estimates are that, in broad terms, demand will double
by the end of the centuly (Collinge, 1967:5), leading, after much research and
discussion to the reorganisation of the industry in 1974 based on the concept of
integrated river basin management.
4.7 Recreation: Reorganisation 1968-73
The reform was largely the initiative of the Ministry of Housing and Local
Government (later DoE). Its reasons were various but included a desire to avoid
having to adjudicate in local disputes in the industry. The Ministry also felt that
water tended to be neglected in local authorities and so favoured the setting up of a
self-financing water industry where management would have a higher priority and
status. This solution also reflects the fashion of the time: the managerial revolution
(Richardson & Jordan, 1979:46).
The real (as opposed to political) debate ran on across the change in governments in
1970. The impetus to reform was organisational, following the 1973 Act, functions
were administered within large, managerially oriented, integrated organisations
instead of small-scale, uncoordinated units. This change was as radical a policy
switch as can be cited in post-war Britain (Richardson & Jordan, 1979).
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4.7.1 integrated river basin management
In appreciation of the need for study of the existing situation in the water industry,
the government established the Working Party on Sewage Disposal in February
1969, chaired by Lena M Jeger, MP and in Sept 1969 reactivated the CAWC
authorised by the Water Act 1945. Meanwhile, in March 1969, a joint symposium
was held in London on Future Organisation of River, Sewage and Water Authorities
under sponsorship of the Institute of Water Engineers, the Institute of Public Health
Engineers and the Institute of Water Pollution Control.
CH Spens, chairman of the joint symposium and for almost ten years previously
chief engineer of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, proposed the
novel idea of multi-purpose Regional Water Authorities for England and Wales
independent of local government (Barty-King, 1992:161). He concluded that:
change was necessary and change was bound to come. The consensus was that
despite its many positive features, in failing to define clearly the river authorities'
responsibilities for developing water sources, the Water Resources Act 1963
undermined clearly designated responsibilities of the water undertakers as spelled
out in the 1945 Act.
Most significantly, a changing concept was that the water industry no longer served
solely a public health function; water was a commodity to be sold for public use.
Therefore, water management on a regional basis might well be in the hands of
small and efficient boards of directors with highly competent technical staffs rather
than under the control of elected local authority representatives.
Spens concluded that only drastic reorganisation would suffice, with a small number
of autonomous regional water authorities which would:
- control the whole of the hydrological cycle,
- be based on river catchments or groups of catchments,
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- control river flows, both in quantity and quality,
- be responsible for conservation and development of resources,
- abstract water for public supply, treat and distribute it,
- collect wastewaters and conduct them to treatment works,
- construct and manage treatment works, accept the effluents back into the rivers
(Institute Public Health Engineers et al, 1969).
The CAWC's (1971) report The Future Management of Water in England and
Wales (see Collinge, 1972:13), confirmed the view that the responsibility for water
was fragmented among many separate bodies, with conflicts between them and
inadequate machinery for resolving these conflicts. The main problems were:
inflexibility in the use of resources (Department of the Environment, 1971 b),
division of responsibility between river authorities and water supply undertakings
for development of new sources; promotioll of large schemes; and inadequate levels
of wastewater treatment. They concluded that reduction in the number of operating
units and changing relationships amongst authorities were necessary to permit the
formation and implementation of comprehensive water management plans.
The conclusion of the CAWC in their 1971 report was that the remedy lay in a
much greater re-use of water and therefore much greater concern with the treatment
given to water after use. That depended on the existence of a single comprehensive
water management plan for every river basin (Nixon, 1972:1-6). The object of
integrated river basin development has been defined as: The orderly marshalling of
water resources of river basins of multiple purposes to promote human welfare
(United Nations, 1970).
CAWC was not of one mind with regard to the implementation of reorganisation,
with some favouring step-by-step change and others urging a more radical, one-time
surgical operation (Nugent, 1971). The greatest criticism of the CAWC report was
that it did not come to any hard decision as to the desirability of single-purpose vs
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multipurpose authorities. It set Out the advantages of each and left the government
to choose (Banks, 1973).
The proceedings of the Symposium, published in 1969, and in the same year the
Royal Commission on Local Government which recommended reorganising
municipal bodies, the report of the Jeger Committee, published in 1970, and
especially the report of the CAWC, issued in April 1971, all contributed
significantly to the governments decision to move ahead. These documents helped
shape the government's proposals for reorganisation which were published before
the end of 1971.
4.7.2 the Local Government Act 1972
The presence of the then sitting Royal Commission on Local Government in
England, if not its recommendations which were not yet available, hung heavy over
discussions of water reorganisation. Fear was expressed that water reorganisation
might need to be adapted to decisions made for local government rather than for
local government to be molded to permit sound reorganisation of the water services.
Senior (1974:557-9) pointed out: it was evidently characteristic of the department in
charge of housing and planning.. .that what its left hand was up to remained
unknown to its right hand, or even to its erstwhile head.
The Local Government Act 1972, calling for the reorganisation of local authorities
on 1 April 1974, with health service reorganisation taking place on the same date,
gave urgency to consideration of water reorganisation. If water reorganisation were
to follow long after 1 April 1974, then local government would have to suffer two
successive and equally traumatic reorganisations over a very short period. Thus the
Secretary of State for the Environment, on 2 December 1971, announced to the
House of Commons the government's intention of reorganising the water services
on the basis of ten all-purpose regional water authorities and subject to approval by
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parliament, this would take effect on 1 April 1974, the date of local government
reorganisation.
4.7.3 government proposals
The government believed the time had come to bring together all aspects of the
hydrological cycle under all-purpose management structures (Barty-King,
1992:166). While, in the six years of their existence, the river authorities had made
a useful start, problems had arisen from the separate responsibility for water supply,
river management, water conservation, pollution control, sewerage and wastewater
disposal. The government concluded, and the Royal Commission on Environment
Pollution concurred, that water authorities concerned with all relevant aspects of
water management should replace the many and diverse public authorities in the
field.
The Regional WAs would take over the water conservation, water quality control,
navigation and recreation functions of the river authorities as well as those of the
British Waterways Board for canals and navigation. They would replace the existing
joint water boards and joint sewerage boards but the statutory (privately owned)
water companies would continue, provided a satisfactory arrangement could be
made for them to serve as agents of the WAs.
Under their powers, the WAs were able to focus on the various roles of a river as a
source of water, as an amenity and as a recipient of discharges from sewage works
and factories. Each needed to balance these requirements in the best overall interest,
in the knowledge that river water quality, standards of sewage treatment and
potential for water resource use were linked.
Local authorities would continue to be responsible for local sewerage, although the
WAs would control the discharge of industrial effluents to these sewers. Local
Chapter 4: History of the Water Industry Page 148
authorities would also retain the responsibility for independent testing of public
water supplies to assure that water delivered by the WAs would be wholesome.
Banks, representing the views of many professional engineers who had favoured the
adoption of single-purpose authorities, was far more accepting of the projected
reorganisation following the Government's proposals: As a long term solution to the
water problem, the proposals have much to commend them. Sewage treatment and
pollution control are closely related to water supply, and all three can affect the
provision of recreational facilities and amenities, the importance of which is
emphasised again and again in the memorandum (1971: 2361).
4.7.4 constitution of the water authorities
The government agreed with the CWAC that WA areas should be hydrological and
that their boundaries would therefore not coincide with those of local government.
Close cooperation between the WAs and local authorities at all levels would be
necessary if the reorganisations of local government and water management were to
succeed. Five factors were to contribute to this close cooperation:
1. the appointment of a majority of members on each WA from LAs,
2. the LAs' service as agents of the WAs for discharging the sewerage function,
3. the relationship of planning in the WAs to the system of land use planning,
4. cooperation in the provision of goods and services by one authority to another,
5. arrangements for emergencies and disasters.
Within the area of each WA, one or more consumer councils would reflect the
various interests involved in the WAs, such as local authorities, industry, farming,
amenities and recreation. The WAs would report to these councils and the councils,
if dissatisfied, would have direct access to the Ministers. A water council was
proposed, consisting of a chairman appointed by the Ministers, the chairmen of the
WAs, and appointed members having specialised knowledge of industry,
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agriculture, amenity, recreation and other matters of concern to the WAs. This
national body would promote efficiency in the industry by comparing practices and
performances of the WAs and help the WAs to profit from one another's
experiences. Also, the statutory (private) water companies would be retained, as
these companies could continue to play a valuable role as agents of the WAs.
The Ogden committee was charged in 1972 to consider possible forms of
management structure with the view to producing guidance on this matter for the
WAs. Their report The New Water Industry Management and Structure (Department
of the Environment, 1973) was issued one year later. The committee emphasised
that a multidivisional multidisciplinary approach to management was essential and
that a start should be made immediately at HQ. While the overall planning process
must be determined at regional level, the committee recommended that
responsibility for the different water functions should be delegated to divisions to
the fullest possible extent, consistent with efficiency and economy, in part on the
basis that such decentralisation would encourage staff involvement. With regard to
the operation of the WAs themselves, the committee hoped the members of WAs
would adopt a corporate approach and not pursue local constituency or special
interests. A committee structure was suggested (UBS Phillips & Drew, 1989:23).
The proposals for reorganisation were met with a wide disparity of responses, from
enthusiasm, congratulating the government for being progressive, farsighted and
bold; to claims that the reorganisation was not sufficiently radical. Many others
claimed that it went far beyond what was necessary to deal with the existing
problems. For instance, a strong plea was made for separate directorates for water
supply, sewage disposal and rivers. As Finch elaborated: The sewage functi on
should not be carried out by one officer responsible to another officer, whose
primary discipline may be one of the other two functions; water supply or the river.
No man can do justice to all three functions; there will inevitably be a conflict of
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loyalties and there is plenty of precedent in local government on this important
subject (1974:5-13). Banks criticised the proposals: . . . in lacking the checks and
balances of independent authorities; in being monopolies with obligations to show
returns on capital employed (as do other state corporations) and whose spending
will be influenced primarily by the needs of the water cycle rather than the
consumer.. .(1972: 1929).
The Water Bill passed on its second reading on a party line vote, 220-210. This
narrow majority of only 10 presaged a somewhat more turbulent passage through
the committee stage than expected. Parliament met for the fourth time on 17th July
1973 to consider amendments to the Bill made in the Lords, none of which was
controversial. As originally drafted, the Bill appeared to give WAs wide discretion
in deciding whether to comply with directions from the Secretary of State. On 18th
July 1973, the Bill received Royal Assent.
4.7.5 preparation phase
Even before the Water Bill had received Royal Assent, preparation for
implementation of the Act had begun. The attitude of most in the water industry was
that the reorganisation had to be made to work, particularly by those at the
executive level, who were involved in planning at an early stage. It was the
acceptance of the reorganisation on the part of those who had fought it bitterly, such
as Peter Black, chairman of the Thames Water Authority and Alex Morrison, its
chief executive, who, when reorganisation seemed inevitable, and they had been
selected for leading roles in it, were determined to make the Thames Water
Authority and the entire reorganisation successful (Okun, 1977:104).
Anticipating passage of the Bill, the government announced on 10 July 1973 that, if
parliament were to pass the Water Bill, certain designated individuals would be
appointed as chairmen of the WAs. Almost all had considerable experience in some
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phase of the water industry. Eight of the 11 chairmen had been primarily involved
in private enterprise, business, industry or farming. Among the members appointed
by the government, about 40 percent represented private industry with 60 percent
representing some element of public life, including the nationalised industries,
agricultural and environmental groups and local authorities.
The WAs were to be created in 'shadow' form as soon as possible so that they
might begin to appoint staff, organise into committees, make budgets and in all
ways be so organised as to be 'off and running' on 1 April 1974. The ten WAs
were established by statutory orders during the period 26 July to 14 August, while
the NWC was brought into existence on 23 August. The first meetings of all the
WAs were held in August 1973.
Most of the activity in preparing for reorganisation day, 1 April 1974, and for the
period beyond was concentrated within the WAs. In the very abbreviated time
interval between their formation and the date that they would assume full
responsibility for hundreds of millions of pounds' worth of facilities, the WAs were
required to organise themselves, employ officers staff and workers, establish their
HQ and those of their divisions, prepare budgets and assess charges and collect
moneys. The WAs were to be a new type of body. As Okun succinctly relates: The
opportunity to create de novo a group of massive organisations seldom appears.
The challenge is particularly great when these organisations are to employ some
65,000 individuals, spend hundreds of millions of pounds annually, and affect the
lives of eveiy individual in the nation in some way (1977:114).
The reorganisation was being launched at a most difficult time from an economic
standpoint, with Britain undergoing rampant inflation and with considerable
pressure from unions for substantial increases in salaries and wages. A few weeks
before vesting day a national election was called in February 1974, and parliament
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disbanded. The Conservative government lost the general election and a new
Labour government took office at the time that the WAs assumed their
responsibilities.
Labour Ministers were not greatly opposed to the large public sector bodies created
out of reorganisation. These large bodies were established to tackle what were
perceived as big challenges. A local authority recruit to the new Thames WA recalls
the ethos of the public sector: Don 'tforget this was the era of development and
change in the early seventies. Where big public authorities, technocrats were going
to be the way of doing it. Local authorities had become bigger, health authorities
had been created, it was very much a flavour of big technocratic organisations that
could attack these large problems. We could get our professional and our economic
base right and we could go for these sort of things.
An editorial commemoration of 1 April 1974 was arranged by the Surveyor (29/3)
which had called for contributions to an issue concentrating on reorganisation and
the day on which it was to occur, All Fools' Day. The responses were characterised
as generally gloomy and the published contributions had: the air of the condemned
whistling on the way to the guillotine. As Okun concluded: Whether this was the
greatest reorganisation ever 'perpetrated', a characterisation of the reorganisation
rendered by the chairman of the NWC, Lord Nugent, will be left for history to judge
(1977:136).
The 1973 Water Act was the culmination of a process of industry concentration and
a move towards integrated river basin management and regionally based decision
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making, having its roots in the earlier part of the 20th century. Substantial portions
of the 1945 Water Act governing water supply were restated by the 1973 Act.
Likewise substantial portions of previous Public Health Acts governing the
provision of sewerage services were also restated (UBS Phillips & Drew, 1989). In
this way, the 1973 Act took management arising from the 1945 Water Act to its
logical conclusion, integrating the remaining 157 water and 1,393 sewage
undertakings, together with 29 River Boards, into 10 regional water authorities.
4.8 Continuity: Integration 1974-79
A radical transformation of perhaps the most vital public service of all has taken
place quickly and efficiently without any faltering in the standard of that service
(NWC, 1975a). So stated Lord Nugent in the first annual report of the National
Water Council. Nevertheless, many problems did surface. Some were attributable to
the nature of the reorganisation itself, such as accountability to the public and the
relationships between the WAs and the LAs whose residents they served. Other
problems could be traced to external forces such as the deterioration of the national
economy. Ultimately, these problems in conjunction with national political events
would undermine the potential benefits of industry reorganisation and invite further
central government control, leading to the next period of change.
Such massive restructuring was bound to create problems, some anticipated and
others unexpected. Uncommonly serious economic perturbations buffeted Britain
during initial implementation of the reorganisation. Nature also conspired against
the new WAs in their third summer with the worst drought in recorded history.
Many contended that only the reorganisation enabled England and Wales to ride out
these difficulties by permitting a more efficient use of both financial and water
resources than would have been possible under the old fragmented system of
control. Some local water supply projects could be put off because exploitation of
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resources on a regional basis made them redundant. Limited financial resources and
the absence of outside subsidy forced the WAs to explore ways of establishing
priorities so as to derive the greatest benefit from each investment of scarce funds.
The change period was marked by great enthusiasm and commitment to the task
ahead. As one operations controller of sewage treatment recalled of the change from
local government and severe fmancial restraints:.., everybody who had been really
constrained. . . saw this formation of the water authorities as a glorious opportunity
to do all these things for the benefit of the business that they had never been able to
do before. So we all worked extremely hard to put it together and great changes
great improvements were made in that first year.
4.8.1 organisation of WAs
Despite the guidelines from the government the individual WAs did exhibit, perhaps
more than might have been anticipated, considerable independence in how they
organised themselves (Thorpe, 1975:22). Very quickly, each WA displayed a
character and style of operation uniquely its own. The WAs varied extensively in
area and population served, in water resources availability, and in the nature of the
problems they faced (Okun, 1977:137).
Within three months of the creation of the shadow WAs, the New Civil Engineer
(1974) headlined an editorial: RWAs go their different ways (see 6.3.2). On
reorganisation day only 152, instead of 260, divisions were created, representing all
combinations of functions. The Surveyor (1974a: 1/3) concluded from such a diverse
set of structures: The drastic pruning of the number of authorities responsible for
water supply and sewage disposal is welcomed, everybody expecting to see
immediate benefits from the reduction of duplication and effort and improved
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coordination of the two ends of the cycle. Shared services are generally looked
forward to. while better resource planning and spending of capital in these penny
pinching times is seen as a major advantage.
However, the concept of corporate management recommended by Ogden began to
be criticised (Surveyor, 1 974c: 27/9). Hender (Chief Executive of West Midlands
CC) decried the emphasis on 'labelled boxes', indicating that far more attention
should have been given to the process of management rather than the structure, and
he faulted the Ogden Committee report for this lack. Sir William Dugdale,
chairman of STWA, summarised the general approach to the management structure
by calling corporate management: . . . a weapon against departmentalisation and not
an aim in itself. The corporate management team was just like a board of members -
verbose, discursive and in most cases fairly irrelevant - but it had the great
advantage of letting everyone know everybody else's business (Surveyor, 1974c: 11-
15).
4.8.2 the national agencies
The Water Ac did not change the relationship between the government and those
responsible for providing water services. The Secretary of State for the
Environment and for Wales and the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
continued to have the duty to promote jointly a national policy for water in England
and Wales. Even initially, the newly created WAs were to have much greater
freedom of action and relief from detailed control as contrasted with the predecessor
authorities. For meeting the purposes of national policy direction several new
national agencies were created: the National Water Council and the Water Space
Amenity Commission were statutory bodies established under the Water Act 1973;
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the Water Research Centre was established as a company and the Central Water
Planning Unit and the Water Data Unit were part of the DoE (Okun, 1977:177).
The DoE modified its procedures following reorganisation, abolishing a
requirement that it give consent to applications for loans. WAs were now free to
borrow within an overall capital ceiling, with the DoE determining these ceilings
(subject to Treasury control). Ceilings were based upon a compromise between the
requirements of the WAs and the national needs for capital in other fields. The
other major responsibility of the DoE was the surveillance of the corporate planning
responsibilities of the WAs, including long term plans and estimates for future
demands for water over a 20 year period.
The NWC was not like any other central water organisation previously existent in
Britain or elsewhere. It was seen at its creation as facing in two directions, to
government and to WAs, with little to offer but advice and with no obligation on
the part of either to accept this advice. The most important statutory obligation of
the NWC was for the training and education of the 65,000 employees in the
industry. The current Deputy Director of the WSA who joined the NWC in 1977
recalls the role of the NWC:. . . it had an important role in finding a place where the
representatives of the WAs could come and talk. . . the first thing they needed to do
was to establish national standards. . . An alternative view is provided by a former
assistant director of operations in Severn Trent who saw the 70s as a period
renowned for authority get togethers at the NWC: Ten regional Water Authorities
all trying to find out what the others were doing.. . it started off very innocently.. . and
there were useful monthly meetings. But then they spawned lots of subsidiary
committees. It was labour intensive.., almost an industry in its own right.
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There was a general perception of a fragmentation of responsibility at the center
amongst the DoE, the NWC, the WSAC, the WRC, the CWPU and the WDU
(Okun, 1977). It was felt that this situation usurped the important national role of
the NWC, as Thorpe (1975:22) wrote: It does not augur well for the future. I
believe that the NWC has a vital role topl in seeking to provide a national
identity and sense ofpurpose for the water industry and that it is not helped in so
doing by a proliferation of bodies each meeting one or more aspects of our national
needs.
4.8.3 finance
The government soon faced pressing problems in terms of national economic policy,
which made it convenient to have a strong central grip on WAs. The economic
crisis in the mid-1970s coincided with the Labour Party assuming office. Its
response was to cut back planned expenditure and to break in part with the post-war
consensus. As Farnham and Horton (1993) argue, it was the slowing down of
economic growth in the 1970s which was eventually to undermine the Keynesian-
Beveridge edifice. A turning point was the onset of the long world recession
triggered by the oil shock. This would eventually leave the way open for new
political and economic ideas to take their place in 1979.
The country's economic difficulties were reflected in the financial problems
experienced by the water industry. In the first instance, going into business with
totally inadequate working capital and very sketchy information about the financial
situation inherited from some predecessors. The National Loans Fund provided
capital at 17.5% which given the total expenditure in the second year of operation
made in TWAs case:.. .something of a financial nightmare which must be sorted out
(Morrison, 1975).
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Related to this was the investment ceiling set by government via the Public
Expenditure Survey. This was compounded by inflation which raised interest rates.
This on the inherited loans of its predecessors was likely to increase charges. An
uncomfortable promise at a time when the new WAs were trying to gain public
favour. This was not helped by the condition of inherited infrastructure, the
maintenance and replacement of which would only serve to exacerbate the situation.
The question of charging also proved difficult as the Water Act had required the
industry to establish an equitable system for its services. These charges had been
historically "disguised" in local authority rate demands, also the task of billing
millions of customers appeared daunting.
Water service financing was to be shaped by the application of two principles: that
the services must pay for themselves, and that a service should be offered only if its
benefit exceeds its cost. The effects of this new approach are seen in the
requirement that any subsidy 'for the public good' be rendered explicit, so that all
might know its cost: Against such a background, the new economic philosophy of
the reorganization is nothing less than revolutionary (Okun, 1977:228).
4.8.4 charging
Few of those involved realised just how long and painful the transition, still
incomplete, from subsidy to solvency and from expediency to optimality would be.
The combined economic and industry inheritance problems, resulted in large charge
increases not only in the first jolt of 1 April 1974 but also in the presentation of the
subsequent annual budgets of the WAs. The inaugural charges of the WAs
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represented a 41 percent increase over the charges of the prior authorities, as
compared with a retail price increase of about 20 percent over the same one-year
period (NWC, 1975b).
The principles enunciated by the government and incorporated in the Act explicitly
prohibit subsidies and implicitly prohibited equalisation, or the establishment of
uniform charges within a region. The debts inherited by the WAs were immediately
incorporated into customer charges, with no assistance from the national exchequer,
as the rate support grants were not available to the WAs.
The issue of equalisation was to be no more marked than in the furore which
erupted over charging in Wales. The severe financial strains of the water
reorganisation in Wales actually threatened the reorganisation. Throughout the
parliamentary debates on the Water Bill, repeated references were made to the
special interests of Wales in the water reorganisation. This was a serious problem
because Wales was amongst the most impoverished areas of the UK, with high rates
of unemployment and little modern industry and hence had been heavily subsidised.
The bitter feelings engendered by the increased charges were exacerbated by the
growth of Welsh nationalism and the election of Welsh Nationalists to parliament,
whose influence far exceeded their numbers because of their strategic situation in
alliance with Scottish Nationalists. Altogether the nationalists constituted a balance
of power as between the Labour and Conservative Parties in 1974.
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Finally, the Secretary of State for Wales created a committee of enquiry chaired by
Sir Goronwy Daniel. The Daniel Committee constituted the first formal review of
reorganisation and was a precursor to the government's own full-scale review. The
most significant recommendation of the Daniel Committee was that early action
should be taken to reduce the difference in average water charges between the
WNWDA and the other WAs by introducing legislation to give a Welsh Assembly
executive responsibility for water supplies in and from Wales.
The Labour Government were unable to uphold the Conservative Government's
promised relief to householders and the average national increase was nearly 30
percent. The ratepayer's revolt was only subdued by the introduction of a new
government rate relief formula, which would subsidise any increases over 20
percent in the sum of both charges and rates as a special measure for 1974-75 only.
The storm eventually abated, but not before the officers of the WAs had been
effectively diverted from implementing reorganisation by being forced to spend
many evenings on 'whistle-stop' tours attending protest meetings. Wills, Chairman
of Wessex WA: It is our misfortune that so great is the current, and unhappily,
expected rate of inflation, that no economies of scale - and there have been some
that we can show - have been able to break through the great upward march of
charges based upon the rate of inflation that we are currently suffering... (Wills,
1975: 20). He advocated moving to direct billing as soon as possible.
Thorpe wrote of the anomalous situation of the authorities:.., the criticism of our
charges is often supplemented by a reference to the consumers' belief that the
regional water authorities and their members are not accountable for their activities
and in particular for the level of their spending.. . Our constitution therefore places
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regional WAs between the local authority situation on the one hand and the
nationalised industry situation on the other (1975:24).
Public resistance to the new charges, much of which the public had already been
unwittingly paying, focused on charges levied against properties not connected to
sewerage systems which culminated in the highly publicised Daymond case in 1975.
In the transitional period following the reorganisation little change was effected in
the system of charging, and the general services charge, which included as a major
item the sewerage and sewage disposal service, was automatically continued:.. . this
charge stood out in isolation, literally inviting protest from persons not on main
drainage who realised for the first time that they were paying for a service which
they did not receive (Roberts, 1975:16-33).
In May 1975 the courts held that even 50 percent charges against unconnected
properties were beyond the legal powers of the WAs. The SWWA's appeal to the
House of Lords was dismissed, thereby forcing the WAs to refund some £60
million collected from some 900,000 unconnected property owners in England and
Wales over the first two years. The NWC estimated that the average charges to
customers would have to be increased by about 21 percent in the third year of
reorganisation, 1976-77, to cover the loss in revenue (Surveyor, 1975).
4.8.5 capital investment
The greatest initial changes in the financing of water services were in capital
finance, as the WAs were more akin to nationalised industries than to the LAs from
whom they inherited their services. While the WAs had the power to allocate their
capital resources amongst all the services for which they were responsible,
switching their financial resources about as appropriate, the government placed a
capital ceiling each year on each WA similar to their practice with all nationalised
industries (UBS Phillips & Drew, 1989:35).
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This control by the government of the capital expenditures of the water authorities
was based, as it was for the other nationalised industries, on the need for
government to manage its economy in the face of serious financial strictures. In
order to help the government fix these limits, the WAs were required to identify
their objectives and prepare long term investment plans. Within this limitation, the
WAs were not subject to detailed interference on projects but were able to borrow
to the extent necessary to cover their programmes after the WA investment
programme had been approved by the government.
Two other conditions brought the capital programme more into line with the
nationalised industries than had been the case of the LAs. Firstly, borrowing for
capital purposes would have to be from the National Loans Fund, the European
Investment Bank and other foreign sources subject to Treasury and Bank of England
approval. Temporary borrowing from other sources would be permitted only for a
short term working capital. Secondly, the WAs were set a target rate of return on
capital investment.
The financial situation that the WAs inherited precluded beginning large scale
programmes of financing capital investments from revenues, as the charges were
already found to be much higher than had been anticipated. The government, which
had originally suggested that a ten percent reserve fund be developed over a three
year period, felt obliged in the second year of the reorganisation to limit the
amounts to be placed in the reserve to two percent of gross revenue, which was to
include amounts to be used for capital reserve, signifying that initial capital
expenditures would have to be met almost entirely from borrowing.
At the National Water Conference in 1975 many speakers complained about the
crippling interest rates from borrowing (Eric Gilliland, director of finance Thames
WA) and the effects of underinvestment in the industry. For instance, by impeding
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the realisation of economies of scale, Brown, Chairman of Yorkshire WA (1975:6)
forecast: It is my impression that we have in front of us an as yet unidentifiable bill
for 30 or more years of lack of maintenance planned to match the rate of decay.
While Shaw (1975) came to the same conclusion from the effects of the increase in
charges that arose from undertaking capital expenditure. Both Shaw (1975:17) and
Thorpe (1975:24) concluded the industry should be allowed to go on the open
market and compete for the funds to take on the more intensive and high price
capital projects so urgently needed.
Nevertheless, the precarious economic situation presented WAs with an opportunity
to demonstrate the economic efficiency of the new organisational structure by
utilising existing resources, facilities and personnel in an optimal manner. However,
the low level of spending through the 1970s and the early 1980s undoubtedly led to
a deterioration in asset condition and associated levels of service (UBS Phillips &
Drew, 1989).
4.8.6 relationships with LA.s
The sharp increases in water charges, regardless of their justification, created strong
resentment because of the seeming immunity of the WAs to complaints from local
authorities and the public. The constitution of the WAs, with a majority of local
authority members, was intended to demonstrate accountability. Resting somewhat
between the local authority with elected members, and a nationalised industry, with
all appointed members, the WAs were in an ambivalent position in responding to
charges of indifference to their customers. Faced with the responsibility for
continuing existing water services, the local authority members of the WAs found
themselves assuming positions little different from those of the appointed members.
The agency agreements for the district councils to manage sewerage on behalf of the
WAs also created problems (Wills, 1975). The emotional context in which the
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relationships between the district councils and the WAs existed was revealed in the
annual conference of the District Council's Technical Association, where it was
suggested that:.. .both sides might get on just as well, and probably understand each
other better, if they passed their messages in bottles thrown into the nearest clean or
dirty waterway (Randall, 1975:853).
4.8.7 the poacher-gamekeeper issue
The conflict of interest of the WAs in being both polluter and regulator created
remarkably little controversy within the industry initially (Carney, 1991a). In
practice, any conflict was overcome by ensuring that the regional authorities were
not allowed to consent their own discharges - they were obliged to seek consents
from the Secretary of State. There were also internal processes of discussion and
consultation, involvement of local authority representatives and the publication of
plans and results. However, this "poacher and gamekeeper" role remained for some
a source of suspicion and weakness, in particular because of the delay in
implementing the Control of Pollution Act 1974 (see 5.7.7). In light of the severe
limitations placed on capital investments, the NWC and the WAs asked the
government not to implement, for a period of three years, the provisions of the
COPA, which would make WAs liable to prosecution with respect to discharges
from their facilities that infringed consent conditions originally imposed by the
predecessor river authorities.
More serious was the practical problem of improving the quality of drinking water
and waste-water effluents during a period when government was trying very hard to
contain public expenditure. For much of the 1970s capital investment in water was
being reduced (Fig 4.1), when it should have been increasing (Carney, 1991b).
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Fig 4.1 Capital Expenditure in the Water Industry 1920-2000
Source: UBS Phillips & Drew (1989)
The Director of Scientific Services of TWA voiced an:.. .increasing feeling of
unease regarding our national water pollution control position. Two years ago I
was convinced that the attention of the then Government to achieve a marked clean
up of rivers by the 1980s showed a promise, of a brightfuture for the new water
industry.. .Now this bright prospect has evaporated substantially (Fish, 1975a: 7).
4.8.8 drought crisis
Paradoxically, the one disaster of the first years also found in the Authorities'
favour. This was the drought of 1976/77 which was the worst since records began.
The sixteen months from May 1975 to August 1976 were the driest in England and
Wales since meteorological data collection was initiated in 1727, with estimates
indicating the drought in some areas to have been the most' severe in the
millennium. This not only tested the new Authorities capabilities to the limit but
also demonstrated the robust nature of integrated river basin management. The WAs
were able to develop all the available resources to their areas without regard to local
political boundaries and to reallocate and redistribute these resources for their
fullest use.
All in all, the drought did call attention of the populace to the water reorganisation
and the role of the new water authorities at a time when they needed public
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understanding. At least the public were aware that the system worked and could
cope in adversity. Carney (1991b) noted one additional consequence of the drought:
The cut in investment in sewage treatment was even more savage than that of capital
expenditure because investment priority had to be given to water supply following
the drought and to drinking water quality.
4.8.9 the government's (1976) review
The future of the industry was clouded by the government's decision to initiate a
review of the reorganisation after less than 18 months of operation, which
undoubtedly created strain and uncertainties amongst personnel in the water
industry, as the potential for further reorganisation could not be far from the minds
of those most involved.
The main thrust of the 'green-edged' white paper was for creation of a stronger
agency at the centre, a National Water Authority, as had been fervently called for
by the Labour opposition during the parliamentary debates, and for some measure
of equalisation as a response to the Daniel Committee recommendations, as well as
to integrate the privately owned water companies (that serve about 22 percent of the
population) into the WAs with fair compensation (estimated at about 300 million) as
soon as practicable. The government emphasised that the water industry as a whole
should continue to be financially self-sufficient and should operate without subsidy.
After examining various equalisation schemes, the government proposed to reduce
the wide variations in average bills paid in the WAs by an interim device of pooling
the historic (up to 31 March 1976) financing costs attributable to the provision of
unmeasured (primarily residential) supplies.
In proposing only minor adjustments, the government demonstrated its support for
the new organisation of water management. In 1977 the government issued its
White Paper: The Water Industry in England and Wales: The Next Steps. In general
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the proposals in the government's 1976 Review were affirmed with the exception
that the take-over of the private water companies was to be deferred because such a
proposal would not gain sufficient parliamentary support.
4.8.10 1976 moratorium
In 1976-7 as balance of payments difficulties grew acute and water resources had
taken the strain of the drought well, capital spending in water services was a ready
victim of a series of cuts. Additionally, the forecasted water shortages were proving
incorrect. This possibly encouraged the restrictions on capital expenditure that were
imposed on them in successive years. More importantly, as Kinnersley (1988)
notes, the least strain was falling on what had already been the best organised
function (clean water) when the Authorities, took over in 1974. It would be the
sewerage system and sewage works, previously neglected by LAs, that would feel
the main brunt of the cutbacks in the late 70s and early 80s (UBS Phillips & Drew,
1989:21; Barty-King, 1992:172).
This worsening of the economic climate in Britain, necessitating the Labour
government to call in the IMF, was to underline the fundamental problem
bedeviling the industry. This lay in the first instance with the constitution of the
WAs. These so called independent organisations, part LA via Board membership
and part nationalised industry via links with the DoE and the Treasury, were in a
cleft stick. On the one hand subject to the influence of individual LA policies such
as housing development, affecting resource expenditure. On the other subject to a
national expenditure policy which was to have the opposite effect on capital
expenditure. As Morrison, Thames' chief executive wrote in a paper to the Institute
of Municipal Engineers (1976:2): In such a situation it may well become necessaly
for a WA to defer work in the current financial year because it would over-commit
expenditure in subsequent years.
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Peter Hall, then accountant with the NWC training division, described the
moratorium at the time as quite severe, with the consequence that the industry did
not recover for a decade. Subsequently: The incoming government saw the public
expenditure of the water industry as helpfully low and came in on cash limits. And
nothing improved. The industry had a low priority on the government's agenda due
to public and political perceptions at the tirne:The provision of waste water and
drinking water service wasn't bad. . . So it was very difficult to impress. upon the
government priorities in this area. . . and we presided over a slight deterioration in
the quality of services offered. Mainly on waste water, sewage treatment.
4.9 Reorientation: Nationalisation 1979-83
In the period up till 1979 local authorities in general continued to provide services
on the basis of the 'bureaucratic paternalism' (Hoggett and Hambleton, 1987)
which characterised the post-war settlement, despite increasing signs of public
disillusion with public services which appeared to be provided by insensitive,
monolithic bureaucracies in conformity with rigid and apparently unnecessary rules
(Crewe, 1982; Parkinson, 1987). The public disillusion with local authorities came
to a head during the wave of public service strikes which occurred in late 1978 and
early 1979 which became known as the 'winter of discontent'. Criticisms of public
services were increasingly heard and were a contributory factor in the election to
office in 1979 of the Conservative Party under Thatcher (Elcock, 1993).
4.9.1 1979 election
After the 1979 election the Conservative government quickly came to show
generally far less sympathy for local government. After the 'winter of discontent' it
was this breakdown of the post-war settlement which opened the way for the ideas
of the 'New Right' in domestic politics during the 1980s and 1990s (Benn, 1989;
Farnham and Horton, 1993). These ideas and the governmental policies deriving
4.
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from them, challenged the social democratic principles and values which had
dominated British politics since 1945 (see 6.4). The government's economic goals
were explicitly stated in the 1979 election manifesto. The emphasis initially was
upon controlling the money supply, reducing public expenditure and cutting income
tax (Marsh, 1991). Markets now became preferred to politics as the means for
allocating resources and distributing welfare in the new 'enterprise culture' of the
1980s and 1990s. The responsibility for providing public services and welfare
shifted from largely monopolistic state provision to a mixture of public, private, self
help, family and voluntary sources. Targets were the large impersonal and
centralised state bureaucracies. The water industry mirrored these trends with the
imposition of statutory fmancial controls and the associated changes in accounting
policy and manpower reductions. This change period culminated in the
nationalisation of the water industry which would bring it under firmer Whitehall
control.
4.9.2 statutory financial controls
The post-79 managerialist philosophy had a number of important consequences for
the water industry. WAs were pushed strongly towards more self financing and less
borrowing. In 1981 the government decided that the water industry should borrow
less and less until they financed each year's capital expenditure out of that year's
income and repay existing debts before their due repayment date (Barty-King,
1992:168). All such financial restructuring led to larger water bills. Indeed
Whitehall became much better in the early 80s at setting targets and limits for each
nationalised industry that would really put management under recurring pressure to
reduce costs and reduce external borrowing.
Chapter 4: History of the Water Industry Page 170
There were three main devices for this: 1) External financing limits tied potential
levels of investment closely to target levels of internal cash generation which could
be reduced each year. 2) Financial targets prescribed a level of surplus to be
achieved, expressed as a return on capital which would be gradually increased (as a
percentage on asset values also increasing) each year. 3) Performance aims were set
to prevent the cost reductions being achieved by reducing the spread or level of
services provided. This last device was to ensure that the water authorities should
be seen by their customers to be giving value for money, both with regard to the
quantity and quality of service (see Appx 4.2).
4.9.3 accounting policy
Fixed asset accounting is of fundamental importance in the water industry as it is
characterised by substantial investment in long life assets. The main accounting
form used was the historic cost accounting (HCA) system with additional reporting
on a current cost accounting (CCA) basis. Current cost accounting (CCA) was
introduced into the industry in 1981 to be used alongside HCA reporting. Although
it was adopted voluntarily, it was not without pressure from the Treasury. The CCA
methodology Was applied to all assets. Particular problems were found however
when applying CCA to underground assets. Within the water industry there was the
generally held view that CCA asset values are too high and that asset lives used to
calculate the CCA depreciation are too short. This is based on the fact that estimates
of capital spend for renewal are always significantly less than CCA depreciation.
CCA is said to attract only a 'compliance' view from auditors (UBS Phillips &
Drew, 1989).
The then accountant with the NWC, Peter Hall, described the impact of CCA as
creating general confusion because the industry had inherited historic cost or debt
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related expenditure:. . .you had a situation where the historic cost of the industry was
something like a billion and the replacement cost was something like 50 billion or
more. This meant a rather different rate of return when setting prices according to
the current cost and the increased rate of return provides an enormous profit on the
historic cost which is reported.
The effect of adopting CCA was much more to improve cash-flow and internal
financing through higher charges than to produce accounts more accurately
reflecting economic reality (Kinnersley, 1988:117). A more practical result was that
with the low cost returns as a result of paying off debt, WAs were unable to carry
out capital works to comply with certain regulations, all the capital expenditure
controls being subject to a different regime. According to Peter Hall: I think what
they found most difficult was they could save money by being effective and efficient
but they couldn't actually use that to do the things that legally they were bound to.
4.9.4 manpower
In the period following the 1974 reorganisation, manpower numbers increased (Fig
4.2).	
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Fig 4.2 Manpower in the Water Industry 1975-91
Sources: WSA (1991) & UBS Phillips & Drew (1989)
The reasons for this were: the introduction of direct customer billing; continued
demand growth and the filling of vacancies caused by many employees not wishing
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to transfer from their original employers (mainly LAs). After 1979 manpower
numbers began to fall - accelerating after 1982. A nationally based productivity
scheme for manual workers was introduced after 1980 and the introduction of
stringent operating cost controls on authorities in 1982 forced major reductions in
manpower through continued changes in work practices; the introduction of
technology and cutting corners on achieving levels of service targets (UBS Phillips
& Drew; 1989:24).
4.9.5 1983 Water Act
In 1982 the Conservative Government acted on complaints from some sectors that
WAs were not responsive enough to the market or consumers. The 1983 Water Act
swept aside LA representation in favour of a small governing Board, meetings
which were closed to the public and Chairmen from industry rather than public or
environmental affairs (Williams et a!, 1990). The substantial reduction in board size
did away with the need for management committees. Instead, reporting to the board
was established on a more professional basis and channelled through the CEO
making a two tier organisational structure (Fig 4.3).
	
Statutory Comrnitt
	 Board	 DOE/Welsh OfficeIMAFF Appointees
Corpoeste Mgent
	
CEO + Functional Directo
	
Regonal Managemen	 [visionalManaemj
(Functional Responsibilities) 	 (Multipurpose Divisions)
• Engineering	 • Engineering
• Finance Mministrntion 	 S Finance
• Planning	 • Scientific
• Scientific	 •Ppecatiofls
Ofl	 or	 perationsJ
• Water supply	 • District Multipurpose
• Sewerage services	 Management
• Land drainage
• River functions
Fig 4.3 Two Tier Organisational Structure Source: UBS Phillips & Drew (1989)
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This placed the WAs on a more similar footing with other nationalised industries.
The Act introduced a more professional managerial approach to constituting the
board - limiting the size to a maximum of 15, all of whom were appointed by
central government. Instead local public opinion was represented in the decision
making process through consumer consultative committees and various statutory
committees representing sporting, recreational, amenity and conservation interests
(UBS Phillips & Drew; 1989:23).
The main effect of the 1983 Act was to bring the Authorities closer to Whitehall
control which in effect changed the rules for how WAs operated. The CEO of
Severn Trent recalls the peculiar status of the organisation: It was a publicly owned
government run organisatiOn.. . We were accountable to anybody... We worked
directly for the DoE. You had to be appointed director of the organisation by the
Secretary of State... We were a state owned company, even though we were
regional.
The government abolished the statutory National Water Council in 1983 and the
WAs set up their own non-statutory Water Authorities Association to promote their
interests nationally (Barty-King, 1992). The soon to be assistant director of WAA,
Peter Hall, recalled the impact of the 1983 Act: as a surprise to the staff of the
NWC. Only the Chairmen knew, as they had been taken to one side by ministers.
The Chairmen then proceeded to meet quietly elsewhere. With the abolition of the
NWC and the introduction of tighter cost controls and performance aims the
industry became more inward looking to the individual authorities.
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4.10 Continuity: Commercialisation 1984-87
Michael Heseltine, Secretary of State for the Environment, appointed Chairmen to
WAs with the brief firstly, to run the Authorities: with the efficiency characteristic
of any major well run business and secondly: to be commercial (West, 1985). This
brief was fulfilled no more thoroughly than by Roy Watts of Thames Water
Authority, who within the first year of his appointment was accusing the
government of forcing up the rates to customers. This situation arose from the effect
of the statutory financial controls which forced up prices faster than inflation
(Williams et al, 1990). The whole thrust of the comniercialisation phase was
directed by government's statutory financial controls which made an impact right
through the industry, from the planning stage to operational practices and ultimately
upon the quality of discharges and river water quality.
4.10.1 financial controls
Criticisms of the government's financial controls could be heard at the 1985 IWES
conference on The Impact of Financial Constraints on the Levels of Service in the
water industry (Edwards, 1985; Tricker and Hutton, 1985; Kinnersley, 1985;
Bellak, 1985). Edwards (1985:3), Deputy Director General of the CBI, noted
investment in the water industry had fallen considerably since its peak in the early
1970s. The broad consensus within the water industry and elsewhere was that
current levels of investment were too low and further increases of up to £100
million per annum in real terms were required to avoid an increasing backlog of
work. Borrowing was being progressively reduced in terms of total water authority
borrowing and was forecast to fall to zero in two years. The forward picture of such
a trend was that WAs being obliged to progressively pay off their outstanding debts
will become revenue raisers for the Treasury.
This view of the power of Whitehall was echoed in the same conference by
Kinnersley who likened the financial control to a harness in the way it fits together
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and enables momentum to be sharpened or checked. Having its antecedents in the
1973 Water Act, this power was far less obvious to the public than the authoritys
operational and managerial responsibility in its region: Power and responsibility
tend thereby to be divided: accountability is confused and weakened (1985:5). He
questioned the levels of service indicators and suggested these gave Whitehall
greater powers to squeeze WAs.
An alternative voice was that of John Bellak, Chairman of STWA, who spoke of the
beneficial effects of fmancial constraints, justified because of the absence of
competitive pressures. However, he yielded to protests relating to borrowing (EFL)
and to target rates of return. As no Government would commit itself firmly for
more than one year: Here we run into the inconvenient problem of elections: and
that is a very, very strong argument for removing us from the public sector (1985:7-
8) - thereby demonstrating STWA' s early support for privatisation.
4.10.2 the planning process
The WAs made two annual submissions to the DoE: an annual plan in March of
each year showing detailed P&L and Balance Sheet projections for five years. These
were accompanied by a projection of changes in levels of service along with
associated capital expenditure. Capital expenditure and level of service projection
were also made for a further 10 years out but in less detail with the October
submission showing the budget details for the following year. At the end of these
documents WAs made a bid for an EFL for the following year.
The water industry developed a methodology for measuring the service it provides
based on 'levels of service' indicators (see Appx 4.2). They formed one of the two
major planks of the regulatory regime following privatisation (the other being price
control). During the 1980s, most nationalised industries developed an array of
performance indicators (PIs) in response to pressure from the government (Treasury
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1978) and numerous critical reports from parliamentary committees and the MMC
(Carter, 1991; see 6.4.3).
Investment appraisal being linked to levels of service indicators was problematic, as
improving or maintaining levels of service was in turn dependent upon what
customers would be willing to pay. Being unable to measure the benefit from an
increase in levels of service the industry had to exercise judgement. The WAs in
their 'gamekeeper poacher' role had enormous flexibility in deciding whether or
not, or how fast to proceed with schemes to improve quality or reliability. They
needed this flexibility because of the stringent financial regime forced on them by
the government. In practice, however, many decisions on capital expenditure made
themselves: Perhaps one third of spending has to be done to meet statutoly
requirements. . .Another third will be on continuing projects. In only the remaining
third will decisions need to be made (UBS Phillips & Drew, 1989:31). Different
WAs had different approaches to selecting projects where there was latitude.
4.10.3 operational practices
Financial constraints had an impact on all aspects of the water industry, particularly
in operational practices where manpower reductions were the major cost saving.
The early emphasis on manpower reduction made possible by reorganisation, had
shown significant reductions of the order of 55% (Woods and Noone, 1985).
Operating costs rose substantially in real terms across the 1970s, followed by a real
decline in the 1980s (Table 4.1).
1987/88 Sm 
_______________
	
1974/75	 1979/80	 1987/88
Employee costs	 534	 630	 593
Power	 96	 132	 132
Other costs	 520	 672	 647
Total	 1150	 1434	 1372
Table 4.1 Water Authorities Operating Expenditure
Source: UBS Phillips & Drew (1989)
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There was a subsequent knock on effect on sewage effluent quality and hence RWQ
throughout the 1980s.
Woods and Noone (1985) predicted a change in emphasis within operations to
more technical considerations with pressures for further cost reductions. This would
encourage further manpower reductions, while the optimisation of works
performance against the triple factors of cost, quality of performance and reliability,
meant a crucial area of future development would lie in the improvement of this
manpower resource: Attention to date has largely been based upon the 'quantity'
element of that resource. The 'quality' or appropriateness of manpower as the
complimentary resource is now of major importance (1985:173). This prediction
would be realised in the privatisation phase of the industry.
4.10.4 river water quality
One of the consequences of long term reduced capital expenditure was a decline in
effluent quality and hence RWQ (see 5.9.2). Ritchie (1985) made this argument
most persuasively at the 1985 IWES conference. He pointed out that in overall
terms RWQ had slowed with at best marginal improvements since 1979/80.
Investment in 1974 was over 70% higher in real terms than in 1983/84. The effect
of financial constraints was a lengthening of the time scale for river water quality
objectives in order that capital investment could be directed to those projects which
would aid the attainment of identified 'levels of service'. This in turn, he argued,
would have a knock on effect on consumers in the long term, for charges would
have to increase due to essential investment in that part of the water cycle. This
burden on consumers would be made even more onerous by the government's
policy of requiring WAs to move to a position of financing capital expenditure from
revenue income.
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Since 1979/80 the unit costs of sewage treatment and disposal for a five year period
to 1983/84 had remained almost constant despite inflation. Ritchie made the crucial
point that efforts made by managers to reduce costs in real terms, in an area where
a substantial portion of expenditure was outside their control, were not fully
recognised: It is sad that savings made have had little or no impact on charges, as
policy on capital investment has led to a rise in costs which are a measure in
comparison to the revenue savings which can be made from operational economies
and the reduction in manual staff numbers (1985:2.2). A similar argument was
made by the WAA to the House of Commons Environment Committee and the
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution in 1987:The problems are
exacerbated by fresh priorities introduced by the government without an parallel
relaxation of the financial constraints.., in the absence of any additional financial
resources, a hi gher priority in one sector can only be achieved at the expense of a
lower priority in another sector (WAA, 1987a: 4).
A significant legislative development for RWQ was the implementation of COPA II
in 1986 (see Appendix 4.1). Its major effect, as far as sewage treatment works were
concerned, was to allow public access to information about discharges and to allow
prosecution by private individuals if WAs were found to be in breach of consent.
The impending legislation had led to the practice by the DoE since 1977/78; of
allowing operators to reduce effluent quality normally discharged and still stay
within the 95 per cent legal limit. This, according to Ritchie (1985) was not only
desirable but seductive where there was pressure to control revenue costs in order to
conform to the government's performance aims. COPA II also represented an
increased administrative burden (WAA, 1987b) in sampling, analytical procedures
and in maintaining records: In practice, COPA II, despite the additional costs
referred to, will not in itself improve rivers at all. Only capital investment will do
that, together with the public's willingness to meet the increased charges resulting
from such programmes (Ritchie, 1985:2.2.10).
Chapter 4: History of the Water Industry Page 179
4.10.5 government privatisation policy
Privatisation is often seen as one of the hallmarks of Thatcherism and expressive of
ideological motivations and goals (Wolfe, 1991; Vickers and Wright, 1989).
Maloney and Richardson (1992) stress the pragmatic motives and the considerable
criticism which accorded the programme (see 6.4.4). As Helm and Yarrow (1988)
point out, privatisation was as much a reaction to the failure to design appropriate
regulatory policies in the public sector, as it was to the ideological stance of
Thatcherism. Maloney and Richardson see this last point as a reminder that the
problems of regulating industry may be independent of ownership. Indeed, they
point to the global spread of privatisation, irrespective of political party to suggest
caution in seeing ideology as the sole driving force (1992:14).
Pragmatic motives were reflected in some of the early privatisations - such as
Arnersham International and Britoil. They related to individual companies rather
than whole industries, and they called for no special justification beyond a general
inclination to move enterprises from the public to the private sector. As the
momentum for the programme built up, the train of thought promoted was that what
had been good in the early stages for individual companies could and should be
good for whole industries, or nationalised utilities, such as British Gas. This move
to privatising much larger units, as it caught public attention, was also congenial to
a second motivation for privatisation - recognising that it could spread share
ownership as the sales of council homes had spread home ownership, leading to
what was described as popular capitalism (Kinnersley, 1988:129).
A further argument was that as well as reducing the public sector and the activities
for which the Treasury might have to provide some recurring finance, it offered the
Treasury an additional inflow of funds from the sale themselves. Given that the
Treasury welcomed the cash that privatisation could produce from asset sales, more
money could be raised by selling monopolies in their complete form than by
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breaking them up and selling them in a potentially competitive format. Thus the
Treasury came to have some vested interest in privatisations which move away from
their original motivation of promoting competition: and advocates of privatisation at
any price were driven to assert that almost any activity, even if conducted in much
the same monopoly format, will be conducted more efficiently in private rather than
public ownership.
4.10.6 the privatisation process
Richardson et al (1992) see privatisation as having the same status as a new issue.
From a political perspective, they record the privatisation process in terms of
patterns of actor involvement. Drawing on the concepts of 'policy community' and
issue networks' they found these models of actor involvement to be applicable at
different phases of the policy process, while neither captured its totality. What they
propose is that both policy community and issue networks represent different
manifestations of the policy actor interrelationship, through which one individual
policy issue such as privatisation could pass at various stages of development.
The pattern of the privatisation process involved four distinct phases: 1. A limited
consultation phase, involving only the policy community (ie WAs), here defined as
the sharing of community views of a problem which facilitate the development of
exchange-based relationships between actors. 2. An extended consultation phase,
involving a wider issue network, here defined as open networks of people that
impinge upon government. They are characterised as having a large number of
participants with no restrictions on entry and are fragmented rather than segmented.
3. An internalised policy-making phase which excluded all groups and resulted in an
impositional policy style. A fourth phase reintroduced all groups into the policy
making process after the government had imposed the establishment of the NRA.
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The chaotic and possibly episodic policy style must be understood in the context of
the gradual transformation of a policy community over a long period of time. Prior
to privatisation the water policy sector reflected the 1973 reorganisation around
IRBM. This was dominated by engineers and therefore emphasised technology
rather than political criteria for change. The reorganisation also imbued the industry
with a stronger corporate identity. This reorganisation had followed a common
pattern of policy making with all established interests accommodated. The water
policy sector conformed fairly closely to the model of policy community in which
technical expertise was the main basis for consensual decision making.
However, the seeds for radical change had been sown in 1973 which not only
introduced major innovations into the administrative framework but also provided
for some radical changes in the approach to water management. Water was now
regarded as an 'economic good'. Since 1973 it was seen less as a 'service' and more
as a 'commodity' (Okun, 1977). Further restructuring through the 1983 Water Act
pushed WAs towards a commercial ethos and excluded LAs from the policy
community. Thus the distribution of power within the policy community had
changed. With LAs excluded and increasingly tighter government financial
restrictions on the industry, economic considerations became more important than
technology. Thus the decision to privatise was not as radical as first appears. In
historical terms the industry had become more 'managerial' while 'technocratic'
conventional public accountability had declined.
4.10.7 initiation
In January 1985 the House of Lords questioned whether water price increases above
the rate of inflation were required by government in 1985/6. This followed from the
then water authority chiefs reminding customers that the government carried the
blame for the size of the increases. Sir Roy Watts, Chairman of Thames Water,
stated that his authority was unwilling to act as an income tax collector: It is a
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matter for parliamentary debate. We wish the targets to have the force of law; and
until such rules are approved we will if necessary, issue our own charging policy to
reflect our own figures. The targets imposed are excessive (Barty-King, 1992:172).
The Water Bulletin reported that Thames Water were taking on the government. Sir
Roy Watts used the charging debate to press for serious consideration of the
privatisation of the water authorities and instigated a backbench revolt against the
government. That is seen to be the beginning of the privatisation programme that
was completed in December 1989. At the end of January 1985, the Prime Minister,
Margaret Thatcher, had told the House of Commons:
The government would welcome new ideas on privatisation. However, the water
authorities are natural monopolies for many of theirfunctions and we need to be
particularly careful when considering replacing a public monopoly with a private
one (Barty-King, 1992:174).
In February 1985 Treasury Orders on Rate of Return provoked and annoyed the
management of some WAs. Roy Watts continued to play a key role in the initial
stages. Since Watts' appointment he had transformed the culture of Thames to more
like an American Utility Company than a British Service organisation. This
initiative from one part of the industry (the largest and most prominent WA)
reflected the changed values of new managers - though not the involvement of the
water policy community as a whole (Richardson et al, 1992).
Despite the categorical denial of any intention to privatise the industry, the first
inkling of privatisation from the government came with Ian Gow's speech in
February 1985. In attempting to secure the ready passage of a Formal Order,
required to set next years financial target for Thames Water and in order to
overcome the backbencher unrest, Gow spoke of: examining the possibility of a
measure of privatisation in the industry. In the same month Watts volunteered to be
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the first to be privatised. Within a month there was newspaper speculation that
TWA would be a candidate for sale into the private sector. This series of events
effectively threw open the whole privatisation debate and propelled the industry
towards the next major change in 1989.
Thus privatisation arrived on the agenda suddenly. In the policy initiation stage one
sees an absence of policy community influence or of widespread consultation
process (Kinnersley, 1988:127). The issue had been raised, no more. The key
instigator, Roy Watts was described in the Director as "the government's thorn":
Thames in the shape of its chairman, has been questioning, argumentative and,
some would say, difficult. "Those are accolades I have no difficulty with, " says
Watts (Rock, 1988:6 1). It was between the initiation phase and the successful
privatisation that the key decisions were made.
4.10.8 restricted consultation phase
On 1st April 1985 a discussion paper was issued - restricted to WA Chairmen. The
response stressed the need for the principle of IRBM to be maintained (Williams et
al, 1990). The restricted definition of its initial policy community had significant
ramifications for later development of water privatisation policy. It was the cause of
the first controversy as government was criticised for the limited scope of its
consultation exercise. The DoE paper asked for views on separation of operational
from regulatory functions, also: . . . whether pollution control and river management
in general, together with nature conservation, recreation and land drainage, are
best kept in the public sector, or whether it was possible to impose as obligations on
the private sector operational bodies, with setting and policing of these bodies to be
carried out externally (Richardson et al, 1992).
The Water Minister John Patten received 43 responses, 7 supported the principle,
11 opposed while 25 commented on the practical issues without expressing a view
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on its merits. The leaders of the industry were divided and reluctant to enter a
controversial political territory (Rock, 1988). They took the stance that the decision
to privatise was a political one while the practicalities were of central concern to the
industry. The WAA had started to look for ways of introducing private sector
involvement in the mid-80s, driven by a general frustration with public sector
finance. Peter Hall: There was a real interest in alternative ways offinancing the
industry. We had a small group looking at privatisation opportunities, mainly
because we were hearing a great deal about the French franchising processes. We
thought that wasn't quite right for us... this committee reported and said without a
major reorientation of the statute there wasn't a great deal anybody could do.
The WAA felt authorities should be privatised as they stood with all obligations
embodied in a license to each authority. They stressed no clear line between
operational activities and environmental regulatory functions, although internally
they recognised the possibility of internal conflicts between community and
regulatory objectives.
Of the WAs Thames was most enthusiastic indeed, Ken West, the MD, suggested to
an IWES conference in December 1985 that one possible way forward to balance
the stakeholder interests of the industry would be to privatise TWA as an
experiment and model which the rest of the industry might build on in later years
(1985:10). Anglian and SW questioned the likely benefits and Welsh and NW
(Oldfield, 1985) opposed the proposal outright. The other five were at this stage
non-committal.
In 1986 a White Paper and a report on the Economic Regulation of Privatised Water
Authorities was issued. It stated WAs were to be privatised in toto. Land drainage
and flood protection were to remain under public control but it conceded there were
still details upon water law and protection of the water environment to be clarified.
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A public consultation was promised. In March and April two Green Papers
appeared: Water and Sewage Law and The Water Environment: the next steps
(Williams et al, 1990).
4.10.9 extended consultation phase
Much of the controversy of the 1980s reflected concern about placing in private
hands a natural monopoly responsible for services so essential to public health and
well being. As with the 19th century debate on municipal versus private enterprise,
the facts were often subsidiary to the politics. It was difficult for the politicians to
admit that they had failed to maintain the great Victorian water legacy because
investment in underground water pipes and sewers had always been less politically
attractive than roads and houses, schools and hospitals. That underground network
was now in need of repair and renewal (Barty-King, 1992). Indeed, interviewed in
the Director, Roy Watts argued that competition was not at the heart of the
argument: I think that it would be difficult to sustain an argument for pri vati sation
on the grounds of competition and, frankly, I don't think that I would try (Rock,
1988:60). He insisted that his support for privatisation was for the benefit of the
customer.
There was a deluge of opposition to the proposals: CPRE, Institute for European
Environmental Policy, RSPB, CLA, IWEM, CBI and trade unions and MAFF
(Richardson et al, 1992). The RSPB met with officials from the DoE and MAFF,
submitting a 35 page critique of the Water Environment Green Paper. The RSPB's
response echoed most in their conclusion that the government had paid insufficient
attention to environmental protection issues, in preparing its proposals for WA
privatisation. They argued the government should undertake a full reexamination of
the proposed framework for privatisation (Williams et al, 1990). Faced with wide
ranging opposition the government withdrew and agreed to think again.
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Three decisive factors forced the government to shelve its 1986 proposals,
widespread opposition, particularly concerning environmental control; Mr Ridley' s
arrival as Secretary of State in May 1986 was a major influence and the legal
controversy raised by CPRE and JEEP over EC law. Most participants recognised
water policy was subject to 'Europeanisation'. There was a shift in the locus of
power from Whitehall to Brussels. Both government and the majority of interests
normally consulted were slow to recognise the full implications of this shift in terms
of lobbying (Richardson et al, 1992). The CPRE made it clear that it would take the
government to the EC court. Prof Jacobs, Chair of European Law, Kings College,
London was commissioned by the CPRE and concluded: It is quite likely that the
European Court would decide that privatised water companies were not bodies
which the UK could properly designate as "competent authorities" (The Times, 13
May, 1986). The EC responded by issuing a carefully worded warning (Ends
Report 140). It appeared that a competent authority had to be completely separate
and independent from the recipient of its authorisations. An internal report
circulated within the WAA Feb 1987, suggested the solution was for the
government to create a separate body as a competent authority. This was a
completely internal matter and the association continued to lobby for WSPLCs as
competent authorities. The EC issue illustrates the ad hoc development of the
government's plans. They were drafted without reference to this issue and without
effective dialogue with the Commission.
It was only by late May 1987 that the DoE finally conceded the WAs were unlikely
to qualify as competent authorities. The WAA recognised the government's need to
accommodate certain influence groups and began looking for a satisfactory solution
with them. They began to search for a consensus within a more extended network of
policy actors (Belstead, 1988).
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That the privatisation of WAs was postponed reflected the inappropriate choice of
consultation processes by the government. The issue had been raised by the water
industry and had been resolved by the government in close cooperation with the
water industry. The perception that this could be processed under 'standard
operating procedures' within a restricted policy community was wrong. A period of
more limited consultation had been followed by a more open phase in which actors
outside the normal policy community played an important role. This was now
succeeded by a period when policy-making became 'internalised', ie government
virtually ceased consultations with affected interests - even with those normally part
of the inner circle of groups.
4.10.10 internalised and impositional policy phase
During the general election of May 22nd 1987, Nicholas Ridley announced the
government's revised plan for water privatisation. The government had concluded
that concern about the exercise of regulatory functions after privatisation were well
founded. In July 1987 a discussion paper was issued on the NRA. The greatest
impact upon conservation interests was development and sale of land and water
space (Williams et a!, 1990).
This third model of policy-making presented an opportunity to resort to an
'impositional policy style'. The shift was not due to external pressures alone but
also reflected the new minister's views. Ridley also recognised that WA chairmen
had reached a consensus on the desirability of privatisation, there had been a shift of
opinion. The regulatory question could now be resolved by governmental
imposition, providing industry guaranteed involvement in negotiations over the new
body (Richardson, et a!, 1992).
The decision-making process on creation of the NRA was undoubtedly one of the
most important single issues affecting the future shape of the industry. It failed to
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conform to either of the consultation models outlined, as there was no consultation
over the actual change in policy. Although the NRA was imposed by the
government, the industry concluded privatisation offered too great a benefit to be
jeopardised by opposition to the NRA: In short, government got away with an
impositional policy style and did so rather well (Richardson et al, 1992).
4.11 Recreation: Privatisation 1987-89
This change period begins with the consensual policy phase of privatisation,
whereby WAs having accepted the terms of the government's programme, now
participated in the bargaining process towards implementation. Having adopted an
impositional policy style, the government then had to shift to a more consensual and
negotiative policy style in order to secure delivery of policy as a whole.
Management support was crucial to the successful outcome of privatisation.
4.11.1 consensual policy phase
The WAA finally decided to accept the imposition of the NRA and play a full role
in the decision-making process relating to the many remaining issues to be resolved.
The WAs soon realised a unified voice on major policy issues was vital in order to
present an effective front to the department and particularly to the Treasury on
negotiable matters of central concern. The government had successfully brought the
WAA back into the inner core of the policy community via its switch from 'high' to
'low' politics. This was crucial because of the pivotal position of the WAs vis-à-vis
their role, both in the flotation and subsequently, in implementing privatisation with
the need to maintain their public support for the main thrust of a controversial
policy. The high political salience of privatisation was being eroded into a series of
more manageable sub-issues which were bargainable. At the same time there was a
flurry of activity in the industry as both Southern and Northumbrian WAs bought
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stakes in water companies that lay within their bailiwick. Also the three major
French concerns had been cross-Channel shopping (Rock, 1988).
In July 1988 the Permanent Secretary at the DoE sent a letter to Chairmen
demanding that they speak with one voice. It called on the WAA to establish a
compact team to negotiate with the government. The WAA created a new small
negotiating team which had daily meetings with DoE officials. The WAA
privatisation structure was therefore further supplemented in response to the DoE.
The government announced on 20th July 1988 that the 10 WAs would be privatised
in one single flotation.
4.11.2 public opinion
Many deplored the transfer to 'businessmen' of a public service such as water
supply which had no competitors. This privatisation was the most controversial and,
from all the research done, the least admired of the privatisations of Mrs Thatcher's
last term as prime minister. Given the size of the investment - £28 billion for ten
years - new or imminent EC directives, the backlog of mains and pipe renewal to
make good, and the effect of all this on water prices, privatisation always seemed
more appealing to those in the industry who knew what they were doing than the
industry's customers. Michael Carney (1990, 1991 a), Secretary of the Water
Services Association, saw the move as offering an escape from political interference
and the stop-go investment policies inherent in the UK nationalisation model.
It was no easy task for the government to convince the many genuine doubters that
water privatisation was a good thing. The independence of OFWAT and the NRA
helped. But public disquiet and debate wore on. Writing in The Times in March
1989, Lord Wyatt said the opinion potts suggested that more people were more
hostile or indifferent to water privatisation than to any other: Irrational, atavistic
feelings were at work, he said (Barty-King, 1992: 179). It was vaguely felt that
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nature's bounty, if not free, should at least be publicly supplied without a distasteful
connection with profit. It was feared that otherwise prices would soar, and concern
over quality and pollution of rivers and beaches, and the health hazards of sewage
would diminish. The general atmosphere was one in which:. . .all the logistics of
flotation had to be carried out under very critical media attention and significant
political controversy (Carney, 1991 a).
4.11.3 the 1988 Water Bill
There was a delay in introducing privatisation, mostly because of the backlog of
other Parliamentary business (Williams et al, 1990). The Water Bill of 23
November 1988 contained a number of provisions and duties applied to the NRA
and sewage undertakers aimed at protecting interests of shareholders, customers and
environment.
With 179 clauses and 24 schedules, the Water Bill was one of the largest pieces of
legislation presented to Parliament by the Conservative Government since it took
office in 1979. Several attempts to amend and strengthen the Bill were made during
the committee stage, it engaged the support of MPs of all parties and focused on the
need for tougher statutory duties toward nature conservation, water quality and the
protection of the water industry's surplus land. Many lobby groups, including the
Ramblers' Association, CPRE, NFU and RSPB declared an interest in this latter
aspect.
4.11.4 WAs' financial position
The Secretary of State was required to set annual price increase limits for the first
ten years, expressed in terms of the formula RPI+K, where RPI represents the
movements in the Retail Prices Index and K is an element calculated separately for
each company which takes account of its particular operational and capital
expenditure needs. The pricing limits were determined through a model into which
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was input the costs which the companies - after allowing for efficiency
improvements - would necessarily have to bear. Cost pass-through is the passing
through into charges between K review periods, of the costs of new environmental
or other obligations imposed upon the companies, including EC directives and the
possible costs of installing domestic water meters (Carney, 1991c). The model
calculated the financial performance of the companies for any given level of K. As
K is established annually, the model produced possible K profiles for each company
over a 10 year period. The Department realised from an early stage that K would
need to be positive given the scale of investment requirements in the initial years
(National Audit Office, 1992).
Ministers decided provisionally that initial Ks need not average more than five
percentage points if the companies had capital structures suitable for their
investment requirements. As the National Loans Fund cannot lend to private sector
companies, the Department, as with all privatisations, had to write off all National
Loans Fund debt totalling some £5 billion. Ministers then needed to decide what
capital structure should be created in its place. In June 1989 the Government were
assuming a capital structure for flotation in which little or no new debt was created,
and in which there was an aggregate cash injection. The 'green dowry' cash
injection was initially estimated, on the basis of illustrative calculations which were
subject to further detailed analysis, at around £600 million. This was later
recalculated at £1.5 billion. Beneficial corporation tax treatment meant that no water
company was likely to pay mainstream corporation tax over 10 years because of the
billions of pounds of unused capital allowances available to be offset against pre-tax
profits.
4.11.5 flotation
As flotation approached, WAs secured very strong bargaining positions because
they had to sign the prospectus for flotation. They had every incentive to bargain
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million applications for the £2.9 billion shares, it was the second highest response
ever for a government privatisation. The total amount raised for the Treasury was
£5,225 million (Barty-King, 1992:176; Carney, 1991a).
4.12 Continuity: Private Sector 1990-94
This last phase of the industry has been dominated by issues reflected in the various
papers which have been written by leaders in the water industry since privatisation.
All have been preoccupied with two main themes: the benefits of privatisation and
the cost of future environmental legislation to the customer. The benefits of
privatisation have been contrasted with the underinvestment of the public sector
(Jones, 1990; Carney, 1990, 1991b,c; Bellak, 1991; Brooker, 1991). The case for
privatisation is made most explicitly by Carney (1991b) who cites evidence from the
USA, Eastern Europe and the EC. He concludes that the role of government should
not extend to business. Hood, N (1991) spells out the cultural differences necessary
to manage the shift from the public to the private sector.
4.12.1 industry performance
Over the three months following flotation the package of shares out-performed the
FTSE All Share Index, moving to a premium in excess of 20 per cent after allowing
for the general movement in share prices, by the end of January 1990 (National
Audit Office, 1992). The sale of the ten water companies was an ambitious and
complex undertaking and the companies had a number of constraining
characteristics; they were new trading companies with no track record and the
companies were to be subject to three kinds of supervision: the operation of the
price limitation formula placed a ceiling on the revenue earning capacity of the
companies, they faced strongly negative cash flows over the medium terms which
constrained the financial profiles which would be acceptable to the financial
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markets, and substantial reliance would be placed on the regulator accepting interim
adjustments to K if significant additional burdens were imposed on the industry.
4.12.2 regulation
The lack of competition facing the privatised companies has ensured that the
question of regulation is very important (Marsh, 1991). Indeed, it is one of the
paradoxes of privatisation that it has involved greater regulation (see Thompson
1990:135). The government is at the centre of this regulation, despite the
Conservatives' stated desire to reduce intervention (Graham and Prosser, 1988:8;
Barty-King, 1992:176). In surrendering ownership, the government remained as the
watchdog, through regulators, overlooking the activities of the private commercial
operators. The government maintains its continued interest through two forms of
regulation, environmental, embodied in the National Rivers Authority (NRA), Her
Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution (HMIP), and the Drinking Water Inspectorate
(DWI); and economic, via the Office of Water Services (OFWAT). Generally,
regulatory structures have become more complex with the water industry now
having a more onerous regulatory structure than under public ownership (Maloney
and Richardson, 1992).
4.12.3 environmental regulation
The DWI was formed to give, for the first time, a national body responsible for
ensuring water companies meet the new standards for drinking water quality. They
would investigate any significant water quality problems, audit compliance with
investment programmes and carry out independent inspections of water supply
plants and processes. Where the new standards were not being met they would lay
down compliance programmes that companies would have to meet. If any company
was shown to supply water unfit for human consumption it would risk prosecution.
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The NRA was established as an independent body to look after the water
environment - the 'controlled waters' of rivers, lakes, reservoirs, aquifers and the
sea around the coast for a distance of three miles. It was given responsibility for
river basin regulation, including setting river water quality standards, consenting to
discharges, monitoring compliance and for licensing water abstraction from any
source. It also had the difficult task of deciding between the competing claims of
navigation, fishing, conservation and water abstraction. A total of 6,500 former
authority staff were vested in the new body. The creation of the NRA represented a
return to the principles of river basin regulation of the 1963 Water Resources Act,
but with regions subject to control and coordination by a central NRA board. In
July 1992, the government decided to establish a new Environment Agency which
would include both the NRA and HMIP.
Compared with other privatised businesses, the WSC 's face tighter environmental
regulation and many more environmental requirements, in particular from the EC.
Most of these requirements result in non-revenue earning expenditure.
Improvements in drinking water quality, or sewage effluent, or bathing waters do
not, as such, increase revenue. All of them require heavy expenditure and there is a
historical backlog to make good. However the Bill and the appointment together
attempt to deal with these requirements. The new companies can look to the
Director-General to ensure that they will be able to finance new requirements, and
also in the process obtain a reasonable rate of return on their expenditure. For the
first time environmental improvement is becoming a profitable activity. (Carney,
1992).
4.12.4 economic regulation
The economic regulation of the industry is characterised by the contract approach to
regulation whereby a contract is made between the regulated companies and the rest
of society. In return for fulfilling their contract, the appointees are remunerated
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through the regulatory price cap. The formal opportunity to review the contract is
via the periodic reviews. The formal domain of the contract consists of written
rules: EC directives, UK water legislation and companies' licenses, which govern
the operation of the industry (OXERA, 1993/94).
The DG of water services Ian Byatt, oversees the contract between society and the
water companies. By setting the maximum rate of increase of the companies' prices,
he determines the contract fees which the water companies receive. However, the
necessary level of K is influenced indirectly by quality regulators who enforce the
relevant environmental standards: the achievement and maintenance of these
standards requires investment expenditure which, in turn, places upward pressure
on prices. The contract under which water companies are placed encompasses the
following formal obligations: to provide water and sewerage services to all
customers within their franchise areas; to charge no more than the price-cap permits
for those services and to avoid discriminating between different classes of customer;
to undertake a large-scale investment programme to improve the quality of their
services and to report annually to OFWAT on their progress in this respect. Alan
Booker, Deputy Director of OFWAT, summarised the Director-General's remit:
The first duty is to ensure that the companies carry out their functions. The second
is to ensure they can finance their functions. To add to that he has to protect
customers and on to economy and efficiency and to facilitate competition which is a
little bit difficult at the moment.
OFWAT only take limited account of regional differences between companies which
can be reflected in price setting but otherwise deal in a consistent way with
companies. They expect water to be no different from the other utilities in the main
operational business areas and to be able to reduce prices all the time. As with other
utilities the industry is subject to RPI-X. The difference with water is that having to
accommodate quality improvements, this creates a requirement for a +Q element in
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the K. K is thus broken down into -X+Q, so that where Q > X= +K and where
Q<X=-.K.
Ian Byatt saw the raison d'etre of OFWAT as being that water customers could not
look to market mechanisms to protect them from unnecessarily high charges or a
poor service, or both. His object was to achieve through regulation, the same
balance as would otherwise be achieved by competitive markets. The DG has
warned the companies that due to the impact of the new regulations concerning
municipal waste water treatment and sludge disposal, the K Factor would be made
more onerous if the companies pay excessively high dividends to their share-holders
instead of ploughing money back into the business (Maloney & Richardson, 1992).
To assist in protecting and considering customer interests, the DG appointed ten
Regional Customer Service Committees. The CSCs are seen by the companies as
being very close to the economic regulator and quite independent of both.
According to Booker: The industry has become much more customer focused than it
was. One development is the OFWAT National Customer Forum for the CC Water
Customer Council (ONCC), comprised of Chairmen of CSCs. The ONCC is now
starting to develop some contacts with like-minded bodies in Europe and with the
Commission to try and influence the new environmental quality improvement
directives. According to Booker: There is a fairly general consensus that some of
these directives have gone a bit too far. The environmental pressure groups are less
influential now in the water area. . . but it is important to recognise that
improvements are not a free good.
The DG has taken up the option provided in the 1989 Water Act of carrying out a
periodic review of K factors after 5 years, which occurred in 1994. Comparative
competition, linked to levels of service plays a part in the K calculations. OFWAT
sets up a monitoring regime which the companies respond to by gathering the
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quality framework where they set out quite clearly their intention to try and
renegotiate some of the European directives. As nothing has been renegotiated yet,
this is one of the unknown areas in price setting.
With respect to prices, market research has shown customers unwilling to pay for
many environmental improvements. OFWAT feel that the price escalator which
customers have been on for the last four or five years can be slowed and in some
cases stopped. With regard to the 1994 periodic review: We feel that it is possible at
a national aggregate level to slow the 5 %K which we've had over the last 5 years to
somewhere between 0 and 2%. The 2% was set as a ceiling being the long-term
average growth in household income (Booker). Companies were also asked to take
account of affordability in their area. There are some efficiency assumptions built
into the price limits but if companies want to improve their level of profitability
they are required to seek even greater efficiency than has already been assumed by
the DG. OFWAT has also asked for even further efficiency savings to be devoted to
improving service levels. Ultimately OFWAT are looking to achieve Ks which are
going to be much more affordable for customers in the second five years and third
five years to 2005. This will mean in real terms possible price increases of up to
10%.
In the organisation of the country's water supply and sewage service, therefore,
Government is still very much in evidence. Carney (1992) views it as a well
structured compromise: Private ownership combined with public regulation provides
both the market dynamism so necessary in the efficient and economic production of
goods and services, and the degree of public control so essential when a private
monopoly is responsible for a basic product like water. In this sense, OFWAT and
the NRA could be said to be pulling in different directions to the benefit of the
customer.
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4.12.5 regulation and capital expenditure
In the first ten years of operation, the ten water supply and sewage companies
together with 29 water-only companies planned to spend more than £28 thousand
million on improving the quality of drinking water and treating wastewater. At 1989
prices that was more than double what the publicly owned water authorities were
authorised to spend by successive governments during previous decades. In real
terms the expenditure on wastewater was three times as much (Barty-King,
1992:178). However, less flexibility will remain about where to spend money.
Sewage treatment works must meet effluent consents and water quality must
conform to standards. The investment choice then reduces down to which
engineering solution is the least cost - although the future regulator may allow some
latitude for trade-off on timing (UBS Phillips & Drew, 1989).
The underground Asset Management Plan (AMP) was a requirement in the
Appointment given to each of the privatised WAs. It is an investment planning tool
and one which would probably have been introduced even without privatisation.
Under the Appointment water and sewerage services companies must provide an
underground AMP covering the mains and sewerage system. This is because with
underground assets, particularly the sewerage system, it is possible to vary the rate
of investment for rehabilitation, by very large amounts without major short-term
effects on levels of service. Governments in the past had used this attribute as a
means of solving their financial difficulties by putting a break on water industry
investment and building up problems for later. The underground AMP is designed
to allow the regulator to ensure that adequate investment is being made in
underground assets.
4.12.6 the EC
Laws made by the EC are of increasing importance to the UK legal system in
general, and to the areas of environmental protection and public health in particular.
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As EC directives are imposed on governments of the member states rather than
individuals or companies, each government must draft its own laws by which the
directives take force. They form a contract between the water companies and this
wider society. Furthermore, since they cannot be amended or repealed by the UK
government unless agreement is given by a sufficient number of other member
states, they form an even more basic and inflexible part of the contract than UK
law. Although there are many directives which have some bearing on the water
industry, the areas of particular importance are the environment, public
procurement, competition law and social policy legislation.
The environmental directives concern the quality of bathing water (1975), the
quality of drinking water (1980) and the treatment of urban wastewater (1991)
(OXERA, 1993/4). The water industry is critical of Brussels Commission and
complain its standards are unreasonably high (see 4.11.7), thereby forcing up prices
to the consumer (Economist, 1990). The recent judgement of the European Court in
the Francovich case is of great potential significance. This has created a situation in
which an individual who suffers physical damage (ie illness) as a result of drinking,
or bathing in, UK water which does not meet the required standards laid down in an
EC directive, could sue for damages in an English court. The important questions
are whether UK water and sewerage undertakers could be directly liable for
damages to an individual or, if the government or the NRA themselves found liable
for damages, they could in turn seek compensation from the relevant water or
sewerage undertaker (Lougher, 1992)
The public procurement directive means that the UK water and sewerage
undertakers will have to observe certain publicity requirements when awarding
public works or supply contracts which exceed the value thresholds of £3.5 million
and £280,000. Lougher (1992) concludes that the adoption and implementation of
Community legislation in the social and public procurement fields may well impose
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an increasing administrative and legal burden on water and sewerage undertakers,
whilst the EEC competition rules may be more actively applied to the Community
water and sewerage industry. Thus, the single EC market heralds an unsettled
future for the UK water industry.
4.12.7 the future of regulation
A variety of water industry authors have written on the subject of future regulation.
Most are critical of the need for additional improvements (Carney, 1992; Bellak,
1990; Richards, 1991) and point to the need for pragmatism if higher standards are
not to lead to a cost-benefit spiral (Bellak, 1990) and diminishing returns (Carney,
1992). Environmental demands are calculated at £24-26 billion over the next 10
years (Jones, 1990; Grove, 1991) for which the customers must pay an estimated
75% increase in charges in real terms compared with 1989/90 prices (Bellak, 1991).
These demands will result from EC directives and customer expectations and fall in
the areas of wastewater treatment disposal, water distribution, sewerage
infrastructure, and information technology; alongside an impending bill of £2 billion
for the wastewater at sea directive (Grove, 1991). All writers point out that the
costs of regulation are financed more easily in the private sector. For the future
there is a general consensus that standards will continue to tighten and the industry
will experience ongoing dynamic change in the area of technology (Carney, 1991a).
Other authors cite the impossibility of zero-risk, with for instance drinking water
quality (Richards, 1991) and criticise the current EC numeric standards. In the same
vein Fraser (1991) stresses the need to interpret complex regulatory jargon into a
simplified form. In answer to the upward drift in standards, Bellak (1990) calls for
stringent enforcement of the law against polluters and Carney (1992) the need for an
advisory organisation such as the government's environmental agency. He is critical
of the cost of the current regulatory structure and argues for simplification with one
agency (1992:18-20).
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Henderson (1990) argues for the finance of additional standards by the customer.
He points to the historic background of profitability in the public sector with the
Treasury insisting on realistic rates of return. He then lists the priorities for
standards under drinking water and waste water. Oake (1991) discusses the options
for sludge disposal in the light of the 1998 deadline for alternative dumping at sea.
He puts the cost at 25% of the total for water and sewerage undertakers. Skellett
(1991) highlights the benefits of privatisation in better sewage treatment. The issue
of climate change due to the greenhouse effect is discussed by Turton (1991) in the
context of water resources. As climate change could effect water quality and hence
availability, he stresses the need for the WSCs, NRA and the DO to use a similar
basis on which to assess future water resources and demands. In particular, there is
a case for 'cost pass through' (allowing for increases in water charges to pay for
additional investment).
The regulatory environment is seen to evolve via the development of informal rules
during the course of the regulatory process (OXERA, 1993/94). Much of the action
in water regulation has been in the informal domain: on two occasions OFWAT has
asked companies to refrain 'voluntarily' from increasing their prices to the full
extent permitted by their price-caps; the debate has continued on a number of
aspects of methodology for writing the formal contract at periodic reviews, as well
as on the issues of water charges, conservation and environmental quality. Recently
this has led to a number of changes to the formal framework of regulation
(OXERA, 1993/94).
Thus far the government has been mostly interested in financial indicators (Carter,
1991), but it seems likely that the changing climate of growing concern about
consumer satisfaction and quality of service, particularly if it finds sufficient voice
through Parliament and consumer pressure groups, will encourage the greater use of
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performance indicators (Carter, 1991:86). This will be particularly true in
privatised monopolies such as water, where the various regulatory authorities will
need to use PIs to measure quality parameters such as, for example, river pollution.
Alan Booker lists the issues for the future:Qualily is going to be the ongoing
issue.., improving service, the introduction of water metering, disconnections and
the level of complaints. There may well be ongoing issues about the regulatory
regime and a UK economic regulation. The environmental agency will certainly
have an impact on the overall scene and the development of statutory WQOs.
4.12.8 future of the industry
A major challenge for the water industry in the coming years will be to ensure
adequate water supplies without damaging the environment. In this respect metering
is likely to feature more predominantly. In May 1992 OFWAT told companies to
extend the metering option and the government has given the water industry until
the year 2000 to introduce a new charging system not linked to rateable values.
The technology employed in the water and wastewater industry will change at a
faster pace, driven by the need to meet higher standards with increased reliability
and greater efficiency. The focus is on how to free fresh water from contamination
by the waste products of high-tech contemporary manufacturing and mining
processes, and of intensive agriculture, the consequences of which are exercising
the water industry and the environmental movement.
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Recurring issues around the questions of absolute standards and safety are deemed
to be the 'wrong damn question' by the Water Services Association who see a focus
on cost and priorities as more important (Barty-King, 1992). It is this point which
Douglas Hurd, Secretary of State, made in a letter in the Economist of 6 June 1992,
in which he said pressure groups had increased in power: They can certainly draw
attention to an evil or a gap in policy. But by definition they wear blinkers. Groups
that never mention the cost to the consumer of environmental improvements are a
topical case. They are not necessarily wrong, just single-minded. Members of
Parliament have to weigh, balance and establish priorities.
4.13 Conclusions
The key issues driving the emergence of the water industry in the nineteenth century
were water pollution and scarcity, brought on by increasing social and industrial
demand. These issues persisted as the industry came under increasing municipal
control, with calls by the new industry bodies for a national water policy and a
central authority. The water resource and distribution issues would ensure that the
industry remained engineering-led right up to integration.
The key change periods were all initiated by the MHLG (later the DoE) in
successive water acts which sought to structure, control and regulate the industry.
Despite industry proposals for improved investment and government commissions
and enquiries; successive policy initiatives were bedeviled by, in the first half of the
twentieth century, two world wars and throughout, by the country's economic
difficulties. Thus one can discern a pattern within the evolution of the industry,
Chapter 4: History of the Water Industry Page 206
whereby the failure of one change period precipitates the initiation of a new
industry structure and or status.
It was the failure of the 1945 Water Act to achieve the degree of consolidation
necessary to surmount the anticipated water resource and pollution problems which
led to the first radical restructuring of the industry along IRBM principles in 1973.
The structure of the industry at this juncture revealed that the evolution of the
different services had progressed at varying speeds, with only a tenth of the water
supply units remaining since the turn of the century while sewage remained virtually
unchanged. The economic pressures for amalgamation were always less in sewerage
services (UBS Phillips & Drew, 1989), a political reflection of the recurring need to
impose financial restraints on public services.
Similarly, national economic difficulties combined with the anomalous status of the
industry, contributed to the failure of reorganisation to realise its potential for
delivery of an adequate service, at a publicly acceptable price and made the industry
a ready target for nationalisation in 1983. Indeed, the concept of IRBM had
implanted new notions of water as an economic good and accentuated by the demise
of the water resource issue, shifted the emphasis from water as a service to a
commodity. After reorganisation the predominance of the engineers had subtly
given way to a focus on finance and corporate management.
The very status of the industry under Whitehall financial control flew in the face of
the Tory monetarist policies and contradicted the emerging commercial ethos within
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the industry. This situation both enabled and provoked, for the first time, proactive
moves from within the industry to initiate change. The final shift from the public to
the private sector was characterised by a preoccupation with issues of regulation and
the environment. These issues have persisted up to the present time without a
diminution of public attention.
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5. RIVER WATER QUALITY IN TIlE WATER INDUSTRY
5.1 Introduction
This chapter traces the course of the river water quality issue throughout the history
of the water industry. The trajectory of this issue is linked to the developmental
phases of the industry following the punctuated equilibrium model of chapter four.
The definition of water pollution has been described as:.. . occurring when the water
is altered in composition or condition, directly or indirectly, as a result of the
activities of man, so that it is less suitable for any, or all of the purposes for which
it would be suitable in its natural state (Woodward, 1974). Acceptance of this
definition links water pollution directly to water usage and therefore when
attempting to detect pollution, different users may adopt different criteria. This is
one of the main reasons for the complexity associated with the evaluation of water
quality (see Kiimersley, 1988:17-20). Evaluation, then, is a related issue which has
significantly affected the pattern of the trajectory of river water quality within the
water industry. Of equal importance to the salience of river quality has been the
issue of effluent quality as one of the main causes of river pollution. This account
will consider these related issues and other key developments around river water
quality during each of the industry phases.
5.2 Pre-Industry Context
The rapid physical and social transformations of the 19th century brought about by
the intensifying of the industrial revolution; led to the growth of population and of
industry and forced physical changes in the towns, most notably in housing, water
supply and drainage. In the 19th century, urban and industrial growth kept
overtaking the trend of improvements being achieved. In 60 years from 1801, the
population not only grew from 10 to 30 million, but also changed its urbanlrural
pattern from a ratio of 30:70 to 55:45. An official report of 1845 found only six out
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of 51 towns had a good water supply, even among the manufacturing centres and
major ports. The critical danger signal, aggravated by the arrival of cholera in
England (from India via Europe) in 1831, was in the trend of death-rates per
thousand in the cities changing from downwards to rapidly rising (Tetlow,
1985:2.3.1).
These physical changes called for much reshaping of municipal government, as
indicated in chapter four. In the course of 100 years or so, several aspects of water
management water supply, urban drainage and sewage disposal, river basin
problems - became in turn the focus of attention in Parliament and in the courts, and
often both.
The towns had been growing before the industrial revolution accelerated and had
been providing themselves with more water supply as they did so. The
manufacturing growth was concentrated in areas with much less local water, such as
Birmingham, Sheffield, Leeds and Manchester. These cities had relatively small
river systems flowing away from them, and these quickly became heavily polluted
as a result of the effluent becoming so large relative to the natural flows (Tetlow,
1985). These towns began to find local water sources unable to support their
increasing needs, and went to the Lake District or Wales to establish major new
reservoirs and long-distance aqueduct systems (Okun, 1977:184).
Underlying this situation were institutional weaknesses and divisions in professional
and public opinion. Edwin Chadwick advocated sanitary reform, which tended to
favour central direction. After his Report on the Sanitaiy Condition of the
Labouring Population of Great Britain, in 1842, he emphasised systematic drainage
as a more urgent priority than better house building which he and others had
previously urged. Only slowly was it realised that contaminated water was acting as
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processes and the waste products of every factory causing pollution and interviewed
numerous witnesses from local government, industry, land-owners, medical officers
of health and sanitary inspectors (Hammerton, 1987:333-4). The result of this
intensive investigation into water pollution was to propose effluent standards as well
as appointing inspectors and conservancy boards. These well intentioned and
sensible recommendations were not, however, incorporated in the 1876 River
Pollution Prevention Act which provided the basis of all legislation for the control
of river pollution for the following 75 years (Hanley et al, 1991).
The important pieces of legislation for rivers during the emergence of the industry
were the Public Health Act 1875 and the Rivers Prevention Pollution Act of 1876.
The 1876 Act was in some ways more significant: it broke new ground in making
the polluting of rivers a criminal offence, but it was qualified in the definition of the
offence, and at odds with the criteria which the courts regarded as important in
deciding civil cases about use or abuse of riparian rights. The debates and
legislation of the 1860s and 1870s are also notable, in a longer perspective, for
what was not followed through at that stage. The emphasis was on building up -
though not really strongly- the role of local government units created for general
purposes as water agencies. All these measures were focusing on local government
as the main instrument for the development of utility services, and by further
legislation in 1888 and 1894, urban and rural district councils were created.
The new laws aimed to do two things: to make it an offence to discharge or dump
sewage and industrial or mining wastes into rivers, and to appoint the municipal
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councils as the enforcement agencies for these new restraints. But in the definition
of the offences there was an important qualification: the polluters would have a
good defence if they had used the best practicable and available means of rendering
harmless the wastes and effluents being discharged.
As technologies for the treatment of sewage and other wastes to moderate their
impact on the river were only just being developed and spread, this qualification
was at least as influential as the basic rule seemingly forbidding the use of rivers as
waste disposal channels. As the municipal councils each had a strong interest in
sustaining and promoting the growth and prosperity of manufacturing industry in
their own districts, they would rarely be motivated to put restraints or cost burdens
on its waste disposal opportunities.
One consequence of the leap in technology and the growth of towns and
manufacturing from the late 18th century onwards was a great increase in the
capability to generate externalities in river basins (especially small ones). This is an
economist's principle, where the transfer of costs arising from activities which
should carry them, escape, to fall instead on people who should not have to suffer
them. There was indeed a major growth in the extent to which they were generated,.
despite the litigation and judgements aimed at restricting them: We can also
understand that the Victorians in the 1870s could think it was to the advantage of
British manufacturers to have the cost-escapes and cross-subsidies implicit in this
high level of externalities, though this was in many ways a mistaken economic
policy as well as very bad environmental one (Kinnersley, 1988:156).
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5.4 Continuity: Municipal Consolidation 1885-1944
Much good work on river quality needs and sewage treatment processes was carried
out during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, assisted by the joint
action of several local authorities in forming Boards for their large industrial
conurbations. At least from 1920 there was also a period of uneven prosperity in
manufacturing industry, with somewhat opposing effects: industries and
municipalities became less willing to incur additional costs on sewage treatment, but
lower levels of business activity also contributed lower volumes of effluent
discharge from factories. Neither appropriate pollution control legislation nor
appropriate levels of investment in sewerage, sewage treatment or industrial waste
treatment were in place in the UK during the early part of this century, however,
and river quality generally declined (Martin & Woods, 1992). Data on investment
in sewage treatment (Fig 4.1) illustrates the overall pattern of investment in water
services in the UK over the period from 1920. This clearly shows the downward
pressures on investment from the two world wars and the depressions of the 1920s
and 30s (Martin & Woods, 1992).
In 1898 the Government set up a Royal Commission on Sewage Disposal to
examine the problem and suggest solutions. The Commission reported in 1912 on
criteria for sewage treatment processes, that were subsequently used for over 60
years (see Appendix 5.1). Higher river flows would allow higher chemical
biological oxygen demand (BOD) concentrations in the sewage effluent without
causing nuisance; in other words an early application of the environmental quality
objective approach to environmental protection (Tetlow, 1985; Mathews & Mance,
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1986). The Royal Commission helped to improve what local councils achieved in
sewage disposal by setting a general standard of quality for sewage works effluent
(known as the Royal Commission Standard).
Tetlow (1985) argues that this standard resulted in the concept of dilution factors
tending to be ignored over a period of time and sewage works were often designed
such that the effluent complied with the Royal Commission standard of 30/20. River
water quality then deteriorated when the dilution factor was less than 8:1, and
money was wasted on providing excessive treatment capacity when the dilution
factor was greater than 8:1. The point was recognised by the government who in the
late 1960s required RAs to justify conditions for sewage effluent discharges more
stringent than the RC 30/20, and required local sewage treatment authorities to
justify those less stringent than 30/20.
This period was significant firstly for the efforts to modernise the laws and
administration of water-related activities other than water supply and sewage
disposal, which were dealt with only towards the end of the period. Secondly, for
both fisheries and land drainage, new specialist agencies were created with local
territories not related to the areas of other local government units. In the period
between the World Wars, there was a run of legislation, on fisheries in 1923, land
drainage in 1930, and on public health and effluent disposal in 1936-7 (Harkness,
1982). These new agencies for specific individual river basin activities thus came to
have not only a separate territorial identity from the local councils dealing with the
main group of services such as education and highways, but also a separate
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character in their mixed membership. The local councils were still involved, but so
were the central government and directly interested groups, such as anglers and
landowners.
This mixed membership was notable for bringing the larger councils together with
other interests, but also with each other. The power which these councils had been
given in 1888 to form river boards themselves (for anti-pollution purposes) had
been little used, with only four boards being set up beyond the Thames and Lea
Conservancy Boards established in 1857 and 1868. In short, the push towards
specialist agencies came from the river basin activities, not the piped services of
water supply and sewerage which were very largely in the hands of local councils.
This thrust towards new agencies was mostly the work of the Ministry of
Agriculture and Fisheries who were becoming committed in the 1920s and 1930s to
a coherent pattern covering these specialist functions across England and Wales.
This membership pattern was also linked to financing arrangements.
5.5 Reorientation: A National Water Policy 1943-48
In this period 1948 may be seen as the beginning of river basin management. It
introduced a sequence of changes unlike the period before it and influenced debates
about the structure of water institutions. Land drainage and fisheries provided the
institutional foundation for most of what followed from 1948.
The Central Advisory Water Committee issued its third report in 1943
recommending the formation of River Boards to integrate water pollution control,
water conservation and rivers control. The resulting River Boards Act (1948)
created 32 of them covering the whole of England and Wales, except the Thames
and the Lea catchments. In 1944 the wartime coalition government issued a White
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Paper on A National Water Policy. The Labour Party published their plans for a
post-war National Water Commission vested with central control, but local water
supply undertaken by publicly owned and controlled Water Boards.
The 1948 Act was the first real attempt made towards comprehensive river
management. It made river boards responsible for land drainage, prevention of
pollution and administration of fisheries, duties which had previously been
discharged by numerous statutory bodies but neither river boards, nor any other
statutory body had responsibility for the organised development of water
(Woodward, 1967). The river boards were also to initiate programs of data
collection on river abstractions and discharges (Okun, 1977:20). The new Boards
were to have members from local councils, and Whitehall. These new Boards
commanded a political confidence among various vested interests. As a result, they
were soon endowed with new powers and functions which otherwise might have
gone to local authorities.
5.6 Continuity: Rationalisation 1949-71
Despite much activity and legislation of the previous period, by 1951 many of the
industry's rivers and estuaries were in a state little different from that described in
the reports of the Rivers Pollution Commission some eighty years previously
(Hammerton, 1987). This can be attributed to an increase in both population and
industry, combined with a lack of political will, the inability to enforce standards
and the cumbersome procedure for taking legal action (1-lammerton, 1987). This
situation paved the way for further legislation to prevent pollution and the more
progressive 1963 Water Resources Act. These legislative moves were to lead to a
steady but slow improvement in rivers thereafter.
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5.6.1 the 1951 and 1961 Acts
Modern pollution control legislation dates from the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution)
Act of 1951 which made it a legal requirement for new or substantially altered
discharges to rivers to be made only with the consent of the River Board and in
compliance with any conditions specified in the consent. A similarly titled Act of
1961 brought under consent control, discharges to rivers not previously so
controlled as they had existed before the 1951 Act (Martin & Woods, 1992).
The success of these Acts and of subsequent legislation can be attributed to the new
powers given to the relevant authorities to specify the conditions of discharge. This
new method of pollution control, known as the consent system (see Appendix 5.2),
meant that all effluent charges to non-tidal rivers were made subject to the issue of a
consent while some tidal and estuarine waters were subject to similar controls by
special order.
The Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1951 was in one respect a far more
positive measure than previous legislation to check pollution. The concept of river
basin agencies with multiple activities related to that distinctive territory was
gaining strength. Yet the effectiveness of this positive step forward was.still
qualified by three weaknesses, each of them related to how fully dischargers were
ready to accept the new discipline which the consent system projected.
First, the application of the new consents was to be gradual. Existing discharges
were to remain exempt from the consent procedure which only applied to new
discharges to inland waters. Some of these exemptions were ended by further
legislation in 1960 and 1961, but some survived until the 1974 Control of Pollution
Act. Secondly, the consent procedure and the extent of compliance with it by
individual dischargers was to be kept secret. For fear of trade secrets being
disclosed through the composition of effluents discharged, the River Boards were
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forbidden to publish any details. The third weakness lay in the representative local
membership of River Boards, nominees of local councils who were also members of
councils which operated sewage works, some of them being major dischargers.
Thus, they could press the Board as regulator and enforcer of consents to turn a
blind eye to any breaches of consent by their own councils.
The consequences of these weaknesses in the 1951 Act and its successors in 1960
and 1961 on the same subject became evident in the late 1960s. Also consents to use
river capacity for waste disposal were introduced without any system of charging
for them. This is a significant difference from the introduction in 1963 of permits
for water abstraction with associated charges from the start.
In contrast with the structural reform of water supply units in the mid-1950s,
without legislation, almost nothing happened to improve the organisation of sewage
disposal activities. In 1974, there were still 1,393 separate authorities (mostly local
councils) dealing with sewerage and sewage disposal, although provision for
adjacent councils to combine these activities had been made as long ago as the 1875
Public Health Act. The devotion of many councils to each keeping its own sewage
service was at odds with their having long neglected it as a Cinderella service.
The responsibility of LAs for sewerage and sewage treatment led to some obvious
anomalies in the provision of such services as the administrative boundaries
generally bore no relationship to the river catchments occupied. Cases of sewerage
networks draining to a point close to an appropriate receiving watercourse outside
the LA's area but then being pumped to an alternative works location within the
administrative boundary were common. Similarly opportunities for economically
attractive joint schemes were not always taken up (Martin & Woods, 1992:2-3).
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This suggests also that the pollution control activities of River Boards had so far
generated little sense of pressure or urgency for improvement and Whitehall had
done little or nothing to stir the apathy. Kinnersley suggests cynically that one
explanation may be that: there are no droughts in sewage (1988:80).
5.6.2 1963 Water Resources Act
In 1959 England experienced what was said to be at the time the driest summer for
250 years, especially in the north and west. At this period, when industry was
aiming at further expansion and farmers talking of increasing spray irrigation, there
were still no agencies explicitly charged with the duty to conserve water resources
or to develop them more widely than various types of user might do for their own
purpose. This led to the preparation and passing of the Water Resources Act 1963,
on advice from the CAWC, several features of which are still in operation and
important today (Okun, 1977:21; Lester, 1965).
This Act served to co-ordinate water resources for the first time on a regional basis.
The River Authorities which replaced the River Boards were based on the areas
related to the basins of the main rivers, including the Conservators of the River
Thames and the Lea Conservancy Board. Their duty was to conserve, redistribute
and augment the water resources of their areas. They had thus gathered
responsibility for land drainage, fisheries, pollution prevention and water resources,
with active regulatory roles in the two latter functions. The President of the Water
Companies' Association described the Act as: The most important piece of
legislation affecting the water supply since the Water Act of 1945. Some saw it as a
defence against nationalisation (B arty-King, 1992).
The Act empowered the relevant authority to demand any information deemed
relevant concerning the operations of any party removing water from rivers, or
adding effluents. It laid the foundations for subsequent legislation concerning the
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control of pollution and the access to information regarding the activities of parties
utilising rivers and estuaries. Much of the legislation included in the 1974 Control
of Pollution Act was derived from the Water Resources Act (Hanley et al, 1991).
There was, during this period, a widespread improvement in water quality
throughout Britain and fish life was restored to many waters (Hammerton, 1987),
made possible by the new consent system and legal powers to enforce the conditions
of discharge.
Like the pollution prevention reforms, this Act introduced a permit system for
abstractions, administered by the River Authorities. The policy thrust of the 1963
Act was progressive. It was not as gradualist as the pollution legislation had been:
virtually all abstractions were to require licensing, though existing ones would be
granted licenses as of right. Abstractions were to be subject to charges, and
suggestions from farming and industrial lobbies that these charges should only apply
to new abstractions were not accepted. The structure of these charges was also
constructive as it was to fund the development of additional capacity where this was
foreseen as essential. The tariff took account of types of use and the claims they
made on resource capacity.
The Water Resources Act consolidated executive power and responsibility, limited
though these might have been, in the river authorities, with their consent control of
pollution and their power to charge for abstractions and use these financial
resources for water resource development. Perhaps the most significant contribution
of the short-lived river authorities was their operating experience as true
multifunctional agencies, the only such in the water field in the UK (Okun, 1977).
One other major innovation of the Water Resources Act 1963, more controversial
and ultimately more unsatisfactory than the others, was the creation of a Water
Resources Board (WRB). This was to be a national agency, appointed by MHLG
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(later the DoE), but there were different perceptions of its role. Some saw it as
purely advisory, to RAs and to ministers. Some opposed it as confusing the
relationship between the Authorities with executive responsibility in their respective
basins and Whitehall. Despite the heavy criticism of the WRB, the Water Resources
Act of 1963, when made law, received a wide range of encomiums: An important
milestone in our history, a great step forward in our water legislation and an
immensely important and imaginative measure (Okun, 1977:23).
5.6.3 the Water Resources Board
In 1966 the MHLG brought in its Memo on limits for effluents more restrictive than
those of the Royal Commission. This provided more flexibility in setting consents.
Effluent quality had to take account of developments in the knowledge of the
chemistry, biochemistry and biology and of the effects of the physical characteristic
of the rivers. Further advice came with the Report of the Technical Committee on
Storm Overflows and the Disposal of Storm Sewage in 1969. In the 1960s and 70s,
work showed that a more appropriate determinand for measuring organic pollution
was the inhibited BOD test rather than BOD (Mathews & Mance, 1986).
Much good work went into understanding and recording far more fully the
increasing pressures of effluent discharges and water abstractions on the small river
basins of England and Wales. The consequence of this came in much more regional-
scale planning for predominantly engineering solutions. Also the WRB sought to
promote long-term planning and flexible co-operation across large regions in
meeting the needs of the individual authority areas. But these very initiatives also
became pointers to the main weaknesses and things left undone.
The WRB had been given no formal role at all in respect of water quality.
(Okun, 1977:25). The neglect of water quality and water pollution by WRB can be
attributed to its limited mandate in the Act, its frustration was articulated in its
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Seventh Annual Report (Water Resources Board, 1971): . . . our strict terms of
reference. . . do not include. . .prevention of pollution, but water quality is a crucial
factor in nearly all our work... reuse of water in rivers plays an increasing part in
meeting needs.. . the most serious defect in the present .system is the lack of any
national authority charged with planning and co-ordinating the work of the 1400
sewage treatment authorities... In its final report, the Water Resources Board (1974)
summarised its accomplishments of which the quality issue receives a significant
mention: The use of rivers as aqueducts, the use of reservoirs to regulate river
flows, and the successive uses of water by a sequence of abstractions and
discharges made the problems of water quality and wastewater disposal inseparable
from the problems ofproviding clean water for abstraction.
More seriously still, the pollution control legislation since 1951 and the RA's
application of it had not been strong enough to improve significantly the general
level of sewage works capacity and performance in many LA areas. Secondly,
while the WRB recognised the long time-scales involved, they had no better ways
than other planners of reliably foretelling the future. Their forecasts of future
demand for water were heavily influenced by projected trends of increases in
population just as birth control was spreading rapidly, and by expectations of more
domestic use and more industrial use, just as decline in manufacturing industries
gathered pace and energy costs rose sharply. The final weakness of the WRB was
the disregard of cost or price of water, evidenced in its 1974 document: Water - A
Strategy for the Future.
The early 1970s offer a significant snapshot of water industry attitudes over a much
longer period. Two decades of rearranging functions and agencies had gone forward
constructively, but the old WRB - with scope to provide more leadership than had
been available before - had been in the old mould, engineering-dominated and
economically illiterate. In addition, through no fault of its own, it had no official
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concern with the emerging future problem of water quality (Kinnersley, 1988).
Thus a period of innovation suffered in the end from the innovations being poorly
directed and unbalanced. Even a forecast of demand doubling in 30 years did not
make them apply themselves to economics as bearing on future demand or capital
investment needs: The WRB really offered not a future strategy but an engineering
spree -just like the old days, but even bigger (Kinnersley, 1988:90).
5.6.4 river water quality
The first survey of river pollution in England & Wales, organised by MHLG in
1958, was followed by surveys in 1970 and 1975 by the DoE, with intermediate
updating in 1971 and 1972 (Okun, 1977:209). Despite limitations in the law, the
fragmentation of responsibility amongst many LAs, the exclusion of many effluents
from control, and a reluctance to call upOn the law to enforce pollution control, a
steady improvement in the state of the rivers occurred over the years (Tetlow,
1985:2.3.2). For instance, Martin & Woods (1992) write of the considerable WQ
improvements which occurred in the River Trent catchment over the last 30 years,
particularly during the 1 960s.
Lester writing about the polluted condition of the Tame discussed the tightening of
effluent standards. Before requiring such standards to be more stringent than those
recommended by the Royal Commission, he suggested the prime criteria should be
the use which is to be made of the river. It might be appropriate to divide various
rivers into categories based on the future use of their water and determine for each
river a water quality objective (1965:10). An idea prefiguring the NWC
classification scheme of 1978. In a 1967 paper Collinge warned of an age where
rapid developments in chemistry and chemical engineering were leading to the
production of a wide range of toxic substances. The presence of these substances in
effluents had consequences for drinking water and he questioned whether the
current state of medical knowledge was sufficient to assure what was not harmful.
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Also the question of accidental pollution, especially spillages hosed into drains
upstream of a river intake had serious implications. He ends his article by asking to
what extent it will become necessary to raise effluent standards and if the burden
upon industry will have an unfavourable effect on the competitive position in the
Common Market.
5.7 Recreation: Reorganisation 1968-73
The next reshaping of the industry which brought all water activities together, along
with new legislation and the improved consent system, was to redress in particular
the balance from too little attention to water quality and almost too much attention
to water resources. With the feeling that better safeguarding of river water quality
was becoming more urgent, the new decade was to be marked by action in pollution
prevention and attention to the natural environment. This judicious mixture of
appropriate institutional arrangements, new legislation and a means of implementing
these changes resulted in a major improvement in water quality (Hammerton,
1987).
The pressure for reorganisation centred in good measure on problems of water
quality management: inflexibility and conflicts in the development of new water
supply sources; the promotion of large schemes that would make optimal use of all
resources; and most importantly, the inadequate level of wastewater treatment
resulting in the pollution of rivers, estuaries, and the sea. Of the six items of policy
in Section 1 of the Water Act 1973, only one, concerned with navigation, is little
related to water quality (Okun, 1977:183).
5.7.1 sewage disposal
The 1970 Jeger report made some 40 recommendations, some of which were
incorporated later in the 1974 Control of Pollution Act, including the ending of
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secrecy in the discharge consent system. The real force of the report was its
emphasis on how poorly sewage works were operated. It pointed out that full
biological treatment capacity was already provided for areas where 80% of the
population live, so that effluents of adequate standard should be, and often were,
achieved - and even better in some cases. But it then produced the evidence that, on
yearly average values for suspended solids and BOD in final effluents, nearly 60%
of works were outside the conditions they were required to meet by their consents.
Thus acknowledging the very weak enforcement of RA consent conditions as well
as the poor performance of local councils in sewage treatment and disposal
(Department of the Environment, 1970b).
Many sewage treatment facilities were old and had not been maintained or enlarged
to keep pace with growth. Smaller authorities lacked specialised staff to deal with
such problems as trade effluent control. As working conditions were often
unpleasant, they could not recruit capable operators and consequently works were
not properly manned (Okun, 1977:213).
The real problem for Whitehall, then, was how to improve sewage disposal. It
would be too slow to give RAs power to build new sewage works as there were too
many. A minimum requirement would be to get these taken over by RAs, yet they
possessed no managerial or financial resources for such a responsibility. To provide
these, a merger of functions which included water supply as well became attractive.
to the MHLG and to some of the outside interests also.
5.7.2 pollution control proposals
As the last of the consultation papers (1972), the government issued a series of six
papers on pollution control. In general, these were addressed to matters that were
not to be included in the Water Bill, because of the press of time, but would appear
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in subsequent legislation and would inevitably become the responsibility of the
WAs:
1. Existing control of discharges and deposits: The government indicated that it
shared in the Jeger Committee recommendation that routine pollution control be
extended to tidal rivers, estuaries and the sea.
2. Pollution from boats: Legislation was proposed that would prohibit vessels on
fresh waters to have appliances that would permit discharges and to enable the WAs
to provide necessary shore-based facilities for boat registration. Also, the WAs
were to be given the power to regulate discharges from boats.
3. Full control of all trade effluent discharges to public sewers: The Jeger
Committee recommended and the government fully supported, that all discharges of
trade effluents be subject to control and liability for charges and that the WAs
should be given the appropriate powers.
4. Risk from accidents: The Jeger Committee recommended better safety
precautions against accidental pollution and provisions for prosecution of those
permitting pollution, especially to underground waters which had no legal
protection. The WAs were to be given strong powers for control of accidents.
5. Publication of information about discharges to inland water courses: The Royal
Commission on Environmental Pollution urged publication of information about
discharges because the waters into which the discharges are made are public
property. The only value of confidentiality to industry is to protect themselves
against action if they had been given a consent by a regulatory authority.
6. Control of discharges of mine waters: Mine waters had in general been exempt
from pollution laws and these would be repealed so as to bring mine waters into the
same class as other pollutants.
5.7.3 the poacher-gamekeeper relationship
The CAWC's indecisive report in February 1971 objected to integrating in one
agency both regulatory and utility roles. The poacher-gamekeeper combination was
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a major source of disagreement within CAWC and difficult to resolve. This one
substantive question about the Water Act itself was raised at the outset by David
Price, then of the Directorate General of Water Engineering in the DoE. Would
problems arise from the fact that the WAs would be responsible for discharges from
their own sewerage systems as well as being responsible for these discharges
complying with standards that the WAs themselves would establish? Would the
WAs be both polluter and regulator, poacher and gamekeeper? LAs would continue
to be responsible for seeing to the wholesomeness of potable water supplied by the
WAs, a division of responsibility that would no longer exist for water pollution
control (Okun, 1977:217).
The internal structures created by the WAs would see to the independence of those
within the authority responsible for checking on water quality (Mathews & Mance,
1986). A quality advisory panel would act as the WA's internal check on water
quality. To provide the necessary degree of independence, this panel must derive its
power directly from the WA and not from one of its committees. It would be
responsible for providing reports on water quality, not only on the performance of
outside bodies such as those making discharges to the WA's rivers, but also to the
WA's own performance as water supplier, sewage treatment authority and custodian
of the rivers (Okun, 1977:115).
The water management committee would be responsible for operations and new
works in relation to water conservation, water supply, sewerage and sewage
disposal and pollution prevention and the oversight of relationships with the water
companies, local authorities and new town development corps that operate as agents
of WAs. This committee would embrace the whole of the water cycle reflecting the
need for unified management.
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At the time of the reorganisation Jack Beddoe, Under Secretary in the DoE, averred
that those who would condenm the WAs as being both judge and jury were
thoroughly 'old-fashioned'. Splitting these responsibilities was like trying to split an
indivisible process: You might as well split water treatment and supply. One of the
most common complaints about the Water Resources Act 1963, he pointed out, was
the division of responsibility between the RA' s functions in water resources
development and the responsibilities of water supply undertakings for water supply
(Okun, 1977:218).
The case for putting the issue of permits into all-purpose authorities was that this is
a key river basin function and that internally the regulatory staff should be able to
influence both investment planning and operational performance to secure better
consent compliance (Kinnersley, 1988). Yet the hazard here was that, even with the
power provided for the Secretary of State to check on permits issued for the water
authorities' own discharges and abstractions, the regulator and the utility operators
would be colleagues in one organisation under a single management. Moreover,
there were issues of even-handedness: if the authority ran its own discharges on a
loose rein, would it do the same for other dischargers also or be unfairly hard on
them? The 1974 Control of Pollution Act would provide for the ending of the
secrecy in the discharge consent procedure but as implementation of this kept being
deferred, the serious conflicts involved in these functions were largely kept away
from informed independent scrutiny.
Woodward sounded a note of caution on the effects of regionalisation on RWQ, as
there may be less control of the major source of water pollution ie sewage effluent,
than with the former system. The effluent standards required by the former RAs
could only be altered by appeal to the appropriate Government Minister. One could
envisage a situation within the RWAs, however, in which desirable effluent quality
standards could be amended internally, against the advice of those responsible for
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Pollution pointed out that classifying a one-mgd river as unpolluted is not very
significant, as it is not much in the way of an amenity, yet it counts as much in the
Table as the Thames (Okun, 1977:206).
Approximately 56% of the total lengths of rivers in Classes 1 and 2 were unsuitable
for abstraction because of insufficient quantity, so that the fact that 92% of the total
length of these rivers were in these higher classes was of relatively little
significance. All in all, the general quality of inland waters of England and Wales
had been improving at a slow but steady rate. This rate needed to increase
substantially in the near future, if many miles of rivers were not to remain in poor
quality and grossly polluted for many years to come.
5.7.5 1973 Water Act
The reorganisation was not a contentious issue in party political terms. The actual
structure created was designed to reflect features of river basin relationships and
water quality management problems that were not a matter of political conflict.
Moreover, a new mood was evident in the early 1970s, strongly favouring more
attention to and better care of the natural environment, as encouraged, for example,
by the Stockholm Conference in 1972 and prominent in many other countries
besides Britain.
The Water Act 1973 charged the Secretaries of State for Wales and Environment
and MAFF with the duties which include the restoration and maintenance of the
wholesomeness of rivers and inland water, use of inland water for recreation,
enhancement and preservation of amenity in connection with inland water and the
use of inland water for navigation, executed through water authorities. Other duties
with quality aspects included land drainage, fisheries management, nature
conservation and amenity, and responsibility to provide wholesome drinking water.
Responsibilities were given with respect to esturial and coastal waters. Periodical
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reviews, plans and programmes were required describing the discharge of these
duties (Mathews & Mance, 1986).
5.8 Continuity: Integration 1974-79
The issue of RWQ was one of potential concern to the industry, given the state of
the sewage undertakings which had been inherited. A new river classification
scheme instigated by the NWC showed promise of a national effort towards river
quality improvement. However, the economic situation of the nation with
subsequent cuts in capital expenditure to the industry would mitigate against these
good intentions. Government conspired with industry to delay the introduction of
part II of COPA and introduced several measures which led to less rigorous
standards being implemented in water quality management. This would lead to a
downturn in river quality, not apparent until some ten years later.
5.8.1 WAs' inheritance
The WAs took over all the facilities within their areas for providing water supply
(excepting the water companies), wastewater collection disposal and river
management. The river authorities had little in the way of major capital investment
and were generally satisfactorily staffed. The awful truth, however, did not begin to
dawn upon the WAs until they began to take inventory of the facilities that they had
inherited (Okun, 1977:2 14). The technical journals reported almost no criticism of•
the quality of the water supply facilities inherited, but they were replete with
revelations concerning the sewage treatment facilities: The hypocrisy behind many
voices of LA protest (at loss of facilities to WAs) has now been revealed. While a
lot of councils were undoubtedly very conscientious, inquiries. . . in three WAs reveal
large numbers of sewage works which have been allowed to deteriorate over a
period of several years, while staff to run them were either badly trained or allowed
to drift away without being replaced (Wiseman, 1974).
Chapter 5: River Water Quality in the Water Industry Page 232
The dominance of water supply engineers in the hierarchy of the WAs led Okun
(1977:108) to speculate: Whether the WAs will suffer from inadequate staff in
sewerage and sewage disposal, the field which is to require the greatest capital
expenditures during the early years, remains to be seen. However, one not
unimportant benefit was the large number of professionals, relative to their total
number in the water industry, that the river authorities contributed to the higher
echelons of the new water authorities. Sharp distinctions had always been made
between the 'clean' and 'dirty' water fields but the river authorities developed
leadership with an understanding of both, a resource sorely needed in the
reorganised water industry. This, added to the experience they had in regional
enterprises, made them prime candidates for top positions in the new WAs (Okun,
1977: 107).
5.8.2 water resources
The NWC pointed out that the WRB's (1973) report Water Resources in England
and Wales was mainly concerned with bulk water storage and transmission and not
the whole of the water supply for which the new WAs were now responsible:
Important aspects of river quality, local distribution, water utilisation and effluent
treatment were touched upon only indirectly by the WRB (NWC, 1975e). The
NWC and the WAs did not assume that past trends of water use would necessarily
continue considering the possible effects of pricing policies on water demands.
Also, better forecasts of direct industrial demand required more detailed analysis on
each river than the WRB was able to undertake (Okun, 1977:192).
The WAs themselves faced difficult decisions in determining priorities. Heavy
capital expenditures were required for servicing new housing developments and for
essential replacements to existing facilities. Increased use of rivers for potable water
supplies would not be feasible if sufficient capital were not available for adequate
upstream effluent treatment. Restraints on capital expenditure and the impact of
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increasing householders' bills for water services were seen to affect the potential for
using downstream sources for potable water supplies. The NWC document included
the critiques prepared by the WAs. Typical is that of the Severn Trent Water
Authority: We are also spec jfically concerned, as our predecessors were not, with
the balance of expenditure between the various sectors of water management and
this will have a bearing on the use we make of the Board's advice (NWC, 1975e).
Okun (1977) critiqued the WRB's strategy which rests largely upon the economies
that would result from having smaller reservoirs and using rivers as aqueducts
under the assumption that the downstream quality problems are tractable: Current
technology is and has been for years adequate to render polluted water
bacteriologically safe and to monitor that safety. However, the chemical revolution
of the mid-2Oth century no longer permits us to be sanguine that a water supply is
indeed wholesome f it is drawn from a polluted source (1977:192). Similar
concerns were raised by The Steering Committee on Water Quality in 1971
(Department of the Environment, 1971a) and Hugh Fish, director of scientific
services for Thames Water Authority stated: It is becoming increasingly dfflcult for
any water authority drawing supplies from a developed river to demonstrate
convincingly that the supplies it delivers are wholly safe in chemical quality for
long-term consumption (1975b: 2-4).
5.8.3 consent conditions
Until implementation of the Control of Pollution Act 1974, discharges of effluents
to water courses were subject to the Rivers Acts 1951 and 1961 where discharges
were permitted by consent (Appendix 5.2). Each WA inherited consent conditions
established under a wide range of criteria and it became necessary to re-examine all
consent conditions to establish a common quantitative philosophy. The need for a
more rational framework for the control of effluents and, thereby, river quality was
recognised. The clear need for a system in which the WAs could be publicly
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accountable for RWQ led, in 1978, to the formal adoption of river quality
objectives (RQOs) for all the significant rivers in the UK (Mathews & Mance,
1986).
5.8.4 1974 Control of Pollution Act
Previous legislation relating to control of water pollution was brought together and
extended in COPA 1974. This Act included a number of provisions intended to
ensure that the Authorities carried out in a satisfactory and even-handed manner
their potentially conflicting roles in the areas of sewage treatment and disposal and
pollution control. These provisions included requirements for the advertising of
consent applications, public registers of consents and monitoring data and the
removal of a previous restriction on prosecution for consent failure (Martin &
Woods, 1992). COPA covered many aspects of environmental pollution, water
being only one part, and the control of water quality and pollution was covered by
Part II. It empowered the granting of 'consents to discharge' by the WA, excluding
specific activities from the legislation (Okun, 1977:220). Walker (1979:33) notes
that: unlike the old legislation, there is no system of consents to outlets as such.
Thus under predetermined conditions, pollution may legally be discharged into
watercourses (Hanley et a!, 1991).
Most significantly, information on water pollution control activities of the WAs was
to be made freely available (for an account of the early impact of the Act see
Tinker, 1975; New Scientist, 1976). Where there is a private interest issue as in the
case of trade secrets, application for protecting such information may be made to
the Secretary of State. The control samples that the WAs require both for their own
operations and the operations of others were not required, to be made public,
thereby excluding the public from a significant volume of pertinent information.
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A major contentious issue before, during, and after the passage of the Water Act
1973 was the accountability of the WAs to the public. COPA constituted a virtual
'bill of rights' for the public with regard to water pollution. Almost all information
concerning consent conditions and audit samples by the RAs had constituted
privileged information from which the public and even the damaged individuals
were excluded. For example, a downstream riparian owner had no rights to object
to a consent or to acquire information about the nature of the application unless the
applicant for that consent agreed. The 1974 Act constituted a right-about-face as the
WAs were to publish notices of applications for consents and to inform the
appropriate district councils and, for tidal water or sea discharge, MAFF. Thus, the
way was open for public interest groups to intercede for the public at large
(Woodward, 1974), as the new Act permitted private prosecutions without
restriction and the WAs as well as those given consent were subject to prosecution.
Accepting in general COPA, the CBI expressed reservations about requirements for
the release of information and was categorically opposed to the initiation of effluent
charges for direct discharges to waters, and to some of the requirements for
compensation.
These aspects did not come into force because of concern over their incompatibility
when taken in conjunction with the inherited consents. The level of non-compliance
with existing consents was potentially very high were these to be interpreted
strictly. The need to resolve this issue led to the setting up of a working party by
the NWC and to a delay in implementing the main provisions of COPA for almost
11 years until 1985.
5.8.5 water quality management
A new approach to water quality management was instigated due to the implications
of COPA and the consequent need to derive a more scientific approach to the setting
of consent conditions (Tetlow, 1985). The impetus for this changed approach came
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from the top government official in the water field, Trevor Hughes, Under
Secretary and chief water engineer in the DoE, who challenged each WA to
consider its objectives, river by river, and the uses to which the river is put: What
quality of water is necessary for these purposes? ... What strategy would make the
best use of the resources available? (Hughes, 1975).
One outcome of this challenge was the creation of a WA working party to address
these questions: The IVWC and the WAs are working together on a proposal to scrap
the principle that all rivers should be improved as far as possible. Its replacement
would be a scheme whereby river pollution control would be carried out on the
basis of the intended use of the river (Surveyor, 1976). The key principle that
would guide the new strategy was stated by David Walker (1976), assistant director
general of the NWC:. . .consent conditions should be related to the use to which a
river is put. Thus if a river is used in its lower reaches as a source of water for
potable purposes, the consent conditions would require much greater expenditures
for wastewater treatment than if water supplies are abstracted from upstream
impoundments and the use of the river as an aqueduct may not be economical. This
approach to pàllution control opened options for water management that were not
considered by the WRB in developing its national strategy.
In 1977 the NWC published its document River Water Quality, the Next Stage:
Review of Discharge Consent Conditions, which established principles for reviewing
discharge consent conditions for implementation of Part II of COPA. The report
was adopted by WAs who then specified RQOs for surface waters, following
consultation with environmental interests and other users, on the objectives and
priorities for improvement.
In reaching their conclusion the NWC reviewed the DoE's simple classification
scheme for RWQ (Appendix 5.4). Five broad classes of water quality for significant
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watercourses were recognised (Appendix 5.5) taking into account river use and 95
percentile quality limits which provided a sounder system in a statistical sense.
Rivers were to be classified on the basis of this scheme in terms of both their
current and future river quality objective (RQO) classes. The latter would if
appropriate represent an improvement. Consents were to be reviewed on an interim
basis to the 95 percentile quality capable of achievement by the existing plant
(Appendix 5.2). Where necessary these would in due course be reviewed to long
term consents appropriate to achievement of the RQOs. The working party also
recommended a switch to the use of nitrification-suppressed BOD, ie BOD (ATU),
with separate control of amonia. Certain EC directives on WQ criteria, where
appropriate, were included.
It was recognised that not all desired improvements in the quality of UK rivers
could be achieved quickly; provision would have to be made in WA capital
expenditure programmes for massive investment over a number of years in
accordance with defined priorities. To allow the implementation of Part H and
maintain a credible position for WAs, in line with reviewed consent conditions to
meet RQOs, it was decided nationally to devise "interim" or "short-term" consents.
This was particularly for situations where cost/benefit constraints prevented the
implementation in the foreseeable future, of consent conditions (known as "long
term consents"), required to meet agreed RQOs (Tetlow, 1985).
The proposed new classification of RQ was adopted at the instigation of the WAs
themselves, although supported and endorsed by the DoE. Not all WAs adopted this
approach to the formulation of RQOs (see Mathews & Mance, 1986:3 on Anglian
Water). However, the same principles underlay quality management in all WAs.
Each Authority developed initial proposals for the interim and long-term target
water quality of specific reaches of rivers, taking account of realistically achievable
improvements. These proposals were then the subject of extensive public
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consultation and amendment. The RQOs were formally adopted by the Board of
each WA and usually not changed without the approval of the Board.
The Authorities' own plans for capital expenditure on sewage treatment were linked
to progressive achievement of the RQOs. Furthermore, RQOs provided a reference
point against which both the interested public and central government are able to
judge the performance of WAs in maintaining and improving water quality. Apart
from these self-imposed RQOs the Authorities were constrained by a number of
external measures both legislative and advisory. River management was also
constrained by national and international legislation, particularly EC Directives.
The posture in Britain for policing effluent discharges that has been characterised by
adapting consent conditions to the local situation was affected by Britain's
participation in the EEC. The EEC was pushing for uniform standards and
regulations for wastewater discharges, being particularly anxious to have these
written into national legislation so as to avoid apparent inequities in the
responsibilities that industries in the common market countries are obligated to
assume. The British delegation to the EEC refused to give its approval to a draft
decision on toxic chemical discharges. The difference in philosophy between the
EEC and the United Kingdom came to a head in Brussels at the Council of
Environmental Ministers meeting on 8th Dec 1975. Britain, the only advocate for
this approach won an important compromise, highly lauded at home, whereby
member states would be able to choose between the two approaches.
5.8.6 the poacher-gamekeeper issue
The controversy over regulation did not let up after the reorganisation despite the
data presented that the 'gamekeeper' without responsibility for the treatment facility
had not been exactly 'successful' as evidenced by the legacy left to the WAs. The
failure of the adversary relationship was attributed to the fragmentation of sewerage
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and sewage disposal in England and Wales, and:.. .double standards of control (of
most RAs), pursuing industrialists in the courts while turning a blind eye to the
local authorities, or, more probably, prosecuting only in those cases where failure
to reach consent standards caused serious pollution of the receiving waters
(Lillicrap, 1974). Recognising the problem, WAs established water quality advisory
panels with an officer responsible for water pollution control who was free to report
directly to the water quality panel and thus directly to the authority. In general, he
was either the director of scientific services where such a directorate exists, or in
the directorate of resource planning, neither of which is responsible for operations.
This arrangement was adopted in all but the Yorkshire WA (Okun, 1977:218).
5.8.7 COPA delayed
With the passage of the 1974 Act during the depth of economic crisis and with the
WAs already facing serious limitations on expenditures for which they were already
responsible prior to the passage of the Act, the government was understandably
slow in initiating implementation. If fully implemented, the Act would put the WAs
in jeopardy because of the facilities they had inherited. The requirement for heavy
investment in capital improvements did not permit them to correct the situation
immediately, and the public would have the right to prosecute the WAs under the
Act. Accordingly, a working party of the NWC on behalf of the WAs recommended
that the DoE provide a three-year delay in implementing the provision (part II) that
authorises the public to prosecute (Municipal Engineering, 1975b).
In February 1975, the DoE gave notice as to its plans for the long-term
implementation of the Act, beginning by pointing out the need to restrict increases
in local authority expenditures. The government's aim was to implement the Act in
two interrelated steps: activating the consent system, and making the discharge of
effluents without consent an offence. This second step would give the WAs control
of all discharges into tidal and coastal waters up to the three mile limit. The
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government did not propose, without extensive consultation with NWC, to
implement the provision that authorises the WAs to institute effluent charges for
discharges directly to rivers.
The capital investment cuts of the mid-70s and the Control of Pollution Act 1974
combined to create a dilemma for the WAs. The WAs came to feel inhibited by
Whitehall spending restraints on how much improvement of discharges they could
achieve, yet remained at risk of more public exposure of - and even prosecution for
- their widespread non-compliance as a result of the 1974 Act being implemented.
Even the National Water Council and the DoE contributed to moves in the opposite
direction of openness under Labour and later Conservative governments.
Tetlow (1985) argued that the NWC class argument was spurious due to the broad
water quality banding of each class, so that river stretches falling near NWC class
boundaries would be penalised, whilst stretches in the middle of a class could have
significant quality changes without being identified in the NWC scheme. Warn
(1989) also argued this procedure repeated for thousands of sites leads to a large
number of false assignments, provoking, with equal harm, undue complacency or
demands for unnecessary action. The practical consequence of such an effect is that
classes would change randomly back and forth and waste money. The problem of
sampling could be controlled by allowing assessors to exercise judgement or by the
use of sound statistical procedures. Thus the strict application of NWC classes and
their related water quality criteria could cause difficulties in the implementation of
COPA. Moreover, the adoption of the 95th percentile quality limits was the subject
of much controversy between supporters of absolute standards and those who
argued for an average annual quality (for a fuller discussion see Appendix 5.2).
Also, the classification of river quality objectives relating to the purposes for which
the water was to be used was considered a questionable move since it introduced the
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concept of high river quality being a lower priority unless specific uses compel it
(Kinnersley, 1988). In this spirit, numbers of consents were reviewed and relaxed in
the conditions they required dischargers to fulfil. Although it was sometimes
claimed that the relaxations did not go as far as damaging river quality, it was not
clear that the previous conditions had been unduly strict. Moreover, despite the
exercise having begun with a helpful consultation paper issued by the NWC, little
or nothing was published on consequential action, either as to the number of
consents relaxed or made stricter, or the degree of variations made (Kinnersley,
1988:121-2).
Ministers went along with this, both in their role as overseers of the consent
standards water authorities adopted for their own dischargers and in the control they
had over the implementation of the 1974 Act (Kinnersley, 1988). On the assumption
COPA would be implemented, the DoE permitted the WAs to 'rationalise' their
consent conditions to the current quality of the river rather than to a true river
quality objective.
A further twist given to the implementation of COPA II was the introduction of an
exemption order in 1983, which allowed various discharges exemption from the Act
and, in effect, made COPA meaningless in those areas until the Government chose
to lift those exemptions: This rather bizarre setting of quality standards to meet the
consent rather than the consent to meet the standards has been typical of the
Government's approach to the environment (Hall, 1989:67). Shaw, Director of
Finance STWA, pointed out the cost of pollution control:. . . a large proportion of
our population has become much more aware of the adverse effects of pollution and
there has been a growing clamour for more positive action to be taken to control
this pollution. (But) . . . the pressure for a reduction of pollution is not accompanied
by a willingness to pay for this benefit (1975: 9). Furthermore, many LAs had, in
the past, imposed very low charges for treatment of trade effluent in order to attract
Chapter 5: River Water Quality in the Water Industry Page 242
new business to their areas. He argued against the practice of setting consents to
what sewage plants should be able to achieve when operated efficiently with their
present equipment rather than requiring extensive capital expenditure to be
undertaken to raise the level of treatment.
As the economic climate in Britain worsened through 1975, the government did pull
back. In a letter to Lord Nugent, chairman of the NWC, Denis Howell, Under
Secretary of the DoE, stated: ... (the government) had reluctantly concluded that in
view of the current economic situation, the introduction of the major provisions in
Part 110! the Act would have to be deferred (NWC,1975d). Provisions that would
not involve significant additional expenditures, such as those relating to the control
of discharges of trade effluent to sewers,, would be implemented within months, but
the control of discharges to tidal estuaries and coastal waters would be delayed. The
WAs and industries were expected to cooperate in joint studies of problems
affecting these waters in preparation for the long-term plans for the management of
these waters.
Government kept delaying implementation of the part of the Act which required the
setting-up of open registers of discharge consents and samples checking compliance
with them. They delayed this until 1985 - more than 10 years after Parliament
passed the legislation. This flew in the face of the registers being an essential
feature of more openness once the authorities were given in 1974 the conflicting
roles of sewage works operators and river quality regulators. Moreover, behind this
screen of continued concealment, further significant relaxations of consent standards
for many sewage discharges seem to have been authorised. In this setting,
publication of even national statistics of discharges and consents lagged notably
behind the equivalent published details of abstractions licensed. The publication of
the five-year River Water Quality Surveys were nothing like enough on their own,
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either as plain data or any sort of exposure for notable individual polluters at
particular locations (Kinnersley, 1988).
5.9 Recreation: Nationalisation 1979-83
Whitehall applied to WAs a standard financial harness for mature utilities and the
WAs responded very superficially by showing how well they could fit into it.
Moreover, as regulatory bodies for effluent discharges, they ignored developing
economic tools so they still depended on legal devices in the form of consents - a
system already unequal to the strains being put on it and which the authorities
themselves further weakened to some extent.
The WAs were in an ideal position to direct water services efficiently on a regional
basis and this did indeed bring benefits. They were, however, increasingly subject
to stringent financial control from central government. The effects of this can be
seen in Fig 4.1 in terms of overall water services investment. As a result of this
reduction in the rate of investment and despite the rationalisation of the consents
system outlined earlier, compliance of sewage works with consents remained
patchy. Limited progress was made towards achieving RQO improvements despite
the initial intention of these being achieved in about 10 years from their publication
in 1979 (Martin & Woods 1992).
The way the water quality issue was handled by the WAs and Whitehall is
significant. It undermined the key arguments, which many accepted, suggesting that
authorities which were environmental regulators and polluters would give high
priority to reducing their pollution and to complying with the standards set for their
own discharges. Kinnersley attributes the undoing of the WAs to issues of finance
and water quality. In respect of water quality, the management in sewage works
became too keen to show they could achieve the staff reductions and financial
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targets which the restraints required, while the authority's regulatory role, expected
to enforce compliance on its own and other peoples' effluent discharges, became
increasingly ineffective: Though Whitehall was the driving force, it is not enough to
say that the authorities were bound to respond as they did. Their judgements about
which issues to address and which to brush under the carpet were far from rigorous
(1988:116).
Equally in water quality, the authorities hung back from serious attention to
improving charges for trade effluent disposal to sewers, or promoting in Britain the
concept of charging for discharges direct to rivers. This was a significant failure,
both because the equivalent type of charge for water abstractions had applied since
the mid-1960s, and because river water quality was emerging as an increasingly
serious worry. Moreover, in Europe much emphasis was being put on the Polluter
Pays principle. While this has some ambiguities in practice, Kinnersley (1988:119)
sees the failure in the UK to make more of the scope for pollution charges as a
major policy weakness
In 1980 a streamlined survey was carried out by the NWC. This survey, which
included a new estuary classification, used more objective criteria than the 1975
survey that could be linked to river use. In order to allow reference to previous
surveys, the 1980 survey data were also presented in accordance with the former
classification system (Appendix 5.5). Comparison of the detailed results with the
former surveys showed continued improvements in RWQ, particularly in the
reduction in lengths of grossly polluted rivers. There had been deteriorations but
generally without detriment to users of rivers (Tetlow, 1985). Overall, no notable
changes were recorded for any authority (NWC, 1980:14).
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5.10 Continuity: Commercialisation 1984-87
This period is notable for a shift in river management policy and practice away
from pollution prevention to quality management (Mathews & Mance, 1986).
Against the backdrop of the first deterioration in RWQ since 1958, the introduction
of COPA II and environmentalism, WAs became more motivated by the need to
avoid prosecution than achieving long term RWQOs. Additionally, increased capital
expenditure after 1985 was largely misdirected towards unnecessary or misleading
quality standards, thereby belying the emphasis on "quality management".
5.10.1 modern river management
The shifts of policy and practice related to water quality since 1974 were seen by
some (Kinnersley, 1988) as largely devices to handle (and conceal) awkward
situations rather than address and remedy the real sources of strain. However,
Mathews & Mance (1986) provided a more positive interpretation of modern river
management: despite the erosion of the original concept of the special role of
Directors of Scientific services at this time, this change had not had the dire
consequences which might have been predicted in the mid-1970s. Instead, staff with
responsibility and integrity who care for rivers and are able to allocate resources as
part of a wider remit of management had been available. An essential feature of
modern RWQ management was its integration with operations and strategic
planning. The annual plans and action for their execution had clearly stated cost
benefits and investments in sewage treatment could be correlated with improvements
in river quality. The cost of meeting specified river quality targets could now be
predicted.
The essence of the philosophy of river management was now quality management
and this represented a shift from the former ideas of pollution prevention. This was
indicative of the current managerialist trend within the public sector generally and
the water industry in particular since nationalisation (see 6.4.2). However, pollution
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prevention still had a role, particularly as the number of pollution incidents was
rising so that many water quality departments considered there was no longer
sufficient resource in this activity (Mathews & Mance, 1986). Pollution incidents
were an area where traditional attitudes of persuasion still played a major, but
apparently ineffectual, part since pollution incidents rose from 12,500 in 1980-81 to
21,095 in 1986-87: Litigation is expensive, time consuming and, of course, in many
cases the polluter may be extremely djfficult to identify (Hall, 1989: 68).
Mathews & Mance (1986:5-6) concluded that various good techniques exist for
modern river management based on integrated management plans but in practice
there were weaknesses. Considerable effort had been expended in monitoring
effluent, river quality and river flows. But few effluent flows were accurately
gauged and more refmed management of.river quality required this to be remedied.
Also, too few river samples had been taken in many places to provide a statistically
sound definition of quality. This was being redressed, wherever possible, with
existing resources. The same critical scrutiny as that given to sewage effluents and
resulting in look-up" tables was required, as this was vital in the context of 95
percentile criteria underpinning the NWC classes, especially if RQOs were to be
given the force of statute.
5.10.2 the 1985 RWQ survey
The 1985 River Quality Survey showed for the first time since 1958, the mileage of
river quality deterioration overtaking that of improvement. Over a quarter of total
river length was recorded as having changed in quality: 12% in 1985 was of higher
quality than 1980 and 14% of lower quality. There was a slight decline in length of
Class la and lb rivers between 1980 and 1985 - net deteriorations came to 903 km
out of nearly 40,000 km surveyed. However, differences in methods used between
WAs and changes between surveys made it uncertain whether the apparent small net
deterioration represented a real change (Department of Environment, 1985).
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Appendix 5.5 shows the results of these surveys over nearly 30 years, with the
record of improvement turning downwards after 1980.
The surveys showed that substantial reductions in the lengths of seriously polluted
rivers and canals during the 1970s had not been maintained in the 1980s. While
some regions had continued to show improvements, there had been a small net
deterioration in overall RWQ between 1980 and 1985 due particularly to setbacks in
the NW and SW WA areas (Fig 5.2). This was accounted for largely by the rise in
agricultural pollution and a decline in some sewage treatment works effluents, the
latter being associated with cuts in public expenditure (Royal Commission on
Environmental Pollution, 1987). Improvements in WQ were attributed to investment
by WAs or by industry (Department of Environment, 1985).
In the report of 1980 it was emphasised that a reduction in pollution was only
possible by investment by WAs and by industry. The WAs pointed out that many
desirable projects in this area were being deferred because of reductions in public
expenditure and limitations on charges for water services. The pattern of investment
in sewerage and sewage treatment is shown in Fig 4.1. Estimates for years prior to
the reorganisation, though less reliable than recent information, show the general
trend of investment which rose to a peak in 1974 before declining. Since 1981
investment had again been rising and WAs in their annual plans proposed to
increase real investment in these services. The overall forecast was for relatively
little net change in WQ. The lengths of Good and Fair Quality rivers were expected
to increase by some 2% while the lengths of Poor and Bad Quality rivers would
decrease substantially, by over 20%. This amounted to a net reduction of some 860
km in the length of Poor and Bad Quality rivers.
A Water Authorities Association document to the House of Commons Environment
Committee in 1987 summarised the results of the 1985 survey: The WAs have the
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technical knowledge and management skills to produce satisfactory effluents but are
constrained by government cuts in borrowing limits, by cuts in operating
expenditure and by pressures from customers to limit increases in charges. In
addition, the extension of controls under COPA and the implementation of EC
directives require a further commitment of resources for monitoring and
enforcement.
5.10.3 COPA II
In 1986 Part II of COPA was fmally introduced after the setting up of the registers
in 1985. Part II makes available a coherent framework for managing all
environmental waters, including groundwater estuaries and coastal waters, lakes and
river waters. This required discharges to obtain consent from WAs who may
impose such conditions as are reasonable. The only instance where advertising for
consent was not required was where the discharge was considered to have "no
appreciable effect" as defined by the DoE. However, there had been problems with
this because it was been based on a proportional increase of quality which lead to
different assessments in different areas depending on the prevailing quality and
NWC class (Mathews & Mance, 1986).
Peter Hall, assistant director of the NWC at the time, recalled the impact of the new
Act: COPA II was written in an extraordinary style and not the style it was written
in the late 60s. Some of the implications of that were quite severe for us. But they
did bring measurement into things like discharges. . . Backing it was a matter of
policy. And the consequences of that was that basically many of the sewage
treatment works didn 't meet their consents.
5.10.4 financial implications of quality standards
Capital spending by WAs had been allowed to rise since the registers for COPA II
were in place. As this was financed substantially by internal funds from higher
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charges (in broad terms, 1 billion a year capital expenditure undertaken with
external borrowing of less than 50 million, compared to less than 20 per cent
internal financing of capital spending in 1974), this did not concern the Treasury.
Performance assessments stretching back in time had indicated a fairly consistent
shortfall between the quality of current effluents and that needed to protect rivers
which now seemed to be getting worse. This suggested that in spite of recent
investment little or no progress was being made towards achieving RQOs. Future
cutbacks in investment would lead to an enlarged shortfall.
Tetlow makes a strong case for giving due regard to technical matters in setting
standards if there are not to be misleading assessments of compliance and waste of
capital resources (Appendix 5.2:4). He summarises: Quite simply, all assessments
of compliance on which improved conclusions are drawn, or on which key decisions
are made, must be done in a way which controls the effect of sampling. This is no
optional embellishment; failure to do this places a strong random element in the
way capital is allocated (1985:2.3 7).
COPA had placed an emphasis on avoiding prosecution leading to a focus on
compliance with current consents as opposed to achieving the Long Term Consents.
Investment directed at the former would not always benefit rivers as much as the
same money spent on achieving Long Term Consents. If the object were solely to
reduce the number of failing works, it would be cost effective to invest in small
works which fail only marginally. A better policy, for the rivers, would have been
to invest according to the effects of discharges on river water quality. In this way
COPA had the effect of delaying long term RWQ improvements.
A second confusing factor was urmecessary or misleading quality standards. Since
the 1912 Royal Commission Report there had been a long tradition of using
suspended solids to manage the quality of effluents, but this parameter has been
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shown to have little general significance for the health of rivers, as long as BOD is
controlled. Hence, it made sense to drop suspended solids from most Long Term
Consents. Failure to take this measure gave compliance statistics which were less
useful in directing resources towards true needs because the statistics were
corrupted by trivial failures to meet limits on suspended solids. Harkness (1982)
made a similar point when he noted the effect on RWQ arising from the full
treatment of all sewage flows: the river BOD did not improve below the treated
effluent discharge as expected, suggesting the degree of nitrification in the BOD test
might have increased with a decrease in pollution so that little change occurred in
unsuppressed BOD results.
A more important corrupting influence was the externally imposed standards. This
had two aspects, the standards themselves and .the imposition of incorrect methods
of assessing compliance. For example, ammonia was known to have strict standards
and so limits for rivers must be based on a comparison of the health of the rivers
and their WQ statistics. All these corrupting influences altered the perception of
need and confused the allocation of resources. They extended the time by which,
with current resources, improvements could be achieved.
5.10.5 environmentalism
Agg & Zabel (1986) acknowledged the strides made in recent years to clean up
rivers. Nevertheless, the UK water quality maps were still showing large stretches
of rivers as Class 3 and 4 and would do so for the foreseeable future. These waters
exhibited limited, and in some extreme cases negligible, biological activity. Given
that the number of reported pollution incidents in England had risen significantly, a
major issue for the future was how to control potentially dangerous substances
(either during production or in use), and in particular the problem of selecting those
chemicals requiring control, their origins and the control options available.
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River quality and the siting of reservoirs were environmental issues in the water
sphere which traditionally attracted public concern, now in addition there was
drinking water quality (Price, 1985). Public support and positive reactions by the
industry to this concern were becoming increasingly important in the financial
climate. Also COPA II allowed the investigation of the quality of discharges to
surface waters by the lay person. Some in the industry, faced with the constraints of
recession and need to cut costs, inevitably resented and resisted pressure to spend
more money on effluent treatment, other WAs were uneasy about publishing the
antiquity or lack of capacity which prevented compliance with limits.
Environmental quality, including river quality had become a politicised issue during
the mid-1980s and environmental groups were joining anglers in putting pressure on
WAs (Price, 1985). Surveys on environmental concern in UK adults, conducted by
Taylor Nelson Applied Futures, demonstrated quite clearly a sharp up-turn in the
mid-1980s, a figure now likely approaching 50% of the population (Soulsby, 1989).
The rise of environmental politics resulted in the much greater involvement of the
Secretary of State for the Environment and his department in water quality
planning, at a time when a firm commitment had been given by central government
to privatise Water Services. This raised questions about how to deal with
environmental services. The privatisation "White Paper" in particular left
unanswered the relationship between the DG, WSPLCs and DoE. Also the proposed
separate responsibility of land drainage bodies had unknown implications for overall
river management. How would the water quality objectives plans differ from those
in the present informal arrangements? The only certainty was that modern river
management was likely to be turbulent for many years.
Soulsby (1989) called for the water industry to encourage an environmental
approach throughout their organisations which stressed the environmental
importance of all operations. If environmental audits were incorporated into all
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design processes then more environmentally favourable solutions could be found for
all schemes. A response to environmental demand suggested greater costs but also
created enormous opportunities for the businesses which develop the acceptable
technologies. Business opportunities existed in effluent control and in waste disposal
in the UK and abroad.
5.11 Recreation: Privatisation 1987-89
During this change period environmentalism remained high on the agenda and
intensified as the privatisation process entered its fourth phase (see 4.10).
Coincidentally, 1988 was European Conservation Year celebrated in posters,
projects and prizes with notable contributions from the water industry (Soulsby,
1989). Pollution prevention had become a £2.2 billion industry in the UK including
a substantial contribution from the water industry. It was a market set for huge
growth if the environmental awareness trend continued and was reflected in tighter
anti-pollution legislation and control. Similarly the market for environmentally
friendly products was also on the increase.
The privatisation process had strongly focused attention on compliance with sewage
works consents. Overall failures had been declining, particularly since COPA II and
the Government stated that the water industry would spend £lbn by 1992 to allow
treatment works to meet consent standards. Even higher levels of expenditure were
expected beyond 1992 to comply with tighter consent standards. But more
significantly, it was not possible to create private water service companies which
would be breaking the law from day one. To overcome this the Government
allowed the issue of time-limited consents for works failing their existing consents.
They were given temporary consent conditions relating to current performance.
Such consents were only issued for sewage works where there were investment
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projects in hand to meet at least the original consent limits and often tighter ones. A
strict timetable was set for the completion of the improvements.
5.11.1 NRA proposals
Lord Beistead, formerly Minister of State at the Department of the Environment,
speaking at an IWEM conference in 1987 gave one reason for the decision to form
the NRA as the deterioration in rivers, evidenced by the 1985 River Quality Survey:
• . . the extent to which sewage treatment works are failing to comply.. .shows that f
justice is seen to be done, the future PLC's really cannot be the regulators of what
others can put into a river or take out of it (Beistead, 1988:23 8). This view is
supported by Kinnersley who summarised the motivations of the WAs in dealing
with river water quality:.. . they largely took paths of quiet compliance with
(Whitehall pressures as obedient utility operators) rather than expose fully the
conflicts which all-purpose agencies could not escape under conditions of
congestion (1988:164).
The degree of recognition of the water quality problem was reflected in the Third
Report of the House of Commons Environment Committee, published in May 1987.
The report was published as the general election was called and as Nicholas Ridley
put forward his proposal for a National Rivers Authority. The discrediting of the
all-purpose authority - which this report really confirmed - may have built up
slowly over five years or so, but it became plain suddenly. Kinnersley attributes the
blame for this to:.. failures in financing and in policies for water quality, to both of
which Whitehall contributed as much as the authorities themselves (1988: 115).
The report concluded that the WAs needed clearer water quality objectives related
to timetables for achieving them, and that improved sewage works performance
must be attained - even though river and estuary quality in England and Wales was
very high. It started to make the case - just ahead of public moves to create a
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National Rivers Authority - for putting pollution control and more active
prosecution policy in the hands of an independent body not involved with sewage
works operation - and urged more prosecution of WAs which cause pollution. Most
notably, in recognising the dynamics of the claims on river capacity, the
recommendations included a requirement for chemical companies to give their
customers data about the hazards of their products, dischargers having a duty to
notify the regulatory agency of any new pollutants in their effluent. That agency
should have a 'stop' power, as in the Netherlands, in additionto existing more
formal procedures for modifying discharge consents. Significantly, the committee
recommended Whitehall to reconsider some form of incentive or redistributive
charge for direct discharges to water courses. This had a strong economic rationale
as a counterbalance to congestion which arises from treating river capacity as a free
resource.
These developments suggest several paradoxes in the experience of the water
industry. Decades were spent accepting single-purpose river basin agencies,
strengthening them and finally bringing them together. They were to achieve better
internal planning, but as congestion was also persisting or in places increasing, it
was making the internal conflicts all the more acute. The real need now was for
more separate agencies and more exposure of the conflicts which involved other
interests in the community as well - especially as to the costs involved in money and
environmental terms.
In another direction, the effort had been focused over decades on better
organisation, though sewage disposal had been long left out of this. But sewage
disposal and factory discharges are point sources of pollution, readily identified if
not always carefully monitored. But an increasing feature of congested river basins
is a major growth in pollution from diffuse non-point sources, eg farming,
accidental spillages: The underlying paradox is that, even if point sources of
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pollution are better disciplined, scattered hazards multiply and strengthen
(Kinnersley, 1988:165).
5.11.2 the 1988 Water Bill
The Water Bill expected RWQOs to be made statutory, therefore it was important to
ensure a consistent and objective method of assessing performance. Primarily this
meant ridding the NWC scheme of subjectivity and exposing the full and damaging
effect of sampling error, previously dealt with through judgement. The creation of
the NRA was an additional spur toward objectivity by establishing a consistent
approach throughout the country and an even-handed approach to all types of
discharge.
5.12 Continuity: Private Sector 1990-94
In 1991 5 new Acts which consolidated existing water legislation, were passed and
came into force on 1 Dec (Appendix 4.1). Until this consolidation legislation was
passed, water law was spread over 20 main Acts and a large number of other
statutes dating back to the 1930s, although there have not been any substantial
amendments to the earlier legislation. The legislation pertaining to the NRA and
relating to WQ and quantity is now to be found in the Water Resources Act
(Bowman, 1992). This most recent phase has not had sufficient time yet to see the
impact of the Water Bill on the quality of water in the UK, with the 1991 NRA
survey showed little improvement. In addition, EC legislation is fundamental to the
creation of current water quality controls and this situation became even more
pronounced after 1992.
Within the water companies attitudes to quality and environmentalism in general
inform how the RWQ issue is perceived. The MD of Severn Trent Water expressed
his company's approach:.. . we 're changing now to a total quality ethic, so when you
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are up to those levels of compliance you actually have to start managing your
business to focus on the failures more and more. And we are moving now from a
management based largely around performance quality of water supply and sewage
effluent to actually business process quality... We also have a strong focus on the
environment, because we recognise that we can lose so much support by not being
an environmental company as well.
5.12.1 theNRA
The NRA has wide ranging responsibilities for managing water resources and must
balance the interests of all who use them, including controlling pollution in inland,
estuarine and coastal waters. The 1989 Water Act requires the NRA to control
pollution by issuing discharge consents, to monitor water quality and the
achievement of national water quality standards, taking enforcement action where
necessary. The Government has increased from £2,000 to £20,000 the maximum
fine which magistrate's courts can impose for water pollution offences. The NRA
also has responsibility to manage water resources and to protect their long-term
future by controlling abstraction rates and by managing a wide range of related
activities, such as land drainage and fisheries (Hanley et al, 1991).
The NRA will advise the Government on WQO5 by maintaining water quality and
by identifying where current water quality needs to be improved and will set the
timetable for improvements. Specifically, during 1990, the NRA surveyed river and
estuary quality (Appendix 5.5) and reviewed its own monitoring practices. The
RQOs set in 1979 continue to provide the basis for river quality management at
present but the Water Act 1989 made provision for the Secretary of State for the
Environment to adopt appropriate sets of criteria for the classification of water
quality in respect of use and on the basis of such criteria to set statutory water
quality objectives (SWQOs). The NRA has published an extensive and relatively
complex proposal for a system of SWQOs based on a general classification scheme
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similar to the existing NWC scheme which had no statutory basis and did not relate
directly to EC Directives. This system has eleven use-related classes and
incorporates the relevant EC Directives (National Rivers Authority, 199 ib).
SWQOs were to be phased in over the years beginning in 1992 but because of the
Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive, all the capital requirements of the industry
are oversubscribed. Consequently there will not now be any expenditure on SWQOs
until 2005 (NRA Manager, Thames Region).
The system of 95th percentile consents evolved to 1985 remains as the basic control
mechanism for sewage effluent discharges (Appendix 5.2). An NRA policy review
has recommended that all consents should include "upper tier" absolute limits so as
to ensure WQOs are met. These limits would allow the NRA to prosecute a sewage
works for a serious short-term polluting discharge at a works which otherwise meets
its 95 percentile consent. They are also intended to ensure an even-handed approach
to all dischargers, consent limits for industrial discharges never having been
reviewed to 95 percentile/look-up-table limits (Martin & Woods, 1992). The report
emphasised consents for discharges to inland and coastal waters have to serve at
least two key purposes: as law enforcement instruments, setting obligations to
discharger and as technical specifications of limits and conditions within which
discharge must stay to avoid harm to receiving waters.
Among the many new measures being brought in, the discussion of market
mechanisms to institute quality control is an important development (Hanley et al,
1991). The NRA have started to consider the desirability of being allowed to make
charges larger than cost recovery and including the likely effects of the discharge on
the receiving water environment. In July 1991 the NRA introduced a charging
scheme for discharges which was designed to recover the costs of issuing consents
to discharge and of monitoring compliance with discharge consents. Such charges
did not cover more than about half the costs incurred by the NRA in its work in
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relation to WQ. This water quality work is a requirement placed on NRA by
legislation and a legitimate charge to government via grant-in-aid to the NRA. The
problem is that the government's estimate is not always comparable to cost in
practice and may well be inadequate. Within the industry, the current system of
'command and control' measures is being discussed with reference to improvement
in water quality but it has still to be demonstrated that market mechanisms can
achieve this aim.
The NRA does not forecast changes in water quality management, but they do
intend to move to watershed management whereby the whole 'picture' is taken into
consideration; for example, they intend to clamp down on non-point sources of
pollution.
Environmental and economic regulation are interlinked in several ways and it is
necessary for the two regulators to have regular communication to ensure legislation
is applied in way that is satisfactory to all stakeholders, including the industry. One
of the main issues for debate between the two regulators relates to the rate and cost
of improving the quality of controlled waters. The NRA is charged with improving
WQ and there is much public pressure for environmental improvement, but the
NRA has to have regard for the cost of such improvements. OFWAT' s prime
interest is in these costs to industry and hence customers. Where the views on these
matters by NRA and OFWAT do not coincide, the Secretary of State for the
Environment may intervene to determine the rate of improvement of WQ and
consequent cost increases to customers.
5.12.2 1990 RWQ survey
A RWQ survey was conducted prior to the setting up of the SWQOs (Appendix
5.5). This was a two part review, the first part designed to replicate as closely as
possible the 1980 and 1985 surveys. It had long been recognised that previous
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surveys suffered from differences in approach by the ten WAs and insufficient
attention to biological criteria. Thus the second part was an overlapping survey
based on a standard set of procedures plus a biological survey. In summary
(NRA, 1991) the report showed that about 90% of rivers, canals and estuaries were
either of good or fair quality and 2%, 1 % and 3 % respectively were of bad quality.
Compared to 1985, 15% of total river length was downgraded and 11% upgraded.
The signs are that the pace of deterioration has accelerated since the 1985 survey,
though as the comparison with some figures for European rivers shows, the
situation in Britain is better than in some countries and worse than in others. Recent
results show no obvious change for the better. The fact that no overall improvement
can be shown is disquieting since over 4,000 km remain in classes 3 and 4 (Hall,
1989).
5.12.3 EC directives
Before privatisation each of the embryonic WSCs produced costings, in negotiation
with the Government, against an agreed list of environmental and WQ obligations.
The EC Directive on urban wastewater treatment will have a major impact on the
shape of the improvement programme beyond 1995 (Appendix 4.1) as will the
Statutory River Quality Objectives after 2005. There have also been noteworthy
developments in the areas of quality monitoring and modelling. It is inevitable that
increasing use will be made of advanced techniques in these areas to enable
demands for improved environmental quality to be met efficiently.
One of the consequences of the UK adopting a European perspective on pollution
control is that a more sophisticated analysis of natural water is required.
Considerable political pressure is being exerted on the UK by European partners to
change from 'dilution' to 'containment' principle for control of List 1 and List II
compounds and to adopt the 'anticipation' principle, which assumes a compound
Chapter 5: River Water Quality in the Water Industry Page 260
poses a hazard unless proved otherwise. This stricter control over Grey, Black and,
more recently, Red List substances will require detailed and costly monitoring of
these pollutants in UK rivers and estuaries. Hanley et al (1991) point out that this
will require funding for further research, equipment and staff training. It will
further focus attention on the cost for the pollution control measures and for the
monitoring to determine compliance and might lead to a stricter application of the
'polluter pays' principle.
The BC propose to establish a European Environmental Agency and European
Monitoring and Information Network. This was adopted by the Council in May
1990 and regulations will come into force the day after a location for the Agency is
announced which is yet to happen. The agency is designed to provide the EC with
the information necessary for developing environmental legislation and will be
responsible for the collection, processing and analysis of environmental data. The
principal areas of activity will be quality and sensitivity of the environment and the
pressures on it. One of the priorities will be WQ, pollutants and resources. With an
emphasis on international phenomenon it will seek the co-operation of other
Community bodies. It has legal status but not many of the powers such as
monitoring compliance and formulating EC policy guidelines (FWR, 1990).
5.13 Conclusions
Prior to the formation of the water industry, RWQ in the UK had reached a grossly
polluted state. From this very poor base, quality continued to be problematic during
the emergence and consolidation of the industry into the first half of the twentieth
century. This formative period may be seen as one in which water quality problems
were correctly acknowledged as important by successive British Governments but
where legislation alone was unable to produce effective control of water quality
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(Hanley et a!, 1991). The infrastructure, in terms of personnel and equipment, was
inadequate and despite the economic recession RWQ generally declined.
Although the formation of the River Boards was a significant institutional
development, it was not until the Water Resources Act of 1963 that legislation gave
adequate powers of quality enforcement to these unique river basin entities. This
was through the implementation of the consent system and there was a marked
improvement in the quality of rivers and estuaries, achieved at the cost of
considerable investment. The most dramatic improvements from the initial poor
base were achieved prior to the establishment of the WAs, despite the fragmented
sewage side of the industry and coinciding with the peak in capital expenditure in
1974.
Despite the undoubted advantages of integrated management, the financial
constraints under which the Authorities operated for much of their existence tended
to make their period of management one of consolidation rather than improvement,
though some progress was made. This period introduced a European dimension into
the legislation concerning water quality via the use of European Directives as well
as the introduction of COPA.
Prior to the 1989 Water Act, COPA was undoubtedly the most important piece of
WQ legislation. Its introduction represented a real chance to make a major impact
upon the quality of UK waters. COPA was, however, sufficient for dealing with
routine, direct discharges but it offered inadequate control over diffuse discharges
such as nitrate leaching. Arguably, it was also compromised in practice and
influenced by the interests of dischargers (Royal Commission on Environmental
Pollution, 1984; Pearce, 1984).
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The financial difficulties of the WAs leading to the delay in implementing part II of
COPA and compromised standards, contributed by 1985, to the first decline in
RWQ since surveys began. This trend has continued into the private sector period,
the effects of privatisation upon RWQ not being known until the next survey
conducted by the NRA.
The trajectory of the RWQ issue has been shown to reflect legislation and industry
changes although institutional arrangements were not always followed up with
adequate legislation to combat pollution. Indeed, where legislation was unavoidable
this was not always reciprocated by adequate standards. Throughout the career of
RWQ there is the constant theme of conflicting interests in improving rivers:
between cultivating industry and enforcing quality standards, economic pressures
and public sector capital requirements, between the adoption of absolute quality
standards and cost and more latterly, between advocates of regulation who stress a
pure view of quality and those upholders of integrated management who take a
pragmatic line stressing the relative nature of pollution.
The salience of RWQ to the industry is reflected in the condition of the rivers
nationally but has not always commanded a consensus of opinion. The pressures of
finance have largely resulted in the sewage side of the industry adopting a less
stringent view of quality. This divergence of opinion became an issue in itself under
the all-purpose authorities, intensified by the financial restrictions. With
privatisation this divergence has now become institutionalised between the NRA and
the water companies. Whilst many stretches of rivers still need to be improved, the
unit cost of reaching the objectives rises progressively so future improvement will
depend on the availability of finance. A reflection still upon the state of the
economy and public opinion.
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The early major improvements were achieved using a relatively simple approach to
consents and quality planning with a lack of publicly stated quality objectives. There
is a continuing movement towards the use of increasingly complex quality standards
and objectives for water in the environment and for discharge consents. Certainly
there is a new direction in pollution control and it is one that is strongly influenced
by European policy and this trend is expected to continue. The involvement of
government continues to have a marked influence. As Kinnersley concludes on the
nature of river management: Thus one can identify a series of tensions and policy
dilemmas as inherent in river basin relationships. The more the river is used for
some purposes, the more it has to be recognised as an economic resource with
charges for its use as one motivator of constructive sharing, despite its initial
character as a free resource (1988:200).
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6. IDEOLOGICAL CHANGE IN THE WATER INDUSTRY
6.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the nature of ideological development within the water industry
from an established constellation of features which had built up prior to integration,
through to their transformation by the time of the private sector phase of the industry.
The intervening 20 years have proved the most radical in terms of ideological
development and change. These changes may be seen to reflect both national political
developments and the water industry's response to its own changing status and
ownership. This ideological development is most distinctly portrayed by an analysis
of the nature of the ideological character of the industry prior to integration and its
current character in the private sector. A four-fold typology has been used to
characterise the constellation of features which comprise both ideological stances:
industry characteristics, values of industry members, beliefs about industry purpose
and function and the resulting management style. These are very general features,
indicative of the industry as a whole and do not account for idiosyncrasies between
individual units. Rather, these features may be conceptualised as modes of shared
ideological expression, derived from the evolution of industry characteristics over
time.
The pre-1974 industry culture is termed the 'Public Health (PH) ideology' after the
various 19th and early 20th century Acts which successively changed the industry
structure. The current industry culture is termed the Business ideology, reflecting the
shared beliefs necessary for operating in the private sector. What follows is an account
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of the transformation of the PH ideology over 20 years, demonstrating how the
parallel political, economic and industry events helped shape this ideological
revolution. Evidence is drawn from interview sources and supporting historical and
political writings.
6.2 The Public Health Ideology
The water industry by 1974 had been through numerous structural changes, the chief
trend being that of consolidation of the industry. These structural changes were
largely incremental in nature as they sought to remedy the various calls for a national
policy for water and concern for RWQ. The instigation of IRBM was a unique one
and highly innovative for the water industry, both in the UK and abroad. In this sense
it represented a recreation for the industry in the creation of very large and powerful
bodies. The demarcation of Authorities by natural river basin areas was both
practically and intuitively correct. It provided both an indisputable means of
harmonising industry practices with their natural resource and answered the twin
concerns for greater efficiency and pollution control. Nevertheless there were several
cultural features of the pre-1974 arrangement which would prove intractable to the
recognition of the greater authority of the new organisations.
6.2.1 industry characteristics
The chief driving characteristic was public sector ownership for almost a century. This
had meant a relatively stable environment under municipal control with few
stakeholders but a significant history and tradition. A former pollution control officer
with a RA recalled his old "sparring partners": The old city Board water engineers,
Chapter 6: Ideological Change in the Water Industry Page 266
they had a very cushy number. No problems, no worries, no anything. And nobody
concerned much about the water supply and everything was nice and quiet... But the
same really on the sewage side. In contrast to this stability were the fragmented, small
units which comprised the industry: Prior to 1974 we had a situation where water
supply was in the hands of a smallish number ofpublicly owned bodies... together with
6 or 7 statutory water companies (former MWB engineer). In effect, these bodies
were local in their outlook with purely local concerns which had been the driver for
calls for rationalisation in the industry.
The heterogeneity between units was further complicated by the functional splits
within the industry. These bodies were functionally distinct in three main areas: clean
water, dirty water and river management, which could almost have been two discrete
industries and a regulator:...Prior to '74 of course you've got to think about the
drinking water industry and the sewage industry (former RA manager). These distinct
functional units meant a degree of stability in organisational practices spawning their
own respective cultures which would become most evident during the reorganisation
(see section 3: case study chapters).
6.2.2 industry values
The industry held community oriented values and saw itself as providing an essential
public service. Functionally distinct entities meant professionally distinct managers,
each versed in their specialism, whether it be sewage, clean water or river
management. The management belonged to different professional bodies each
mirroring the functional splits: Water supply engineering had always been
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professionally distinct from sewerage and sewage disposal, which flies under the title
ofpublic health engineering. Individuals were seldom members of both the Institution
of Water Engineers and the Institution of Public Health Engineers or the Institute of
Water Pollution Control. The water supply and sewage disposal undertakings
themselves had always been under quite separate management without any of the
combined water and sewer departments so common in other parts of the world. Even
consulting engineers tended to specialise in one or the other activity (Okun,
1977:107).
Professional allegiances meant managers were engineers or scientists rather than
professional managers: Generally you tended to be a scientist in a laboratory who
eventually became a manager of a sewage treatment works. .. probably an engineer,
civil engineer, mechanical engineer, electrical engineer and scientist, that's the
general sort of background (former Water Board engineer). This usually resulted in
allegiances to one's profession above the goals of the organisation. As a former
Finance Director recalled: I had been brought up with a professional belief that we
held the constant values of the organisation. The politicians came and went and you
were a professional. You were not actually embedded in the management, you did not
necessarily have to share the values and things of the organisation, you could hold
sort of more enduring values of a professional character; which could withstand the
short term comings and goings ofpoliticians and policies.
Many of the predecessor organisations were internationally recognised. This went
hand in hand with a great emphasis on qualifications and many water scientists and
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river engineers were world experts in their field. As the new CEO of ST found even
by the late 1980s:...culturally speaking advancement and achievement in the
organisation was much more about qual fications for the job than how you did the
job.. .And people had to be very well qualfIed. Not necessarily be motivated to do
things... the letters after the name and doctor or whatever else is very important, sort
of deep culture for the organisation.
There was therefore an emphasis on quantifiable inputs into operational practices and
the measurement of these was instrumental in determining pay and conditions, as in
the water industry productivity scheme which emphasised prescribed tasks and
quantified inputs. An Operations Director with long industry experience recalled: ... it
was about values for how many times you turned a valve or cleaned the windows, or
swept the floor or brushed the weirs. . .how long it took you to travel to the job. All the
inputs and it was a proxy for paying people more...
The different functions attracted long-serving loyal staff from several generations.
Workers and management viewed the industry as a life long career and manual
workers often followed their fathers into the work. A former clerks secretary to the
MWB said: Well old loyalties died hard When Ifirst joined MWB the great thing was
there were a lot ofpensioners about who had been company people pre-1904. And
there is an old chap I know in Hampton who is 100 now, and his father started work
for Southwark and Vauxhall Water Company at Hampton. He was what we would call
a pumping station engineer in 1896, followed his father in the job and retired in 1959.
Essentially the values were lifelong service to the public in the cause of public health
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and loyalty to one's profession: You saw people with sewage effluent and drinking
it... This used to happen a lot of times in the old days: "this is how good it is ". A lot of
people were very proud to say this is the kind of thing that comes out (former Water
Board engineer).
6.2.3 industry beliefs
There were strong beliefs derived from public service values which centred on
dedication to the community in the cause of public health. These put a primacy on
local knowledge, reinforced by maintaining a degree of heterogeneity from ones
neighbouring unit (Martin & Woods, 1992). A former divisional manager and
corporate strategy director of Thames recalls sewage treatment under LA ownership
before reorganisation:...Each one built its own flagship sewage treatment works, each
one probably used a different consultant to design and build it and use different
specfIcations, different gear, different materials, different philosophies about how
you treat it. So every town down the road would have a different approach. In this
way operational practices became diversified throughout the industry which were in
turn reinforced by the individual cultures of and loyalties to old established Boards
and Works. If the purpose of these organisations was to serve the public, this would
be achieved by engineering solutions and there were many past achievements to
reinforce this view. The logic underlying policy and action had at their core the desire
- for excellence and technical achievement.
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6.2.4 management style
The various Boards' and Works' different approaches to management and practices
also reflected their variable access to funds and skilled staff. The PH ideology was
strongly linked to municipal management practices in which long lines of
management were common. Each Board's own culture reflected the inward looking
small scale parochial industry, where the boundaries coincided with the local or
county council ones. Management practices themselves accorded with the public
administration model. Indeed, even more so than local authorities themselves, as one
local authority recruit to the new TWA recalled of its predecessor organisations: They
were very conservative and almost incestuous as far as I was concerned I never
thought local government was that adventurous in its management techniques and
practices, but the Met Water Board was out of the Ark.. the local government people
coming in had sort of survived the late sixties and early seventies and all of the
management changes that had been going on in local authorities andfound the water
industry not touched by any of it.
As Farnham and Horton (1993) argue, public sector organisations have in common
their creation by government to achieve political goals and to support political
objectives and policies. It is this political context which is the driving force behind
public organisations and is reflected in the ways they are managed. While public
organisations are given goals which reflect the purposes for which they exist, in
contrast to those of private bodies, they tend to be complex, vaguely defined and often
conflicting. The goals of public organisations are also sometimes unattainable. The
reasons are identified by Pollitt: First, there is a need to build and maintain coalitions
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ofsupport... Second, a broadly-based objective is less likely to give immediate
hostages to fortune... (and) it is easier to argue that it has been, at least in part,
successful ... Third, vague wording... (or) woolly wording is... attractive in the sense
that it provides endless opportunities for defence, evasion and apparent innovation
during the process ofpolitical debate (1990:121).
Public officials, unlike private sector managers, are also faced with frequent changes
of goals as either political pressures force a new negotiated order or changes in
political leadership result in new priorities. In the water industry the goals were long
term planning, big projects and engineering solutions to public health problems.
Historically, these goals were often thwarted by public expenditure cutbacks and it
was only the larger entities on the drinking water side which faired best:... in the past
the dirty side of the business had rather been left to one side. It was the classic thing:
"no votes in sewage" it was basically a local authority based operation. There were
not the consent standards we work to now (Water Services Manager).
The division of responsibility is a consequence of political considerations rather than
logic, economics or organisational principles. Ultimately public officials are
accountable to the public which they serve. Public officials are expected to act as
stewards of public interest and the public purse. In so doing they operate within a
strict legal framework. As a result, the dominant perception is that public
organisations are administered while private organisations are managed.
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Keeling (1972) listed the nature of administrative systems which have been set against
respondents views:
1. Objectives tend to be expressed in very general terms in administrative systems and
are rarely reviewed or changed:...there was no long term policy as far as they were
concerned And they were professionals... coming from local government background
2. The main criteria of success for administrative systems are avoiding mistakes and
getting things right: There was a great feeling in the organisation that everything had
to be done right. And very little questioning as to whether it needed doing at all...
3. The economical and efficient use of resources are secondary tasks: They had that
local government, service to the public, profit of no consequence, money while you
accountedfor it, on a year by year basis.
4. Administrative systems tend to have rule cultures where responsibilities are
precisely defined and there is limited delegation; structures tend to consist of long
hierarchies and there is a tendency to caution and to refer problems upwards: A
curious lack of responsibility for things. Decisions were almost derived f I can say
from committees.. .And huge numbers of decisions came to the ChiefExecutive's
desk..quite sort of cultural problems about decision making and a big cultural
problem about delegation.
5. The role of the administrator is more one of arbitration and rule interpretation:...a
combination of lots of disparate groups of local government, public service and
public spirited people, professionals who deemed they had a right to practice their
profession in the organisation, who were fighting for power in many cases as to who
had the supreme hand when it came to policies.
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The key features highlighted by Keeling are that public sector managers have
mechanistic structures with long chains of command and narrow spans of control.
They are heavily bureaucratised and foster defensive and passive behaviour. Role and
status are routinised to constrain discretion. The criteria for success in public
administrative systems are mistake avoidance, satisfying public expectations of equity
and fairness, averting political controversy and achieving consensus, conformity and
consistency in practice.
6.3 Preparation for Reorganisation
Thus on reorganisation the PH ideology was dominant. It was the fragmented nature
of the industry, particularly the sewage side and the consequent functional splits
between personnel, which led some industry members to show resistance to
reorganisation. As Okun writes of the differences between the attitudes of those
employed in 'clean water' compared to those in the 'dirty water' side of the business:
In contrast to the note of affirmation given by the British Waterworks Assoc, the
Institute of Water Pollution Control members at their annual conference expressed
grave concern over the reorganisation and prophesised that few from among their
number would be given leadership positions in the new organisations and that their
collective views would not be important in the reorganisation (1977:102). The 1974
reorganisation was therefore undermined to some extent at the outset by the industry's
own cultural history and traditions. This will also be evidenced most clearly in the
case studies of section 3.
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6.4 The Failure of the 1974 Recreation
The reorganisation in 1974 was largely instrumental in changing some fundamental
industry characteristics. The establishment of large regional bodies introduced a
measure of standardisation as well as a regional focus which aimed to change the
formerly stable local units into a force for the national good. In this sense the industry
still sought long-term engineering solutions but could now apply these to a greater
mass of the population. The industry characteristics which could not be changed
overnight were the history and culture of local units, despite the introduction of a
wider body of stakeholders and the destabilising influence of central government
control. The goal of homogeneity was slow in realisation, essentially because the
values, beliefs and management styles were virtually unchanged. This produced a
resistance to cultural change which would recognise the hegemony of the newly
formed WAs. This resistance was to create an inertia to integration proper for almost
10 years. There were a number of reasons for this, both internal and external to the
water authorities. Internally these may be classified into personnel, structural and
management style issues of the new organisations which served to preserve and
promote the prevailing ideology.
6.4.1 personnel
Although government had recommended multifunctionalism as a way to
rationalisation, the larger WAs were prevented from going completely multifunctional
by the large monolithic bodies they had inherited. It was no surprise, therefore, that
many of the elected members and staff were drawn from these old established bodies.
Of the chairmen, five had been associated with river authorities, three with water
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undertakings, five with county councils, one with industry, and only one had no
identifiable experience in water or water-related activities (Okun, 1977:107). The
Chair of ST had served on a River Authority since the early 1 960s and was made chair
of the Trent River Board in 1965. Thames' Chairman was an engineer by training, had
been a member of a local county council and closely associated with the flagship
Mogden works during the 1960s which had been responsible for a major clean up of
the Thames. He had also been a member of all the large predecessor agencies. Thus
key personnel brought with them the culture and knowledge of the predecessor
organisations.
But questions had arisen concerning the qualifications of those likely to be selected as
chief executives. For example, a leader (editorial) in Municipal Engineering (1973)
asked: How many of the chief executive officers of the new regional authorities will be
engineers?...It was cynically suggested... that the chief executive could come from any
professional discipline provided that he was a lawyer. As it turned out, of the 11 chief
executives initially appointed, 7 were engineers and all but 2 who were recruited from
the GLC for the NWC and TWA, were from within some element of the water
industry, 4 being from river authorities and 3 from water supply undertakings (Okun,
1977:107).
Other doubts had been expressed about the feasibility of personnel from the dirty and
clean sides working together in multifunctional units. At a Water Industry General
Management Programme representatives of the local authorities responsible for
sewerage and sewage disposal and of the river authorities, were invited to exchange
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views for the first time on the new WAs. Here concerns were expressed about the
relationships between the 'clean' and 'dirty' personnel. Some of the water supply
personnel at the meeting expressed the fear that contact with the engineers from the
sewerage and sewage disposal field would 'contaminate' them. Typhoid fever might
be carried from the sewerage personnel to the water pipes as both these services
would be within the same organisation. In general, the feelings at this first
multidisciplinary session were negative, with reservations articulated about the likely
success of reorganisation (Okun, 1977:126).
The backgrounds of individuals appointed to the top management positions in the
WAs affirmed that the regrouping of water supply undertakings had created
opportunities for engineers from the water supply field to occupy positions of high
technical and management responsibility, not open to personnel from the highly
fragmented sewerage and sewage disposal phase of the industry. Thus, amongst the 30
executives responsible for both water supply and sewerage and sewage disposal,
almost all were drawn from the water supply phase of the industry, and only two
could be identified with sewerage and sewage disposal in their previous professional
employment (Okun, 1977:108).
The dominance of the water supply engineers in the hierarchy of the WAs continued
even into the lower posts. Of some 70 positions 80% were drawn from among the
members of the Institution of Water Engineers. Of all the instances where a division
was responsible for operations in sewerage and sewage disposal plus water supply or
river management, in only one or two cases had the manager been selected from the
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field of sewerage or sewage disposal. In almost all other instances the managers were
drawn from water supply undertakings or from the river authorities. The cultural
attachment to their predecessor bodies was to lead to poor relations between directors
and departments, reflecting the different functional specialisms and cultural
orientations to providing a service. A new recruit to the planning department in TWA
at the time stated: Their styles were very d(fferent, and their culture within their bits of
the company were very different. So within planning we were not interested in
hierarchies and reporting lines... Whereas engineering was very much dominated by a
traditional public service kind of organisation. . .My metaphor was a team of
carthorses all pulling in different directions on something in the middle of them...
6.4.2 structure
The fragmentation of the dirty water side of the industry led to delays in establishing
provisional management units or divisions. Separate working parties to facilitate the
orderly transfer of functions to operating units had been established in 1972 for all
three functions. Such difficulties and delays that were to occur with the working
parties occurred almost exclusively with those for sewerage and sewage disposal: The
complications resulting from trying to unify a great many small, jfpoorly organised
services into comprehensive management units in a matter of months, as compared
with the regroupingfor water supply which took place over almost 30 years, led to
many delays (Okun, 1977:113).
The extremely short time frame of 8 months for such extensive organisational change
had ramifications throughout in the establishment of WA structures. It had become
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clear that for a considerable period, possibly three years, the operating units
(divisions) would have to carry on as far as possible under established procedures.
These internationally recognised organisations had existed for many years and were
perceived by the industry to provide a first class service. The real worry was that these
bodies had been very efficient and given the short time frame of eight months, change
might endanger the smoothness of changeover on 1 April 1974. Thus the old
established and largest bodies became single purpose divisions in the largest
Authorities during this period of change. As of reorganisation day, of the ten WAs,
three planned to begin with their divisions as multifunctional entities, three hoped to
approach multifunctionalism gradually, one viewed multifunctional operations
sceptically and one had not yet determined, in principle, how it would move (Okun,
1977:138-9).
In many cases divisions carried on almost entirely as they had as predecessor
organisations. This is in effect what happened with the larger WAs like Severn Trent
and Thames. Their inherited monolithic bodies were retained as single functional
entities. This led to a situation where divisions assumed great power away from the
centre and carried on with their own individual cultures and practices almost
untouched by reorganisation: The managers were actually stronger than the managers
that were managing them. It is the old syndrome that fyou go from engineers to chief
managers, they may not necessarily be good managers... They really did not have the
management skills to get a grip of it. So the organisation was led by the divisions
which went whichever way they wanted (Planning and Support Manager).
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The Board which oversaw the whole structure paralleled the local authority style of
arrangement and served to preserve the values and beliefs around municipal style
focus and management. A former finance officer at the time said: ... They promptly set
up a committee structure with chairmen... so the relationship between the officers and
the members was exactly one I was familiar with in local authorities.., and with all the
sort of subtlety that surrounds that relationship as to who was really in charge and
where the direction comes from.
6.4.3 management style
The structural arrangements in the early years after reorganisation were largely
responsible for the perpetuation of the administrative management style. Very often
local interests were pursued instead of looking for solutions for the greater good of the
region. Added to this, the historical low level of interest in the industry by LAs, meant
that many of the members were elderly or had previous experience with the
predecessor bodies. It was not seen as a career move to sit on a WA board and hence
the collective managerial abilities were not high. Rather the board was politic
managed: So it was not exactly a very starry bunch...Labour politicians and Tory
politicians and they tended to sort of go on their party lines and we had a good
collection of gentleman farmers and do-gooders, as well as quite good special interest
people... CBI nominees would come along and try and say and do business like things
and find himself totally at sea in this mass of conflicting backgrounds and cultures
and things (former Finance Director).
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The functional loyalties of many of the executive served to maintain traditional
boundaries between departments with a consequent lack of communication. All in all
management discretion proved to be small, with much time spent on committee
relations and too many tiers of management: Certainly afiavour of all the worst
things about local authorities.. .And the level of decision-making that was taken by
sub-committees of the Board Absolutely incredible. Even down to members of sub-
committees hearing disciplinary panels...(Sewage Operations manager). Executive
directors were used to playing political games and networking was seen as a vital part
of management. A former divisional engineer listed the various contacts: Working
with the committees, working with the Authority. Working with and understanding the
appropriate officers at National Government level. People at the DoE, the sponsoring
Ministry...
The Chair of Severn Trent recalled his impression of the executive management when
he arrived in 1983 as still very much in the LA mould:...a high level of intelligence, a
high level of qual/Ication, a high level of ability and certainly devotion to the
business... But... an outlook which was informed by their background and their
previous activity very much.
It was very often the personalities within divisions which promoted the prevailing
ideology. These individuals had long-standing careers within the industry prior to
1974 and were often experts in their field. They were instrumental in maintaining PH
practices and styles of management. A former water engineer for a private company
who joined STWA in 1974 recalled:...Ithinkat that stage it was apersonality issue.
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And some of the divisional members had been city engineers previous to 1974 and
they were really hard core... His overriding impression was that the three tiers of
management - the Board, executive and divisions - were bureaucratic but had little
consensus.
The full benefits of IRBM were slow to be realised by the difficulty in striking a
satisfactory balance between HQ control and divisional autonomy. Reflecting on this
convergent period, one former director with a public sector background described the
inherent local government culture as: Financial administration, strong on inputs,
weak on outputs. Customers dealt with in local authority terms "we know best what
the customers want". Efficiency, economy buzzwords. And we were achieving nothing.
The authorities remained very introspective during this period. Kinnersley attributes
this in part to their tradition: water supply and sewage disposal managers have little
inclination or perhaps opportunity to be in frequent contact with their customers. Also
to the integrated structure itself, having control of almost all aspects of the sharing of
water, the need for external dialogue may have seemed less. This effect became more
marked as increasingly the authorities felt constrained by Whitehall imperatives: If as
a water professional, you are unable to do much of what you think needs doing,
public dialogue can be increasingly awkward and uncongenial (Kinnersley,
1988:110). He also adds that the representative membership from local councils in the
governing bodies of the authorities was not very effective in promoting the public
profile of the WAs.
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6.4.4 external issues
The internal problems were compounded as much by economic and political events as
they were by structural relationships between the industry and external bodies. The
regionalisation of the industry had placed the new WAs under control of the Treasury
via the DoE. This introduced yet another tier of networking relationships to cultivate.
Indeed it has been suggested that the lack of a strong central body to give the industry
an identity was one of the factors contributing to the 1974 reorganisation (Thorpe,
1975; see 4.7.2). Individual WA executives spent much time in negotiations with
government departments which could have been handled as industry wide issues with
a more concerted and united approach.
The dire economic events of the 1 970s which led to the moratorium on capital
expenditure sapped much of the enthusiasm from the industry. Personnel felt held
back from achieving the goals of reorganisation, particularly in the late I 970s : It
brought a lot ofprofessionalism and expertise. It brought in regional standardisation.
But it eventually sufferedfrom lack of cash and to some extent fudging of objectives
within itself..I think it worked quite well in the early years. It began to fall apart
under pressure (a) of capital restriction and (b) perhaps this need to compromise all
the time (Planning Director). Also the financial restrictions only served to accentuate
internal rivalries, according to one former divisional manager: Management spent
more of its time fighting each other than trying to manage things. But the problem
came when money was tight...
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Indeed, it would be the very policies of the Labour administration, in response to
global and national economic events which would precipitate a new era of politics
with the election in 1979 of the Tory party under Thatcher (see 4.8.1). As Tony Benn
makes clear in the foreword to his diaries of the years 1973-76: These years facilitated
the entrenchment of monetarist policies when the Conservatives returned to power in
1979, and some of the militarism can be traced back to the decisions of a Labour
Administration.., the victory of world bankers in the IMF over a Labour Cabinet
clearly marked the beginning of what subsequently came to be known as
'Thatcherism for the adoption of money supply targets was an integral part of the
banker's demands...(Benn, 1989:xi-xiv).
In short, though there was a change of administration in 1979, which was clear and
sharp in electoral terms, there was a continuity in thinking about central questions
which stretched from Labour to Conservative rule, one paving the way for the other.
Benn argues that the post-War Labour Government of Clement Attlee was able to
carry through its social revolution because the planning mechanisms it had inherited
from the war-time coalition were at hand to deal with the task of reconstruction, and a
war-weary public retained a sense of community which made it into a willing partner
in the establishment of the welfare state and the rebuilding of an industrial base. But
the public sector institutions chosen for that purpose lacked an essential democratic
element and came to be seen as centralised and bureaucratic and hence increasingly
unacceptable to post-War generations.
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6.5 The Erosion of the PH Ideology
The erosion of the established ideology began with the change of government in 1979
and the introduction into British politics of the ideology of the New Right. The
introduction of managerialism into the public sector would divert the industry goals
from engineering to financial and performance measures. This was facilitated further
by nationalisation of the water industry which brought more Whitehall control and
introduced market mechanisms into managerial practice. But most importantly, a
change in ideology could not have been effected without the introduction of a new
calibre of management, imbued with private sector ideology. The introduction of
outsiders to the boards would serve to undermine the administrative management style
which had persisted despite reorganisation. In particular, it was the new Chairman of
Thames, who in exposing the contradictions in government policy, provoked the
backbencher revolt which marked the instigation of privatisation of the industry (see
4.9.7). We turn first to an analysis of the antecedents and various manifestations of the
New Right ideology.
6.5.1 the New Right
The New Right critique of the post-war settlement is an expression of economic
liberalism, anti-collectivism and elements of social authoritarianism. It draws on the
works and ideas of economic liberals such as Friedman (1962) and Hayek (1944,
1973), public choice theorists, such as Buchanan (1975), Niskanen (1971) and
Mueller (1979), and political economists such as Lindbloom (1977). The influence of
American thinkers on the New Right has been dominant, with the main outlets of New
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Right ideas in Britain being the Institute of Economic Affairs, the Adam Smith
Institute, the Centre for Policy studies and the Salisbury Review.
The meso objectives of the Conservative government are most pertinent here, as
Farnham and Horton (1993) elucidate, these were to revitalise private enterprise,
increase the competitiveness of British businesses and strengthen the right to manage.
These objectives and most notably the latter, would leave their mark on the water
industry as the decade drew to a close; manifested in what has come to be known as
the New Public Management.
The introduction of financial controls and performance aims served as part of the
package of managerialist ethics injected into the public sector, as well as bringing the
industry closer to Whitehall control. In this way the repayment of debt could be
couched in terms of economy and efficiency whilst also acting as indirect taxation.
However, the focus on costs and efficiency led to an anomalous situation within the
nationalised WAs where the notions of capital and revenue were quite different from
that of industry. As the newly appointed CEO of STWA found when he arrived in the
late 1 980s:... tightly cost controlled on rather sort of narrow basis. There weren't
monthly accounts for instance ... There was a profit and loss account produced but
really only looked at once a year. The business was cash managed. We were working
to the amount of money that the government allowed us to spend during the year... But
nevertheless we had to generate a cash surplus... Because you had to raise all the cash
in the year in which you spent it... Capital was actuallyfree.. . Numbers like
depreciation were pretty theoretical... We weren't allowed to borrow more money...
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The nationalisation of the water industry in 1983 removed local authority involvement
and the smaller Boards introduced Chairmen and members from the private sector
which would facilitate the importation of managerialist orthodoxies. The Deputy MD
of ST: People who were used to running companies and who were looking at much
sharper strategic planning, much sharper accountability and at achieving greater
efficiencies in the organisation, strlpping out some of the tiers of management.
The micro objectives of Conservative govermnents included optimising consumer
choice and consumer sovereignty in the marketplace, freeing individuals from the
'dependency state' and motivating individuals to take personal responsibility for
themselves and their families. These objectives were at the heart of the government's
economic and social strategy with its commitment to individualism (Walker, 1990:
3 0-35). For instance, the establishment of consumer consultative committees in each
WA paid lip service to the optimisation of consumer choice and sovereignty in the
marketplace (Kinnersley, 1988:113-14). Also, the primacy of personal responsibility
has echoes in the subsequent human resources policies adopted by the privatised water
companies.
The tenets of market individualism within an enterprise culture were stressed by the
incoming Thatcher government in its first budget statement in Hansard of 1979: first,
the strengthening of incentives, particularly through tax cuts; second, greater freedom
of choice by reducing the state's role and enlarging that of the individual; third, the
reduction of the borrowing requirement of the public sector which leaves room for the
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rest of the economy to prosper; and fourth, through firm monetary and fiscal
discipline bringing inflation under control and ensuring that those taking part in
collective bargaining are obliged to live with the consequences of their actions.
The tactical means by which successive Conservative governments attempted to
implement their strategic objectives consisted of three main sets of measures. First,
economic measures were designed to increase market competition, foster enterprise
and create a 'business' culture. Another initiative was to reduce the size of the public
sector. Various means of 'rolling back the frontiers of the state' were attempted. These
policies had the triple goals of transfening the supply of these services to the private
sector, providing them through the market, or at least quasi-markets, and cutting
government expenditure. Privatisation had the further advantage of raising additional
revenue from the sale of state assets, so avoiding increases in general taxation to fund
government expenditure. These activities were associated first of all with monetarist
and subsequently, supply side economic policy.
The second set of tactical measures used by the New Right was to create a strong state
that could carry through its policies without political constraint from either local
authorities or powerful pressure groups. Legislation was used to strengthen the role of
central government and remove or limit the powers of local authorities. This
particularly impacted upon the water industry where nationalised industries were
required to prepare themselves for privatisation from 1983 onwards. As Kinnersley
(1988:113) notes:...with the loss of local council representation, the authorities lost
all the allies who might have helped them to sustain some independence of
Chapter 6: Ideological Change in the Water Industry Page 288
Whitehall.. .At national level too, the Water Authorities Association became more of a
club, which did not favour more active co-ordination of outward-facing policies
among the 10 authorities.
The third set of tactical measures used by successive Conservative governments was
linked to the goal of popular capitalism: A term applied to a variety ofpolicies aimed
at widening property ownership and consumer choice. It sought to empower
individuals by weakening their attachment to the Welfare State, to undermine their
belief in the concept of 'society' and to raise public consciousness of the ideas
associated with the 'enterprise culture' (Gamble, 1988:138). Widening property
ownership was facilitated by a number of measures, including denationalising major
public industries, with proportions of the 'new' shareholdings reserved for individual
shareholders (as in the slogan: 'you too can be a H20 owner) and encouraging
employee share ownership schemes and profit sharing in the private sector. The means
used to widen consumer choice focused on advocating the primacy of markets in both
the private and public sectors.
6.5.2 the new public sector management
Various measures were introduced into the public sector as part of the New Right
ideology to decrease the power of that sector and to inject market mechanisms of
efficiency and effectiveness into management. This evolved into a package of reforms
which came to be collectively known as the New Public Management (NPM). The
rise of NPM since 1979 is one of most striking international trends in public
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administration (Hood, 1991a; cf Hood & Schuppert, 1988; Dunsire & Hood, 1989;
Dunleavy, 1989).
The origins of NPM are conceptualised as a marriage of two different streams of
ideas, the 'new institutional economics' and 'managerialism' (Arrow, 1963; Niskanen,
1971; Ostrom, 1974; Merkle, 1980; Pollitt, 1990; Martin, 1983). Why NPM found
favour is discussed at length by Hood (1991a) who sees it as a response to a set of
special social conditions developed in the long peace in developed countries since
WWII, and the unique period of economic growth which accompanied it. (For a
review of the conditions which may have helped to precipitate NPM see Tocqueville,
1946; Peacock, 1979; Meizer and Richard, 1981; Bell, 1973; Piore and Sabel, 1984;
Jessop, 1988; Mills, 1986; Hood, 1990b:206; Hood and Schuppert, 1988:250-2).
NPM is shorthand for the set of broadly administrative doctrines which dominated the
bureaucratic reform agenda in many of the OECD group of countries from the late
1970s (see Aucoin 1990; Hood, l990a; Pollitt, 1990). Seven overlapping precepts
appear in most discussions of NPM. Not all seven elements are equally present in all
cases nor fully consistent because they do not have single intellectual provenance. At
least 5 are pertinent to the UK public service and in particular the water industry:
1 .Hands on professional management, meaning active, visible discretionary control of
organisations from named persons at the top 'free to manage', is justified because
accountability requires clear assignment of responsibility for action, not diffusion of
power.
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2. Explicit standards and measures of performance, meaning definition of goals,
targets, indicators of success, preferably expressed in quantitative terms, especially for
professional services (cf Day & Klein 1987; Carter 1988) are justified because
accountability requires a clear statement of goals; efficiency requires a 'hard look' at
objectives.
3. Greater emphasis on output controls as resource allocation and rewards are linked
to measured performance; the breakup of centralised bureaucracy-wide personnel
management. These are justified because of the need to stress results rather than
procedures.
4. Stress on private sector styles of management practice and a move away from
military-style 'public service ethic', greater flexibility in hiring and rewards; greater
use of PR techniques. These are justified by the need to use 'proven' private sector
management tools in the public sector.
5. Stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use in cutting direct costs,
raising labour discipline, resisting union demands, limiting 'compliance costs' to
business. These are justified by the need to check the resource demands of the public
sector and 'do more with less'.
Some of the tangible outcomes of NPM were performance indicators and the Tory
privatisation programme.
6.5.3 performance indicators
Pis were very much the fashion of 1980s, they were embraced at the highest levels of
government and promulgated throughout the public sector (Carter, 1991). The shift of
interest from the traditional focus on inputs to outputs was partly because the
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government needed to find out what departments were actually doing and partly
because of the overriding concern to control public expenditure: hence the obvious
attraction of a system that emphasised outputs rather than defining all improvements
in terms of inputs. The government was also anxious to improve managerial
competence. The ascendancy of the 'three Es', economy, efficiency and effectiveness
(a model couched in the language of private sector financial management), was
intended to increase central control over service delivery as much as it was to cut
costs, although the two were inextricably linked (Carter 1989). This is confirmed by
the current Quality Assurance Manager of ST Water: I think what became important
as the mid-80s gave way to the late 80s were things that governed costs and
containing costs, efficiency, priorities, levels ofservice. And the concept of customer
became an increasing focus. The precise definition of economy, efficiency and
effectiveness became an industry in itself (Beeton, 1988; Flynn et al, 1988; Levitt and
Joyce 1987; Pollitt, 1986 inter alia).
Pressure came from another source too, in particular, parliamentary committees had
repeatedly demanded a currency of evaluation that would increase ministerial
accountability (Public Accounts Committee, 1981; Treasury and Civil Service
Committee, 1982). This build-up of interest resulted in the Financial Management
Initiative (FMI) which emphasised that managers at all levels in government should
have: A clear view of their objectives; and assess, and wherever possible measure,
outputs or performance in relation to these objectives; a principle that made it
essential to develop: performance indicators and output measures which can be used
to assess success in achieving objectives (PM and Chancellor of the Exchequer,
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1983). The most obvious manifestation of this clarion call was an epidemic of PIs in
the Public Expenditure White Paper: multiplying from 500 in 1985 to over 2000 by
1988 (Carter, 1988).
6.5.4 the government's privatisation programme
The government's manifesto did not use the term 'privatisation'. Indeed, as far as most
authors are concerned privatisation was not a consistent, coherent policy developed in
opposition and carried out in power (Marsh, 1991; Jackson, 1985:17; Mitchell,
1990:17). The Conservatives did come to power with a number of specific proposals
(Young, 1986) which could be considered aspects of privatisation but these were
dwarfed by the emphasis placed upon monetarism.
Of the many New Right proposals, privatisation in its many forms was gradually
extended and internal market mechanisms became the centre-piece of major pillars of
the state sector, such as in health and education by the early 1 990s. As the events
leading up to privatisation of the water industry show (4.10.6), there is little evidence
that the Conservative government had a blueprint or a strategic plan which it
consistently followed through. There is more evidence to support the view that its
approach was incremental and pragmatic and that its policies unfolded as
circumstances and opportunities permitted, or as failures and problems called for new
responses. What is clear is that New Right ideas and values informed the strategic
policy choices and implementation programmes which the first Thatcher government
and its successors pursued.
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The privatisation policy grew so much in its second term on two accounts (Marsh,
1991). First, the impetus towards privatisation came from the government not from
the electorate (McAllister and Studlar, 1989). Second, the government embraced
privatisation for political rather than economic reasons. As Brittan argues (1984:110),
selling public assets was politically much easier, and more popular, than cutting
public expenditure. In addition, during its first term the government suffered a number
of disappointments with its economic policy; unemployment rose rapidly, the
recession deepened, inflation increased, manufacturing output declined and interest
rates rose. Most embarrassingly, the money supply figures grew consistently faster
than the government's plans, with public expenditure growth being most marked in
agriculture, industry, trade and employment and social security. Even when inflation
began to fall towards the end of the first term, this fall owed nothing to the control of
the money supply, which was still rising (Whiteley, 1985).
It was not surprising that the government seized upon privatisation as an alternative
way to control the PSBR, given that the proceeds from such sales are treated as
negative public expenditure and thus reduce the PSBR. In addition, as Moon et a!
(1986) argue, the deterioration of relations between Whitehall and the nationalised
industries, particularly after the election of Conservatives, also provided an incentive
to privatise these industries. By the end of 1985 there had already been 14
privatisations (Appendix 6.1), although the Government's commitment to a general
policy of privatisation had not previously included water (Carney, 199la).
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The government's privatisation of BT without ensuring effective competition and the
substantial change in aims in relation to privatisation, particularly the emphasis on
political motives, indicate the inconsistencies and contradictions in the policy. Indeed,
the initial contradiction of intent with regard to water privatisation and the subsequent
shambles made of the first water privatisation proposals were indicative of little policy
coherence.
6.6 The Impact of Change and Cultural Resistance
The 1983 Act served to change industry perceptions of their status. The then regional
performance measurement manager of STWA recalls: It was seen as a step up... we
moved into the slightly bigger school alongside British Gas and Telecom and the
electricity industry. It was viewedfavourably within the company and probably within
the industry as the logical way to go... We were pseudo -nationalised. The impact of
Chairmen with private sector backgrounds was highly significant, particularly in
Thames: Roy Watts commandeered and - that was the start of a major attitude
change... the local authority way of doing things is such a dfJIcult way... You are
actually adding a very great sort ofpolitical agenda to something that by and large
isn't political (former Regulation and Planning Manager). And at Severn Trent: John
(Bellak) introduced a number of thoughts and concepts. He was the one who pushed
marketing as an idea. We'd never believed you could market water. It was there and
people knew what it was... But he brought in a lot of genuine, business commercial-
type thinking.., into the Board (current Director of Services).
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The dismantling of the PH ideology was both sudden in the changes wrought by
nationalisation and slow in permeating throughout the industry. Pockets of resistance
were inevitable as people felt threatened by the new managerialist orthodoxy. One of
the main effects of the smaller Board was to give the executive more freedom to
manage. Although recognised as needed, many senior managers felt anxious about the
new freedom, as was the then Director of Finance for TWA who described it as: A
seismic event. And the culture change that was triggered at that stage was key. It hit
me particularly hard because I had always grown up in the local government
culture.. .And Roy Watts came along and said no. The Board is not there to set policy,
to take decisions... This is your responsibility to set the direction of the
organisation... You take ownership of the management of the business. Now the whole
of my upbringing had been not to take ownership or management of the business - so
the requirement on me was - horrendous.
Indeed, the changes also involved profound shifts in ideological values for
organisational members at all levels, as a former finance director recalled: I had been
schooled in my professional training to hold these values...And it was not justfinance,
I mean the engineers, f anything had an even more deeply ingrained culture. And the
scientists... But the others had even more defensive sort of culture. For instance on the
issue of risk, water was traditionally a 'no risk' industry which now sat uneasily with
the new management principles:...the culture was very much not a managed risk..but
the managers have to manage risks in their judgements in the way they operate. So we
tried to make that distinction and it was a learning process for us... trying to switch
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from the older style of managers really just being administrators to giving them
freedoms and the same competence as managers (Personnel Manager).
Each year when the WAs had to submit their corporate plan to the DoE the Treasury
people would trim their budgets. Chairmen became increasingly disillusioned with
what they perceived as rigid government control over capital funding. The Chairmen
of both Thames and Severn Trent started to become influential in changing the
relationship between their Authorities and the DoE. Roy Watts eventually turned this
into a campaign in which Thames was made into the champion of the consumer,
fighting against government plans to put up water charges. Unlike the ambivalence
and in some cases outright opposition of the other WAs, there is evidence to suggest
privatisation had been on Roy Watts' agenda from his arrival. He has been described
as:.. .A totally single-minded man. A lot of charisma in terms of leadership and
visionary and quite simply, always said government is a bad owner, cannot run
business, this is a business we have got to make it efficient, f we make it efficient we
move into the private sector.. .Also we can diversfy, can build on our water base and
by the year 2000 be like IBM Those sort of real visionary things (NRA Manager
Thames Region).
Roy Watts' strategy represented the first proactive move for change from within the
industry since reorganisation. In this sense, he emerged as a maverick who was astute
to the government's political agenda and could transform the New Right logic of
reducing the PSBR and supply side economics, into a case for privatisation of a
previously unconsidered industry. However, the final privatisation proposals which
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included a river regulator had less appeal for Watts who wanted to privatise all
functions. This was an arrangement favourable to and influenced by John Bellak,
Chairman of STWA who, while not in the media eye over privatisation, did have an
important influence: Although Roy Watts got a lot of the credit for pushing the
concept ofprivatisation. . .1 think John Bellak was the one who persuaded Nicholas
Ridley that privatisation of the industry could work.. was talking to Nicholas Ridley
behind the scenes... They seemed to get on very well.. .John Bellak deserves a lot of the
credit for idenqfying the mechanism by which the industry could be privatised..
(former Secretary to the Executive group STWA).
6.7 Dismantling the PH Ideology
The dismantling of the PH ideology became pronounced as the preparation for
privatisation gained momentum in the years 1987-89. The privatisation process had
two main strands, the preparation for wider enterprise activities and ensuring the
availability of adequate finance for all the capital investment necessary as private
companies. The main issues centred around developments of long term strategies for
investment and the concern for compliance with standards in drinking water and
sewage. WA annual reports show improvements in meeting financial targets and
reduced operating costs as a result of efforts to rationalise the structure. At the same
time the government constraints were falling away. The main activities were in
drawing up asset management plans and surveys on customer profiling.
Despite the changes of the previous four years there was still apprehension within the
organisations and pockets of resistance to the proposed changes. The current
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Personnel Manager for Thames recalls: I think the majority of the people who worked
for us thought it was a bad idea... It was a big unknown, it required a lot of change,
uncertainty at one level. A lot ofpeople who had worked in the water industry for a
long time still had values about public service...
This required a drive from executive management to effect change and build the
capability of management. New Chief Executives were brought in from outside for
their business acumen and city presence to drive through the privatisation process. For
instance, Severn Trent's Rod Paul: Brought in with him a whole set of management
sector practices involving team working, and a much stronger focus onpeople...also
the word marketing which we had not really recognised previously in a utility. And he
also brought an increasedfocus on technology. These are the things which I believe
caused us to transform (MD ST).
However, not all managers could accept the new philosophies; many left and were
replaced by outsiders. This was particularly so for TWA. The rivers and regulations
units, set up in advance of privatisation, absorbed many dissident members who
wished to remain in the public sector. Also, there were still signs of a significant lack
of rationalisation or uniformity of practices throughout the industry which had to be
rectified. New projects were initiated: a one stop customer shop in Thames,
centralised engineering functions, single warehouses central to their regions, a
programme of training all management to a common standard and the same with
supervisors in operations. Much investment went into forecasting models. As part of
the new ethos WAs developed creeds or principles by which they operated.
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This was also a great period of structural change. In Thames the overall message went
out that change was an integral part of being in the private sector:...there were the big
reorganisations... the message in Thames was basically "well you look outside at other
companies, they are not standing still. They are reorganising probably twice the
number of times that we are." (former Finance Director). In STWA the number of
divisions were halved and the support functions merged. The operations functions
were split up into 15 districts to provide greater contact with customers. One manager
saw this as the beginning of the focus on customer service: I think it was a belief it
was the first dawnings of the fact we were a customer service business and Ifelt we
needed more local ownership. And the concept was that the district manager would be
the local Mr Severn Trent.
There is also evidence to suggest that the prospect of privatisation served to energise
and motivate individuals: We used the two years between '87 and '89 very
productively. And it was all about change management (former Finance Director
STWA) - not least because of the prospect of capital availability: At that stage what
we now call the utility business had been wondrously changed... there was going to be
capital... It's nice to be given a view of the tasks to do... Things to be improved, money
coming on stream, that energises the organisation in a way that continuous
retrenchment can't (former MD Thames).
Work on the prospectus was important as it elaborated the framework for spending
over the next 5 years and then 10 years. This was a document which WAs knew they
were going to be measured against and therefore had to get right. It also had to be in
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the right format to enable the organisations to deliver the outputs that were needed
post-privatisation.
The impact of privatisation was swift in terms of new responsibilities despite the
preparation period. As the new CEO of ST described the change-over: We movedfrom
one direction to outputs to achieve. Andjust flop, nothing gentle about it, it just
happened. .for those at the top it was a switch. I mean nothing gentle about the
cultural change. One day you were and the next day you weren 't. Day one you were
nicely comfortably thinking our works have failed what do we do about it. The next
day and are they going to prosecute us for it? That's a slightly different view of the
world However, the change in ideology had been inexorable and significant: Before
'89 we had already moved quite some way towards the internal model that still
applies, so there had been a change and a lot of emphasis to change our attitudes to
our employees... so in one sense the flotation date passed without it being a dramatic
event (former Corporate Strategy Director).
6.8 The Business Ideology
The transformed ideology of the water industry may now be described in terms of the
four-fold typology at the beginning of this chapter in contrast with the PH ideology of
20 years previously. The 10 geographical boundaries remain unchanged (except in
cases of minor acquisitions of water supply companies), but the management
processes within have changed radically. That is not to say that there is wholesale
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acceptance of the new ideology, but the change has been irrevocable and there is
every sign of more change to come.
6.8.1 industry characteristics
After privatisation the industry had been sold into the stock market as 10 regional
entities and the process begun in 1973 was finally complete. The regional bodies had
finally gained an identity as private companies with all the financial freedom and
responsibility that this entails. The industry characteristics now present a stark
contrast to those which had informed the PH ideology prior to 1973 and which had
persisted into the late 1980s. The acceptance of the regional entities as companies has
erased forever the small municipal identities with their histories. Thus in the private
sector, the industry has very little history to draw upon and many of the personnel
which promoted the PH ideology have gone:... none of the people in ST who I would
count as among the successful worked in the water industry when it was a small
business. Because they all went. So all of them have grown up in the industry... They
don't have any allegiance to any previous system... they've nothing to do with
Birmingham City Water Department (former Finance Director).
The individual companies are now more heterogeneous than before as each must
compete with the other according to the regulator's comparative competition. All have
now devised individual management policies, employee wages schemes and training
and financial management packages. As such, the goals of the companies have
changed from operational excellence to ones of profit motive, compliance with
regulations and positioning in relation to the competition: Everybody thinks that
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public sector companies don't focus on money. That's all they focus on, rather than
actually the combination of money and output. And increasingly we are focused on
outputs: the outputs of customer service, quality and the intermediate outputs around
quality of our business processes as well, which really is what drives efficiency (MD
STW).
The focus of the companies is now firmly regional, the many changes to the divisional
structures having done away with parochial rivalries and interests. There is also an
international outlook in terms of offering utility services abroad. These wider and
pluralistic concerns in the private sector make for a turbulent environment which is
now accepted by managers, who under the old culture operated in defiance of change
Now change is a permanent part of organisational life in response to the environment.
This has of necessity made for more instability in the structural arrangements which
also serves to dilute the building of power bases. Thus change has become a way of
managing according to the Chairman of ST: I suspect that there is only one simple
secret to all management practice and the vast books written about it, which is that
first f the thing is very decentralised you centralise it, and then when you've over
centralised it you decentralise it and so on. And actually some improvements occur
usually each time oddly enough. It's a permanent Maoist revolution (John Bellak).
Adding to the plurality of concerns is the increase in the number of stakeholders
which the industry has acquired. The regulatory bodies, the City, investors,
government and the EC, all have an impact in different ways and make demands
which can be conflicting (see 4.11:2-6).
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6.8.2 industry values
One of the key value changes is the shift from allegiance to one's profession to that of
the company as discovered by this former Corporate Strategy Director:...Suddenly you
had to identfy, you had to own the policies of the organisation, you had to go out and
promote them, both internally and externally, and so for me that was an enormous
change of character. The whole notion of becoming a business has meant
management by professional managers rather than the industiy related professions:
It's become a business as opposed to a... bureaucratic non-decision making
organisation... it's an organisation that goes about conducting itself in a more
business-like approach and is very clear what it means by professional management
to achieve that. This is very closely linked to valuing professional management
practices: So suddenly.. .you had this clear sense of the management has a purpose, it
is in control. It has a whole series of things it wants to do, and as a person, as
individuals, you have got to play in that team and play hard and take ownership of it
(former MD TWA).
At the heart of professional management are the core values of quality and efficiency
which are manifested in the outputs. Described by Severn Trent's Director of
Services:... The combination of total quality, business process re-engineering, the
customer service strategy which we launched in a big way. Competitiveness too, is a
value which has permeated down from rivalry between companies to rivalry between
groups of workers. The Manager of Sewage Operations Thames says: What we are
trying to do now is beginning to benchmark those areas of as it were, excellent team
working and actually try to articulate what that is. And then going to other teams and
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saying "what's in it for you?" The consequences of these new ideas are major shifts in
employee perceptions about the scope of their work, reward systems and personal
initiative. The effects of rationalisation have been to enlarge jobs; everybody now has
to 'cross-skill' because people have to really count in the business.
All these value changes have meant an increase in individual responsibility for
managers and workers alike which is a complete change from the previous mode of
decision-making by committees. A key vehicle for driving through performance
related pay and job enlargement has been the notion of empowerment: So people have
to be given the training, the development. They have got to be empowered.. Opinions
matter... We are very much more people oriented both internally and externally. And
that is I think quite exciting because it gives everyone a bigger stake in their jobs
(Quality Assurance Manager Severn Trent). The ability to give responsibility to
people at a lower level is largely the result of the culture shift from the predecessor
organisations to the companies themselves.
6.8.3 industry beliefs
The fundamental tenant of the core beliefs is that government is a bad owner and that
effective and efficient service can only be delivered in the private sector (see 4.11).
The two case study organisations have clear policies which are informed by their
belief in acting as service driven companies as opposed to financial or professional
ones. In order to encapsulate the requirements of customers and regulators the
organisations have embraced a total quality ethic. This involves all levels in both
organisations and people are encouraged to come up with their own solutions: We are
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actually into a much clearer regime, I think, of understanding the three main business
drivers: cost, quality and risk And everyone is now encouraged in every part of day-
to-day thinking at all levels, to actually go to articulate decision making priorities in
this sort of context (MD STW).
The concept of risk, too, is not so much eliminated as managed and this forms the
backbone of managing within a regulated environment: It's more to do with the whole
style of management, fyou are in a regime which says there will be no risks, then
what is that organisarion saying about cost and quality? On the other hand fyou are
saying you want to get the best value for money for our customers and try to improve
quality. And to do that you have to be able to manage risk; actively rather than
passively. And that's a very different way of operating (Senior Manager). This
includes identifying with the dictums of the regulator. Both Thames and Severn Trent
actively pursue a policy of harmonious relations with the regulator and have
pronounced themselves as major environmental businesses.
Most important in changing beliefs are the managerial mind sets and the concept of
organisational learning is proffered as the key to future organisation-technology
interfaces. This is in no small way linked to concerns with management taking on
board the private sector ethos: I think managers are very self conscious in a lot of
ways about producing vision statements...Performance objectives, critical success
factors, I think these are alijargon that people are a bit frightened of... What I like to
talk about... is to say "what six things have you got to do really well to make your area
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a success, and fyou go from the top down you start focusing on it." (IT Director
Thames).
Ultimately the core beliefs have changed from engineering to management solutions:
There are opportunities now for those with bright ideas to get listened to, particularly
?f they save money... For the manager that wants to manage there is afar wider remit
within reach of responsibility (General Manager Water). There is also a strong belief
in the management of change to succeed. This is evident in the IT area, heavily
pushed by Thames IT Director:... the continuing drive down in the price of technology
and the software that goes with it, means that Ijust don't see any company succeeding
in the twenty first century unless they are on top of technology. And that means
everyone out there will own the technology... The ongoing drives for efficiency,
manifested in new technology, HRM changes and reorganisations, have resulted in a
permanent climate of change within the organisations. On one level this is seen as
good business practice by Thames' senior managers: So we are doing the sorts of
things that most other large companies are doing at this time of the decade, because it
does seem to be right for us as well. At another, it is seen as an integral part of the
management process: I don't think the job is ever done. It's part of the management
process. The most important aspect seems to me to be managing change (Sewage
Operations Manager Thames).
6.8.4 management style
Turning again to Keeling's (1972) five features distinguishing administrative from
business systems, one can compare the management styles of the PH ideology with
that of the Business ideology. Independence of Treasury and self financing are seen as
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vitally important in the new era of professional management:.. .It 's changed the nature
of the work within the business, all things are now possible and they weren't before.
There really was a ceiling and walls and everything else. Of course there are now but
you manage them... the framework is all there for us to manage (CEO ST).
1. Instead of general objectives there are now specific targets related to profit and
regulation because of the regulatory framework and the limits on long-tenn
profitability. The regulation driver is as much a contributor to the focus on outputs as
the drive for efficiency. Here the emphasis on total quality and service driven
management are key. New regulations controlling the industry standards mean that
after privatisation, sewage works have to achieve 100% compliance or seek
dispensation so they are within the law. This means an emphasis on outputs:.. .But it
focused people on what needed to be done, not a series of tasks that may or may not
achieve the output (CEO ST).
This has especially focused management who face jail penalties for non- compliance.
A situation which has made it imperative that workers on the ground adopt the right
ethos. As a result of the bonus scheme introduced by ST, operators began to come up
with alternative solutions to capital expenditure when works failed (7.6.4).
2. Success is now all about measurable outputs as opposed to just avoiding mistakes.
The new managers of Thames utilities business were described by one senior manager
as taking Attila for a role model but:... what privatisation did stop was the rise of
mediocrity and ifyou are smart you've got a chance. This has sharpened management
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style but made ruthless cost cutting from the top to prop up the group companies to
maintain the share price... Human resource management concepts in the private
companies are very different, reflecting the new emphasis on outputs. There is now
more stress on knowledge than qualifications. Performance related pay has been
introduced into the companies at all levels. For instance, parameters have been set on
water and sewage treatment works in ST to determine basic pay for manual workers
and are:...one of the things that we are very proud of here in terms of the achievement
of outputs... if a sample fails he loses pay. So he knows what he there for
(Operations Director). In Thames this has involved taking out old job demarcations
allowing further rationing: One of the major planks of the employee project is to say
that the only limit to what an individual did would be described only by two things.
And that would be his competence and safely. Everything else is blown out of the
water. In terms of "this is not my job" type of reaction (Senior Manager). Also, all
training courses have now got to be linked to results and actions for improvement: So
you have got to have some very clear business drivers for it... because that is a clear
message that it is linked to competence and performance and action as opposed
to... acquiring knowledge without any outputs (Sewage Manager).
3. The economic and efficient use of resources is now paramount given the prime
objectives of the industry. This is reflected in the new management style of decision
making, with managers discussing issues around a computer screen rather than in
committees. All managers are now very finance oriented: You won't find a manager at
any level virtually now who doesn't know what his finances look like...Not only today
and yesterday but his estimates. And we match peoples' expertise on how good their
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estimates are. As opposed to how good their budget and their business plans are.. .(IT
Director). This has led to the increased use of IT and further delayering of
management, also made possible by the cultivation of hybrid" managers who have
many areas of expertise. Similarly, further redundancies are possible lower down the
workforce by encouraging multi-skilled workers.
There is a sense within operating staff of the cost of capital which requires a different
way of thinking if your bonus depends upon controlling costs: Now one of the
revolutions has to be that people begin to understand that capital also costs money
and there are trade-offs. And the best solution may be a more expensive operating
solution but uses less capital rather than the other way round which again any private
sector organisation will be accustomed to. (Chairman ST)
The drive for efficiency means that the organisations have a vested interest in
monitoring employee output. This is best served by harnessing technology to avoid
the creation of bureaucracy. This is then expounded as placing trust in the
workforce:...every piece of work that people do is now in our job management system,
or our account maintenance system. And the hours that they work the success or not
of it, it 's all there. So fyou totally change the way we operate and work, and you
start trusting people and you don't check and double check and triple check it, then
you can get rid of an awful lot of bureaucracy (IT Director).
4. The new ideology has transformed the hierarchical rule culture into a flatter role
culture via the delayerment of management. The former Planning and Regulation unit
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Manager of Thames says: The pace is different now and much more responsibility is
vested with the individual now, partly because there are so many less layers of
management and people between you and the responsibility. This has been largely
achieved by the introduction of IT which can facilitate work teams, leaving managers
free to manage the work flow between teams: So you only need 3 to 4 levels of
management. Because they are the only ones that add value to what you do and how
you work (IT Director).
5. A professional management style may now be seen to have replaced the
administrative management by arbitration and rule interpretation. The Business
ideology has set in place professionals who manage by empowerment and learning.
This involves a new conception of management whereby the process is one of
facilitating decision-making further down the organisation. This of necessity involves
increasing the skill levels of the work force and adopting an organisational learning
ethic. Managers no longer simply manage workers and take decisions, they operate
from a meta-level in tandem with IT, enabling them to oversee work flows and focus
on wider strategic issues.
The future for the new water company managers is perceived as involving more
accountability, greater focus on the customer and activity accounting, to enable
managers to be even more accurately judged on performance measures. Also an
increased use of sophisticated technology. The implications, as the IT Director of
Thames explained, are a different conception of managers: I think we've got to go
through huge culture shock again...Now we've got to become very much more
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customer orientated, service orientated.., and to me it's much more about what kind of
organisation do we want to be. And what kind of systems override that... and the
manager isn't a manger, the manager is the coach...
6.9 Conclusions
The last 20 years of development within the water industry represent the most
turbulent passage of time since the emergence of the industry in the mid-nineteenth
century. The incremental development of an ideological character by 1973,
represented here in the typology of industry characteristics, values, beliefs and
management styles, had been determined by structural change within the industry, the
emergence of professional groups and the particular set of social circumstances
surrounding the growth of the public sector following WW II. The resultant PH
ideology was detrimental to the full realisation of IRBM, the most innovative
structural change experienced by the water industry in Britain. In the transformation
of the PH ideology there are crucial links between political ideological change in
central government and the introduction of maverick outsiders to the industry who
would overturn the established orthodoxies. The period beginning with the NPM trend
in 1979, through nationalisation and the subsequent commercialisation period,
represents a transition period for the water industry ideology. During these phases of
reorientation and convergence, the industry developed a hybrid form of ideology in
which NPM ideas were grafted on to the PH ideology in an uneasy alliance. It
required the subsequent change of status and ownership for the identities of the ten
regional entities to be finally acknowledged and accepted.
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SECTION 3: CASE STUDY ANALYSIS
In this section the primary data are analysed to provide an organisational context for
the trajectory of the river quality issue. The following two chapters are therefore a
synthesis of the case study data, illustrating the evolution of the two organisations
from their formation in 1973 through to privatisation and until 1994. It is here that
river quality is viewed in the context of organisational dramas and change and where
the comparative contexts emerge. These chapters also serve to demonstrate the impact
at the organisational level of the industry events described in section 2.
Both case study chapters are organised chronologically around the punctuated
equilibrium model (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985) introduced in section 2. This
model of change and continuity serves as a temporal framework by which to locate
key organisational events and links the case studies to their industry context. It is
noticeable that the findings differ from the punctuated equilibrium model in one key
respect. This is that the duration of the commercialisation convergent period is
considerably shorter than the reorientation which proceeded it. This idiosyncratic
finding is attributed to the nature of the industry at the time being vulnerable to further
change from the political turbulence of the wider environment. Further discussion on
this and its implications for the punctuated equilibrium model will follow in section 4.
Each period of continuity and change is examined for the internal management
processes around structure, key functions and regulation and river quality. The river
quality issue comes towards the end of each organisational phase to indicate the
cumulative effects of the internal processes upon the issue.
The analysis of organisational change and development documented here reveals
strong similarities. Both organisations exhibited a pattern of development whereby
each period of convergence attempts to fulfill the goals of the preceding change
period. However, the trajectory of the river quality issue displays significant
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differences. The pattern for both organisations shows initial enthusiasm at the
formation of the authorities followed by a static trend with a slowing of improvements
from the mid to late 1970s. Thereafter deteriorations become evident in the early
1980s and the pattern of performance for the two organisations diverges. While
Severn Trent shows a slowly improving trend until 1990, Thames exhibits a marked
deteriorating trend until the end of the decade.
The key issues borne out by these chapters are the failure of integration due to the
early structural arrangements and internal politics, the impact of new government
financial controls on managerial processes and the adoption of a commercial ethos
following the nationalisation of the industry, the rapid cultural changes required by
privatisation and the current policy emphasis on efficiency, quality and service bound
up with the regulatory structure. Throughout, the effects of government financial
controls on organisational politics and decision making which impact on river quality
are evident. Distinctive key events for the two organisations are the MMC enquiry
into Severn Trent during 1979-80 and the instigation of privatisation by Thames' Roy
Watts as a result of an unprecedented public campaign, first for a debate in the House
of Commons and later to make the rivers private. This detailed examination of the
internal processes of the case studies is a crucial underpinning for the analytical
chapters in section 4.
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7. SEVERN TRENT WATER
You and I must keep from shame
In London streets the Shropshire name;
On banks of Thames they must not say
Severn breeds worse men than they;
A. E. Housman, 1896
7.1 Background
The Severn, the Trent and their tributaries effectively divide England, gathering in the
huge Midland industrial and manufacturing area that lies between the lumber estuary
and the Bristol Channel. Severn Trent was the second largest authority, after Thames,
but with a considerably larger area, needing for instance nearly 10,000 km more water
mains than Thames. This authority was unusual in combining the drainage areas of
two rivers, the Severn (the longest river in Great Britain) draining into the Atlantic
ocean and the Trent into the North Sea.
Severn Trent occupies an area of contrasts; a substantial part of the drainage area of
the Upper Severn is in Wales providing ample quantities of high quality water, while
the Trent, with Birmingham at its head, has been heavily polluted by serving as a drain
for the industrial Midlands. The peculiarity of the region is that most of its major
conurbations sit on the headwaters of river systems. For instance, Stoke-on-Trent,
Birmingham and Leicester are all on small brooks or rivers, providing little dilution
for effluent. As the first Chairman Sir William Dugdale pointed out, these contrasts
were the impetus to put the regions together: And it was absolutely vital...
The combined STWA therefore had a tough job on their hands initially with river
water quality. Even though the Severn produced good water, this in itself did not
guarantee quality standards: In the Midlands the water on the whole was better than
London because it came from Wales.. .As a result of that the founding father
philosophy in the West Midlands was: never clean anything up, it's your neighbour's
pro blem 5 miles down the river and f you get short of water you can build another
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reservoir (Sir William). There were also distinct differences between the Severn and
Trent RA areas in terms of investment: ... the Trent was a much more wealthy
authoriiy...So the RA could afford to pay the staff to do more consent setting in those
townships (former Trent RA Engineer).
The major clean-ups of rivers had begun in the 1960s by the then Minister of the
Environment Tony Benn: ... there was a lot of expenditure in Stoke and in Birmingham
in the early 70s, which ran into STWA up to about 1978 (former Trent RA Scientist).
Also the authority inherited personnel with a sound record in RWQ improvements.
STWA's Director of Scientific Services was responsible for cleaning up the Trent for
10 years prior to coming to STWA, including setting up purification lakes on the river
system and working with the WRB on the Trent Economic Model. The clean-up of the
notoriously polluted Tame was initiated by Severn Trent's first Director of Operations
and later Chief Executive, Don Reeve.
7.2 Emergence: 1973 Reorganisation
The new skeleton authority was immediately confronted with a poor sewage effluent
record. However the shock at the scale of river pollution was matched by a
commitment to pollution control by the Chairman and the expertise and enthusiasm of
key officers within the authority. The main activity of the shadow authority centred on
establishing a decentralised structure to prepare for the emergence of the new
organisation within 9 months.
7.2.1 quality inheritance
In examining their inheritance, the STWA studied the quality of water supply systems
of 25 water supply undertakings, the wastewater and disposal facilities of 210 LAs
and two drainage boards and the quality of industrial effluents discharged to rivers.
They prepared a report to serve as a baseline for the assessment of the future
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performance of the STWA (Severn Trent Water Authority, 1973 a). The current
Director of Planning who joined in 1974 had as his first job to .can-y out a survey of
the company's assets: It sounds strange to say but we did actually find assets that we
didn't know we had. Even the local authority who had handed them over didn't know
they had them. They were mainly small little sewage works.. .pumping stations and so
on.
The report noted with satisfaction that all the water supplies in the area met the overall
public health requirement of being 'wholesome'. This was in sharp contrast to sewage:
the overall quality of sewage effluents discharged to rivers was appalling. Nearly
300 of the 700 sewage works produced unsatisfactory effluents based on the
conditions of consent given by the former river authorities and more than 25 percent
of the 436 mgd (2 M m3 per day) of sewage effluent discharged was unsatisfactory in
quality.' (Severn Trent Water Authority, 1973a: IV). If the requirements of the
receiving stream were being considered, 43% of the treatment facilities discharging
66% of the daily volume of effluent would be classified as unsatisfactory. As a former
Divisional Manager at the time reflected: Prior to 1974 1 was horrified by what went
on in sewage treatment and local authorities with similar other operations spent as
little as possible on it.. .In Dudley, all the sewage went straight out onto alarm. The
whole of Dudley went off into allotments and people grew cabbages and things...! just
didn't believe it when I saw it. But it had been happening for 50 years. There was no
sewage works for the whole of Dudley.
The industrial effluents that discharged to rivers exhibited a picture not dissimilar
from that for municipal effluents and discharges. These unsatisfactory effluents
caused tributaries of the Severn and the Trent to be so polluted as to be incapable of
supporting fish life. Thus, even where they had legislative authority on inland waters
and enjoyed an 'adversary' relationship with those being regulated, the river authorities
for a wide variety of reasons did not make a strong record (Okun, 1977). One of the
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reasons was identified by a former Divisional Manager: We had extreme cases, where
we had 2 sewage works in adjacent fields, belonging to different district councils.
That sort of nonsense had happenedfor political reasons.
Recognising the problem of the 'poacher-gamekeeper' controversy, the STWA
established a water quality advisory panel in an attempt to assure the public of its
dedication to pollution control. Their decision to produce annual WQ reports unique
to the industry, reflected the background of the Chairman who had previously been
Chairman of the Trent RA and of the River Authorities Association Pollution
Committee: I had served quite a long apprenticeship and picked people to run the
department who.. .felt it was very necessary.
In introducing the STWA report, the chairman of the water quality advisory panel
stated that the report: ... records in quality terms the past performance of the
Authority's predecessors and wiliform the baseline for the assessment of the future
performance of the STWA by the water quality advisory panel and by the public at
large (Severn Trent Water Authority, 1973a). This self-regulatory arrangement was
both political and pragmatic: It was political in the sense that it was trying to
show... the brave new water authority was actually genuinely making some
improvements (former Pollution Control Officer). While from the viewpoint of Fred
Lester: ...when you let people know what's going on it's strength to your elbow.
Indeed, the first Water Quality report received some notoriety by listing those
companies who had refused permission prior to implementation of part II of COPA, to
disclose the nature of their consents. This was picked up in an article in the New
Scientist (Tinker, 1975) which the CBI quickly discounted as unscrupulous. Severn
Trent repeated the exercise in their second year of operation (Severn Trent Water
Authority, 1974/75) which was lauded by the DoE (New Scientist, 1976).
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7.2.2 Board
Okun (1977) noted that because the STWA served a highly industrialised area, its
labour and industry members exerted a somewhat greater role than might be the case
in other WAs. Also, local authority members appeared to serve more as
representatives of their authorities than was the case in other WAs. The Chairman was
viewed as a strong character and well connected with government: . . . he was steeped in
the local authority tradition and his job was to manage the 40 people and he was
ideal for that (Finance Director). He always attempted to keep politics Out of the
committee work and tried to concentrate on the task of pulling the organisation
together, and one retired Divisional Manager described him as: .. .absolutely brilliant
politically. He was brilliant at making people work hard. One strategy for making
members see where the priorities lay was recounted by Sir William: Well, you only
had to take them to one of the sewage works and stand them over the effluent going
into the river. People got the gist quite quickly. AlsO, most of the members had served
on one of the water supply undertakings: And so they'd seen the effects of chucking the
stuff over the boundary. And you know we worked on them like Billy Graham really
and we had tremendous teaching all the time (Sir William).
7.2.3 structure
The organisation of the HQ followed the guidelines set out by the Ogden Committee.
The STWA division structure was also organised in accordance with Ogden, with
divisions for the separate functions: water supply, water reclamation and rivers.
STWA took over and amalgamated 242 separate organisations to form 15 water
supply, 9 water reclamation, 2 dual-purpose (supply and reclamation) and 2 river
management divisions.
The late Marshall Nixon, the STWA's first chief executive, saw the initial period in
the life of the authority as being devoted primarily to meeting R-day, 1 April 1974,
with the maximum delegation to the operational units. However, as a member of the
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Ogden Committee, he indicated that the STWA would be examining very closely the
2 dual-purpose divisions, as their structure would be truly multifunctional, with four
key individuals in each division being concerned with chemistry, operations, new
works and finance, all on a dual-function basis. The success of these divisions would
affect the speed with which the remainder of the STWA moved towards dual-function
operation. Each of the two rivers would be managed by separate divisions, with basin-
wide management programmes for monitoring and organisation.
The predecessor organisations would have an influence both in terms of how fast the
organisation integrated and the tenor of management processes, for at least 10 years.
As the Finance Director reviewed the unification of the new authority: .. .we started off
with something like 240 different organisations coming from disparate parts of the
Midlands: organisations large and small with their own characteristics, with their
own idiosyncratic practices, with their own management styles. And combining them
was achieved by the imposition at times of practice.
7.2.4 management
The quality and expertise of the management were high. It was not surprising that WF
Lester OBE was appointed head of Scientific Services, the regulatory arm of the
organisation. He had a long career in pollution control and had previously worked
with the Chairman Bill Dugdale in Trent RA, who described him as a "crusader", on
cleaning up the Trent. He was remembered by one former Divisional Scientist as a:
Very powerful man with a national recognition. While a former Operations Director
remembers Lester and his team producing water quality reports which were ahead of
their field. Also Marshall Nixon came from the Trent RA with a history of
commitment to improvements in water quality. The reorganisation allowed ST to
select the best staff from the LA bodies: What we were able to do was to take
inherited management graft a lot of good people on to these. But actually to use the
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good quality management over a wider range of works (Director of Environmental
Affairs).
The excitement, tension and enthusiasm of those first months in setting up a new
organisation is captured by a former Divisional Manager: We stood in the office and
cheered when we had the men 's'first pay day and got away with it - it was really
quite hairy at first. Just getting the support services sufficiently together and f we
hadn't cooperated between the operating divisions... We all worked out of one office in
a rundown building at the beginning. It was really quite pioneering. And very
exciting.
7.3 Convergence: Integration 1974-79
The first period of convergence was marked initially by a new CEO after the
premature death of Marshall Nixon, restructuring into multifunctional divisions one
year later and abolition of the resources planning directorate. The annual reports
during this time show a preoccupation with the authority's inheritance and internal
development issues for the first five years (STWA Annual Reports and Accounts,
1974-79). The one external issue which dominated much of the organisation's agenda
during the 1970s was that of water charges, and later direct billing. As Sir William
recalled: The real political problem was that no council house person before 1973 had
ever seen a water bill.., so that when every single council house got a water bill, you
had to stand back and wait for the explosion which duly came.
Unfortunately, Nixon had died before the STWA became operational. He had played
an important role in the reorganisation throughout England and Wales as well as in the
STWA. The Chairman took over as chief executive for R-DAY until the appointment
of a new CEO. JE Beddoe, who had been Under Secretary in the DoE, and has been
characterised as the 'architect' of the water reorganisation, was appointed CEO on 25
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April 1974. As he had been intimately involved in the reorganisation from its initial
emergence as a possibility through its most difficult periods, as a member of the
Ogden Committee, and behind the scenes in many of the government's activities with
regard to the reorganisation, professionals in the industry would follow with interest
the impact that he would make on the STWA. He could not have been much more
different from Marshall Nixon, as he was very much the administrator and more
organisation focused.
7.3.1 structure
The total projected capital investment needs of the constituent bodies which became
STWA was very high. The first thing STWA did was to rationalise that programme
because there were many overlaps. In October 1974 the STWA announced that it
would, as of 1 April 1975, operate on a completely multifunctional basis with eight
all-purpose divisions replacing the previously organised divisions. Included among
these new divisions were the Birmingham Water Supply Division and the Upper
Tame Water Reclamation Division, entities that incorporated what had been the two
largest agencies taken over by the STWA. The two river divisions were abandoned
and their responsibilities distributed amongst the eight new multipurpose divisions.
This reorganisation was the subject of considerable adverse criticism, particularly
from those associated with the river divisions, who felt that their jobs were being
threatened by the new organisation. NALGO's national organiser for the water
industry indicated that the union had yet to be convinced that the reorganisation was
necessary at all. The new changes would disband what had proved to be an
experienced and successful team in managing the Severn, and many officers believed
that the ST WA's two catchments, the Trent and the Severn, should continue to be
managed by separate divisions. This was considered the only effective way of
safeguarding the river. In STREAM, the house organ of STWA, Beddoe gave the
following explanation, characterised by the Surveyor (1974d) as jargon-c1ad': ...we
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must look forward and consider how the pioneering work of the former river
authorities has led the way to this present recognition of the need for the primary
functions to be organised on a broader basis. DAD Reeve, Director of Operations,
asserted that the STWA reorganisation was only accelerating a process that had been
planned and pointed out that integration of river management with the rest of the
STWA's responsibility was a natural corollary of the Water Act, bringing all water
functions under a single control.
All functions would be coordinated at HQ and those responsible for river management
would report to the Director of Scientific Services rather than the Director of
Operations, moving the dual role of 'gamekeeper-poacher' one step higher in the
management pyramid. Reeve was convinced that the decision to speed up the
introduction of multi-purpose divisions reflected the wishes of most of the staff to
minimise the evolutionary period, and in opting for the more revolutionary change
'there had to be some blood spilled on the way'. This was felt by a former Operations
Controller who helped set up the first divisions and found 2 changes within 12 months
traumatic: I thought it happened too soon, we were still up to our ears getting ready
the original single function divisions...
The regulation function was now organised into seven pollution control areas, each
with an area pollution control officer. The majority of staff were based out in these
areas which were carefully chosen so as not to have a one to one match with a
division. The sort of activities which were carried out, such as sampling and
monitoring effluent quality, were an extension of the old RA functions: We were very
protective. Very very parochial. I was only interested in my river catchment and I
didn't give a damn what went on around it (former PC Officer).
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7.3.2 leadership
Blood was also spilled at the STWA HQ, which initially had been organised,
following the Ogden Committee's guidelines, with five directors. In the summer of
1976, Beddoe proposed and the STWA endorsed the elimination of the Directorate of
Resource Planning and its replacement by a small central planning unit reporting to an
assistant director with dispersion of its staff to the other directorates. That the STWA
was the only WA abandoning its directorate of resource planning gives credence to the
view that the issue was one of personalities rather than principle. The current Quality
Assurance Manager remembers it as one of the first power struggles: That was a
resources battle f you like because a lot of the resources people (were) painting very
large pictures and very large power. He points out that resources people were
virtually unknown in the industry before 1974 and had their own identity with
organisations like the WRB. Leadership under Beddoe was at this time very much
driven from the top, as the current MD recalls: Beddoe was managing a group of
directors who were barely a team...
After Beddoes retired at the end of May 1977, Don Reeve took over as chief executive
on 1st June of that year. He was described by the current Finance Director as steeped
in the water industry: Now his attributes were knowledge of the patch, knowledge of
the people, knowledge of the technology and techniques, his ability to command, have
a presence on national committees. He was a water man. Formerly of Upper Tame
Main Drainage Authority, Reeves was an old sparring partner of Fred Lester from the
RA days, described by Lester as the engineer for Trent RA's main polluter.
Under the multifunctional reorganisation, divisional managers had been responsible to
Reeve as Director of Operations. Now Reeve decided to take direct responsibility for
divisions, leaving the new Director of Operations, Bromell, out of power: .. .he raised
the status of divisional managers... this was a wise and proper thing to do and in that
sense (most people) held him in a reasonable amount of esteem. I think he was an
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evolutionary chi ef executive as opposed to a revolutionary one. This was actually
needed at the time because there were so many changes going.on (Quality Assurance
Manager). Reeve's management style was to give increasing responsibility to
divisional managers: It was a phrase that was used time and again - 'Responsible for
everything that happened in your patch' (former Divisional Manager Upper Trent).
Nevertheless, the increased power of managers allowed them to appeal over his head
directly to committees: They set up these sort of committees... which tended to
dominate the region in the day-to-day running and the balance of power (former
Divisional Manager West Midlands).
7.3.3 divisions
The devolution of power to divisions led to poor relations with the HQ management
who dubbed them the eight barons. As one former Divisional Manager recalled: The
centre became very frustrated by having to suggest things to divisional managers
rather than implement them. So they became coordinators at the centre. However,
there were positive results for multifunctional management, as expressed by a retired
Divisional Manager: The whole function of the business depended upon the operating
divisions getting to grips with the operational problems. And we were given immense
freedoms to do it. And there was a great deal of talent. Managerial talent...A huge
amount, that had never been given its head really.. .And they were like little boys. This
divisional arrangement while useful for the organisation at this stage of development
had its drawbacks: ... it was very difficult for them to respond to change. They were
fixed, they were hierarchical, the divisional manager did have his baronetcy... (former
Divisional Scientist). One method of retaining power was to work the committees as
Board members: ...they'd get hold of their local man...arrange for a sub-committee to
be set up which they would be sitting on as the expert and then they were sort of
running the show (Director of Planning).
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The current MD recalls the dynamics between divisions: There were eight powerful
divisional managers. And the meetings that took place were often quite
confrontational and not always very business-like. Differences between divisional
managers in how they used their power came down to personalities. The strong ones
had typically been city engineers and could be somewhat inflexible. There were also
differences in practice, for instance one Senior Manager remembers when regional
water quality data systems were introduced in 1978, two of the eight divisions
continued to use their own: (They) basically cocked a snook at the regional systems.
So there was quite a lot of tensions of different sorts, and of different priorities and
different views of how things should be addressed. This inevitably led to different
divisional cultures developing but not entirely without some shared understanding of
the responsibility of running a division: They were quite big businesses and demanded
a lot of control. So there was a great deal of camaraderie between, certainly most of
the divisional managers (former Divisional Manager).
One former Divisional Manager found he had to work quite hard to maintain the
cooperative stance between his division and HQ: I quickly discovered that unless I
worked positively to reduce the gap between us, then it naturally grew. Of its own
volition almost... His policy was to ensure that his staff maintained very firm links
with HQ. While divisions had a great deal of discretion in decision-making on a day-
to-day basis, HQ needed to coordinate policy, such as for example in dealing with
district council sewerage agents. But as one Divisional Manager found: The dividing
line between coordination and interference is often afairly fine line. And f either a
divisional person, or a HQ person, was wanting to make a name for themselves and
make waves. Then there were plenty of opportunities for them to do it. Always.
The divisions at that time were concerned with meeting and complying with their
budgets, getting their water supplies up to better standards and trying to do the best
with the sewage works they had to meet the consent standards. Each division had its
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own support function such as collecting its own income from its customers and was
responsible for their own capital programmes. Three or four of the divisional
managers were very strong willed characters who resented the HQ interference in their
capital budgets. A former Divisional Head of Finance remembers the treatment
metered out to the visiting HQ appraisal team by the divisional manager: .. . saying 'you
are not welcome here and we would rather you didn't stay. And f you insist on
staying then I will call the meeting off' Tail between the legs the appraisal men came
back to HQ and reported.
The capital programme was a major task as not only did divisions have to fight for
priorities on the allocation of cash by justifying the benefits, they were also held
responsible for spending it in the capital year. Thus a manager may be managing a
capital programme which would take 3 to 4 years to implement and running on a year
by year cash allocation. A former Manager described it as dominated by accountancy
management: You tried to ascribe values to benefits and cash flows...And at the end of
the day you came out with a sum. And your scheme got a ranking of X. But of course
you could influence the priorities on the base of maybe 30 headings f you knew what
you were doing. This was a coding system for the capital programme and the
divisions eventually became expert at managing it so that it became a game as well as
producing a certain amount of friendly rivalry between divisions: If you had a good
little back room lawyer who could work the coding of the scheme he could get you
anything. And of course, there were sort of 'well chi ef exec I think we need that' a lot
of lobbying (former Divisional Scientist). One former Divisional Head of Finance
recalled his tactics of being better prepared than the people at the centre to get
resources at the yearly budget meetings: I always knew that they were trying to
manage 8 different organisations and I always sought to be in the refirst. . .1 knew they
wouldn't get their act together until about round three. But it was not all bad; one•
former Divisional Manager recalls the improvements which could be made to quality
with the small schemes budget (<±20,000): .. . that did tremendous good... it gave the
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individual operating managers the opportunity to do the things they'd been wanting to
do with their effluents that they'd never been able to do.
7.3.4 HQ executive
The key executives all came from either RAs or sewage operations which gave an
emphasis to the concerns at the time: We had some fairly eminent people here as
directors at that time, who'd come from a sewage treatment background. And
therefore I think we always tended to hive more of a driver coming from the sewage
treatment direction (Director of Operations).
The corporate management team (CMT) met as 4 or 5 directors once a fortnight while
the divisional managers met monthly with the chief executive. Although Reeve
chaired them both there was conflict between the two groups. There was also a second
tier in the centre, comprised of 28 assistant directors who formed their own ADCMT
because they complained they didn't have sufficient power over divisional managers
and in policy making. As a former Assistant Director of Operations from that period
remembers: Strangely enough it wasn't the enmity between the divisional managers
and the new ADCMT, it was the suspicions of the CMT that the ADCMT were seeking
to usurp their powers...It was immaturity, a lack of strength on the part of
management, or indifference ... to take a strong central lead. And the ovennanning -
too many directors and assistant directors who were fighting for power... One of the
responses to the overmanning was for the executive to attend endless meetings and
committees either at the NWC in London or with government. There was no way that
the HQ executives could be described as a team with the power struggles and
difficulty with decision making, hence another outlet increasingly became the
operation of the divisions.
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7.3.5 the Board
The struggle for power at the centre was compounded by the 50 odd members of the
Board, described by the former Director of Operations as: A totally unworkable
situation being a disparate group of people politically and from different
backgrounds. Many were looking at their own local interests and so decision making
tended to be dominated by parochial views. There were a variety of powerful
individuals on the Board who headed up committees or were deemed to have
expertise in a particular field, but as the former Chairman declared: The able
politician is very good but a great many of them are frankly windbags and want to sit
on the committees rather than actually get stuck in and do the work
Gradually the Board became more interested in the detailed workings of the authority,
leading, as one former divisional manager recalled, to a situation where: There wasn't
a clear line between HQ's responsibility and divisional ones. The Board set up their
own committees for works, finance, etc to occupy its members which all had to have
committee clerks: At one stage you had 8 or 10 people just in the Committee Clerks
Office. Looking after agendas and minutes of meetings for Authority committees and
sub-committees (Head of Technology Development). They also had reports back to
committees which were all asking for additional information, supplied by the assistant
directors: And the directors had to look at the information that was supplied because
they weren't very happy that third tier officers were answering these questions
(former Finance Director). A former Divisional Manager remembers the Board as
interfering and inefficient: It cost a bit of money to administer. And we resented that
too. That was money that should have been spent on improving sewage effluents.
The Board did become more influential in decision-making. For instance, it had very
strong fishing and land drainage lobbies although there was no lobby for sewage or
water. The land drainage committee was divided into two sub-committees for both
catchments with representatives from MAFF and the NFU: ... very powerful people by
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dint of the organisations they'd come from...and they lobbied for cash to be spent in
their direction (former Assistant Director). There was also the widely quoted example
of the Board overruling the decision to buy an IBM computer, against the advice of
the directors, in favour of ICL (to support British industry). It never worked and was a
costly mistake to rectify.
7.3.6 policy
A former Divisional Manager of the largest division recalls the divisional structure as
a viable and cheap form of organisation which needed very little direction from the
centre: At that time it was quite clear, you either got rid of the centre and had eight
individual units which could be made relatively, quite efficient... Or you had a central
organisation and didn't repeat all the various activities in the divisions. It was pure
power, of the worst. But it was a question of where you were at the time as to which
way you wanted to go.
Indeed, decentralisation had the support of the Chairman because of the size of the
region and his management philosophy: I'm a great believer in leaving people to do
their own thing and hammering them f they get it wrong. However, decentralisation
was found to be hindering the benefits to be gained from reorganisation: By 1980 it
became a question of how much effort have we got to put into this to put it right. And
that was an issue (former Assistant Director). This issue would first be resolved by
integration of the regulation PC areas into divisions during nationalisation and, in the
following era, by the centralisation of support functions.
7.3.7 river water quality and regulation
The projected shortfall of water by the WRB in 1970 made water resources a key issue
and one of the drivers of RWQ, as the only new water sources were from polluted
rivers. This was linked to the key issue of integrating the disparate bodies responsible
for the water cycle: .. .you had the clean waters people realising that they were
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dependent on the dirty water people cleaning the thing up...and that the thing was
economic, that money you were charging was being well spent (Sir William). A
subsequent analysis on the levels of domestic demand proved that the demand issue
wasn't anywhere near its projected shortfall (Source: MD). STWA were almost
committed to a new reservoir Craig Goch in Wales which only a bit of brinkmanship
prevented. Later this was channelled into Carsington reservoir.
In the early days it was felt that there was a strong will and determination to improve
RWQ: I think it was a conscience of a long history of problems in the country...and
there was a tradition and history of improving water quality... The corporate
management team at that stage did have people who were definitely from the industry
and carried that with them (former Pollution Control Officer).
classification of rivers
STWA were very much involved with the national rivers classification scheme, based
on river use and related to river standards (see 5.7.5). This set a national standard for
the first time with planned objectives. However, some rivers had been classified
without a great deal of data, particularly the smaller rivers which PC officers made
subjective judgements about. For instance, there were lowland rivers that were
classified as IA which wouldn't apply now because of farm pollution. But officers
were reluctant to downgrade because the variability of RWQ means a lot of data are
needed to be certain that a change has occurred. Therefore there was a more optimistic
classification of rivers in WQ reports than was the case in the mid to late 1980s
(Source: NRA manager). Linked to the classification scheme was the setting of
effluent standards from 80% to 95%. This caused friction between operations and
Fred Lester because it was perceived within divisions to be a tightening of standards:
We were concerned, those of us who knew sewage works very well that it was going to
be impossible with the equipment that we had to comply 95% of the time (former
Divisional Manager).
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the regulation function
Some PC Officers felt compromised from the start in the new integrated authority: I
think some of the PC officers probably felt that their freedom to act was diluted by
being part of Severn Trent as opposed to a more £4. type organisation (Principal
Advisor Effluent and RQ). This was felt early on in the rivers divisions when the
differences in the size of sampling between the rivers and operational divisions meant
that the large divisional sampling, when averaged out, tended to absorb the smaller
amount of independent sampling. A former Senior PC Officer recalled: Our samples
were seen as audit samples which wasn't very effective... There was afeeling that we
were, if not a nuisance, that we were to be considered separate. Later, in the seven
pollution control districts the officers tended to ignore the politics of the organisation
and maintained a separate identity: Idon't think Ifelt part of an enormous
organisation. And certainly up to '82 we weren't really made to feel, or wanted to feel
part of the organisation. We tended to treat ourselves as the elite of the organisation.
And we'd put as much pressure on them as we could (former Senior PC Officer).
Fred Lester saw the statutory responsibilities of the RAs as more clear cut than the
authorities. It had been an adversorial system which changed in 1974 to in-house
regulation thereby presenting a more difficult situation for the regulating arm. As Fred
Lester recalled: From 1950 to 74! knew precisely what my role was. I had to cause
people to spend money. He conceded that the advantages of IRBM lay in the planning
and immense sums of capital expenditure to which Scientific Services had an input:
So you were able to deal with it internally, to improve things. But the change had
serious consequences because the WA could not take legal action against itself and
evenhandedness in dealing with industry was in question: I can remember very clearly
when something went wrong on one occasion, the Divisional Manager was
reprimanded and told f it happened again he'd be out...So as far as industry was
concerned they didn't see this as being quite cricket (Fred Lester). Later, the abolition
of the rivers division was seen as a further compromise. As a former Scientific
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Services Scientist concluded:.., the regulation might have been stronger f the rivers
divisions had stayed as rivers divisions. Instead of all being absorbed centrally.
Regulation was an improvement on pre-1974 days in terms of expenditure on
sewerage and sewage treatment, particularly in relation to the requirements of the
river, nevertheless: ... there were virtually no teeth in the quality auditors... because
they were part of the same body as ourselves...generally weakened by the delay in the
UK government passing COPA part II (Director of Planning). So if the authority
broke the consents applied to the works, they were immune from prosecution apart
from gross pollution. Indeed, self-regulation was an advantage to the Treasury who
didn't want to see costs going up. One Senior Professional at the time recalled the
tactics to save money: .. . our operational samples... were also the statutory samples we
were policed by. I'm not suggesting that we ever fiddled the results but I'm quite sure
we could take a sample when we knew the sewage works was likely to be operating
better. The then Chairman described sewage works regulation as:...always liable to be
a trade-off in a corridor meeting between Fred Lester and the Director of Operations.
He had always felt it was a political mistake to exclude the prosecution route to
compliance:...we weren't immune from the careless operator who did something
wrong. And then you should be prosecuted. Fred Lester felt that while a reasonable
system of planning was in place for increased pollution loads from industry or new
housing: ... it would always be too late. We would like it to have happened before we
said anything. Also criticism was levelled at the WQ reports by the former Director of
Operations: It was historical and that was the big mistake... it was six months after the
year and it was all too late to do very much about it.
The intentions of STWA were good in this period and much enthusiasm for
improvements had been carried over from the RAs. This optimism was reflected in the
classification of the regions rivers and the projected improvements. The concern with
quality was high, evidenced by the huge bureaucracy it precipitated in terms of
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fisheries, river monitoring people and laboratories, all expanding very substantially,
including financially.
The capital investment programme was very much the key to performance during this
period. It was driven by schemes and their speed of implementation which depended
in turn on local engineering issues and planning permission. But these were still
divisional decisions with the disadvantages of decentralisation, as the current MD
recalled: I thought a lot of that stuff at that time was slightly ad hoc. It wasn't really
part of an overall strategy. The initial investment by STWA was responsible for some
improvement in RWQ but external factors were also cited as relevant, including: The
decline in industry and the change in the nature of industry, going away from heavy
manufacturing processing (former Senior PC Officer). Thus performance may be
attributed to both external regional factors and much positive activity from within
STWA.
7.3.8 summary of integration
At the formation of the organisation the main impetus to keep the services going led
to a great focus on operational activities. As the organisation matured the benefits of
uniform approaches began to be appreciated. This was confounded by the problems of
decentralisation: So one couldn't see Severn Trent Authority really as a single
entity.., and there developed quite a desire for centralisation (former Divisional
Scientist). Consolidation and rationalisation were not achieved during this period and
took until 1980 to really begin that process effectively. Also there had been a
weakening of regulation as the Director of Planning hypothesised: Perhaps that 10
year period was a bit of an opportunity missed. And maybe the key thing was the lack
of an independent regulator... In discussing the overmanning situation and the
reluctance to make changes, he identified a lack of organisational cohesiveness and
vision: People weren't prepared to learn from their mistakes... We had no corporate
vision. And it certainly wasn't shared further down the organisation.
Chapter 7: Severn Trent Water Page 334
7.4 Reorientation: Nationalisation 1979-83
This period of change begins with the Tories coming to power in 1979 and is
characterised by the new financial controls placed on the WA which would prepare it
for nationalisation. STWA was at the forefront of these changes with their referral to
the MMC in 1979. The subsequent outcome of that report would have ramifications
throughout the industry in 1983 with the removal of LA Boards. Internally, the
organisation's response to the MMC and increasing financial constraints had a marked
effect on their regulatory function with implications for RWQ. Another issue was
consents standards which were set at the performance of the works. This period of
change culminates with the arrival of a new Chairman and a smaller Board.
7.4.1 political change
The first impact of the change of government was felt when Sir William was called to
see the Secretary of State Michael Heseltine. The Financial Director at the time
recalled his words: The rules have changed, we're going to start running this
organisation efficiently. The immediate consequences were a request to cut manpower
by 10% and a cut back in the Board's proposed 17% increase in charges to 13%. At
this time ST along with the other authorities was subject to a government audit to
ascertain their level of charges. Relations with Ministers and the DoE were tense at
this first meeting under a new government and continued so. As the then Finance
Director recalled, there were: Huge arguments in those early stages. There were
major stack-ups that evening we had with Michael Heseltine. He walked out, his
goldilocks flying and I can remember getting very cross with him.
Like the other authorities, STWA had recruited a lot of people in anticipation of the
never to be realised problems foreseen by the WRB in their prediction of increasing
water consumption. Then economies became possible with information technology
enabling efficiency gains with direct billing, laboratories, CAD and the processing of
salaries. Reeve decided to rationalise the workforce, confirmed by a former Divisional
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Accountant: ... You'll probably not find any documented evidence, but he had
manpower phases 1 and 2. The first phase cut out 5% of manpower across the board
which caused consternation within the divisions as one former Manager recalled: Now
that came as a pretty cold shock to divisional managers. I was the same as eveiybody
else saying "OK, we can do it, but it will affect quality"...And we were wrong. I was
wrong. We got rid of 5% ofpeople and never felt it... it taught us we could work a
whole lot harder than we had done.
When phase 1 proved successful, the second phase made more selective cuts but with
the stated intention of getting all manpower reductions closer to 10%.
This involved the Chairman in negotiations with the trade unions: I spent a great deal
of time going round talking to branch GMB union meetings. STWA had started off
with 11,000 people and by the end of nationalisation bad slimmed down to 8,500 with
rationalisation and automation. As the Director of Planning explained: We really
couldn'tflnd efficiency out of the organisation other than manpower, that wasn't
counteracted by growth.
7.4.2 finance
The Finance Director at the time chaired the group which introduced current cost
accounting and so was an enthusiast: CCA information helped us enormously because
by the time we were privatised we were repaying debt... the thing that screwed up
everything was inflation. However, the package of financial controls caused much
consternation because of their rigid framework with the result, according to the
Planning Director, that it was difficult to get a needs driven culture into the
organisation: The government.., virtually enclosed us and gave us no flexibility at
all... We felt, although we wanted to plan against needs, all we ever got out of the DoE
was some financial constraints and 'just manage as best you can lads". So there was
nothing to bite on... The guys out there who were operating the plants, if they didn't
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get any investment felt they were hard done to. And those that did felt they were just
lucky.
7.4.3 MMC enquiry
The debate over centralisation was finally settled by the MMC enquiry which took
place over 1979/80: We were told that we were chosen because we were one of the
few that could stand it (MD). It proved to be quite a turning point, leading to a
detailed investigation of STWA's management processes. The report was mostly
concerned with the effects of decentralisation as the MD explained:.., they were very
critical of the devolved responsibility to the divisions. They felt there wasn't sufficient
management control. The MMC concluded that the common policy throughout the
region wasn't strong enough to get the benefits which should be available from an
organisation the size of STWA. One former Divisional Manager thought the
conclusions wrong, as the benefits to be gained from divisional independence were far
more important than continuity of policy: ... their inspectors had been polluted by a
number of assistant directors at HQ who were very keen to get control of the
divisions.
The enquiry also led to more of a focus on operating costs which was followed soon
after by the introduction of performance aims' to the industry. At this time STWA
quantified levels of service, although at a fairly crude level compared to later in the
1980s and now, according to the MD: And quite honestly, f you look at our
organisation now, there are still elements of the MMC report which exist. As a result,
a whole series of controls were set in place, initially budgetary and later quality
controls. An almost immediate outcome of the enquiry was a structuring of the
divisions' capital programs to meet the strategic objectives agreed by the authority.
The then Finance Director tells how the MMC saw the Chairman and directors but
none of the members, until asked by the executive if they wished to talk to them: Ifelt
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a bit guilty about it because we sent them there with no briefing... And that showed
them what a rabble they were. The upshot was the recommendation that a small Board
would provide a more efficient method of running the organisation. As the Finance
Director recalled: When the Chairman came back he was ashen. He thought we'd
come out of it very badly. But as the smoke cleared it was a very good exercise. A
Divisional Manager of the then largest division expanded on the benefits of the
enquiry, calling it: ...one of the best things that ever happened to ST...Because it
allowed them to recognise where the strengths and weaknesses were as perceived by
an outside body... and to start to put matters right, ahead ofjust about everybody else
in the field...(consequently) STby the fact they'd been forced to do it became leaders
in the management of change.
7.44 regulation and RWQ performance
Regulation within the authority was tempered both by external political collusion with
the lowering of standards and the internal politics of the organisation, shaped by the
structure, practices and financial pressures. The most significant change came with the
disbanding, in 1982, of the Scientific Services Directorate and the move of the
regulation function into divisions. This combined with external pressures on financing
lead to an overall static performance in EQ and a slowing of RWQ improvements by
the close of this change period. The Director of Environmental Affairs
elaborated:.., over the period, particularly moving towards the late 70s early to mid
80s, there was a very heavy squeeze on capital investment, which meant that we were
not able to pursue the things which had been agreed nationally, in terms of RQOs in
1979.... There were a lot of tensions at that time within the Authority. On the rate of
progress that could be achieved.
1979 review of consents
The DoE consents review which set the standards to the performance of the works
was seen as a fudge by the regulators: And they said essentially "what can we cut, how
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much can we move the goal posts" with respect to the consents to make ourselves
comply (PC Officer). Whereas the rivers divisions had sampled randomly and
established averages of 60% compliance, the favourable operations samples provided
comparatively weak data which overnight implied 95% compliance. These relaxations
continued into the 1980s, the consequences of which were elaborated by the Principal
Scientific Advisor: I think one of the effects of all these reviews of consents, perhaps
that people had a lot on their plates. Certainly the regional policy people had a lot to
worry about. And perhaps this diluted some of the effort that might have gone into
being more concerned about things like pollution incidences...It was also a frustration
to those people that the powers of COPA were never implemented.
1982 structural change
In 1982 the seven pollution control areas were moved into divisions. Officially this
was to rationalise resources as there was often an overlap of function between the PC
officers and divisional trade effluent control: And certainly at times there was adverse
comment that the two might turn up. Being completely independent (former Principal
Scientific Advisor). By putting quality control into division and combining it with
industrial waste it created a much neater interface.
There were also political motives around the tensions between Fred Lester and
Operations as a former Assistant Director recalled: I-fe was often in conflict with the
operational people who had the power base... (while he) had the statutory
responsibility. The change had been mooted a couple of times previously but had been
headed off by quality control, the Director of Scientific Services' empire. As Fred
Lester himself explained: I argued against it but you're in the system and it's very
difficult... He saw the move arising out of a scheme concocted by one of the Chairmen
of the committees: They'd obviously been got at by divisional managers, who, of
course, didn't like somebody poking around into their little neck of the woods.
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At this time financial pressures exacerbated the internal rivalry: ... the tensions started
coming fundamentally because the Scientific Services was about spending money
(former Divisional Scientist). The other related aspect was that while Scientific
Services policed industrial discharges, the WA was dependent upon income from this
source and therefore wanted to get as much industrial sewage into the works as
possible. In this respect Lester was described as: .. .sitting in an untenable situation
really being on central management... (and) accountable for meeting their standards.
And also on the industrial side (former Director Operations). After Fred Lester retired
in 1983, Scientific Services was disbanded and his role was taken on by Frank
Earnshaw the Director of Operations, who also took on his assistant director. This
merger would serve to reinforce divisional power at a time when under threat from the
MMC proposals.
In considering if the regulatory function worked, the current Principal Scientific
Advisor felt that it had its shortcomings: I think f somebody were to do an audit they
wouldn't have felt that the regulatory function was being strictly carried out. If you
compared the way ST or other dischargers were treated in comparison with industrial
dischargers, there would have been a noticeable difference. Similarly, divisional
loyalty made the regulatory role harder as it was difficult for PC officers to be
completely impartial when working directly through the divisional manager. Even the
Principal PC Officer, although working for the scientific section at HQ recalls
that:... the divisional manager paid his bills, paid his salary ... in theory we still had
this independent line, it didn't work (former Senior PC Officer). This weakened the
relationship with the director of Scientific Services as a former Divisional Scientist
explained: . . .he actually was the guy who grew up within the team in the division. And
the divisional manager regarded him as his. So, despite having a lot to contribute in
terms of scientific knowledge their auditor roles became blurred. Those that wished to
remain separate: ...stayed as policemen.., they were very cynical, right through until
Chapter 7: Severn Trent Water Page 340
the new river authorities were formed...and got out as soon as they could when the
opportunity presented itself (former Director Operations).
Some interviewees saw this situation as a more moderate approach to regulation,
involving people working together to solve problems while others felt compromised:
my job became a multifunctional job. I wasn't purely river pollution. We did trade
effluent as well. ..Responsibility was diluted by having to do the other arm of the job
(former Senior PC Officer). There were also tensions between the trade effluent
function and pollution control: They tried to get involved in parts of our work and
they felt that we were trying to get involved in parts of their work...And at that time it
was always difficult to define where one responsibility ended and the other
began. ..But again it depended to an extent on personalities... We always had a feeling
that they wanted to take over (former PC Officer). Another conflict lay between the
engineer and the scientist. The scientists often became involved in the day-to-day
management of divisions: ...because they could see where the power base was. They
could see operational managers getting promoted (former Director Operations).
This time was considered by some pollution control officers as a very black period:
When we were forced into doing jobs that none of us really attempted to do. While
others:.. felt that we had a much more integrated job where we went to a site and you
dealt with all aspects of water pollution. This former PC Officer explained his
differing view from his colleagues: I was always fairly committed to the idea of the
STWA...I think they've kept a purer view of what river qualities are all about. He felt
that by cooperation and making an input to the capital works that improvements
would follow: which I think it did initially but subsequently there were other factors
which resulted in that not progressing as quickly. For instance, PC officers would take
formal samples of STWA discharges: Not that we could do anything with them. But
just to say "this is a very serious situation". We used to get it in the neck afterwards.
We felt that...you don't cause waves like that. This caused bitter feelings on the part of
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PC officers, as one explained: I think we always used to say we used to operate
despite the organisation. . .simply because it was a vocation to the people who did it.
Ultimately something would get done about works problems but as one former Officer
explained: they were very bad at taking remedial measures. It was "OK, we'll put it in
our capital programme, it will be done in five years' that's it, it's finished. Although
pollution control had to be multi-experts on a number of processes they couldn't know
the implications of all their recommendations: I wasn't a sewage works operator. So I
didn't know the ins and outs of how sewage works operated... We used to influence
tremendous capital expenditure right across the board (former PC officer). However,
unlike the authority, when it came to industry, PC officers would expect them to take
remedial measures. In summing up his feelings about regulation a former PC officer
concluded: It wasn't too bad. But it could have been a lot better. But you have to
forgive the organisation in a way because it was doing what it was told to do.
organisational response to financial pressure
The pressure for improvements to RWQ implied consents compliance which was
countered by pressures to keep down operating costs as a consequence of government
capping on capital expenditure. As a former Senior PC Officer recalled: Quite often
we'd get a memo come down "What are the implications of doing this" cut, cut, cut.
Very often savings were made on power consumption and dismantling plant to reduce
maintenance. Some of these short cuts compromised consents which were
subsequently reset, as part of the DoE collusion with the lack of capital. In this
respect, the authority effectively issued its own consents under the standards at the
time but there just wasn't enough cash to go round and as the authority entered the
1 980s they were being squeezed very hard by government. The Head of Quality and
Environmental Services explained the implications for policy: ... it wasn't clear what
our objectives were because everybody was worried about "well what does it cost,
well perhaps if it costs that much we perhaps ought to modify the objective." The
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short termism of the budgets was contrary to the needs of such a long term capital
intensive business: In our industry that's a disaster, it's a recipe for waste or for non-
achievement of something that's quite important. That was the inside concern a lot
because it created enormous hassle and bureaucracy...! think there was a sense
around that things were declining (Quality Assurance Manager).
The effect of the capital expenditure cuts was a serious decline in the sewage works
infrastructure. The old plants were so bad that the civil engineering part of it was
falling down and the mechanical and electrical engineering side was being kept going
by stop-gap measures. As the Director of Planning related: So the operators were
living on a knife edge, just keeping the works going... the consent compliance or not
was almost second. An alternative view is presented by the former Director of
Operations who saw consent failures as a failure of management at that time:... if
they'd all been better managed and had more competent operators, scientjfically
based operators, the works would have produced a much better effluent in its own
right. He remembers meetings over consent failures as a much lower key exercise than
before privatisation: It was so slack ..but things had not developed at this stage where
it was a major issue.
Prioritising capital expenditure was inevitably a matter of deciding where to
compromise as the Director of Environmental Affairs remembered: Always when
looking at the capital programme and looking at therelative priority of schemes,
quality and effluent...some of the other issues you fight against were actually
customer service issues, to try and get the money to quality as opposed to improved
pressure...Because the argument might be "what's the point of improving pressure if
the quality's not right?" The priority system meant that drinking water took
precedence over sewage and sewage treatment, including direct overflows from
sewers which were simply not addressed. The money on sewerage went into flood
prevention with little concern if it went into the rivers. The customer service issue was
Chapter 7: Severn Trent Water Page 343
seen to have a greater priority than river pollution with the result that: . . .basically, our
asset stock, both its structural condition and its performance probably deteriorated
over that time (Director of Planning). Nevertheless, intentions within the organisation
were good in the face of difficult decision-making: I think people were trying to do a
professional job. They were trying to take a balanced view.., it was always a
compromise on the consent condition really (Head of Quality).
7.4.5 1983 Water Act
Nationalisation was generally viewed as a positive move, it was seen as an increase in
status within the authority (see 6.5). The new Chairman John Bellak, found the MMC
suggestions quite useful in his new role, as he described his first impressions: ... what
struck me when I came was that after 10 years there should have been a greater
similarity of method... Bellak brought with him a business culture, coming from a
private sector background and business non-executive directors. The MD described
the immediate effects: He caused us to focus on long term strategies and resources we
needed long term. And of course was very powerful in helping to drive through the
privatisation process. He was very political, spending much time in Whitehall and
also brought a critical eye to the authority's approach to regulation: He was pivotal
...And he said "in Royal Doulton f we make cracked pots we throw them away, we
don't sell them" and what he was saying was why do we have quality standards f we
don't comply...And questions started to be asked about quality and customer service
and about the condition of underground assets (Director of Environmental Affairs).
He was described by the Finance Director as more hands on: You almost had a role
reversal when the chief executive could easily have been the Chairman and our new
Chairman could have been the chi ef executive...He wanted to be involved and he had
to be involved to get to know the organisation.
The new Board was initially composed of a mixture of old LA representatives,
government appointees and private sector backgrounds; it gradually changed to be
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dominated by private sector people: It was sharper. You had a very clear route to the
top. There was more sense of unity, purpose...And so there was more cohesion, more
direction and afeeling that the thing would be managed f you like. One could almost
physically see the organisation now (Quality Assurance Manager). This was achieved
by a new ethos of business practice and greater power devolved to the executive. As
the former Finance Director recalled: There were no votes. And the corollary of that is
that the executive directors have immense powers, huge powers. The new powers also
meant directors had more significant demands made of them by the Board.
7.4.6 summary of RWQ during nationalisation
The general consensus on RWQ performance during this period was of high ideals
thwarted by financial controls. Indeed, Fred Lester testified to much progress in
reducing pollution, ST being the only authority that actually set a time limit on
achieving the objectives: It wasn't the authority's fault they weren't achieved. It was
the government restrictions on expenditure.. .(NRA Manager). The issue was rated
highly because ST committed themselves to 600 or 700 km of upgrading within 10
years. However, many schemes in the corporate plans for 10 or 20 million pounds
never got done. The current NRA Manager explained: I'm sure management at the
time would have liked to have done them f they'd had the money. But if you cut back
you do the essentials you don't do what people consider as extras. In addition to the
restrictions on finance the ST region suffered from farm pollution which affected river
quality. Although according to the NRA Manager, at the time responsible for setting
RWQOs in STWA, this was not appreciated during the late 1970s. As a result the
quality of some rivers was over estimated and there was always a reluctance to
downgrade rivers once they had been set. He feels STWA could have made more fuss
at the time to alert government to what was happening to RWQ: Certainly through the
early SOs even though they (rivers) were getting worse it was assumed they might get
better.
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7.5 Convergence: Commercialisation 1984-87
In the mid-1980s it was a changing scene, from the focus in the early 80s on operating
costs and the derivation of the levels of service measures, to the development of long
term strategies for capital investment to ensure maintenance of the infra-structure.
Then the failure to comply fully with the standards and the problem of achieving
compliance highlighted the regulation issue: I think costs became very important to
customers... The game keeper-poacher issue peaked at this time, as a reason why it
couldn't be prolonged anymore (Quality Assurance Manager).
7.5.1 management and structure
Of the executive team and the management, the Chairman's first impressions were: . . . a
high level of intelligence, a high level of qualification, a high level of ability and
certainly devotion to the business.. .But with necessarily in most cases having never
had a different sort of background... with still a lot more committee type decisions and
a lot less individual type responsibility. The CEO Don Reeve spent much of his last 2
years running the Institute of Civil Engineers: ...Don probably wasn't as strong later
on than might have otherwise been the case, given the circumstances (former
Director of Operations).
The 8 divisions were amalgamated into 4 in 1984 in response to the MMC
recommendations: The realisation that divisional strengths were not really
compatible with the regional policy...that there were a lot of overheads.. .And again it
was influenced by computer availability (former Director of Operations). This was
under the direction of Frank Earnshaw Director of Operations: So at the time we were
looking for centres of excellence...saying that division is strong in that area, let's
transplant that across the other seven. At the time STWA were still reducing
manpower but hadn't achieved their targets so were looking for opportunities to
reduce the numbers. Frank Earnshaw explained his thinking: ... my model at the time I
well remember was the Gas Board, who'd previously changed their organisation from
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more powerful districts into a central organisation. I went down to several gas boards
and electricity boards to see what we could learn from them. The downside of the
voluntary severance programme was its attractiveness to the best people in the
organisation, resulting, in Frank Earnshaw's words, in: A general weakening of the
organisation and we'd got to stop the haemorrhaging.
The divisions were split in two ways, into smaller operational districts downwards
which were amalgamated upwards. The four divisions became the support areas for
the operating districts, responsible for specific functions like engineering and planning
at regional level, while the districts concentrated on operations and were the front line
for the customers: The idea of the districts was that they should focus on operating
and interface with the customer as necessary, but not get more involved than
necessary in forward planning (Principal Scientific Advisor). It was also a way of
reducing a certain level of support costs. The immediate effect was to diversify power
into localities, divisions and HQ. But this did not reduce conflict and increase
consensus: ...you had this middle tier. It was never centred. I think a lot of us felt that
you had this tier which perhaps could second guess (Director of Finance).
Increasingly resources were being put into the centre and the divisional functions
taken out. Within the regions the changes brought their own tensions, as one
Divisional Manager found at the time: It's all about managing people. (There was) A
lot offear.
Ray O'Brien was appointed chief executive on 1 April 1986 after Reeve's retirement:•
His prime focus was to sort out a computer strategy...! think the two things he did was
to focus on that and to start recognising the importance of the people dimension.
Until then it had all been about money.. .And Ray began to actually select key people
for the future (MD). Computing had initially been decentralised within divisional
computing units. The director for computing pushed for centralisation and worked on
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a strategy for putting all the divisions on one main-frame at HQ: That was a huge
change, in thinking as well as to effect (Divisional Manager).
Gradually the functions of the divisions were incorporated into HQ in 1986 with the
centralisation of non-operating support services, leaving 15 operating districts very
much responsible for day to day management: It was very clear that their job was to
operate what was there. They were not there to make policy. It gave them a very sharp
focus (MD). The new business approach of the organisation was revealing itself in
concerns about customers and service.
7.5.2 finance
The upshot of the financial controls was the introduction of a more commercial ethos
into financial planning at divisional level. For the first time ever, each division had to
produce a corporate plan for the next three years: So that started to structure the
financial economies. For the first time we were putting income against expenditure.
We were starting to account on a more commercial basis... We still hadn't got a profit
and loss, that was a dirty word. You had surpluses and deficits.. .But it was starting to
realise that certain things couldn't be done because you had no income to generate
it.. .It was quite a formative stage albeit a fairly gentle transformation (former
Director of Operations). As performance aims were the device being used by the DoE
to control expenditure, ST needed to understand how they were spending money and
what relative efficiencies were between the different divisions: (It was) quite a
fascinating time because we got ourselves involved in not only comparisons between.
the eight divisions we had, but we started comparative studies with Yorkshire Water
and Anglia Water, as well as participating in the national studies which were being
done under the auspices of the DoE (Director of Services).
The implication for corporate planning was the necessity for executive coordination:
Because we were moving away from a structure that was 5 departments running
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totally independently to try and get an executive group of directors to work as a
group. So the interplay was important and trying to encourage them to explain what
they were planning in their area and how it interrelated with the others was important
(Head of Technology Development). Despite the improved quality of the corporate
planning and long term strategic thinking, the current MD describes the interaction
with the Treasury as: a bit of a charade. The external financing limits prevented the
organisation from receiving the resources to meet the long-term strategy: You were
still back with the short-term pressures, whilst at the same time pressing you to do an
even better plan next year (MD).
Bellak found the experience a sharp contrast to finance in the private sector: And he
actually got to be very upset with some of the ministers and the way they were
tackling this.. .And he was horrified to actually find in terms of the number of
parameters with which we could ultimately run the business, it was our charges and
our borrowing and our capital expenditure... that each year that we were being sent by
the government a sheet, which actually contained all three numbers. He assumed that
we could at least set our own charges (MD). The authority now began to question
Treasury decisions more: ... we began to shape up and challenge back And those
meetings were less comfortable for the DoE. And gradually we were fighting a war
there (Director of Environmental Affairs). The organisation's dealings with the DoE
were always quite skilful: I think the Authority behaved quite well in deciding where it
was going to dig its heels in and say we're simply had to have this... and probably did
a rather better job than many others.. .Highly academic intelligence applied to
everything within the company that way (CEO). The sort of arguments which began to
be developed concerned government lack of funding for the infra-structure: And it
wasn't only quality, it was on whether we were as water authorities asset stripping
(Director of Environmental Affairs).
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Severn Trent Water Authority reports (1983/84-1987/88) show the organisation
moving towards self financing and reducing its debt. This despite financial constraints
and performance targets, explained by the current MD: Well the way they did it was
essentially to squeeze cash. So operating costs were brought down year after
year... (we) brought down manpower by usually 300 a year... We squeezed our capital
investment programme down and held it down and we pushed our charges up
whenever we could.. .Andso we were getting to the point where we were pushing our
charges up but not using the income to finance the capital investment programme but
using it to repay old debt. The end result in the opinion of the Operations Director at
that time was in his words: . . .a hopeless mess. This strategy where we had two purses,
one was revenue and one was capital. The revenue was a bit tight because you had to
raise that from the customer. Capital was a doddle jf you could persuade government
to go ahead and you're only paying 5%... it did the job of revenue for you. Things like
replacement of worn out pipes or depreciation were more capital orientated.., which
is nonsense, like maintaining a car on the road and adding on to the borrowing you
needed to buy the car.
7.5.3 privatisation debate
At the time Ian Gow proposed to privatise the industry John Bellak was enthusiastic:
Where I differed from my colleagues at that time, nine out of the ten felt it should be
done precisely as it was then structured. And I being perhaps a trWe political felt that
would never get past both houses of parliament. Other organisational members with
life-long careers in the industry did not share the Chairman's enthusiasm and one
former Divisional Manager echoed most concerns at the time when he spoke out
against it as president of the Water Pollution Controllers Institution: I really couldn't
see the point of it. And I really did feel that quality would be subordinated to profit.
And that would affect the quality of our work...In fact that hasn't happened, I was
wrong, because I really did feel at the time that everybody in the business would be
hammered to produce more profit. And that would inevitably affect the day to day
Chapter 7: Severn Trent Water Page 350
decisions, even at ground level, trench digging. Amongst the more enthusiastic at HQ
there was anxiety about what the process involved as well as concern for the
implications for a public service. Many were: Terrified by all that went with the
preparation of the short form and long form reports, and the huge amount of
verfi cation that had to go on. But conceptually the thing had been talked about and
debated. So we were all attuned to the possibility and understood a lot of the
arguments... a little bit of concern.. .perhaps putting a public service at risk (Director
of Services).
7.5.4 regulation and RWQ
The 1985 DoE RWQ Survey showed 3 percent of river length changing class
positively. However, performance in achieving RWQOs took a downturn during the
mid-80s. For instance, class 4 remained static against an anticipated decrease, class 3
increased against an expected decrease, class 2 remained static while classes 1 A and B
declined significantly against projected increases (Severn Trent Water Authority,
1975/76-83/84): And it precipitated quite large debates both nationally and locally on
government funding and what was to blame. And it was projected at the time that this
was a temporary blip and the investment was in place in fact... We're in a longer term
industry and you just can't turn it on and off like that. It was quite a traumatic time in
terms of quality (Quality Assurance Manager).
STWA reports and accounts also show a marked increase in pollution incidences in
the mid-80s. There were various explanations to account for this. The first was that at
the time they seemed like a collection of isolated incidences and it was only with
hindsight that one got a true perspective of the trends:...part of the problem is of
course that information came in, you were looking at it with a two year time lag as
well (MD). The Director of Environmental Affairs explained that there were not such
sophisticated means of gathering information at that time. Also, agriculture and
industry were seen to be at fault, which he attributed to the economic situation at the
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time: If you are in business and the business environment becomes dicey in terms of
turnover and profit, what do you try to do? Another common perception was that
STWA were getting better at detecting pollution incidences: We took the view that it
didn't always pay to prosecute. ... We did try to bring as much pressure to bear as we
could. We certainly didn't turn a blind eye (MD).
The former PC Officers interviewed did not attribute the downturn in RWQOs to
pollution incidences: It is all down, 80 to 85% of river quality in our region is the
impact of sewage. This was squarely attributed to financial constraints on the
authority: Things like saving revenue costs by reducing retention times and aeration
times...but it was all set against the background of what was going on in the country.
When the government told us to cut capital expenditure... it was the very big RQO
strategies that just got dropped off the end...in the 5th year. When PC Officers got
together they used to exchange stories about samples being removed from the register
because they were unsatisfactory: Some of them were very poor at it. Samples used to
get lost, or removed or deleted. One Senior PC Officer at the time agrees information
was an issue in detection: It wasn't until you got 2 or 3 years into it and then you sat
down at the end of 3 years and you really looked at the data you actually perceived
there was something going wrong.. .It was so progressive and cancerous that nobody
really cottoned on for a bit.
The authority was now becoming careless due to transferring costs from revenue to
capital. The increase in capital demands meant things like maintenance became a
capital issue. As the Director of Operations at the time explained: So that was one of
the things divisions started to play rather well... There was greater pressure on the
capital resources... On the whole, I don't think we did a very good job at that time. I
think we could have done a lot better f we got government to recognise better
management, better maintenance and more stringent resolution standards. One of the
things which STWA cut back on was sewerage: There were pipes in the road, these
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were things that had been put in donkeys years ago and some were in a state of
hopeless collapse literally, structural collapse (former Director of Operations). This,
he explained, had implications for the maintenance of storm overflows and hence the
quality of the water which then ran into streams: That was all academic at that time.
So f all you did was reduce your expenditure on maintenance of sewers, rather more
came over the storm overflows at places you didn't want it.
COPA II
The introduction of COPA II in 1985 meant a great emphasis on getting works to
comply with their consents. PC officers felt COPA II had an adverse effect on
performance related consents although it made the organisation aware of standards:
All that tended to focus people's attentiOn and get reporting procedures meshed in
together (Senior PC Officer). Having been set at their current performance, if the
works didn't comply, there were two options: either to spend money, or move the
consent. If it were deemed that the resetting would not adversely affect river quality,
then money could be reallocated to achieving tighter standards at other works where
river quality would benefit and the RQO might have been achieved. The Principal
Scientific Advisor believes STWA did it in an extremely correct way. He cites the
example of works which might be performing to a tighter standard than was required
to meet the RQO and in setting them to the capability of the works, the COPA review
established unnecessarily tight standards. In some instances works started to fail after
a few years because they were then not allowed to review their consents: . . .because of
HMIP's attitude we were then locked into investing at keeping that, really arbitrary,
initial standard. Thus COPA came with a mixed blessing: I think in the pollution
control area from 85, compliance with the consent then in place assumed a major
priority, a major importance. Whether it was an appropriate consent or not (Principal
Scientific Advisor).
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The prior cost cutting measures had to be readdressed eventually as one former PC
Officer recalled: They suddenly realised they'd made a bit of a mess of it...And they
started reinstalling parts of the treatment plant which they'd knocked out. And really,
it was just bringing it back to where it was before. Idon't particularly blame Severn
Trent anymore than I blame Anglian WA or any others. It was just a cost cutting
exercise. And you couldn't do anything about it. He conceded that those working in
pollution control had high expectations about what the authority could achieve:
Pollution control people wanted I suppose, their cake and eat it because f we saw a
sewage works was capable of producing twice as good a quality effluent we wanted
twice as good a quality effluent even though perhaps the river didn't necessarily need
it that much. And similarly on the issue of consent limits, they always tended to treat
those as an absolute standard. This was in contrast to effluent quality planners who
saw it as highly variable and subject to a lot of extraneous factors apart from sewage.
PC took this stance also because of the public register: It was this panic that they were
going to prosecute. Environmentalism also had an impact in the mid 80s with a great
input by pressure groups such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. The
environmentalist cause was also helped by the public register which now became, in
the words of a .former PC Officer: A wonderful private service to them of taking
samples and analysing them at great expense and giving them the information for
nothing.
The downturn in achieving RWQOs during commercialisation was slow to be realised
because of the gradual nature of the decline and lack of sophisticated data gathering
techniques, but also due to a lack of willingness to believe that it was permanent: I
think we generally did regard it as a sort of fairly temporary hiccup. When we knew
there wasn't room for much expenditure. And I suppose we didn't know how long it
would last (Principal Scientific Advisor). Also, given the post-war investment in
sewage treatment which had made major improvements to river water quality;
subsequent improvements were always going to be more incremental. As the NRA
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Manager for Severn Trent explained: The next step was always going to be more
difficult - to go from that point to what was then the long te rm objectives. 1 think it
wasn't quite appreciated that it would be difficult when they were originally set... Then
the restrictions came in on capital expenditure. Schemes that were put into the
corporate plan were never implemented...And then in the end that had a cumulative
effect and RWQ started to deteriorate...
7.6 Recreation: Privatisation 1987-89
Preparation for privatisation began in 1987 and largely involved considerations of
finance: The privatisation process was very drawn out and involved us in ensuring
there was going to be adequate finance available, after privatisation to fully finance
all the capital investment that was necessary (MD). This exercise made the company
realise that during the period of tight monetary constraints they had squeezed the
capital investment and operating costs below the long term sustainable level and
certainly below the level that was necessary to meet standards in Europe.
The process of-preparation was considered a hugely complex process and involved
discovering new requirements with increasing momentum: .. .first of all by the week,
then by the day, then by the hour, then by the'minute in the period over the last 12
months, leading up to the final spitting on the hand and shaking of the agreement with
government as to what our financing would be (Director of Environmental Affairs). A
fortune had to be spent on meeting all the standards of sewage works, driven by
OFWAT requirements. There were levels of service targets to meet and detailed
analysis was carried out of all assets.
7.6.1 management
Rod Paul was appointed CEO in February 1988 with nine months to go before
privatisation. His impression on arrival was of a dedicated but closed management
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team: There's afunny sort of culture of patting you on the head in this organisation.
When I arrived, the existing duopoly of power, Frank Earnshaw and Cohn
MacMillan, suggested that for the next 6 months, they'd run the business and I would
just learn. Needless to say the offer was declined. He found that unless he insisted on
knowing the details of the decision making the information would be withheld. This
was particularly so for big operations decisions like those involved in building
Carsington dam. The previous CEO hadn't requested such information and it was a
change for directors to have to explain their reasoning to Rod Paul. For the operations
directorate in particular, that was a cultural change they had to understand.
However, he was to find that both the directors of finance and of operations were key
individuals within the organisation and vital in preparing the company for
privatisation given their intimate knowledge of the workings of the company: I think
we probably had one of the best teams in the ten companies. The Chairman's political
contacts, particularly with Nicholas Ridley, were also helpful during this period, as he
confirmed: I think during the privatisation period Nick knew that I was supporting his
principles and therefore he was prepared to listen if! had a particular point to make.
7.6.2 culture
The culture of the organisation, even at this late stage, still retained many elements of
the public health ideology identified in chapter 6. For instance, a very big part of the
organisation was an intellectual approach to all decision making. It was cumbersome
with much time spent evaluating all the possibilities which had to be changed fast:
we started to call it fast track, or standardisation and (there were) all sorts of things
to get over it. So it's a big cultural change from that point of view. There was a
tremendous inability to delegate which the new CEO took in hand early on: As far as I
was concerned I don't want a committee decision, I want a name. And so we had to go
in for a delegation instrument, showing at what levels we could make these
decisions... That's changed a lot now. That culture is still partly there but these things
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die very hard. Another issue was the feeling of a fairly wide democracy in the
organisation with a lack of compartmentalisation of activities and no team working.
This did not become a feature at headquarters until after privatisation: The big change
caine really with the end of that generation...and a new team led by Roderick Paul
coming in from the outside, and progressively new directors coming in and a new
culture (Deputy MD).
The period up to flotation was quite short to deliver all that the organisation needed to
enter the private sector. The constant changes during the l9Os meant people began to
adopt a mentality of always talking about the next development change There was
this open discussion about what might happen next. It was very disturbing for the
people in the organisation. There was one more change made after Rod Paul arrived
which rationalised the regional structure further, and it was then announced there
would be no more changes for at least five years.
7.6.3 finance
As the level of capital investment in the mid-80s was not going to meet the EC
directives an important exercise undertaken by the finance director was to identify all
the stakeholders relevant to their company in the private sector. The Finance Director
now began to approach the external financing limit (EFL) from the perspective of
performance aims: One of the things that I think that! can claim having introduced,
which Vic took up with government, is that an acceptable level of service is usually
seen as a subjective judgement... What isn't subjective is what is unacceptable...So all
our capital schemes had indicators which began to drive the expenditure to reflect the
elimination of something which was unacceptable. And it was moving, and Severn
Trent was the forerunner of that, it underpins a lot of Ian Byatt's thinking today.
In devising their asset management plans (AMP 1) one of the main strategies of ST
was to get as much as they could in the first five year capital programme so that they
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didn't have as much to negotiate in the next five years. The then Director of
Operations was daunted by the task: I well remember at the time arguing that we
couldn't expand fast enough to carry out the plan that we'd done. The capital
programme was being completely reshaped by the now Director of Environmental
Affairs: I was going out from the centre, particularly on sewage works, effluent
compliance issues... at HQ we understood the priorities that were building... Because
we couldn't actually form a private company that was breaking the law... For people
out in the operating divisions this was a change which was difficult to understand,
even after managers had seen the strategy: .. . because there was a credibility gap
between the thinking and the thrust at HQ and the divisions. This was an example of
the tenacity of the PH ideology. One particular change which was emphasised within
the organisation was the fact that in the public sector, directors lived in a risk-free
environment. For instance when Carsington reservoir fell down the Finance Director
wrote off 30 million pounds in the accounts .: If I'd been in a plc a) I'd have lost my job
and b) the company's shares would have plummeted. And the Chairman would have
gone.
7.6.4 regulation and RWQ
Privatisation had quite a startling effect on people in terms of regulation with the
realisation that the organisation were doing things that were illegal. STWA had to
achieve 100% compliance by privatisation or seek dispensation for works: ... there was
a considerable amount of stress with this in the organisation. But it focused people on
what needed to be done, not a series of tasks that may or may not achieve the output
(Rod Paul).
No one could tell the CEO how many of the sewage works were meeting their legal
consents or what the legal consents were. Then, just when they thought they had
established them, the Director of Operations dropped a bombshell (often recounted)
by revealing there were volume consents as well: Prior to that nobody bothered about
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volume consents, it was just figures in a book (former Director of Operations). These
volume consents had originally been set by Fred Lester and his team, who had
ambitions to get all river quality to a standard like their previous success with the
Tame in the RA days. The complexity of the consent system had meant that even long
serving members of the organisation were not familiar with the extent of them, as the
Director of Planning revealed: I didn't appreciate until about a year before
privatisation... that basically every one of our sewage works consents not only had
quality parameters... it was also volume related...Somewhere approaching a half of
our larger works were actually exceeding the volume. So on a constant load basis the
quality parameters should have been tighter to compensate for the higher volume.
We're only just about working our way through that. The volume issue was as much
about lack of finance as a pragmatic problem, to do with the device required to
measure the volume. This interfered with the natural effect of gravity being relied
upon to push the sewage through the system and necessitated pumping costs.
With only six months to go before privatisation, STWA adopted a policy of no
recriminations to achieve consent compliance. As Rod Paul explained: ... if there was
something wrong just bring out your dead...I said "up to privatisation all sins are
free, let's know about them and handle them"...So I said to Frank "there's nothing fair
about this but any sewage works supervisor whose area of responsibility it might
be... that meets their consents in the financial year will get a bonus of a thousand
pounds. If they don't, he won't." Other WAs did not have these volume consents and
so the pressure on STWA to comply in the run-up to privatisation was great: We
thought we'd inherited a real bag of worms with this, because we suddenly were faced
with having to meet standards which previously had been treated as academic
(Director of Operations).
Despite being considered very unfair, a great many works started to meet their
consents. Most of the operatives had known some part of the consents of their works,
Chapter 7: Severn Trent Water Page 359
others didn't and very few knew whether they were actually meeting it. The effect of
the new policy was swift: As soon as the manager was on a bonus, they all knew, in
fact it actually almost became an item of stress in the organisation (Rod Paul). People
knew that when a works failed it came to the CEO's desk. Various tactics were used
by operators at this time to keep works within consent and save money, for instance
using an onion bag from the greengrocers to act as a filter when the works were
blocked. Similarly when an arm failed because of a faulty driver, an electric motor
was bolted on the outside and held by a big elastic band. In Rod Paul's words:
Anything to make it go even though the money needed spending. It's got to work.
Don't bring me any excuses...
The COPA program which ran from 1987 included some RQ improvements but
mainly schemes at a lot of works to achieve compliance. This brought with it the usual
doubts about best use of capital and the senior Effluent Quality Planner stated that a
better investment could have been made in targeting works which might achieve RQ
objectives. A similar view was expressed by one former PC Officer that compliance
with consents didn't necessarily bring about improvements in RWQ: Apart from the
fact that you then start to comply. And it looks good. RWQ was a great matter of
concern at all levels of the organisation, particularly in terms of the new commercial
ethos: That was one of the measurable outputs that was understood (Rod Paul). The
outcome of having to achieve such high standards meant STWA had them ifl place
ahead of the other utilities, as the former Director of Operations explained: Yorkshire
for example were much more relaxed in terms of dye stuffs. But in point offact it's
turned out to ST'S advantage because they've now done most of the work, or basic
work. Whereas others are still doing it. And (with) the present game of regulation, I
think their shareholders are going to suffer as a consequence.
The CEO did not agree with the independence of the WQ Panel because he felt it
confused the responsibility of management and the Board to have an advisory body
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telling the organisation what to do. He felt that all recommendations for quality should
have come to the Board: So it was about bringing it back into the overall management
organisation. This involved clearly telling the panel that responsibility lay with
management for investment decisions:...and that was threatening the power of the
MAFF representatives in particular, on that point. (They were) two of our directors
incidentally.
NRA unit established
STWA set up an NRA unit in 1987 to prepare for the experience of working with the
new regulator: We did it before anyone else did...because we felt we had to learn how
to live with it while it was still within the organisation then we could sort of manage
the boundaries of it (Rod Paul). Initially there was a degree of tension engendered by
the split, as one former PC Officer recalled: Relationships as a whole cooled very
rapidly to begin with. I think the water company were concerned that straight away
we were going to start to pillory them. This led to a degree of defensive behaviour:
There were all sorts of things said like "the people who can't make it in the privatised
company will be the ones who" you know... For the NRA's part, they were annoyed
about the 12 month amnesty given to the utilities before they had to comply. With
hindsight the Finance Director saw extreme attitudes on both sides: We tended to get
preached at a little bit because they still expected us to play a minor role in the
partnership... On the pollution control side there were people who suddenly had the
freedom...and thought they'd get their own back...generally I don't think there was a
problem.
In many respects this alternative public sector organisation was seen as a help to
absorb all those staff who didn't want to work in the private sector. This was as true of
pollution control as land drainage and planning resources people who hailed originally
from the old RAs: There were some individuals in the organisation who all the way
through the 70s and 80s, put their prayer mats out every night and hoped that the
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river authorities would be reestablished. So when the NRA came along they just felt
they were back in the environment that they wanted to be which was a confrontational
one.. .And so for them the cultural change was a relaxation into a previous life
(Director of Environmental Affairs).
7.6.7 summary of regulation in the public sector
The advantage of IRBM according to Fred Lester was that there would be input into
the needs of the river at the planning stage. But this input could always be deferred
due to other priorities: So you can't always in IRBM arrive at the best decisions so far
as the quality of water is concerned on the river...I think it was a phase that was
probably worth going through. Self-regulation was seen to encourage underhand
practices and there is the strong belief that the public sector has always got an excuse
for its mistakes. As the former Finance Director noted of divisional practices: We
always achieved river quality because we took the samples at the right time. In
contrast, the private sector has the advantage of an independent regulator to measure
levels of service to protect the customer: As John Bellak said frequently, "you never
find a private sector company breaking the law, they don't, cause they can't. And
public sector have always got reasons why they do. And they do." (former Finance
Director).
7.7 Convergence: The Private Sector 1990-94
The issues have changed since privatisation, previously finance was a priority and
quality was 4th or 5th. Now quality is ranked alongside finance: One follows the other
whereas before it was standards following finance (Head of Quality and
Environmental Services). Severn Trent in the private sector is increasingly focused on
outputs: customer service, quality and the intermediate outputs around the quality of
business processes which drives efficiency: Still controlling the operating costs,
looking to grow the income line...and for that we're one of the first companies to
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employ a director of marketing (Director of Finance). Capital investment is now made
on a long term basis with the aim of a return within a good timescale of planning. The
change strategies implemented by the company since 1989 have had a considerable
impact: They are having infinitely more effect on the company than privatisation as a
process (Director of Services). Also many interviewees noted that customer
perceptions were seen to change over night and expectations grew because they were
in the private sector, along with the shock at the scale of profits.
7.7.1 policy
Severn Trent have a vision statement which gives their aims as care for customers,
shareholders, employees and the environment. Before privatisation the organisation
treated customers as consumers:.. .because we knew best if you like. Although the
emphasis on being guardians of public health has not changed...It's historical and I
guess it will continue within the ethos of the company (Director of Environmental
Affairs). The perceived negative reaction of customers to privatisation led Vic Cocker
to position the company as a customer service organisation: We've just about realised
that we are a customer service business.., they may not have a choice but they do have
a voice. And it's up to us to deliver (Director of Services). Added to this is an
environmental slant, the responsibility of the Director of Environmental Affairs who
is responsible for the group environmental policy and meets environmental pressure
groups locally: Nationally pressure groups run campaigns. They usually run them on
misrepresentation of the data that we provide them with... This is the reality of the
framework that we live with. Being an environmental business has meant retaining a
sense of proportion with the entrepreneurial ethos: I always say to people don 'tforget
we ask people to drink our product... we're not in a risk business. And we don't want to
employ entrepreneurial wild people who are taking risks... Our business is a major
environmental business and you're in the business of being safe (Rod Paul).
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Essentially although perceived as an environmental business, it is customer driven:
it's all about delivering the right quality product (Head of Quality and Environmental
Services). The company has met all its obligations agreed with government in 1989
and have delivered improvements in customer service as measured by the DG. The
customer focus has also spilled over into notions of competition: Competition for the
hearts and minds of customers I think is more important to us. Getting them on our
side...all 8 million of them (Finance Director). The customer service focus is also
evident in executive responsibilities and titles within ST. Whereas prior to
privatisation it was assumed the customers took operations for granted, now in order
to emphasise their customer service orientation, the Director of Operations (also
Deputy MD), has the title of Director of Customer Service. In this way, billing was
also brought into operations to close what was seen as a gap in the organisation.
Just prior to flotation, ST created a Quality Assurance department on the basis that
quality was going to be a key issue: So my department was created to ensure the
company had afocus on quality and never lost it. And I'm independent of the
operational departments of the company (Quality Assurance Manager). ST have
thereby created their own internal regulator, in this case responsible for drinking water
quality. The company is now developing a total quality ethic, such that, given the high
levels of standards compliance they are now focusing much more on the failures. This
has resulted in a progression from managing the conformance with standards to that of
business process quality, focused on delivering better customer service. As the MD
elaborated: And we are, 1 believe as an organisation, now transforming ourselves to
be a much better utility. And one in whom the customers can trust... We call it in our
organisation "working for quality". That's our brand name.
The MD is very insistent that the company works harmoniously with its regulators:
We've always taken the view that regulation is a necessary requirement of being a
monopoly business. That it is important to have positive relationships with regulators.
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He feels that while the influence of the regulators is generally positive he is critical of
the collective pressure applied by the NRA and DWI to drive up customer bills: There
is still a tendency for individual regulators to be concerned about the particular
pressure groups they face, without recognising that we have become a customer
service business. However, despite the general feeling within the industry that the
amount of regulation is too overbearing: I still think it is a price worth paying for the
freedoms that we have... (MD).
7.7.2 management and personnel
The former divisional structure had power because management neither had control
nor the parameters within which to guide action. The staff are now empowered within
specific parameters and therefore more easily managed. The organisation is also much
more cohesive due to the restructuring which separated out the support functions from
divisions. There are now systematic management practices operating from coherent
sets of rules and aimed at producing more standardised approaches with clearer roles
and responsibilities.
The five year plans indicate the outputs to achieve within the organisation, including
regulation requirements and growth targets driven by dividend needs. Managers are
given targets and their pay, including that of the Director of Customer Service, relates
to achievement. Bonus schemes and performance related pay, even at the lowest
levels, have been locked into achieving compliance and critical success factors. The
Director of Customer Service explained: We have carried that right down to the chap
who is operating the works. And a proportion of his pay now is related to outputs of
that water treatment works. Tolerances are predetermined and 10% of basic pay is
related to those outputs. They have identified 20 or 30 parameters on the craft process
side for the different activities which measure quality delivery. This is now being
carried over to the non-manual staff side, initially on measures of team performance.
There are already in place self-imposed and regulatory imposed parameters,
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guaranteed standards such as responding to customer enquiries within a pre-
determined number of days. Ultimately ST are building up a measurement hierarchy
to determine how these will be achieved: Every individual will know what their job is,
what the skills are that they are expected to have...So (it is) quite a fascinating move
and it has not been easy, it's taken about 12 months longer than we thought it would
(Director of Services).
ST claim to be ahead of any other company in the area of performance related pay
which took 2 years to negotiate with the unions: The trade unions were against
peiformance related pay and the culture of public sector unions in the organisation
was very strong, it isn't now (Rod Paul). The prevalent belief is that policy goals are
attained only through their people. So people have to be given the training and
development to be "empowered", and as the Quality Assurance Manager explained: I
think the customer gets a better service.
This positive view is countered by the perceptions of the former Director of
Operations who does not believe in an organisation-wide commercial ethos: You will
find a lot of people haven't changed they are still doing ajob...sometimes with a lot of
gloss on it. A lot ofpeople now have recognised their role is to make a profit... and
they are commercially orientated but for every one of these there must be five others
that are content to do the job they did previously. A major concern of employees is the
reduction in staffing which continues to decline: So although we've managed the
numbers down, right sized as opposed to downsized, it's been done in afairly humane
and caring sort of way which we do say in our visions is one of the things that we aim
to do (Director of Services).
7.7.3 finance
The whole process of capital investment has been radically changed and the Head of
Quality and Environmental Services admits to surprise at their own achievements:
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When we jacked foreign investment from £250 million to £600 million I don't think
anybody actually conceived that could be done as quickly as it did. This was achieved
by having a professional management investment system in place. Capital appraisal
schemes are radically streamlined by a screening committee who approve most
schemes apart from the big projects which go to the Board. The focus on investment
has changed from how to make the money go round to how to ensure that outputs are
achieved out of the money allocated: The other thing which came with a great bang
was depreciation... which starts to make quite a djfference in terms of balance sheets
and accounts. So the type of development started to become important in the sense it
had a depreciation value (former Director of Finance). In the early days with the
highly ambitious investment programme the concern was with ensuring the money
was spent. Now this has changed to a focus on income, income generation and income
recovery.
The response to ST's first announcement of £200 million pounds profit brought
adverse reaction from the public, despite it being a surplus which had to be put back
into the business, as the then Director of Operations explained: This was a simple
change from surplus to profit. So we became aware of the sensitivities... When we
announce the profits we are going to have to be very careful to satisfy the shareholder
and the consumer... it's a delicate balance. The other dramatic change was that for the
first time ever, people in the organisation realised they had to make a profit. Under the
Treasury accounting system capital was free and operators became good at controlling
operating costs because their bonus depended upon it. Now organisational members
have to get used to being judged by achieving the required outputs within budget and
take into consideration the cost of capital when deciding upon operating solutions.
The only difference from any other private sector company now, is that capital
expenditure is not so much profit related as related to quality objectives which are
paramount in order to retain the company's license. There are relatively few quality
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objectives which have a straight forward profit and loss calculation attached to them,
although the principle is the same.
7.7.4 future of the business
The business has been growing initially from quality, mainly improving assets and
productivity which will flatten off. Indeed, it is already tapering off in terms of
growth. This leaves ST with more skills available to use in related activities. Having
considerable skills as an operator, the company is looking for opportunities to run
other municipal facilities as a contractor, in Europe and more significantly, North
America.
The diversification strategies have been less easy to assess in terms of company
benefits and are not the utility's responsibility. The company has tended to acquire
relatively small technology companies relevant to the water industry, in the hope of
transplanting new technologies into the organisation. But there have been problems in
getting the core business to recognise and live alongside a commercial enterprise, as
the former Director of Operations found with the first acquisitions he managed:...they
were highly suspicious. The core business found it difficult to reconcile that people in
the commercial sector are in a risk situation and are compensated accordingly and
have different views about pushing their product. This didn't work out as well as he
had hoped. The difficulty for the core has been living with this relationship.
7.7.5 regulation and RWQ
The company has now developed a highly refined knowledge of all its assets. They
have completed computer systems of all their consents, 5 to 6,000 of them. For
example, for each works there is a plan in the database showing the current consent,
load growth, the likely future consent, quality achievements, other regulatory drivers,
the costs of moving from where they are now to further improvements and the
timescales. The Head of Quality and Environmental services described the results: So
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I can now give you works by works, the cumulative cost of every bit of the waste water
directive. Such sophisticated information systems allow for efficiency planning which
has become part of the management culture. Today ST meet 99.7% of consents on
over a thousand works, as the Director of Customer Services explained: I think as of
today we've got 6 minor works that haven't met those standards over a 12 month
period. That's the sort of margins we are working at...Achieving that degree of
compliance with standards is about managing your people, managing your plants,
managing the investment...
RWQ peiforinance
The 1990 NRA river quality report based on triennial averages demonstrated a net 1%
improvement in the length of rivers changing class between 1985 and 90. This was
compared to a 3% improvement for 1980-85 indicating a slowing of that trend. The
improvements that there were are attributed to improvements in sewage treatment
between 1985 and 90. The report highlights that since the 1985 survey the rivers were
remeasured and the total length reported increased by 570 km. The changes are
therefore a retrospective correction of the 1985 survey. The length of class 3 river was
underestimated in 1985 and about 170 km of the new extra length improved in quality
from class 3. If the old incorrect, lengths had been retained in the 1985 and 1990
surveys, the 1% net improvement would be transformed into a 2% net deterioration
(National Rivers Authority, 1991a).
This report showed the worst period when ST were only beginning to spend the
capital on quality improvements, particularly on effluent, as the Director of
Environmental Affairs explained: At one stage we had a program of45O million of
expenditure. It was not being seen in the 1990 review. When the next one is done in
1995 it should show. Currently the NRA are changing the classification system which
may have a significant effect on river quality, as the Director of Environmental Affairs
explained:...you have only got to have a marginal change at afew very large works,
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on effluent quality, for it to have a material effect on a big chunk of river. ST will be
dealing with the RQOs set in 1979 until the next century. There was an initial horizon
of 15 to 25 years, but some of them may never be economic to achieve being a case of
diminishing returns. The attitude within ST is exemplified by the Director of Finance:
Why should we have to spend 2 billion pounds over the next 5 years on further
marginal increases in our standards when quite a lot of our customers are not
interested? Because you can't see RWQ.
regulation
The new approach to regulation is to make personnel at all levels responsible for
quality in the same way they are responsible for customer service. The Chairman
compared this with the approach in the public sector: The danger of the old system
was the quality committee and the quality operators thought themselves somehow
separate from operations. Now one can see why they got there and the fundamental
motivation which is an audit motive is an important one but you allow them to lose
responsibility. Most districts have liaison meetings with the local NRA on day-to-day
issues while planning for future improvements is conducted at HQ.
The company has reached an understanding with the NRA as to what they are
delivering and a clearer picture will emerge after 1995. The goal is to agree a
spreadsheet of standards for all works which will provide a planning base into the year
2000. One area of conflict between ST and the NRA concerns the focus of ST's
investment programme. In 1987 a reclamation strategy was developed which became
the basis of their privatisation and concentrated on asset renewal work. This type of
output does not provide the NRA with anything measurable and they are often not in
agreement about the choice of works under renewal, particularly when they do not
achieve the RQOs the NRA regards as a priority. Another area of conflict is over the
setting of consents to minor water courses: There it comes down to very much
personal opinion as to what is an appropriate limit... The issue is, is this particular
Chapter 7: Severn Trent Water Page 370
ditch... worth the money? On those Sort of occasions you get a tremendous divergence
of views as to what is appropriate (Principal Scientific Advisor). One tactic ST uses
to negotiate with the NRA is not to argue the case of individual works, over which
very pure views can be taken. They have found that a more powerful argument is to
look at all the works together and involve the NRA in prioritising.
The NRA have four regional areas within ST which they have noted the company
playing off one against the other and applying political pressure when they attempt to
formulate a prosecution. However the regional Quality Manager feels relations at his
level are quite good: When it's come to the cost of quality programme ST seem to be
quite keen to include RWQ improvements in their future programs... They want to
achieve everything that we want them to achieve, perhaps in a slightly longer time
scale.
The economic issue is the key ultimately, with decisions having to be made as to
whether the highest standards are worth the extra capital. It is essentially a question of
balance, according to the Director of Environmental Affairs: ...between two sorts of
customers, the ones who are paying and the ones who are trying to drive the
standards up, the NRA. There are tensions between the regulatory bodies due to the
different customer requirements. ST's market plan showed customers were keen on
certain standards like drinking water quality but not on spending money on the EC
wastewater directive. The ultimate tension is between ST and OFWAT when it comes
to negotiating the price for achieving quality standards. The DG will be making
inroads into profitability by demanding efficiency improvements as well as changing
the financial ratios upon which the company was set up. But these tensions are viewed
positively by the Director of Environmental Affairs: . . .out of that ought to come hard
justfl cation for improvement from the regulator on the quality side, and a hard
commercial approach from us, as to how we are going to fulfil these requirements,
keep our customers happy and do it for slightly less than the Director General has let
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us have so we can make an honest buck. So the tensions can be constructive. When
they become destructive is when one of the regulators tries to secure the moral high
ground of the general public and blackmail the others.
The availability of capital has been the key to unlocking quality improvements as well
as the freedom to decide within certain parameters how this might be achieved. The
NRA can prescribe standards for works which is the company's responsibility to then
build and maintain. But there is also an acceptance of responsibility by the regulator:
The minute he starts to prescribe the plant to put in, he accepts responsibility for it
performing (Director of Environmental Affairs).
As a private sector organisation with an emphasis on costs, a moral dilemma is posed
by the issue of running works consents at a higher than necessary standard because of
concern for the river: Whilst before the general culture was to get the best possible
effluent into the river. The fact that you weren't paid for £30,000 worth of cost by
achieving better than standard was irrelevant, it isn't any longer (Rod Paul). If an
operator sets the standard at higher than the company is being paid for, the regulator
can come and tighten the works to that standard and the company will never be paid
for it, as Rod Paul explained: Now your operating costs are pegged at that level, then
you haven't got any option but to live with them.
Pollution is not now the company's prime responsibility but they have a direct interest
in promoting pollution control to protect their drinking water catchments. One of the
things being done to promote awareness has been a big campaign on pesticide
pollution of drinking water sources. The Head of Quality and Environmental Affairs
explained the reasoning:...because it directly affects our bottom line. If we can get it
down we don't have to treat the things and we save money. So the incentive to be
green is both social and economic. This stance is viewed as the organisation's coming
of maturity as well as public positioning: We're trying to position ourselves as a
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professional cost effective organisation which provides an environmental service to
the community. They are clear that their position is not to set standards but they do
have a view on the standards which are practically achievable: The costs should be
proportionate in the sense that their not diminishing the benefits (Head of Quality
and Environmental Affairs).
In terms of comparative competition, ST rate themselves equal on drinking water
quality alongside other companies which is a fairly even playing field. But in terms of
quality achieved against current standards, they are in the top 2 or 3 and in terms of
price of the product to the customer, the bottom one or two. ST has a high opinion of
its compliance with consents but feels that it has unfair competition in that it has many
higher standards to conform with than other companies. Their Business Planning
Manager explained: For example Oxford. is a big car manufacturing town, the sewage
works there has no metal consents. Whereas, virtually everyone of ours... in the metal
bashing towns... have those consents. This is partly attributed to the different policies
within the NRA regions. Another related issue is the potential loss of trade effluent
income from industry who can threaten to move to another water company area where
standards are lower.
Severn Trent's Environmental Director summarised the feeling of the organisation
towards regulation in the private sector: But the regulation is the key isn't it? I think
that we've now got it the right way round. it's far better to have an independent body.
than all this fuzziness round the edges... And we are essentially environmental
contractors as far as the NRA are concerned. Prior to privatisation quality was not a
central issue because the organisation was a hybrid and those who acted as the
regulators took quality as their priority. So it remained an important adjunct but not a
central focus. It was part of the big master plan for integrated planning which was
necessary at the time. As the company prepared for privatisation quality became a
central issue, alongside cost and most recently customer service, making three focal
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planks: So we have got to continually drive down the costs, continue to drive up
customer service and meet the right level of standards provided they don't infinitely
carry on improving quality... You hit whatever highest standard is appropriate and
then you stick at that (Quality Planning Manager).
7.8 Conclusion
A pattern of organisational development can be discerned within Severn Trent
whereby each period of convergence attempts to fulfil the goals of the preceding
change period. Thus the integration phase was attempting to standardise working
practices. When this was frustrated by the politics of decentralisation, the changes
brought by the MIvIC during nationalisation set in motion a centralisation process
during a period of commercialisation. It was not until a private sector ethos was
adopted throughout the organisation that it could once again embark upon a process of
decentralisation. Organisational members, past and present, have shown a high degree
of self consciousness about the developmental phases and there is a general feeling
that these were necessary shifts in development in order to move from a public sector
organisation to a private one: When I think of some of the working practices and
things we had it's just amazing, we're a different world now... We're not just four years
down the road, we're 400 years in my view (Quality Assurance Manager).
The pace and rate of improvements in RWQ have been influenced by the history and
geographical location of the Severn Trent region. The unfavourable confluence of
geography and manufacturing created heavily polluted rivers which had received
positive attention prior to the formation of STWA. The personnel responsible for river
improvements were absorbed by the new organisation and they placed a high priority
on improving the very poor sewage works inheritance. In addition, being the only
inland authority in the country, STWA had from its earliest beginnings a history of
attention to river pollution and sewage treatment. It was the economic pressures
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during the last years of integration which slowed the pace of change. These pressures
also served to heighten the different views of the regulators and operations personnel,
as articulated by the Principal Scientific Advisor who took the utility standpoint in his
view of developments: I think some of the people who had been involved in the 50s
and 60s were perhaps a bit frustrated because they felt the pace of improvement had
slackened. But, I think that's almost inevitable... You start having to look fairly
carefully at what further investment can be justified. As quality became overshadowed
by financial considerations into the 1980s, so did the attitudes of regulation and
operations become more entrenched, enhanced by internal structural changes. The
politics of the organisation at this time also undermined the quality issue and
marginalised it on the strategic agenda. With the advent of privatisation RWQ gained
in ascendancy as the organisation became concerned with abiding by the law. Within
the private sector RWQ has gained respectability as one of the three focal issues of the
organisation although performance continues to be subject to financial considerations.
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8. THAMES WATER
I dined at my Lord Keepers who treated me with extraordinary kindnesse, setting me the very next to him, and after dinner
carrying me into his Withdrawing roome, we discoursed together of divers Philosophical subjects, as the Nature of Water,
especialy, that of Thames, That onely, and the water of a river neere Bantam and the East Indies being of the same nature, to
putre, and grow sweete againe, and is for all purposes the best we have in England. John Evelyn, 1683
8.1 Background
The Thames region was the one to fit the concept of integrated river basin
management most elegantly being quite simply the area drained by the river Thames
and its tributaries. The Thames has shown a significant improvement in quality
since World War II, largely due to investment carried out in the 1950s and 60s: I
don't think, to be fair, the Thames has ever been a disgrace. It was a disgrace
before the war and immediately after. But after all the improvements at Mogden and
Crossness and Beckton. . . it's never been anywhere near as bad as many other rivers
in the UK. . . That was down to the Thames Conservancy (Planning and Support
Services Manager). Improvements were largely attributed to local authority
investment, even the notoriously polluted Thames tideway had been improved by
the GLC which stood the new TWA in good stead at their formation: . . .we by and
large were inheritors of a pretty good inheritance. The Thames has always been a
pretty clean river, there has been a better control system on the Thames Valley than
there has been on a lot of Northern outfits (Deputy Chairman).
8.2 Emergence: 1973 Reorganisation
The TWA occupied a special place in the reorganisation, being the largest WA in
population and resources, it served a population of 12.1 million, about 25% of the
population of England and Wales and because it included London. It embodied old
and prestigious organisations, including the Thames Conservancy, created in 1857,
the Metropolitan Water Board, created in London in 1903 and the GLC. TWA took
over the assets, staff and responsibility of 200 bodies. It covered an area of 5,000
square miles and employed 12,000 staff: With its HQ in London, the TWA is
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bound to be the cynosure for all who may be interested in water management
throughout the world (Okun, 1977:147).
8.2.1 management
Like Severn Trent, Thames' initial start was influenced by the inherited large
monolithic bodies from which many of the elected members and staff were drawn.
The Chairman Peter Black was an engineer by training and had been a member of
the Middlesex County Council and closely associated with Mogden works,
responsible for the clean up of the Thames a decade before, as well as Chair of the
GLC committee responsible for sewerage and sewage treatment. He had been a
member of the MWB, PLA and Thames Conservancy.
The initial staff of TWA, before any permanent officers were appointed, included
six officers seconded from MWB, the Thames Conservancy, and the GLC. This
utilisation of personnel from these three massive agencies was to continue with the
selection of permanent officers. The Chief Executive and Director of Resource
Planning were from the GLC, the Director of Operations from the MWB and the
Director of Finance and Scientific Services from Thames Conservancy (Okun,
1977:149). Thus did key personnel bring with them the culture and knowledge of
the former established organisations.
TWA started with 52 members in August 1973, 36 elected members and 16 (later
increased to 22) appointed members, which operated largely through its committees
with considerable dependence on its officers. The key players in the corporate
management team were: Alex Morrison, CEO; Eric Reed, Director of Operations;
Cohn Sinnott, Director of Corporate Planning; Eric Gilliland, Director of Finance
and Hugh Fish, Director of Scientific Services. A three day retreat for the corporate
management team, divisional managers and certain committee chairmen was held in
January 1974 at Tadley Court, the administrative centre of the water supply
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industry Training Board (Okun, 1977:148). Alex Morrison described the
organisational structure of nine divisions. Considerable discussion on the
management of divisions revealed disagreements early on. Hugh Fish and Dr
Sinnott disagreed with Morrison on the lines of communication: ie whether it be
through the Director of Operations to divisions or direct to division staff in
functional areas, thus indicating at the very earliest stages the inherent tensions
between operations and the other directorates.
In the end, assistant directors were assigned to the central and western regions,
incorporating five divisions in total and they reported directly to the Director of
Operations, while the divisional managers of the 'old three' reported direct to Eric
Reed. Another assistant director of operations, charged with the responsibility for
new works, reported direct to Cohn Sinnott. This was to ensure the coordination of
the capital programme, especially that of the GLC and MWB. Of paramount
importance was the role given to divisional managers, the policy being to fill the
post with the best manager, whatever his speciality.
8.2.2 structure
The divisional structure of TWA was described as unique by the Surveyor (March
1,1974), being a combination of single function and multifunctional divisions.
Morrison outlined the disadvantages of trying to restructure the old established
bodies they had inherited: Organisations the size of the GLC and MWB have a
momentum of their own, which you disturb at your own peril. It was also felt that
the Authority must have good local management, requiring a high degree of
decentralisation and delegation: Quick response to consumer needs and an
awareness of local problems cannot be obtained through a .system of detailed
control by Regional Headquarters. They require a high degree of autonomy to be
given to Divisions and indeed to local works (Black & Morrison, 1979:1581).
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This inheritance in as much as it provided a framework for organisation also would
serve as the chief force for inertia within TWA. The London divisions were
internationally recognised in their fields, had existed for many years and were
perceived by the industry to provide a first class service. The real worry was that
these bodies had been very efficient and given the short time frame of 8 months,
change might endanger the smoothness of changeover on the 1 April. Thus the 3 old
established and largest bodies (Thames Conservancy, GLC Dept of Public Health
Engineering, and the Metropolitan Water Board) became single purpose divisions.
The Lea Conservancy, also an old established body, was somewhere in between
multifunctional becoming responsible for rivers, sewerage and sewage. The other
five districts became multifunctional and this structure was intended to be
permanent according to Morrison: What we set out to do was to set up the nine
divisions in such a form as to remain. This is not a temporary arrangement
(Surveyor, 1974a: 48). With multifunctional divisions as the ultimate objective, the
officers found no advantage in establishing temporary single-purpose divisions. The
pain of reorganisation might as well be sustained all at one time.
With the overwhelming population being within the London Metropolitan area,
location of HQ in London was virtually mandated by Parliament. Due to the high
cost of commercial space in London, TWA HQ were located at New River Head,
former HQ for MWB, an historic location making the first distribution centre for
public water supply for London, established almost 300 years earlier.
8.2.3 regulation and RWQ
The function of pollution control was seen as very important, with the Director of
Scientific Services directly responsible for this aspect of the water cycle. The
assistant director was even more so, and being concerned with nothing else he was:
the authority 's conscience and since he had no other responsibility but pollution
Chapter 8: Thames Water Page 379
control, something of a Caesar's wife... (Surveyor, 1974a: 48). His job was to give
instruction direct to divisional managers on pollution matters.
The Thames was generally in a very good condition throughout its length and
although there was room for improvement in its uppermost reaches and at its tidal
limit, it provided no problems for the abstraction of water for drinking supplies.
The tributaries, too, were of good or very good quality with further improvements
being noted in only half a dozen. In contrast to this pleasing inheritance, at least
50% of the Authority's sewage works were not achieving the statutory 80%
compliance limits.
The TWA, virtually alone amongst WAs, made a valiant attempt to inform its
public. Immediately upon its creation, it employed the services of a commercial
press information organisation, which issued frequent news releases to catch the
attention of the public.
8.3 Continuity: Integration 1974-79
Altogether the TWA fared well during the first year of reorganisation, with lower
charges and lower increases than the other authorities. The inheritance of the
soundly organised London agencies and the Thames and Lea conservancies
undoubtedly helped. Black concluded that the first year was altogether "splendid":
Despite the biggest reorganisation of the water industiy ever to take place in this
country, we have established a successful enterprise. Notwithstanding inflation, the
accounts show a modest surplus of income over expenditure (Thames Water, 1974-
75: 7).
However, TWA's management were concerned about the future of the industry on a
number of fronts. Aside from the general method of finance there was also the
desire to cooperate with colleagues in other WAs in order that the industry might
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present a united front on matters of common concern. There was also a wish to
integrate operations in order to maximise potential benefits to the public from
IRBM. This last aim was somewhat bedeviled by the difficulty in striking a
satisfactory balance between HQ control and divisional autonomy. Related to this
was the task of ensuring proper managerial delegation of responsibility, and the
production of an effective management information system.
These issues were to remain on the TWA's agenda throughout the integration
period. This period is characterised by a large and varying agenda, not surprisingly
in the first years of a new large organisation. Many are negatively categorised,
externally caused issues which impact directly upon TWA. By 1977 direct billing
had been achieved, the fmancial problems however were to prove more intractable.
Indeed the situation was worsened by the next year with the moratorium on capital
expenditure: There were big challenges for the company. There were big water
resources issues, there were pollution issues and they did not seem to interest our
masters as much as we wanted (former Chief Accountant).
8.3.1 Board
A former recruit from a local authority recalled the familiarity with which the
Board established itself along municipal lines. They set up a local authority type
committee structure with a blend of local politics and diffusion of responsibility.
The great disadvantage that TWA suffered from in that context was that it had
nothing that produced any coherence amongst the members particularly. It was just
a vast collection of individuals, some of whom had political connections. The
general impression was of a not very high calibre of Leadership: And very few of
them were what I would call leading figures... it was not exactly seen as a career
posting for a fairly ambitious localpolitician (Deputy Chairman). Members were
seen as having enthusiasm, particularly in representing their local area but few of
the management skills which such a large organisation required. A former Planning
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Manager from that time explained the implications for the executive: What
happened in practice, therefore, was that the top executive officers had a
tremendous amount of power in reality, but it was sort of split and divide issue
always. Much of the time of directors and assistant directors was spent in writing
papers for and giving presentations to the Board with little outcome: I mean half the
time they didn 't really understand what it was about (Planning & Support Services
Manager).
The Chairman Peter Black was regarded very much as a figure-head who
represented the organisation externally: A very nice man but very much conscious
that he was the external face of the organisation. Not strong on holding the thing
together internally (Deputy Chairman). This situation at Board level would leave
much of the decision-making up to the executive team.
8.3.2 executive
The officer structure reflected not a dissimilar sort of an arrangement as the Board.
There were the traditional departmental boundaries and much the same lack of
coherence at the officer level. Thames' history of good practice meant that it did not
have a lot of the problems of other WAs. Consequently a sense of inertia within
management was attributed to a lack of external pressures: There was no real sense
of direction.. .no clear view of the policies and what we were there for. Most of the
people involved had a sense that this was the biggest thing that they had ever had to
manage. . . a lot of people, a huge spread of territory, very diverse situations. . . There
was no driver for policy, it did not seem to come from anywhere and that persisted
for really quite a long time (Deputy Chairman).
The new Chief Accountant at the time recalled his experience of starting at TWA
and the slowness with which the centre established itself compared to the divisions:
The shock for me, having come from a London borough which was highly automated
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with a vast number of computers, I went out and bought myself a bloody ledger,
literally in order to get the regional accounts going... A lot of the central
departments were starting out on the same basis. So it took quite a long time at the
centre to get working and coordinate personnel. Meanwhile the divisions embedded
themselves in and were off and running.
Alex Morrison, the CEO, was an ex GLC senior officer schooled in the culture
which did not require the officers to give strong leadership. The GLC had been a
very highly politicised organisation with a lot of member control, so all his
background was equalisation: Keeping all the interests happy, avoidance of conflict
and as long as there were no problems he was happy (Deputy Chairman).
However, this was not to say that conflict did not exist between management at the
centre: indeed it was perceived as a major problem. The conflict reflected not only
the different personalities of directors but also their different management styles. A
former Planning Manager recalled the situation: Eric Reed was a very solid
engineer and Sinnott used to like winding Reed up and leading him all over the
place which he could do any time he wanted to. Eric Reed was perceived as one of
the 'old brigade' from the Met Water Board; a good engineer but not a manager:
The operations directorate was the weakest I guess of most of them.. .they managed
the divisions but it was not terribly obvious what sort of impact they actually had on
the divisions.
The differences between planning and operations was a noticeable one, particularly
in terms of management and culture. The former reflected its public sector roots
with hierarchical lines of reporting while the latter operated along more informal
lines: In a much more free and easy relationship between our separate groups and
departments (Personnel Manager). One former member of the operations
directorate recalled: They had big disagreements about some of the principles of the
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London Water Ring Main, which were never resolved between them and the result
was long delays, it never got implemented. The water resources issue was another
source of conflict, with arguments about the WRB predictions: Indeed that was one
of the main conflicts internally which dragged on in a damaging way for a number
of years.. .(Deputy Chairman). The conflict continued between Planning and
Scientific Services, making a triumvirate of arguing between Sinnott, Reed and
Fish.
The one exception was planning and finance which actually got on together quite
well: Cohn Sinnott and Eric Gilliland established their boundaries fairly quickly,
Sinnott 's patch was capital expenditure and Gilliland did not really get involved in
that. Sinnott did not really get involved in operating expenditure. So once they got
that clear between them each let the other get On in their patch (Personnel
Manager). The capital programme was the one thing which the centre had most
control over because it was centrally determined by the planning directorate.
One new recruit to the authority described the politics at Thames at this time as
'absolutely awful'. He was brought in as a third tier officer, along with others in
their twenties and thirties, who found their enthusiasm dampened by the centre
politics: (We) found ourselves enmeshed in this power politics and what we saw to
be archaic attitudes. There was a whole cohort of us who tried to do quite useful
things... The directors were seen as empire builders out of the tradition of local
government, while below them the individuals in the different directorates did work
well together. Increasingly, management spent more of its time fighting each other
than trying to manage things. The problems were exacerbated by monetary
restrictions and came to a head in Thames on silly schemes, minor sewage works,
or disagreements between the water quality committee and the planning committee
over standards.
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8.3.3 structure
Four principles guided development of TWA's structure:
1. Operational organisations to be built around existing services.
2. Only one reorganisation in Thames ("one upheaval was enough").
3. To avoid centralisation as much as possible.
4. Cooperation of staff was a matter of great importance.
On the third principle Morrison explained to Municipal Engineering (14th March
1975b) that the capital works programme was closely controlled from HQ while the
actual expenditure was left to divisional managers: The first thing we require of
divisional manages is integrity...we can forgive everything except lack of integrity.
We have tried to delegate the maximum amount of authority to divisional managers
and to restrain HQ participation to what we consider to be absolutely essential.
This has been very difficult. The fourth principle would also prove an elusive one
throughout this period.
The Divisions retained much of their local government ethos, particularly the
largest which had been left intact and therefore continued to operate in much the
same way as before reorganisation: They brought their own culture and history with
them. The other divisions that we had at the time were put together from a mixture
of all sorts of local boards and urban district councils, so did not have much of a
culture to start off with (Personnel Manager). The largest divisions in London had
more power and their managers were stronger than the executive: No matter what
the management at that time tried to do, they never really got their hands around
London, it carried on being the Metropolitan Water Board and the Metropolitan
Health Department of the GLC (Planning & Support Manager). The divisions
though powerful were isolationist and introverted: We characterised them at the
time as robber barons each in his own fiefdom and it did surprise us that they never
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saw the power that they could have had by ganging up on us.. . Each one went his
own way with little reference to the rest (Personnel Manager).
Where there was rivalry this occurred between the three big divisions. This
inevitably affected efforts to standardise practices and achieve the hoped for
rationalisations from IRBM. A former Divisional Manager described his
perceptions: I think there was a certain standardisation of approach but there was
absolutely no question, f you went to different divisions you would find them doing
things in different ways. Indeed wide disparities also existed within divisions
making standardisation an uphill struggle. One area of conflict lay in the plans and
aspirations of the predecessor bodies which the authority had inherited. As one
middle manager in Planning at the time explained: A lot of the people on the
engineering side saw it as an opportunity to get their pet schemes put
forward. . . These had been deferred for years and years. This planner's job was to
challenge their assumptions given the fixed amount of capital to work with and to
prioritise: That often meant that I was in contention with them and the same was
true of most people in planning. . . So there was a mixture offriendly rivalry (and)
hostility. . . but it was quite good fun actually. The policy of decentralisation without
direction left a vacuum at the centre. The situation was described by the Deputy
Chairman: There was a tremendous amount of tuif conflict between the centre and
the divisions so it was a very introverted organisation without any clear team focus
or drive at the centre.
8.3.4 finance
After the 1976 drought there was the feeling within Thames that they had come
through the big operational test with flying colours, so there was nothing wrong
with the organisation. There was some doubt about whether the big resource
schemes were needed, but there were no environmental pressures, so there were no
drivers on the operational side. In many respects finance was more active than the
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technical aspects and what had come to the fore, was that they could not be reliant
on local authorities for the billing. The move to direct billing then became one of
the biggest things to preoccupy the organisation' s external relations for some time
in that early formative period. The Chief Accountant at the time recalled the furore:
It precipitated the most almighty row... Whereas the WAs in my guess, had made
very little impact on the public consciousness up till then. All of a sudden the roof
came in... (which) set quite a sour note with the customer base.
The biggest area of direct billing was with the Metropolitan Water Board.
Historically they had always made it their business to produce very low bills for
customers. They had the City with a lot of high rated property and quite
deliberately milked the high rateable values of the area, to subsidise the domestic
consumer. As the Chief Accountant now discovered: Japanese banks were taking
hundreds of thousands of pounds off their water bill, so we had to increase the
domestic water bills and put the sewerage charge on top. Relations with the London
customer base reached their lowest ebb: People were going berserk.. .As a result the
organisation became even more introverted and less sure of what it should do to
fight its way out. . . Its relationships with the outside world seemed to have created
enormous problems and in a sense dominated the industry by finance. This was a
time described by the then Manager in charge of Billing as one of 'great trauma'.
Only to be compounded by the Damend case (4.8.4) which led to a 25% increases
in charges generally, throughout Thames region. TWA took full advantage of the
situation when the call came to move away from government borrowing and put an
extra 5% on top.
At the same time the restrictions on capital investment with the moratorium gave a
sense of hopelessness. There was no investment money which heightened the
dilemma of collecting money from the customers and being unable to spend it, thus
adding to the tension both inside and outside the organisation. This was particularly
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difficult for the Board to cope with: You have this large local authority tlying to run
it, wringing their hands over the whole thing. . . Nice honest men who 'd come out of
the shires found themselves besieged by their constituents and pilloried in public for
their part in this. So they got even more defensive about the whole thing (Deputy
Chairman). TWA's response to this crisis was seen as characteristic of the lack of
decision making in the organisation: There was no taking the scalpel and making the
correct management decisions based on fact. It was much more to do with "let's
react in some way that actually stops the whole system" (Manager Operations
Sewage).
The effect of the moratorium was greater expense for the authority because
contractors had to be laid off, as well as a delay in the investment programme. It
was this more than anything else that caused the build up of the backlog of
investment. The investment plans of the divisions were considered far too ambitious
by planning who had to mediate between their demands and Treasury control on
expenditure. A middle manager in planning at that time explained: Our job was to
try and sort out the priorities. You tended to do that through influencing directly the
major investment projects, and through controlling minor investment projects. The
planning department were very much involved with trying to influence and persuade
the DoE of the merits of what they were trying to do but found little common
ground, in the opinion of one former manager in economic and financial planning:
The debates there were not well informed, in the sense that there was not really any
sense from within the department, of any real ability for them to judge the case that
we were putting forward on any real merits and we accepted that is how government
worked at the time.
8.3.5 regulation
TWA established the separation of the control and audit samples in the directorate
of Scientific Services by having one assistant director (division services) take
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responsibility for the control samples, generally at division level but augmented
when necessary from HQ. For the regulation function another assistant director
(pollution control) had responsibility for the collection of audit samples from all
works, including those owned by the TWA as well as industrial and other
discharges. Divisions still maintained a distinct managerial distance from Scientific
Services in deciding their own policy.
Concern for assuring the public of TWA's integrity was ever present. Hugh Fish,
an acknowledged spokesman for the scientific and river quality community in the
water industry, defended the WA's role in serving as its own regulator (Municipal
Engineering, 1974). While recognising that the regulation function and the
provision of unbiased information to the public should be performed by agencies
completely outside the WAs, he believed that this would not be economically
practicable because of the wasteful duplication of effort and resources.
Nevertheless, Fish did make a formal proposal to the TWA water quality advisory
panel that it retain a firm of consultants as 'game keepers' to keep a check on water
quality quarterly audits (Municipal Engineering, 1975d): Managing a highly
developed and extensively used water supply river system can be likened to riding a
tiger. Skill, nerve, and a tight rein form the essential control mechanism. One bad
pollution mistake and the tiger stops dead in his tracks and turns on its corporate
riders (Fish, 1975a). The proposal was rejected by the panel, who at the same time
gave assurance to the public that the TWA has confidence in its own professional
staff and believes that the public, which it represents, would share that confidence.
Tensions between Scientific Services, Operations and Planning reflected their
origins in the predecessor organisations. Thus Scientific Services operated
independently of Operations as the Thames Conservancy had done before while
arguing with Planning about finance: Hugh Fish was veiy good with the members
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and spent a lot of time cultivating them. RWQ was very much his thing and Sinnott
was against spending any money on it. Hence that was part of the tension (Planning
& Support Manager Regulation). Thames set RWQOs but, unlike STWA, without
any time limits on them because of the constraints on capital expenditure. The
former Divisional Manager of Thames Conservancy explained the situation: As far
as Thames was concerned it was quite challenging to maintain quality. There were
pressures in the catchment, population movements. . . and they did actually have to
work quite hard to maintain their sewage effluent peiformance and maintain their
water quality without actually making any improvement.
8.3.6 standards
The major reconstruction of Beckton sewage works had already commenced in 1974
and the money had been allocated while a number of other works had either been
done or were already underway: And they left TWA with quite a good platform
really, to shout about. In terms of improvements in the Thames estuary (Planning &
Support Services Manager). There were still quite a number of inherited sewage
treatment works in 1974 which ought to have been enlarged at a much earlier date
than they actually were. A former Assistant Divisional Manager in Thames
Conservancy explained the background: LA 's expenditure on sewage treatment
works was governed by loan sanctions and we had hundreds of examples all over
the catchment, of unbalanced sewage works which had got bits missing because the
DoE chemical inspectors had refused to allow them a loan sanction.
The consequence was TWA landed with consents which were set on the basis of
80% or 75% compliance. Being design criteria, once the sewage works had been
built the standard was fixed. There were programmes in hand for putting these
things in order but they were slow because of the backlog of work to be done.
These problems were compounded by the moratorium and later the introduction of
COPA: So there were quite a lot of sewage works which were under capacity and
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led to effluent failures. And of course the effluent failures were not particularly
enforced f we are honest about it (Planning & Support Services Manager). The
enforcement of standards was a capital expenditure issue which inevitably brought
Scientific Services into conflict with Planning, as one planning engineer at the time
recalled: There was a lot of pressure within the company not to strengthen those
standards. And again Cohn Sinnott had quite a lot of say in that. A former planning
officer elaborated on the nature of some of the arguments between the two
directorates: We tried to do some work on river quality planning and Hugh Fish's
department came round and they tended to rubbish it and we got into this silly
argument. . . we did the cost of sticking with a certain set of objectives or improving
them, we upset him, because we actually suggested that some of the objectives were
on the verge of unachievable. The real issue was that to achieve the required
standards meant designing works to a level beyond the capability of the operational
people. Hugh Fish's view was to have these objectives to try and improve the
sewage works, whereas Sinnott was concerned about the cost.
Expenditure on standards being a director level decision, Scientific Services was in
such instances one of four directorates and there would be quite a lot of influence
from the others to keep costs down. The problem the planners had in trying to eke
out a very tightly rationed capital lead to a concern with prioritising. Ultimately
decisions about works expenditure had to be made in the context of where cuts
could be made in other areas. The ceiling on capital expenditure did not provide
many options: So in a sense the directors really just had to take a corporate view of
what they wanted the company to do. It was very dfflcult to say well we won 't look
after the waterworks because they wouldn 't regard sewage works as a higher
priority. So all we were doing was just trying to plug the gaps. . .And gradually the
situation got worse (Planning & Support Manager Regulation).
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Drinking water claimed a priority over sewage with the inevitable consequence that
sewage works investment lagged. A former planner explained the situation: There
was always a si gntfi cant number of them failing their consent. Basically because
they were undercapacity. And we hadn't got the money to put it right. Despite
resetting their consents to the capabilities of the works they still kept on failing
them: That is where the sort of tussles came in really because the Scientific Services
directors were not terribly keen on actually having the standards pushed back so a
number of them were modWed. The problem from the planners viewpoint was that a
works with spare capacity doing better than it was designed to do would get its
consents as part of the quid pro quo ratcheted down. Whereas others were pushed
out because they were not capable of any better. This often created a situation
where any additional load required capital expenditure because the works were
consented at their functional limits: Fundamentally there wasn 't enough capacity in
the system, so run as well as you like you cannot overcome those deficiencies.
Sewage works being controlled by the capacity they run on, there is little to
compensate for the lack of time that the sewage is spending in the works.
Thames began organisational life with the best intentions to keep its regulation
function separate. The separate reporting arrangements to the Board ensured an
honest and effective start for the new organisation. Reorganisation allowed for a
more even distribution of skilled staff and big improvements were noted initially,
particularly in the estuary. The failures in standards of sewage treatment were
brought about by financial constraints and exacerbated by internal rivalry and
conflict, such that a resolution via coherent policy and decision-making was not
possible.
8.3.7 summary of integration
The principle of IRBM was seen as first class but largely a missed opportunity
during integration. Described as a very 'passive period' by the Deputy Chairman: I
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will be candid, I don 't think we were quite as active in taking the role on, as some
of the other WAs, who did seem to take a more coherent view of their
responsibilities. The difficulty in rationalising and standardising the predecessor
organisations was as much due to the policy of decentralisation as the internal
politics created by a lack of cohesion between the directorates, the executive and the
Board. Thus there was an inability to see the organisation as a whole with executive
responsibility left up to the nine divisions and no central coordination. As a result
the changes required to operate the new authority effectively were impossible to
implement: There was a lot of resistance to change. Enormous resistance to change.
In fact, I don't think much change happened (Planning & Support Services
Manager).
One former member of the planning directorate recalled the integration phase with
enthusiasm: It was exciting, it was a big challenge. It was an enjoyable period
because life was much more relaxed back in those days. Despite trying to plan from
the centre and involve the divisions in doing their own plans, it was very difficult to
get the organisation to look far ahead. The other difficulty was the inadequacy of
available information for the whole region: The lack of computer power and the
requirement for cooperati on from the divisions compounded the difficulties. A lack
of a strong centre with strategic thinking resulted in a reactive organisation where in
the words of the Network Services Manager: In the 70s it was very much "keep the
ship afloat" and very much the culture was "Thames is best ".
8.4 Reorientation: Nationalisation 1979-84
This period begins with new top management as both the Chief Executive and then
Chairman retired in 1978. Their place was taken in the first instance by the former
director of Scientific Services, Hugh Fish, and an outsider to the industry, Geoffrey
Edwards from BA, in the latter case. This phase is characterised by a decline in the
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number and variety of strategic issues. Geoffrey Edwards' first annual report for
TWA makes mention, in its Future section, of the 1979 Tory victory, and a
government dedicated to a reduction in public expenditure which: No consideration
of the future for the Authority and its customers can ignore.. .(Thames Water 1978-
79: 38).
TWA had established its position as a viable entity, if not the largest in the
industry. Management and strategy within the organisation had shown little
improvement during the 1970s and now TWA had to contend with a new financial
framework introduced by the newly elected government: So (in the) late 70s (there
were) enormous turmoils, more of an attempt to give a sense of direction and of
control and coherence to the outfit but going not at all well in Thames (former
Chief Accountant).
8.4.1 management
The new Chairman, Geoffrey Edwards, had a totally different view of the
Chairmanship. He had little regard for the members and thought that he should be
able to manage as an executive Chairman. The current Deputy Chairman described
him as: . . . totally contemptuous of this member grouping, saw them as a rag tag and
bobtail lot. Decided to tiy and run the thing through the officer corps. This was a
less than successful strategy, for despite management differences the executive
closed ranks on the new Chairman: So after a long, internal power struggle,
Geoffrey was totally rebuffed as an executive Chairman, at that stage belatedly tried
to turn round and build a power base among the members and left it far too late. So
the poor devil ended up without any real friends in either camp. Edwards' career in
TWA was seen as a particularly inglorious one; not only was he perceived as not
very clever, he was not skilful at playing his hand with government either.
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There was a change in emphasis from finance with the appointment of Fish as Chief
Executive, having more interest in the technical side of the organisation. Despite
there being two or three other directors who were seen to be stronger in terms of
the weight of their function and their background, Fish had always cultivated the
members and emerged as a compromise candidate. There was no way he was in
charge of a unified management team: I think in Hugh Fish 's time the extent of the
warring intensified really. And it was especially between operations and planning
(Planning & Support Services Manager). Therefore Fish built his relationship with
the members as a power base but not with his own officer team. His idea of the
direction of the authority was influenced by his environmental scientific
background. In this respect he tried to give the organisation a direction that had
previously been lacking.
Fish knew the sewage treatment works were failing and tried to respond with work
which needed to be done. He was also keen to start promoting multi-functionalism
more effectively. At the same time he was under enormous pressure externally from
the DoE control functions to save on investment and to increase efficiency. In
response he tried to demolish the old divisional power bases under the banner of
efficiency and multifunctionalism because he could not dislodge them.
The top executives were in a precarious position ultimately, with Geoffrey Edwards
ostracised from managing the outfit and alienated by the members, he was also seen
to be ineffective by government. While Hugh Fish was seen as: Struggling to do his
best, but without too many friends and trying to keep all these balls in the air at
once (Deputy Chairman). His impact has been described as minimal and his
particular weakness in the inability to take decisions: It was an almost pathological
reluctance to make a decision (Personnel Manager). Their leadership manifested
itself in a series of internal upheavals such that: Rather than lift our heads and look
outwards again, the organisation turned back on itself (former Finance Director).
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8.4.2 structure
Within TWA it was felt that no progress had been made in building an integrated
organisation and the blame was laid at the time on the three predecessor
organisations. The Personnel Manager described the situation: They wanted to carry
on doing what they had always done and the people who were heading up those
divisions were quite strong or quite powerful... There followed in 1981, a
reorganisation of Thames' divisional structure from 9 to 6 along geographical lines,
with North and South London multi-functional divisions. This enabled a significant
reduction in manpower, the first time the MWB had been taken apart: The culture
survived remarkably well after being dismembered and it took quite afew more
years of the changes (Personnel Manager). Similarly for the former Thames
Conservancy, the rivers division carried on until 1982 when all of pollution control
centralised under the Directorate of Scientific Services.
It was the beginning of successive moves to try to create a centralised organisation,
and less like a collection of nine divisions. One of the changes was the move from
engineers and technical divisional managers to heads with management skills. One
new Divisional Manager during this reorganisation had come from the planning
department at HQ: Doing that was quite a big change for me because it was like
jumping in at the deep end but I had a very good (assistant) divisional manager who
was an engineer and knew the operational side inside out... Strategic thinking was
not a feature of divisional management but divisions at this stage were beginning to
take initiatives of their own: What one was trying to do was to actually pick up the
thing that was giving the most trouble and trying to make sure that they had got the
resources and the money to be sorted (Planning & Regulation Manager).
There were others who expressed doubts about this restructuring. For instance the
then Financial Director saw the changes as less about effectively delivering a
service than demolishing some of the old power structures: He did that to great
effect. The problem was it was more about what he wanted to get rid of, than what
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he wanted to put in its place. So it was all a demolition job. There were divisional
relationship changes with the clear out of some of the old inherited managers being
replaced by team players. However, the consensus of opinion was of no easy
change, it was a difficult period.
At HQ the executive directorship was reduced from four to three with the
unification of operations and planning under Eric Reed and later Cohn Sinnott on
the former's retirement. This facilitated projects like the London Tunnel Ring Main:
Because everybody was together and we agreed that we would get on with it. . . and
all those things we resolved then. Because we had the right sort of structure for
resolving it. .. There were a lot of other issues kicking around the place which were
similarly resolved (Planning & Support Services Manager).
The divisional reorganisation did enable Thames to cut manpower. As the former
Finance Director recalled: For an organisation which had never to my recollection
shed a post it was really quite traumatic. People agonised over one post going.
There were a couple of people taking early retirement and the whole organisation
was trauniatised by this. Further rationalisation became possible in the aftermath of
the 1982 water strike. The outcome of management working round the clock to
supervise sewage works during the strike, was the realisation that not only were the
works extremely adequate, but that they were well over-manned: It did not get
anybody what they wanted really. It was a major battle because everybody,
including the government, thought that the water industry would be on its knees
within a week. . .London was the big battle ground (NRA Manager). When the strike
ended all the overtime on sewage was stopped apart from emergencies:That was a
proper shambles, from a trade union point of view (former Assistant Divisional
Manager).
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8.4.3 finance
The new financial framework had the effect of rationalisations in a number of areas,
the most notable being manpower. The financial targets were assisted by the
programme of selling off surplus land and property in 1979 which three years later
had realised £14 million. Throughout the period TWA managed to hold increases in
charges to below the level of expenditure.
Finance naturally dominated the budget at this time. The Board was seen to take a
very passive attitude. One of the key reasons was a lack of an acknowledgement of
any major service problems, thus there was no basis on which to create a case to go
to government: So every time the government cut things there was a lot of weeping
and wailing and gnashing of teeth. . . So we dutifully cut the capital investment
programme. . . with great internal management wrangling and with a lot of wagging
offingers... (Deputy Chairman). The perceptions inside TWA were of few allies,
either in consumers or government, the latter being seen as "holding all the cards":
I think some of the more active companies played their hand with more skill and
vigour than we did (Deputy Chairman).
Relations with the DoE were strained, with little acceptance by that department of
the long term nature of the organisation. One Planning Manager described the
difficulty for the company: Most of the debates seemed to be about 'once you had
less money what you would do?' It is difficult to answer in a way that provides
ammunition to say 'don 't do it'. Because the rate of deterioration is so small. . .you
don 't stop doing things, you just push everything backwards. . . The trouble is the
failure occurs about ten years down the track when its all built up. In meetings with
the DoE there was little discussion about positive objectives, long term planning or
forward looking: The DoE could never see beyond a year. They were interested in
this next spending round. It was short termism gone mad.
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Bill Harper was appointed as the Finance Director in 1982 and he tried to forge
links with the planning department in order to streamline planning and finance. This
was just beginning to come together and work when the complete change brought
by the 1983 Act came about. In Edwards' last report he refers to the imminence of
the 1983 Water Act with reference to TWA's gradual metamorphosis from a
rateable-value based "taxing" authority to a public utility. He notes the achievement
of the Authority in meeting all the requirements of the new financial framework.
Then in lieu of the key change to WA Boards, he regrets the excessive turnover in
membership: in the nine years since its existence the number of appointed members
had reached 234 (Thames Water, 1982/83).
8.4.4 RWQ and regulation
At this time relations between the regulatory side and divisions were largely
amicable: The regulatory side just accepted that they had to put up with what
happened really (Planning & Regulation Manager). Thames Conservancy which had
been an effective and powerful regulator prior to reorganisation did however feel
frustrated, as a former Assistant Divisional Manager explained: Whatever they
wanted to do the whole thing would be overruled from some high level, on the
grounds we didn't have the money to do it.
Information on RWQ was not as extensive as STWA in the sense of a separate
quality document. Thames established a data base which recorded the performance
of each works year by year and the river quality. There was a publication put out by
the planning department but this was discontinued in the early 1980s with the
reorganisation of the planning directorate. In general the gathering of quality data
was a lacklustre affair: There was always this great hype to the divisions each year
to get data (and a) certain amount of resistance: "we ' ye got better things to do than
fill in your forms" (Planning & Regulation Manager).
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The former Divisional Manager of Northern and later the Rivers Division,
explained that improvements in RWQ were very incremental Slowly that situation
was worked on but it was not dramatic improvement. On the other hand Thames
rivers were a lot better than Severn Trent's anyway, so you would not expect quite
such a dramatic change. The smaller Board did not regard the issue of RWQ in the
same way as the old quality sub-committee had which was solely responsible for
water quality: They realised its importance, but it was important against other
things. It manifested itself primarily in the issue of how fast we could improve
sewage treatment services, which again came back to money.
Generally the issue of RWQ was low on the organisational agenda for a number of
reasons. In the first place, TWA displayed little recognition of external issues: My
enduring recollection all the way was not a lot of consciousness of the outside world
(Deputy Chairman). There were many internal problems which the organisation was
grappling with, in terms of the politics of the organisation and capital expenditure
cuts which were the main driver of decision making: By the time we got to the early
80s we were really into shedding manpower from the organisation, saving money in
great swathes. And the sewage treatment works were failing more and more and
that was not regarded as veiy clever but it was not the first priority (former
Divisional Manager Rivers). Secondly, the organisation, by virtue of its glorious
past, had convinced itself that sewage works problems were not a serious issue. The
Deputy Chairman explained the thinking: We were living off the tideway clean-up
still and that was by definition taken to mean that there were not any shortcomings
on the sewage side. We did not have some of the problems that the Northern
Authorities had of collapsing sewers and genuine dereliction of the infrastructure.
So nothing was driving us from outside at all.
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8.4.5 1983 Water Act
The 1983 Act represented the culmination of the nationalisation period. Its
immediate effect was to reduce TWA's Board from 62 to 15. Most of the new
members were DoE appointees but they came in with specialist knowledge and a
new set of objectives to make the authorityy act in a more commercial manner. It
was the Chairman who made the most impression: Roy Watts. . . hit the place like a
bomb, that was when Thames changed direction. . . he was a one man army (former
Finance Director). In his first annual report Watts wrote of the Board: It seeks to
deal only with poiicy, strategy and peiformance monitoring and to do so without the
proljferation of Committees which marked the previous arrangements. It believes
that management is the responsibility of the executive under the Managing
Director. . . (Thames Water, 1983/84).
The next year is characterised by a predOminantly internal focus on issues
concerned with organisational change, all internally driven in response to the new
perceived status of the authority. As its first task, a programme of change was
initiated by the Board with the help of outside consultants. Efficiency measures
were established with another restructuring of the divisions from 6 to 4. More
significantly, each Division was given its own profit and loss account; as was the
new Support Services Unit, thereby setting up a system of checks and balances. A
marketing organisation was established with a General Manager and symbolically,
HQ was transferred from London to Reading. A wide ranging series of studies were
launched to examine measures of operational efficiency. Managers' roles would be.
enhanced, there was to be a corporate management and they would be judged on
performance. Within a year there was an 18% reduction of non-manual and 6% of
manual employees. In this way Watts fulfilled his brief to be efficient and
commercial within the first 12 months of nationalisation.
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Watts who had come from BA where he had axed 2400 staff and raised £250
million from the sale of surplus assets, applied the same formula to Thames.
Dubbed "The man who thought he'd taken over an airline" by sceptical staff, Roy
Watts explained: I went in with my sword because I tend to think old companies get
fat (Management Today, 7/91). During his first weekend on the job Watts took
home the organisational chart and ended cutting through several layers of
management. As the then Finance Director remembered: The Directors Board went,
I was the only survivor. Now no manager could have a reporting line of less than
six people and the previously tall tree structure was dismantled. The General
Manager of Support Services at the time recalled the mood of the organisation: So
tears, collapse. People used to cheat and play games and all that... For Hugh Fish
some jobs were very scientifically based rather than managerial and those sorts of
stresses and strains caused him to fall out with Watts. Within a matter of weeks
Fish decided to leave: Hugh could not stand it, he stayed on the Board for awhile
but he went as Chief Executive. This period was described by Watts as "a fairly
lonely time". For some in the organisation the changes were an opportunity, as the
Thames region NRA Manager explained: The people who were at the centre, the
system directors and head officers, were really smashed and it was the night of the
long knives. People working out there in divisions, like me, assistant divisional
managers suddenly found ourselves promoted.
A new MD, Ken West from Unilever, was appointed by Watts within months, to
replace Hugh Fish. Many of the top management had changed and a lot of internal
people promoted to senior positions. The then Finance Director described the
situation: This new team tried to shake down under Ken West. Roy (was) giving vemy
strong leadership at this stage. Interestingly not so much to do with what we now
call the core business because again, we told him there was no problem. . The issues
are efficiency, not service. Thames was the greatest Water Authority in the world.
The drive for efficiency focused Watts' attention on streamlining operating costs, to
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the surprise of the Finance Director: He came along and said "what do I do to cut
10% off the operating cost?" My jaw dropped. The previous cuts in staff had all
been blue collar while the management had gone up. Any cost cutting had to make
inroads into the employees: He said "right 23% off management,10% off white
collar and perhaps we need some more off blue collar".
A fonner Divisional Manager explained that employees were very devoted to
serving customers but as a vocation, rather than as representatives of the
organisation. The problem was, if there was a service problem, there was no
customer management system to solve it. A technician had to resolve it and it would
depend on what this employee felt like as to how the issue was managed: And often
at that next level they could get a bit antagonistic to customers. Very quickly Watts
began to impress the concept of customers upon the organisation and its key role in
the provision of a service. The Planning & Support Services Manager explained: He
really started saying we've got a load of customers out there, we really ought to be
treating them as customers. He was the first one to start enunciating that as an
objective.
The finance director was subsequently made head of corporate planning and
replaced by a director with a commercial background. Though ruthless in his
determination to increase efficiency, Watts gained a lot of admiration from some
quarters: It was a work of art in terms of grabbing power. Because he really moved
it from the big Boards and chief executives driving with some checks and balances
into really driving it personally (NRA Manager Thames Region). It was obvious to
many organisational members that from the start Watts wished to streamline and
privatise. The Deputy Chairman of Thames summed up the feeling within Thames
one year after Roy Watts' arrival: That was '84, I think it was in many respects the
worst year of Thames Water's hfe. A lot of people retired, (with) enormous cultural
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change hitting the people at the top and a lot of newcomers coming in. It was a bad
year.
8.5 Continuity: Commercialisation 1985-87
Thames' strategic agenda through the mid to late 80s was steadily expanding. It
consisted of mostly internally located issues caused in equal measure by external
and internal forces. The changes and demands from the political segment are in this
phase matched by internal developments and challenges. The underlying drive of all
new developments was the desire to introduce commercialism into the organisation.
This can be seen in a centralisation policy, the promotion of big projects and the
dispute over proposals for the NRA. The atmosphere of turbulence could not have
been eased by three different MDs within 4 years.
8.5.1 management
Alongside the focus on efficiency, management were now required to think in a
more entrepreneurial fashion: Roy also gave us some new interesting spins like you
have got a lot of assets and skills here, do other things as well, develop some non-
regulating business. We had been doing a bit of overseas consulting. He wanted
that blown up. . . Exactly what you would expect from a man with his background,
used to looking for opportunities and broadening the base of business (former
Director of Planning).
All except one of the new appointments from outside did not last, including the MD
Ken West who retired after only 15 months for 'personal reasons'. His successor
was Bill Harper, Head of Corporate Planning, chosen because he was well liked and
would provide a sense of stability during a turbulent period: Nobody was more
astonished than me when the Board pulled me in and said would you like to do the
job. I was totally gobsmacked.. .1 think the Board had said enough is enough, we
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just have to settle this thing down and organise it. That was largely my role to
actually rally the troops again. I knew all of the players but also energised by this
new environment, and by what had rubbed off on me, I had a fairly clear idea of
what I needed to do.
The finance director also left at this time while the internal management tried best
to adapt. Despite the upheavals, there was a positive sense to the changes in terms
of enabling managers to manage: It was a huge opportunity as well, because for the
first time ever we had got direction, it might have been hairy but at least it was
management trying to get things done and moving (former MD). Watts was able to
generate support and enough allies to make his vision work for the organisation.
One of the ways Watts won people over was to take what became known as the top
75 managers out of national pay structures and gave them a management style
package and company car for the first time. This was later repeated with the next
rank down.
A new personnel director, Richard Marshall, came with the view to build the
capability and confidence of the management group. As the Personnel Manager
recalled: We poured a lot of effort into the top management team.., to use them as
the engine house of change. Internally changes in management were being brought
about at a fundamental level in terms of revising strategic notions of their business.
An internal document circulated at a senior management meeting on 19th March
1986 outlined new management principles, new management processes for
developing growth businesses, and improving accountability. It ended with the
proposal to further review the organisation, noting as it did that this would be the
third review proposed in five years. In April 1986 a reorganisation of senior
management was announced to cope with expanding activities under a £740 million
five year corporate plan.
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During this period new strategic issues gained in momentum. In particular the drive
to gain credibility as a business. Performance related pay was introduced, planning
became much more important and an emphasis on customer which eventually spilled
over into the privatisation debate. The 1985/86 annual report gives TWA's
aspiration: To be the best and most efficient water undertaking in the world. This
was supported by key objectives of those elements of the business to provide the
main growth:
-to generate profits
-to create and exploit growth opportunities
-to exploit and develop existing resources, expertise and experience.
This was also evident in the launch of big projects, designed to keep Thames in the
headlines and demonstrate its commercial viability. Work on the London Tunnel
Ring Main began (175m) as did investment in a new pier at Westminster. This last
was to open up the tideway to London's visitors and be attractive, functional and
profitable.
8.5.2 cultural change
The changes were not wrought easily as they involved profound shifts in ideology
for organisational members at all levels. Managers had to own the policies and
identify with the organisation (see 6.7.2). Allegiance to Thames now took
precedence over professional values as the former Finance Director found: Yes,
professionalism seemed to stop several layers down, you could not afford to have
undermining professionals up on the Board, with their own agenda as it were. He
smashed that flat in the outfit. Similarly, organisational loyalty was also more
important than ones departmental function: It was getting away from the idea that
my department was more important than the company (Planning & Regulation
Manager).
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Cultural difficulties were particularly evident in the problems with trying to
establish enterprise activities. For instance, Thames set up its first profit centre in
1984/85 in construction engineering management which was slow to prosper. The
manager responsible at the time recalled: The culture wasn t there to really support
it, the final push, to some sort of management style and culture. . .1 remember having
briefing sessions with the regional full time officers, which required me to sit down
and actually explain to them what a profit and loss statement was. Why we had to
do things differently. And that was quite an awkward period...
The changes took years to effect at both ends of the organisation and represented a
bewildering time for many organisational members: There was physical turbulence
down at the bottom end of the organisation and a shower of messages came down
from the top to do all sorts of things. People did not know whether they were
coming or going. The poor guys down at the bottom end were taking the brunt of
the particular thing (Deputy Chairman).
8.5.3 structure
Bill Harper as the new MD decided firstly to sort out the internal structure: None of
the reorganisations in my opinion had ever been as clearly directed as they needed
to be so we centralised the outfit. Some of the key functions were pulled into the
centre: Because it was always clear to me that you could not have a real power base
in division and at the centre and have clear direction and get things done. In its
place a completely centralised organisation was established as regards all the
support functions and the operations were split into units along clean and dirty
water lines. The merging into four divisions created more powerful structures but
with centralised control. The key issue was management control and so HQ and
divisions were for a period equal. This had followed relatively quickly on the
reorganisation under Hugh Fish, described as: quite a bewildering period by a
former Divisional Manager.
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It was not until Harper had been director of planning that he became aware of the
extent of the service problems: We were changing to get efficient but by this stage,
it was also clear that we had major service problems as well and we had things to
do that were externally driven. They were well behind the pace in London demand
which confirmed that the calls by engineers, who for years had been saying they
should re-main, were actually right. Having never been able to articulate their case,
they had given up trying within the organisation. Harper did some development
work on the ring main evaluations, started to take stock of the sewage treatment
works and found that 30% of them did not work. About this time anglers were
suing TWA because of the pollution of the river, so they needed some good
development strategies for water resources. TWA was also starting to get in trouble
with drinking water quality. All these service problems indicated a desperate need
for a service development plan and investment.
8.5.4 privatisation debate
As the authority which initiated the privatisation debate, the issue had profound
significance for organisational members. Roy Watts argued for privatisation on the
basis that WAs were taxing customers to raise revenue for government. TWA was
the first of the companies that was starting to move to debt repayment: So Roy
really went for it because he thought Thames' customers were being unfairly
treated. . . (Planning & Regulation Manager). Thames' campaign made considerable
inroads into the dominant ideology at Thames, particularly at senior level.
Senior management suddenly found themselves caught up in challenging the
government and attracting positive public notice, both unlikely events in traditional
water industry thinking. A former Divisional Manager recalled the novelty and
excitement of the event: We wrote to the 200 largest customers, nobody had ever
thought about people who paid water bills as customers... (we) never knew before
we did all this who were the biggest customers... That was novel. . . He described the
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excitement of going on the river, past the Houses of Parliament on a boat, with
some of the opposition front bench on board and a few dissident Tory MPs, with a
big banner saying "No Minister, don't tax water": It was a remarkable turn around
in image. . .because we had taken on the government in order to keep the charges
down, cared about customer, (all new ideas which showed Roy Watts as a) top PR
man.., it was great suddenly to be working for Thames Water, it was pretty good.
Letters were sent out with every customer's bill saying if you don't like this write to
the Minister. After 2.1 million bills Watts was called in by the Secretary of State
and threatened with dismissal.
Bill Harper felt that Roy Watts was on dangerous ground in taking on the
government, but knew he was past caring: So much was changing. He was a man
with nothing to lose which is a very dangerous situation. He'd had his career at
British Airways, he'd left under not very happy circumstances. . .So he came a bit
embittered from that experience. . .He had no great affection and interest in the
water industry, he just wanted to be seen to show that he could do it. But he did not
care if the government sacked him. It did not bother him, he was reasonably
comfortable and he was that sort of age...
Out of that huge row privatisation sprang, and because Thames' financial position
was very strong at that stage, Watts had Harper constructing the balance sheets as to
how it would look if they were privatised. They did the back room work on it and it
was feasible. On 13th September 1985, Ken West gave a paper to the CIPFA
conference entitled The Privatisation of Thames Water. In this he makes the links
between customer satisfaction, capital spending, prices and levels of service.
Internal competition was being encouraged and developed by the use of profit and
loss centres and thence to performance related pay. Significantly, in light of future
wranglings between Watts and the government, this paper argues not only for the
maintenance of IRBM but also regulation: To be fair, he saw immediately the
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advantages of river basin management and he was quite happy to pick up the
banners of the industry in that respect, to see the technocratic advantages of that
(Harper).
In an article to Public Finance and Accounting Harper argued for privatisation on
the grounds that it would create management opportunities:. . . Thames Water's
public position is that privatisation will bring benefits to the customer and the
economy through improved and extended management peiforinance (Harper, 1986,
March 30: 14-15). The rest of the industry regarded privatisation with some
scepticism, as Harper explained: Most of them were aghast that the edifice had so
thoroughly been shaken and that these wild ideas of privatisation and development
and new functions were coming out of Thames... We were seen to be out of control
you know- smashing the institution to the. industry and upsetting all sorts of people.
This did not deter Watts who was less interested in the water industry than in
proving the point that to be efficient it had to be privatised. Therefore Watts
behaved as a maverick, without deference to the rest of the industry: He distanced
himself, and he did his own thing, he did not consult the others and I think he felt
that if he consulted he would be watered down. Thames was very much like that in
those days (former Director of Corporate Strategy). The experience of being alone
in the industry in promoting the issue was described by the former Director of
Corporate Strategy: We upset everybody. We did not have many friends out there.
Roy had gone over the heads of the establishment to the sort of populist appeal. He
was the friend of the people. . . he was very clear that it was for the benefit of the
customer...
The result of Thames pushing for privatisation was that they set the agenda for
awhile. It was widely claimed by interviewees that Ian Gow's 'consideration of a
measure of privatisation' was a means to buy Watts off. He had set two conditions,
one of which was some acknowledgement of privatisation and the other one, a
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debate in the House. Despite losing the debate the seed had been sown: And Thames
produced a whole series of proposal papers to government at that stage about how
it could be done (Deputy Chairman).
The proposal to privatise the authority had a mixed response internally, early on
many felt that the environment would suffer, as the Environmental Science Director
explained: There was quite a strong feeling that it would all be taking money out of
the business and doing the absolute minimum. Also, organisational members were
concerned about how to reconcile the public service values with making a profit.
The Personnel Manager described how the organisation responded by recognising: a
need to debate those issues at great length and trying to find ways of understanding
how you could lead to reconciliation of the two. Those who were in favour of
privatisation tended to be managers who saw it as a good opportunity for change
and could see coming out of it more freedom, power, money and opportunities.
However, as the Personnel Manager explained: If you were to take the whole of the
9000 people that we employed at the time, I would have guessed that you would
have got a pretty thumping thumbs down to the idea.
8.5.5 RWQ and regulation
Under the new reorganisation, the two original Conservancies were taken out of
mutifunctional divisions and reestablished in their own right to oversee the rivers.
The Divisional Manager at that time: We were having a more focused debate then
about the need for investment in certain areas. We were much stronger then on our
facts than we were in the 70s. A regulation and monitoring department was
established, somewhat in advance of government proposals for the NRA. This was
in line with Watts' desire to privatise the whole of the industry's functions. His
vision included leisure and recreation on rivers as potential growth businesses. He
was therefore bitterly disappointed at the announcement, a year later, of
government's intention to form an independent regulatory body.
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Roy Watts' determination to keep in the rivers was as much about the characteristics
of the Thames basin as commercialism. Thames are the archetypal river basin
authority. Harper had advised Watts to privatise water and drainage and get rid of
the rest, including river management. Watts' response was: No way, river basin
management, we take the lot. Roy Watts saw a lot of glamour in that side of
things.. .He had big ideas for the tideway (Ilarper). The Directors of Corporate
Strategy and Finance worked very hard with other people in the industry to produce
a model for privatisation that would work: We struggled heroically, to make the case
and we caine veiy close actually (Harper). The idea was to have a small specialist
body to undertake regulation. Given the monopoly industry, they had always
accepted there would need to be a regulatory framework for water prices and
quality. The former Divisional Manager for Rivers outlined some of the problems:
Flood defence was a dfficully. So I saw documents which would have given the
water companies 20 year licences to run flood defence.
Watts was determined to try and hold what he felt was the key concept of integrated
river basin management together, that is what had created the WAs, there was a lot
of management and strategic planning merit to it and he fought it; despite being
advised by his MD that he could not win: It seemed to me to be impossible to win
but he stuck to it to the last and made it a personal article offaith it was to be done
that way. And when eventually it wasn 't, frankly he was never quite the same again
after that. Thames immediately began a campaign to lobby against an independent
regulator. Bill Harper was reported in the press as saying: . . . this development is
clearly a disappointment to the authority, which has made it plain at all times that it
believes privatisation should proceed on the basis of retaining the present pattern of
functions.
Watts told MPs that the forecast £lbn flotation value of Thames could be cut by
£lOOm and prospects for international business damaged by Ridley's decision to
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introduce a new quango. Believing that an independent regulator would undermine
IRBM principles, the real concern was the potential damage to Thames' chances of
exporting its expertise in the area. This was particularly salient at a time when the
Reagan administration were planning a $20m restructuring of the US water
industry. Watts' persistent opposition to the government proposals in appealing over
Nicholas Ridley' s head to Tory MPs finally resulted in a showdown in which he
was threatened with dismissal if he did not curb his opposition. Bill Stanley
remembers the critical meeting between Roy Watts and Nicholas Ridley: Roy was
steeled up for this meeting, to develop this issue. And he came back within a few
minutes looking immensely cross. White faced, having to stride back round the
corner from Marsham House to Smith Square.. . he didn 't say a word for about a day
and he had to drop it.
With the implementation of COPA II Thames set up centralised cash programmes
and brought the operational science group together to report and sort out the
problems. They set up monitoring and management procedures and were
independent both in a policing audit role and also a service trouble shooting role.
The progran-inl.e was successful as a former assistant Divisional Manager explained:
A lot of people working together did a lot of work very quickly. They cut a few
corners along the way but they had to. Two drivers for the necessary speed of the
programme were privatisation and the 1992 target for compliance: Nobody would
want to buy a company that was failing to meet all the statutory requirements, so we
really had to get in shape for that.
Despite the cash programmes, this period was a poor one for pollution control, with
sewage works undergoing efficiency drives and failing their consents. This was
reflected in the 1985 DoE national river survey, in which Thames showed a net -3 %
of rivers changing class with no change in estuarial quality. The NRA Manager for
Thames region summarised the root of the problem: I think it was summed up by the
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fact, that in the last year of its existence, Thames Water prosecuted about six times
and we notched up about 90 in our first year as the NRA. Despite COPA II there
was a lack of management will to prosecute and unless there was gross pollution
they had difficulty taking people to court because they failed their consents. The
Environmental Science Director confirmed the situation: Little monitoring was
carried out, little concern about meeting the EC directive that was already in
existence. The effort was put into areas that were thought of as public health
concern while consents continued to fail: There wasn't the political will at
government level to prevent there being non-compliances. While some of it was no
doubt poor management, a significant part of it was just lack of investment.
8.5.6 summary of commercialisation
The pace of change accelerated with the arrival of Roy Watts who got a focus on
the organisation with the various efficiency measures: It was an enormously
turbulent time from '83 onwards: a huge loss of staff, monumental restructuring
again, fewer divisions, different changes offunctions at the centre (Bill Harper).
This momentum carried on but slowed when Watts turned his attention externally to
the privatisation issues, as the new CEO found on his arrival in 1989: So it was at
that period when the company slowed down in its rate of change. At the end of the
commercialisation phase the utility business had been wondrously changed. It was
demonstrably more efficient, the organisational pattern was more coherent. People
understood what job they were doing and where they were doing it. There was a
good team atmosphere in the management team, the task was clear, they had a good
development plan. The impact of the new Chairman had been key: I think that the
whole concept of the company as a worthwhile object of service. . .for the sake of the
company was improved and increased by his influence. . . he provided I think, the
leadership that was needed at the top (Planning & Support Services Manager).
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8.6 Recreation: Privatisation 1987-89
Preparations for privatisation continued apace. By flotation manpower had been
shed by 1750 and a quarter of senior managers were recruited from outside. The
most influential was Mike Hoffman, brought in as CEO in the last nine months to
see through privatisation. Roy Watts had become so involved in the privatisation
issue that he had to some extent taken his eye off the company: So it had gone
through a sharp change, it had plateaued out and was ready for a really big change
after that (Hoffman). For Thames, this next change period under Hoffman would be
as swift as it was significant. The organisational message was that change was
synonymous with being a private sector company. Thus 1989 was the year in which
a fundamental change in ownership was combined with an internal reorganisation of
divisions and management, to see through the change with optimal efficiency.
8.6.1 management and structure
The enormity of the task ahead was given by the then MD: One of the things about
privatisation was there was going to be capital, so we were beginning to see our
way through to a big capital programme. This involved changes in work practice to
project based roles affording more management accountability. These were
supported by extensive management training in which 104 top managers went on
external courses, alongside supervisors and first line managers. Additionally an
enormous investment programme was launched to comply with standards set by
government and the EC, while further rationalisation continued with the selling off
of expensive London offices and cutting laboratories from hundreds down to tens.
In 1989 a last major reorganisation took place which made all the divisions
functional again.
Hoffman came at the beginning of 1989 with a history of rescuing ailing companies
and then leaving them. According to one Thames Manager he arrived in the
organisation like a "bombshell". Hoffman's gave his perceptions of management on
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arrival: I thought there were some very good managers and some people that did not
read the creed and those that hadn't read the creed were people who just could not
accept change at the pace it needed to go... He was considered a ruthless manager,
focused on reducing costs and improving quality: That was a great big shock
because he charged around the place upsetting people left right and centre,
demanding things of them that they had never been demanded of before. . . He did a
lot of good in terms of getting people to realise that they could take a step change in
their expectations of what could be done. A lot of people could not take it and went
under or went out (Personnel Manager). In the same year Bill Harper was replaced
by Mike Hoffman who took over the MD role alongside his group MD
responsibilities: We had to change faster than he believed and also I think Thames
PR at the time had out-run it - in other words we thought we were better than we
were. . . (Hoffman).
The divisions were reduced to two: sewage and water with operating districts
underneath. The then General Manager of Water found the change advantageous to
the impending privatisatiori: And we could then start looking at the whole lot and
start bringing in standards. It was a golden opportunity as well, for a big shake-
out, (and to) shed a lot of people at that time. Hoffman's particular contribution
was the introduction of systems and IT. The first annual report of the transition to
the private sector states reorganisation as the theme for the year. An indication of
the challenge felt by the organisation is given in the Annual Report: We have
adopted the operational theme "Make it Happen" to emphasise our total
commitment to our new circumstances (Thames Water, 1989/90).
Hoffman felt that the organisation displayed systems which reflected its planning
and financial orientation: So there were no systems in any way that were supportive
of operations. For instance he recalled the first sewage treatment works he visited in
which all the data of a purely historic nature were recorded in what looked like
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huge school books: There was no what I call diagnostic or forecasting data. His
aim was to set up an IT platform, or strategy: It meant that you did not control the
information, but you knew how the company was run. . . For instance, in combatting
the failure level of sewage treatment works, an IT systems support was installed to
control the works processes. Hoffman explained the effects: Then you can actually
run the processes near as you possibly can to the limit and you save on power,
chemicals etc. Also you give local autonomy to the guys running the plant. A lot of
effort has been expended on modelling to get predictive data and corporate
modelling. The IT strategy was scheduled to be put in place within five years which
was achieved: The other important thing was, that I did not allow any deviation
down the track. In other words, what we set out to do at the start was broadly what
we delivered.
The capital works programme was an immense undertaking, requiring the authority
to spend £400 million a year. In order to oversee the programme, engineering was
centralised into an engineering directorate to look after the large capital works. An
office block was acquired for the purpose, computerised to state of the art design,
again reducing the numbers of people and called the "centre of excellence". There
was a longer term plan: the logistics project, which aimed to reduce all the stores
around the group and standardise the way in which they operated. Then a
programme of training all management up to a common standard at Templeton was
initiated. This was followed by a similar programme for supervisors at an
operational level. Improved vocational training was introduced for technical
employees. Performance related pay was linked to a job evaluation exercise for
middle managers. Also, further manpower reductions were made during this time
along with the implementation of a new pension scheme.
One of the biggest jobs was the writing of the prospectus which meant a complete
overhaul of everything in terms of information and policy and weaknesses or
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strengths within the organisation. The former Corporate Strategy Director explained
the position: We had to iron out any issues that would be a problem for the stock
market or for investors in terms of risk... In fact almost all the pamphlets and
statements of the authority previously made public, were destroyed. It was a
question of virtually reissuing every statement. And every document had to be very
closely vetted by the legal people and by the merchant bankers, working almost
constantly for two or three years.
The customer assumed an important focus: Interestingly (there was) a strong
infusion of customer culture which began to manifest itself in organisational and
system changes, which even now are only just beginning to fully pay off (Harper).
Thames response here was to establish a Customer Service Bureau, to liaise with
the CSC, to introduce a code of practice and wrestle with the problems of getting
the new flagship centre for customer accounting in Swindon up and running.
Positioning the centre in Swindon when most people had been working in London
meant recruiting around 300 new people who could be more easily introduced into
the new ways of working. The "one stop customer shop", as it was called, was
originally planned to operate from 1996 but that changed to 1994 successfully,
although not easily: We have had a hell of a struggle to get it going (Hoffman).
8.6.2 formation of the NRA
At the time there was a great debate on the NRA and what it should look like. It
started off with an idea of 40 people in Thames region doing high level regulation
and it ended up with 1300. There was no shortage of ready staff, for as the NRA
Manager for Thames explained, this new organisation suited everybody: The old
navigation people thought they were going back to Thames Conservancy. The
pollution people thought they were going to be liberated at last, they could actually
be the policemen out there and do a good job and the old rivers would improve. The
Chapter 8: Thames Water Page 418
flood defence workforce, (had been) frightened by Roy Watts and his
commercialism.
On the whole therefore, the transfer of staff to the new organisation was a smooth
affair. The only contentious aspects concerned transfer of non-scientific staff and of
buildings. All the second best people seemed destined for the NRA and they were
being pressured to move into rented accommodation. Flowever a beneficial deal was
done to acquire the freehold of a Thames building: On a professional basis we
suddenly were several miles apart. It was a fairly tough time.. .In the end we were
fairly happy that we'd ended up with afair split of the assets (NRA Manager). It
was Hoffman's policy to make the NRA split as smooth as possible: We ran their
systems with a suitable lock-out so that we could not get at data finding for two
years, until they got theirs.. .1 felt f we did a reasonable job of moving them out
there would be no scores being settled... we have very good relationships with the
Thames region NRA.
Initially the NRA held off from prosecutions because they realised that Thames had
a capital programme in hand of £200m which could not be implemented overnight.
But as soon as it was deemed reasonable the NRA were not slow to fulfill their
function which created tensions between the two organisations. The Regional
Scientific Manager for the NRA described the situation: They were very immature
about things which they liked to call company confidential... . but the water
companies were big boys in the outside world and they had to comply with the
law... because the NRA took a different line from the water authorities. By and large
f it was a prima facie evidence of transgression we would prosecute. . . . and in fact it
was not a popular approach to put it mildly, (we) had some fairly heated
discussions with Thames on the subject.... but I think they understand our position.
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In September 1989 when the functions and assets of WAs were transferred to the
newly created water companies, they agreed, as a condition of their terms, to a ten
year capital expenditure programme which for Thames was worth £4 billion at 1989
prices. By November when the industry was privatised, Thames became one of the
largest utility companies in the world. But the changes throughout the 1980s had
prepared Thames. One of the things that did change totally was the attitude of the
DoE towards compliance, as the Environmental Science Director outlined: from "no
it's not needed" overnight to "why aren't you complying, why all these failures,
when are you going to do it? ".
8.6.3 summary RWQ and regulation in the public sector
Throughout their public , sector existence, TWA had retained pollution control at the
centre. Their General Manager for Water explained: Otherwise I think it would be
too close to the bone. Regulation could then be properly regarded as "the enemy"
and maintain their regulatory function. But the overall performance record in terms
of maintaining sewage treatment consents did not reflect much success in self-
regulation. The Planning & Support Services Manager explained why: Well, I think
looking back it's probably dubious, that you should expect somebody to effectively
regulate themselves.. . But it's out of order f you are told that your expenditure is
capped... Well, you make the best of a bad job.. .And it was the reason that river
quality standards were down-rated, they certainly weren 't up-rated, at anything like
the necessary rate.
The Manager of Sewage Operations takes an alternative view in attributing poor
regulation to a lack of management skills and in particular, strategic thinking: There
was no 'how do we manage this process, how do we use technology?' Linking all of
those things together and saying 'what is right? '.. . The trouble was you had all
different parts of the organisation promoting actions. (there was) no well integrated
strategy. The preoccupation with financial controls and the belief that there were no
Chapter 8: Thames Water Page 420
service problems meant data had never been rigorously collected and the gradual
decline in works went unheeded: The Management Board of the late 70s early SOs
rarely received peiformance reports. There wasn't a drinking water quality report.
There were some numbers in the annual report but there were not any sense of
problems, so why create all this information f it didn't tell you anything. But as you
move down on into the 80s it was becoming manifestly clear that there were
problems (Harper). The reluctance to accept that there were problems meant
Thames could not convince successive goverliments of whatever complexion, that
investment was needed. As the Planning & Support Services Manager argued: The
government were able to say that Thames was sort of holding its own. That was one
of the arguments against increased capital investment at the time. Of course, that
was all overturned by the EC directives. Meanwhile there was beginning to be a
backlog of investment required and the rivers deteriorated, including infrastructure
problems like the weirs on the Thames.
RWQ therefore deteriorated between 1980 and privatisation, largely because of the
cut in capital investment and a reduction in staff numbers, including pollution
control which served to reduce their monitoring. The Regional Scientific Manager
of the NRA recalled: . . .so they were barely capable of doing what had to be done.
He explained the tensions between PC and the water quality planning sections of
operations: One of the tensions was that there was a perception, particularly in the
run up to privatisation that we (IWA) got pretty cavalier, that water quality
objectives were not veiy high on the list of priorities. The levels of pesticides had
also been growing during this period and by 1989 it was clear that substantial
investment was going to be required. Thames' late awakening to matters
environmental are largely attributed to the leadership focus at the time: Roy Watts
was into efficiency, privatisation and that sort of thing and almost the environment
became important when it became important to the City (NRA Manager).
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In terms of regulation the verdict was a lack of even-handedness because of the
inability of TWA to prosecute itself. The NRA Regional Scientific Manager
explained that as TWA's own capital programme was constrained by cash, this
meant a difficulty in pushing other polluters: The fact they were under pressure. It
meant that others (polluters) didn't have the same pressure put on them as they
would have done I suspect.
8.6.4 summary of the public sector
The privatised Thames inherited an infrastructure that had been running down over
a 12-15 year period. This was felt on the operational side just after privatisation:
Two or three quite important things went wrong.. . the system had got to the stage
where it was really creaking (Personnel Manager). There was no management
policy until the mid-1980s for dealing effectively with organisational problems.
Even then a management culture was slow to be established and one new director's
experiences of top management meetings were a farce in terms of resolving issues:
Information is power because that was in the old Authority days. Senior managers
were good wheeler dealers.., they were good compromisers, they managed the
organisation that way. Things didn't come up through top level.
The relationship with the DoE was always ambiguous, because as the former
Corporate Strategy Director explained: They would be lambasting you for failing to
achieve standards and then they would be refusing you the money in effect, to do
anything about it... Their budgetary horizons also dictated the way in which capital
works were managed: You found a lot of projects were split into small parcels, so
that f government funding stopped, you had got a usable entity at the end of it
(Hoffman). The 83 Act did achieve some change in the culture, especially in terms
of efficiency but they needed the financial freedom which came with privatisation.
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8.7 Continuity: Private Sector 1990-94
This period is characterised by a continuing increase in the number of strategic
issues, mostly internally located but equally derived from internal and external
factors. Under private ownership the network of accountability has widened and
Thames must now deal with a greater variety of external influences. The
distinctiveness of this period is the decline in the number of financial issues relative
to previous eras and the increase in stakeholder issues. Thames adopted four
principles: Seek to excel
Put the customer first
Respect the employee as an individual
Careing for the environment
which encapsulate the strategic concerns of the organisation until the present.
In this period the extended external stakeholder membership is making its impact
felt for the first time. On the regulation side a whole host of investment
programmes were begun to comply with impending regulations from Government
and the EC. Thus in the 1989/90 Annual report there are references to major
investments in sewage and the introduction of enhanced sampling programmes to
raise quality on the clean and dirty side. There is also a welcome for the
Government's code of practice on conservation. Thames' community affairs policy
is revised to promote community relations and a customer guarantee scheme
implemented.
8.7.1 policy and management
The management team are very company oriented now, particularly at senior
operations level where there is a lot of focus on a uniformity of approach. The
business drivers are clearly articulated in the company as cost, quality and risk and
all decisions are made in this context. This is largely due to the pressures of
shareholders but the freedom to acquire capital has brought benefits: The company if
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it wants to do things grabs them and makes sure they 're done now. There is a much
more aggressive management style... (Planning & Regulation Manager). These
pressures on management have also meant that about half the directors brought in
from outside since privatisation have gone within six months. The driving force
behind assessing their performance is Mike Hoffman.
Efficiency is an ongoing issue in terms of getting the balance right between
lowering costs and maintaining quality. A key aspect of the overall efficiency drive
has been the IT strategy driven by Hoffman, the Utilities MD Bill Alexander and
the IT Director, Mike Ribbins. IT has been used to drive through continuous
organisational change: It's a peg to hang change on. You can say "hey of course
you can do better because I'm spending some money on it ". And people don 't take
that as much of a personal insult about what they do (IT Director). Through the
logging of every piece of work on a management system, IT has been instrumental
in removing bureaucracy. It has allowed teams of people to be created, enabling
them to take more decisions which in turn has changed the role of managers from
decision-maker to coach. As the IT Director explained: The manager is the person
who understands best how to do things. So the manager is there to support and
coach, not to track and take decisions. This has facilitated the delayering of
management as the three or four levels left in the organisation are the only ones
which add value to the work and how it is done.
In more practical ways IT allows the rationalising of suppliers and closer working
relationships. This has meant a lot more effort needed in negotiating with key
suppliers. The IT Director described their results: You've got to get the framework
agreement right... The relationship is just totally different. I mean the key suppliers
I've got. . . they are absolute partners in what we do. If you walk around the building
you couldn 't tell which are the suppliers and which are the 10 people who work very
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closely together. Thames' aim is to come down from the 16,000 suppliers they have
currently to between one and two thousand.
IT has also served a vital purpose of making all kinds of information about the
company widely available, thereby breaking up the old authority style of 'power is
knowledge'. This is now called "management by facts": Because that was a culture
change needed... With the old system, before you had an ITplazfor,n, knowledge
was power, whether you were a turn-cock who operated valves in the street and
because we did not have maps to know where they all were, you were absolutely
vital to Thames Water. Or whether it was a manager that knew what was going on
in various places, because he was round and about and kept that information to
himself (CEO).
8.7.2 employees
The employee project has seen the biggest change for manual and craft employees
in the last few years. All the previous demarcations were taken out and the number
of jobs rationalised to 21 broad jobs defmed by job profiles. Performance related
pay based on outputs began in March 1995. There are now only three layers of
management between the senior management and the workforce. Monthly
performance reviews are held with the MD. These are linked to forecasting future
performance, finance, quality performance factors and quality forecasts which
cascade down the organisation to local teams which own subsets of those
performance measures. The Manager of Sewage Operations described some of the
outcomes: They actually rotate between themselves who is running what piece of
plant and actually set each other challenges to do. . . so there is an element of
competitiveness which is not other than a positive one.
Previously operators did not feel ownership for treatment works performance,
seeing their roles as purely functional. The Environmental Science Director
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described how this has changed: Now we have tried to get people to buy into the
works peiformance being their peiformance. This has been a significant part of the
culture change alongside getting teams of people to manage the works: It is their
responsibility to get that works running, eveiyone there is important in that process
everyone has got to know what their impact is. Putting in quality management
procedures has helped efficiency because there are now procedures to document
when things go wrong and management must provide a solution. Privatisation has
allowed ideas and investment to be applied to the business quicker So the whole
concept of quality assurance is now fairly well developed and people on the ground
are now much more involved.. .1 think everyone realises there is no question of any
divisional barriers any more, you work for Thames. Thames style of doing things is
the way you are doing it.. .1 think in terms of output standards are higher (former
Planning & Regulation Manager).
There are reservations that the ideal of work ownership has permeated right to the
bottom of the organisation and that some employees may even feel alienated because
of the constant changes. For instance, Thames has decided that everybody will have
more than one skill, thereby reducing the numbers of those not capable of acquiring
them. To this end, productivity programmes have been introduced for employees
and skill certification authorised by the Board. Hoffman explained: Broadly we are
lifting the skill level up and sub-contracting all of the straightforward easy
jobs.. .But you would not get 100% agreement with the guys or girls at the coal face
that the changes have made their lives easier. Because some of them cannot face the
challenge. . . That is just a question of training, walk about management and trying to
involve people. Those that feel that their jobs have been made much more
worthwhile have welcomed making their own decisions and taking on responsibility
instead of just twiddling valves: The difference is an attempt to enlarge everybody 's
job. It is almost something that has to happen if you are going to cut numbers and
you are going to make people really count (Planning & Support Manager).
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Now Thames is starting to benchmark areas of excellent team working to transfer
these over to other work teams. This style of operating is very much underpinned
by a quality management work schedule: understanding effluent consent standards,
operating standards and quality managethent systems. The Sewage Operations
Manager explained the thinking: .. .just trying to challenge people to give more
flexibly. To have the opportunity to use their skills to the limit.
8.7.3 customers
The customer focus is also another important issue which is monitored very closely
as it represents the biggest threat to Thames currently. Byatt found that the number
of complaints going to them was increasing and putting a lot of pressure on his
department. As the Environmental Science Director explained: We are still trying to
be more customer orientated, trying to get that into the mind of everybody, that
customers are what matter in the end because they are the ones who pay the bills...
Thames have moved from very poor to poor on customer response times and their
aim for 1994 was very good whilst hoping to get good. Although the IT Director
feels tremendous strides have been made within the company there is still a need for
increasing performance measurement. A key issue for the next century is how to
deal with a forecasted increased demand for water. Thames' response has been to
identify underground sources and begin work on a new reservoir in South
Oxfordshire.
8.7.4 finance
On 2 January 1990 Thames joined the FT listing of top 100 companies in the UK.
Expenditure has continued on the LWRM project and in response to environmental
legislation: hence the refurbishment of sewers, the drinking water quality
programme was stepped up, including new investment in treatment works. Also,
investigations into sludge incineration began in response to legislation to cease
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dumping. But the issue of how much capital expenditure to invest is still very much
alive. The Planning and Support Manager described the issue: Certainly in Thames
we are not spending on the long term rate what we need to, but that long term rate
may not hit us for another 20, 30 ,40 years. Despite the assets being in a fairly
good state there will need to be more expenditure if they are to last into the future:
There is a big argument as to, "do we really keep on top of eve,ything now and do
it for the future, or do we just do what we have to do to make sure its not too bad
for the future?"
They are also focused on cost savings which has become extremely pressured. The
targets set by group to utilities capital are quite large and it is the intention to meet
all of these. Efficiency measures under the logistics project have controlled
operating costs. This allowed the Project Manager to make a huge reduction in
staff: I got rid of virtually 90% of the staff, about 250 to 300 people. The advanced
capital programme in allowing the purchase of new technology has also significantly
cut numbers. Manpower has therefore reduced at an even faster rate in the early
1990s than in the 80s, for example, a reduction of 421 in 1992/93: And! guess it
will carry on doing so as well. Pressures of being in the private sector are much
stronger of course than even Roy Watts could exert (Planning & Support Services
Manager).
The periodic review was an all encompassing issue in 1994 as it was central to all
the capital programmes that were to be put in place and the ability to finance those.
The General Manager for Water explained its importance: We have got to make
sure that we are going to be in a position to finance whatever obligations at the end
of the day it is accepted that we should carry out.
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8.7.5 structure
The latest reorganisation is attempting to decentralise the organisation again. The
aim is to set up and manage business units in divisions, functions like accountancy
and personnel will return under the senior divisional management while retaining a
dotted line function to the HQ director: The centre has had control, then it moves
back out again and its difficult management juggling, decentralisation,
centralisation, whichever you try to do actually (General Manager for Water).
Hoffman believes that all structures should be varied periodically: We've opened it
up so that Baronets, Baronesses will not be created. . . The big advantage now with
corporate systems as they are with IT, you cannot take the isolationist view you got
in the past.
8.7.6 culture
The cultural change has enabled the decentralisation to be more successful than
under the authority structure, as the Environmental Science Director explained:
That evolution is indicative really of a confidence in people now, that you can trust
them more, that the culture has become more Thames and less of the dissident
organisations. There are a lot more standard working practices enabling the
company to give people at a lower level much more power over their work. The
organisation is seeking to strike a balance between the freedom to manage and a
very centralised policy. For instance, the Personnel manager explained some
differences in working practices still persist today but management are more
sanguine about the effects: You have got to draw some sort of boundary and say,
well at the end of the day you have got to let managers manage and do it the best
way they see fit and that does not mean everything has to be standardised. The
emphasis now is not so much on standardisation as on a uniform standard of
service. This has resulted in a reinstatement of some of the divisional functions
which had been centralised in the mid-80s.
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It is seen as crucially important by Hoffman that management share the cultural
values of the organisation: Even now there is probably still one third of management
that don't share my philosophy and the fact is they have got to go. At the senior
management level, those who disagreed have gone since privatisation: . . .just
cleaned those right out, because you cannot have people with a dWerent view of
how the company is to be run at the top. Nevertheless there are cultural remnants of
the PH ideology as the Network Service Manager described: And even now you can
go out with some of my guys and they will still talk about the Met Water Board
because that's where they originally worked... The ghosts are still around. The
concept of privatisation, too, is still not wholeheartedly accepted: I guess you will
still find plenty of people who work in our organisation who have misgivings about
it. . . and will point to other things like the poor performance of our non-utility non-
regulated acquisitions... (Personnel Manager).
Despite the enormous expenditure on IT, and getting four levels of managers to link
in with it, the IT Director still sees blockages to change: I don't think we have in
the main a set of people who use the infrastructure very well. And I think the next
major challenge for us is to focus on the people. This has now led to the matching
of data to business lines and people, with the ultimate aim of becoming a learning
organisation: What people out there need is coaching in the use of technology.
Managing through the pitfalls of technology and allowing people to make mistakes
is seen as important in helping people to accept technology, as well as a culture
change for people who previously were not used to making errors in the first place.
The IT systems in place have allowed financial accounting to be streamlined across
the organisation. The latest shift is to activity accounting: Because these days you
can monitor much more than just pound notes. You ' ye got to break the business
down into activities and the activities down into key performance indicators.
However, there is still a strong element of psychological inertia within the
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organisation in terms of escalating problems and accepting that they need help. As
the IT Director complained: They sit with problems, bleed money out of the
company, affect quality, make our customers absolutely mad.. .And often just for the
sake of someone picking up the phone and talking directly to the customer.
A consequence of ongoing rationalisation has been continuing redundancies. But
despite a vision statement expressing care for employees, the Personnel manager is
aware staff are apprehensive which has made management difficult: I still think in
the main out there, there's an atmosphere offear, people are worried out
there. . . They are frightened of making mistakes and there's a lot ofjob losses. . . . So
managing that kind of environment, that kind of culture in that kind of environment
has been dffi cult for us. This is true no less because of the constant changes over
the past years, as an Administrator explained: In fact we have even been told that
change is going to be pennanent from now on.. .In a way that's not a bad
thing. . . But in another way it makes for a great atmosphere of not knowing where
you are.
8.7.7 comparative competition
The Personnel Manager explained how surrogate competition pressure has made an
impact on the top management team decision making: At the top the comparative
competition does matter and does actually hurt quite a lot. The fact that Ian Byatt
can put up a list of achievements against peiformance targets and Thames Water
comes eighth out often, it hurts. If you are a manager or MD, in charge of that,
you want to be higher up the list. . . It is a matter of personal pride.
Comparative competition also has very tangible effects in terms of share price.
This has certainly had an impact on the review of Thames' pricing formula for the
periodic review in 1994. The league tables thus condition both regulatory and
financial freedoms. However, the comparative competition measures are not
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necessarily regarded as valid when it comes to the quality and quantity of the water
supply, because they are so dependent on the regional circumstances of the
company concerned. For instance, as the Planning & Support Services Manager
explained, Thames will always be behind in comparison to Northumbrian on some
measures, such as: The degree to which we can assure people of water supply
throughout a drought, which is one of the measures. They (Northumbrian) are
always going to be a mile ahead of us. . .1 don 't believe OFWA T has gone the right
way about taking things into account. Climate, topography and density of
population all make a difference.
8.7.8 future business
The key issues for the future are customer perceptions, regulation, and for the CEO
of Thames, income generation: Trying to find a way of augmenting the income
outside the regulated business, because the regulated business will slow down profit
growth. . . Our skill will be. . . make it last a bit longer before it turns down. But in the
end, what you are trying to do is to fill that gap with other earnings. These other
earnings include expanding close to the core business which takes time to become
profitable. One of the biggest opportunities is the world-wide privatisation market
which Thames have entered successfully acquiring, among others, a big contract
with Mexico. Thames' key assets abroad are its management systems and people, as
Hoffman explained: You would take the Thames formula for doing things, f that is
the appropriate one in that case, and 4 or 5 key people. . . we have got people in the
company with big skill levels on almost all the problems that arise.
8.7.9 regulation
After privatisation Bill Stanley was responsible for setting up a planning and
regulation unit to manage relations with OFWAT and any other group: There was a
lot of learning on both sides. (There was an) immense amount of information that
Chapter 8: Thames Water Page 432
OFWA T wanted, far more than the DoE had ever wanted. A lot of effort is spent in
managing their relationship with OFWAT.
While there has been surprisingly little day to day contact with their former
colleagues in the NRA, on the whole relations have been good. At privatisation
Thames were required to comply with their consents and according to the NRA
Regional Scientific Manager were quite successful: Not just the consent compliance
but f you look at things like BOD removed you can actually see the polluting load
that we were discharging into the rivers reduce significantly, between '89 and '92.
Nevertheless the first national rivers survey undertaken by the NRA in 1990 show
Thames in the period 1985-90 to have made a net 14% decline in river length
changing class. This is a deterioration of 11% on the 1980-85 DoE survey.
However, the NRA confirm that over half the changes in class can be attributed to
Thames greatly increased monitoring programme. Thus some of the changes
reported could have occurred prior to 1985. Additional factors responsible for the
deteriorations were unusual weather during 1990 (202 km total) and poor effluent
quality (64 km total) (NRA, 1991a:38). Improvements in rivers from class 3 to 2 or
lb accounted for 63 km while those attributed to improved effluent quality totalled
15 km. The NRA Manager confirms that Thames have not made a proper
assessment of RWQ in the past and had underestimated the deteriorations but that
the next survey should look better: They doubled their capital programme on the
sewage treatment works and instead of 100 works failing they have got five or six.
And the river water quality is beginning to reflect that.
The Environmental Director feels that RWQ is not attributable solely to sewage
works standards and cites evidence from the NRA to suggest that at a significant
percentage of works, the difference they have made to the river is negligible or
unknown because of a lack of data. He points to other factors such as agricultural
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and industrial pollution and climatic and river conditions: So you are always trying
to sort out what is actually natural processes going on from the actual step-changes
that you have done by changing the input to it. The NRA echo these arguments to
some extent, as their Regional Scientific Manager explained: It is difficult to work
out whether partly it is due to Thames Water investment, partly due to climate
changes, partly the recession, you get variations and you have to sit back and look
back over time, but all the signs are quite encouraging. A related issue is of course
the cost of improvements relative to the noticeable difference in RWQ: If you want
to achieve a particular thing let's look at how we can achieve it and not just be
driven down by a system which says this is the answer. . . money can be spent but in
the end people have to pay for it (Environmental Director).
The NRA's Regional Scientific Manager feels Thames need to be a bit more open
with their investment programme which is considered sensitive information because
of the effect on their share prices. This is gradually changing and he feels the
outcome of privatisation has been positive: Yes, I think Thames probably would not
have got the investment done in the public sector. . . I'm not saying it could not have
been done some other way but certainly it has been positive.
The AMP2 exercise has brought the NRA and Thames much closer together in
terms of agreeing improvements for the waste water directive. For the NRA
Manager's part: We have been working very closely with them to make sure that we
get good cost effective investment in the environment out of this process. In
particular the NRA is working much closer with Thames in coming to accept that
rivers will never be the pristine condition they were before the impact of people.
This has shifted the discussion to agreeing where the priorities really ought to be.
One criticism of the NRA is their sampling regime which tends to be once a month
whereas Thames' own is more consistently based upon statistical sampling. From
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the viewpoint of the Operations Manager for Sewage: I'm not sure you can describe
that as a terribly scientific regime of regulation. These sorts of issues have led to
wider discussions within the industry on self-regulation and how it might work.
Certainly some of the regions are seen to have greater flexibility in consent setting
but the national NRA are seen to link the UK benchmarking approach with the
European one of absolute standards.
Despite the good relationship with the regional NRA, Thames have not got a good
one with the national body as Hoffman explained: Only because of personalities and
different visions of where to go. One of the problems with the NRA nationally, has
been coming to an agreement on the standards of water quality and the sorts of
timescales within which these are to be achieved. This directly impinges on the
work of the Planning & Support Services Manager: I view the NRA as having
unfortunately a different sort of timetable and schedule than I've got. Being
unprepared to define the future as they see it, at the sort of timescale that we need
to know it. . . The NRA is still very strongly influenced by the old River Authority
scene. It's very gentlemanly and all that but it doesn 't want to be rushed about.
Similarly with OFWAT, Thames try hard to manage that relationship but it is
highly variable on reaching agreements. According to the Regulatory Planning and
Support Services Manager: Relationships are I guess reasonable but strained,
because I guess we have got different aspirations. One of the tensions is the
increasing demand for information. The Network Services Manager described the
significant impact on management from the greater efficiency imposed by the K
factor: That's part of the business sense, which perhaps has become more
ingrained, certainly at senior levels of the organisation. You have always got to be
looking for improvements. Hoffman explains his view of their relationship with the
regulator: OFWAT are the customer personai, that's the only way to look at it and I
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spend as much time on regulation as 1 did on marketing and product development in
any other company and that is a lot of time. So I do not see a problem.
Thames' view of the NRA is spelt out by the Head of the Legal Section who sees
this as evolving positively: Not surprisingly some folks in the NRA would see
themselves with a mission to clean up the environment... Over the few years that
have gone by a sense of realism has entered into it, in particular that sense of
realism has speeded up considerably now we are getting towards the finishing line
on the periodic review This has been largely due to the DoE persuading the NRA
to accept some limitations on the amount of quality improvements that it will ask
companies to pay for as part of the whole K deal for the next five years.
Thames is fortunate in not having any seaside to clean up but they have nitrates.
The NRA Manager for Thames region believes the company does care more about
the environment now because it is favoured by the City and customers: They have
begun to convince me more and more, that they mean business on the environment.
They see themselves as a high investment, high quality player, with high returns on
cap ital for shareholders. It is in Thames' best interest to invest in capital projects
like sewage works because by improving quality there is that much more scope for
improving profits. As the NRA Manager points out ultimately their basic motivation
is to shareholders: I think they have probably got intellectually a more difficult thing
to square, we can be single minded, we want to improve the environment.
Thames want to be seen to be environmentally sound but have to balance this
against what customers want to pay for. The oncoming regulations have made it
very difficult to keep costs down and cutting profits means more borrowing which
increases charges. As the Regulation & Support Manager summarised: The
argument is about paying now or paying later. Increasingly, the most pressing issue
has been one of how to balance future charges with the increased expenditure
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demanded by environmental legislation. Thames has to spend around £450 million
just on the EC drinking water directive but that investment takes time to phase in
major engineering works. The Environmental Science Director explained: So we are
stilifighting the problems that existed before many of which government didn 't want
to know about.
In response to the quadripartite talks, Thames has published a market plan in order
to flag up the issues with consumers around mandatory and discretionary
expenditure. The outcome has been to convey consumer desires to OFWAT and the
government on their preparedness to pay for environmental legislation. At the
current time it would appear that the public is only in favour of essential
improvements in water services, such as prevention of foul flooding, which have an
immediate impact. The reluctance to pay for more long term environmental
improvements may mean that the government has to backtrack on agreed EC
legislation and renegotiate their terms. Hoffman summarised what he saw as the
main debate for the future of regulation: 1 think the debate is about how much you
can afford top on the one hand and secondly, on the time scale that you can
bring the changes in.
8.7.10 summary private sector
The general view of Thames since privatisation is of a reasonably successful
business. The Deputy Chairman gave his opinion: As far as I am concerned, it is.
more efficient gives a much better service, is much clearer in its direction so all that
change paid off in the end. It is a much more integrated, cohesive, single minded
organisation. There is a lot more shared language around the place than there ever
used to be. A sense of all being part of the same thing.
In many cases the new concepts are perceived as beneficial but also increase the
pressure on the workforce. Senior managers have noted that human resource
Chapter 8: Thames Water Page 437
changes have not been easy, and in some cases have taken up to 12 months longer
than anticipated: I think some people find the work a lot harder and more
demanding, not necessarily less attractive. . . So I would say there is quite a
fundamental change there and I think on the whole you would find that people
welcomed it. I suspect that you would also find reservations as to whether it has all
been pushed too far. And whether the balance is right (Personnel Manager).
However, the promotional prospects are much better in the private sector according
to the former General Manager for Water, particularly for managers who have the
right abilities: If you beat the overall budget there's a bonus for managers and
directors. Much more of a chance now. Before it was dead man's shoes. When I
think where I arrived at to where I expected to arrive its light years away.
There are differing views as to whether the change of ownership was necessary for
the benefits of privatisation, as the Personnel Manager conjectured: We could have
but I don't think we would have. I think privatisation has been the spur that was
needed... Others like Bill Harper feel that the changes have less to do with
privatisation than a change in organisational culture: Frankly that was not to do with
the change of ownership. That just enabled you to push to a logical conclusion some
aspects of the member framework. We are still regulated so we are not masters in
our own house. But this sense of ownership of the organisation and its direction, of
a clear view of priorities, a lot more emphasis now on performance... You just
would not credit it was the same organisation as ten years previously.
The freedom of the private sector has meant access to the money markets and the
ability to diversify the business. But the regulatory framework, including stock
exchange rules means an increased number of stakeholders to satisfy: There's more
people looking over our shoulder than there used to be (Manager Network
Services). Management are sensitive to the external perceptions of the company in
response to their heightened profile since privatisation. The Head of the Legal
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Section sees the differing criticisms from a variety of stakeholders as leading to
more of a defensive stance internally which had not existed before: Privatisation is
such an emotive issue that at a stroke one is portrayed as the bad guy whatever you
do. . . That rubs off I think on people working in the company.
8.8 Conclusion
Thames has exhibited a pattern of organisational development not dissimilar to
Severn Trent whereby each period of continuity attempts to fulfil the goals of the
preceding change period. The integration phase of Thames was equally bedevilled
by internal conflict and a policy of decentralisation which inhibited policymaking
and strategic thinking. The changes induced by a new leadership during
nationalisation did not prove radical enough and it required an outsider to the
organisation (and indeed the industry itself) to dismantle the internal resistances.
Thames' role at the forefront of privatisation of the industry gave it a leadership
status for awhile. It was the proposal to establish an independent rivers regulator
which brought Watts into greatest conflict with the government and the point at
which Thames' attention to internal matters was somewhat deferred. Like Severn
Trent, the adoption of a private sector ethos was necessary for the formation of a
new decentralised structure which would work. In the private sector Thames'
biggest challenge internally is adopting the proactive management style necessary to
make best use of a flat structure.
The TWA started life with a good base of RWQ. Since the 19th century the Thames
made dramatic improvements, particularly under the guardianship of the Thames
Conservancy who were responsible for all the upstream alluvial flows. This was not
true of the estuary which was in a poor state at the formation of the authorities and
according to their former Divisional Manager of Rivers, was improved significantly
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by TWA: The Thames in the tideway has been a lot better over the last 1010 15
years than it was 20 to 30 years before,
Like Severn Trent, Thames on its formation absorbed personnel with a commitment
to improving the river. The general consensus is that RWQ had a high priority in
Thames, attributed by the NRA's Regional Scientific Manager to the large amount
of recycled water which Thames produces for drinking and their London base:
Whereas they might like to save money on their sewage treatment processes, they do
actually have to drink the effluent. So environmental water quality is a high priority
in Thames, very important and they have also got a tideway through London and
Chairmen of the Authority were not too keen on having tea on the House of
Commons Terrace seeing dead fish floating down outside. Indeed, one of the key
differences between Thames and Severn Trent was the comparatively little recycled
drinking water of Severn Trent.
Nevertheless, despite its high priority, the rate of improvement to the river was a
static one during the life of the authority, as the Planning & Support Services
Manager made clear: (In) the period '74 to '89, I guess that the river very largely
held its own, but it didn 't improve. Economic pressures combined with an
organisational denial of problems meant that although RWQOs were set, they were
not given time limits, nor were formal quality reports produced. By the mid-1980s
deteriorations were evident on the tributaries due to population expansion in the
south east of the country, as the Strategic Planning Manager explained: All those
towns had sewage works which filtered clean but the population expansion put the
pressure on the works. The efficiency drives of the 1980s denied sewage works the
capital and manpower necessary to cope with regional population changes. RWQ
did not regain its former status on the organisational agenda, as with Thames
Conservancy, until privatisation, with the real threat of prosecution. As a private
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sector company, Thames has positioned itself as an environmental company and
RWQ occupies a high agenda status alongside finance, the customer and employees.
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SECTION 4: ANALYTICAL DISCUSSION
The following three chapters analyse the data presented in chapters four through
eight. Utilising structuration theory (Giddens, 1979) from a Realist perspective
(Bhaskar, 1978), the evidence is interrogated in order to draw links between the
industry and organisation chapters. Chapter 9 explores the aetiology,
preservation and change of organisational ideology in the case studies. It seeks
to demonstrate the way in which intersecting structural properties at macro and
industry levels contribute to the character of ideology, and the way in which an
ideology may be a force for inertia and change within organisations. In this
respect the relationship between the structural properties of ideologies and the
agential powers of management is crucial.
Chapter 10 makes out the case for the comparison of river water quality
performance between Severn Trent and Thames. The more favourable trajectory
of the issue on Severn Trent's agenda is explained in terms of differences in the
issue, organisational and leadership contexts, which Thames' less favourable
performance is discussed in terms of its leadership context. The difficulty which
both organisations experienced, in keeping river quality alive, is then discussed
in terms of the part played by structure, sponsor role, function and the external
context. The resulting model of processes of strategic agenda building is then
deployed to explain what makes different organisations attend to different
strategic issues and how in the same organisation, different issues command
different amounts of attentional resources. The model also has implications for
the properties of structure and action.
Chapter 11 concludes this study with a review of the objectives of the work and
the extent to which they have been met. This is discussed in terms of the
relationship between structure, process and performance. Next, the research is
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evaluated in terms of its strengths and limitations and the implications for future
research explored. Finally this study's implications for the practice of change
management is discussed.
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9. ORGANISATIONAL IDEOLOGY
9.1 Introduction
This chapter sets out to explain how organisations acquire, retain and change their
ideological character. Ideology is taken here to mean an enduring set of beliefs
which inform and legitimise organisational members' work practices and their views
of their organisation (Bendix, 1956:2; Mannheim, 1991; Wilson, 1973). In this
sense, ideology is taken as a variant of organisational culture with a specific focus
on the collective understandings about the role of the organisation in society and the
nature and form of organisational practices. As such, this notion of ideology
touches on members' conception of professionalism, industry beliefs, organisational
norms and the social status of the work itself. More specifically, ideology enables
management to explain and justify that authority. Or, more succinctly, ideologies
are ideas used as weapons for social interests (Mannheim, 1991). As Aldrich
(1979:167) outlines, ideologies serve three functions: they legitimise the particular
system of productive enterprise in terms of its relations to the state and to the
general "public welfare" of the society; they legitimise the manner in which
enterprises control their employees and they provide a system of beliefs allowing
entrepreneurs and managers to achieve a sense of self-justification for their roles in
the system. From a realist perspective ideologies may be seen to grant causal
powers to managers (Tsoukas, 1994).
In line with recent thinking about organisational culture, an organisational ideology
is not assumed to be uniform and accepted throughout (Whipp, Rosenfeld and
Pettigrew, 1989; Gregory, K. 1983; Pettigrew, 1985a; Whipp and Clark, 1986:42).
Rather, a plurality of beliefs are envisaged within organisations, the inherent
tensions serving to underline the organisational culture. Further, ideology has a dual
character in being both the shaper of action and the outcome of those actions
(Whipp et al, 1989; Knights and Willmott, 1987). As a product of a plurality of
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social systems (Whittington, 1990) with their inherent contradictions, ideology may
be both a force for conservatism and change (Dunbar, Dutton and Torbert, 1982;
Gregory, D. 1982; Thompson, 1968).
A structurationist (Giddens, 1979) account of ideology is used to analyse its social
structural roots and its means of empowering managerial agency (Whittington,
1992). The structural properties (rules and resources) of organisations are seen to
comprise a large part of the values, beliefs and management styles. They also
reflect industry characteristics as part of the social system in which organisational
members participate. As such, ideology may be seen to justify managerial
legitimacy by institutionalising the rules and resources drawn from wider social
structures. These structural properties need only be drawn upon selectively
however, or not at all, giving managerial choice to strategic initiatives (Whittington,
1992). It is the contradictions and ambiguities within and between different
overlapping social systems which may be exploited to effect ideological change (see
3.8.5).
The key question for this chapter is how does the development and evolution of
ideology shape the organisational context? Related to which is understanding the
relative roles and relationships of context and action and their implication in
organisational change.
The two case studies reveal a general pattern of ideological development and
change, such that the failure of the integration period for the two organisations may
be traced to, among other things, the embeddedness of the dominant ideologies. The
period from nationalisation through to privatisation is a transition phase in
ideological development. During this period the industry developed a hybrid form
of ideology where NPM ideas and selective capitalist logics were grafted on to the
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PH ideology. It was during the privatisation phases of the two organisations that a
new ideological form finally emerged.
9.2 The Aetiology of Organisational Ideology
To understand the origins of organisational ideology it is necessary to look at both
the internal organisational processes and the external context from which these
processes draw their inspiration (Willmott, 1987; Meek, 1988; Mills, 1988). Here
the origins of both the PH and Business ideologies are examined in terms of the
social systems and their structures (Whittington, 1990) implicated at three
interrelated contextual levels: the macro-environment, the sector and the
organisational.
9.2.1 The Macro-Enviromnent
The two ideologies have their origins in a plurality of overlapping social systems
(Whittington, 1990, 1992): specifically, the intersection of community, political and
economic systems which have been pivotal in the historical developments of the
industry.
9.2.1.1 the public health ideological roots
The PH ideology is derived out of the confluence of the communal, economic and
political social systems. Here the communal context has been a driver for
developments within the industry with the calls for cleaner rivers and drinking
water and accessibility of water services to all houses. In this way the dominant
structures of environmentalism and health have been evoked with concerns for the
aquatic environment and the link between pollution and disease (see 4.2-4.3). This
last concern was supported by the health professionals of the nineteenth century
who could command the resources of expertise and legitimacy from their
professional structure. These too would find support in the literary works of Charles
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Kingsley and Dickens who inspired the consciences of their readers (Hall, 1989).
Industry in voicing concerns about water resources, could evoke the capitalist rules
of profit maximisation. These concerns also indicated an increasingly sophisticated
society, where both community and industry were voicing growing expectations
about the quality of life. They were instrumental in motivating political action at
both the state and local levels.
From within the political system action took the form of Royal Commissions and
Acts of Parliament which gave powers of legitimate coercion to local authorities
over water services (see Appendix 4.1). The ultimate control over resources to the
sector would take the form of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, later
the DoE, which controlled local authority expenditure. As we have seen, local
authorities subscribe to public sector rules of shaping objectives and policies to
political goals (see 6.2.4). By the same token they are also subject to changes in
political leadership which influences new priorities. This would result in an uneven
distribution between sewage and water services which reflected their political
importance. Moreover, the competing claims on the government purse meant that
the relatively low priority afforded the industry could be explained by balancing
funds for the greater good of the nation. In this way, political indifference to a
national water policy for the first half of the century represented both a government
denial of community problems and a deliberate policy of not employing state and
hence, local authority resources of legitimate coercion. For government had exerted
little influence on the passage or implementation of local acts for water management
(see 4.3).
The growth in the public sector after 1945 reflected the political rules of the post
war Labour government. Based on a package of economic and social reforms, these
rules emphasised nationalisation, economic and physical planning and welfare. The
MHLG chose to implement this logic when it instigated an aggressive campaign in
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1956 to accelerate the regionalisation of water supply undertakings, but not in the
case of sewage services which remained an LA function and subject to the economic
constraints imposed by central government. This emphasis on the public sector with
the increasing amalgamation of water supply would ensure that while water supply
gained in importance, sewage would remain parochial and a second rate local
authority service. These different outcomes for the two sides of the industry would
in a large measure reflect the rules of keeping all constituents happy at both state
and local level in the deployment of scarce economic resources (see 4.5).
The water industry after 1945 must be seen in the context of a political pendulum in
the UK, whereby selective intervention by government in industry varied between
periods of social market (1970-72) under the Conservatives and state intervention
(1974-76) under Labour. The government policies up until 1979 were informed by a
context of eroding UK industrial performance, continuous economic difficulties,
Conservative and Labour governments and a 'trinity' of state, employers and labour
market interests. During this time a significant role was seen for nationalisation and
mixed entrepreneurship to rescue declining industries and stimulate emerging ones.
What is noticeable about the post-war period, is the lack of a coherent industrial
policy by governments of either persuasion with policy largely decided on political
grounds. Lack of political will to create a coherent national water policy would
deprive the industry of the causal powers necessary to effect change to become
more efficient. Instead power resided at local authority level and with small scale
fragmented Boards and Works (see 6.2.1).
9.2.1.2 the business ideological roots
The 1980s witnessed a clear break with political tradition in the UK as the
Conservative government masterminded a package of monetarist reforms designed
to diminish state intervention in industry but centralise state control away from local
government and the public sector generally. This occurred alongside a growing
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social awareness of green issues and concern for the social responsibility of
business.
The economic intellectual system at the root of the business ideology is the
monetarist economic philosophy adopted by the Conservatives (see 4.8.1). This
economic stance was given legitimacy by respected academic economists and
promoted by Whitehall thinktanks such as the Centre for Policy Studies (see 6.5.1).
The rules of letting the market decide underpinned the accelerating privatisation
programme of the Tories throughout the 1980s. The strong free-market ideological
commitment advocated an arms length relationship with the economy and
government intervention in business as inherently undesirable. Specific industry
policies were minimised and operated through economic and fiscal controls. These
included curbing public and private monopolies to stimulate the market, tax cuts and
the reduction of regulation upon business.
During the same period the social segment in the UK and other industrial countries
witnessed a rising concern with environmental matters (see 5.10.5). The implication
of industry in environmental destruction was reinforced by such incidents as the
Valdez oil spill. This was allied further to the growing concern by society for the
social responsibility of business. The creation of regulatory bodies to oversee the
privatised utilities was a means whereby the government could both compensate for
a monopoly market and ensure standards of service to customers.
Thus with privatisation of the water industry the falling away of government
financial constraints was replaced by an increase in regulation (see 4.11.2-4.11.8).
However, the legitimate coercion exercised by the regulators and the EC has
provided the industry with the ammunition to increase investment and hence prices.
The environmental and economic regulators have contradictory rules, for the former
to spend more and the latter to hold down prices which allows the industry to opt
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out and place the responsibility for decision making with government. This has
resulted in quadripartite talks where the environmental regulator has been the loser
to the political expediency of holding prices down. Another contradiction lies in the
market forces rationale for privatisation of monopoly utilities companies. The quasi-
competitiveness of comparative competition introduced by OFWAT represents a
closed economic system where measures of efficiency rather than entrepreneurialism
are dominant. Hence innovation within the sector revolves around the bargaining
abilities of management in negotiating their K factors rather than competitor
influenced cost and quality settings. The comparative measures relate to customer
service issues (availability of water, reliability of service and response to customers)
which provide an artificial market mechanism where supplier switching is
impossible for domestic customers and no real threat of entry is likely.
9.2.2 The Sector Context
The influence of the sector upon organisational practices and culture has been
discussed by various authors (Huff, 1982; McGee, Thomas and Porac, 1985;
Reynolds, 1986; Whipp & Clark, 1986; Child & Smith, 1987; Spender, 1989;
Porac and Thomas, 1990). The ideological roots of the water industry lie in both
the character of the social systems identified in the macro-environment and sector-
level variables identified in chapter 6 as industry characteristics, values, beliefs and
management styles (Gagliardi, 1986). The following section attempts to draw
linkages between trends in both the wider environment and sector level, and
ideological development. The four sector variables - industry characteristics, values,
beliefs and management styles - will be assessed for their dominant social systems
and the rules and resources which inform behaviour in each category.
9.2.2.1 the public health ideology
The evolution of the Public Health ideology had been an incremental one over a
century of industry developments and change. It has been shown that the political
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system provided little legitimate power and it resided at the local level. Thus the
industry characteristics derived their legitimacy from the communal social system,
being embedded in the public sector. Services provided by utilities are traditionally
regarded as community orientated, first in the sense that, as with water, the
provision of wholesome water and adequate sanitary arrangements are in the best
interests of the whole community by reducing disease and promoting good health.
Secondly, the purchase of such services is not possible by individual householders,
they must of necessity involve a shared infrastructure. Thus the communal social
system is brought into play. The basic resources were the organisational histories
from which information could be drawn about the infrastructure and its environs ie
'knowledge of the patch'. The basic rules were an adherence to local norms and
traditions of practice based on historical knowledge. These rules ensured a
heterogeneity prevailed within the industry regarding work practices (see 6.2.1).
The diversity within work practices was further maintained by the three-way
functional split within the industry with separate organisations for each part of the
water cycle.
The industry values (see 6.2.2) (Gordon, 1991) draw upon the professional and
communal social systems for inspiration. For instance, the community was evoked
in the core values of public service, guardians of public health and recreation which
could be claimed by all segments of the industry. Similarly, the valuing of
quantifiable inputs into operational practices drew on communal allegiance to union
membership, legitimised by the rules of the water industry productivity scheme.
The professional social system was drawn upon by all three industry groupings
(water, sewage and pollution control) in their core values of professional allegiance
and the emphasis on qualifications which provided the resources of expertise and
legitimacy and the rules of professional codes of conduct. Further, these rules
would demand an allegiance over and above the members' organisations. Another
legitimising factor was the technical expertise established over long periods in the
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larger organisations which had international reputations. Also, developments within
the industry were very much shaped by the industry bodies, established since the
end of the 19th century which pushed for a national water policy (see 4.3). The role
of CAWC during this century was most noticeable in this respect and very much
informed policy for the 1945 Water Act (see 4.4). Finally, the familial social
system could be drawn upon as guiding the choice by workers to give life-long
service over several generations (see 6.2.2).
The professional and communal social systems also provided the legitimising logics
for industry beliefs. The belief in the industry as a public service with the
concomitant dedication to community was reinforced by the emphasis on local
knowledge and subsequent industry heterogeneity. The professional social system
provided legitimacy for the belief in engineering solutions and fresh water being
seen as both a necessity and a science (see 4.3). As the industry evolved, resources
became technological excellence which would underlie much policy and action with
an emphasis on past achievements. This was to some extent undermined in sewage
by the status accorded to their works engineers by local authorities. This, together
with the fragmentation of this sub-sector and lack of public funds, contributed to the
poor state of sewage facilities in 1973.
The management style of the sector owed much to its public sector domain (see
6.2.4) with the emphasis on hierarchy, error avoidance, service regardless of cost,
command management and employees as agents of operational practice. These
actions derived their legitimacy from both the intellectual and political social
systems. Financial resources were provided by the municipal authority which in
turn was subject to the political expediencies of central government in the form of
the MHLG, later the DoE. It was the nature of the funding arrangements and the
often perceived shortfalls which led to a management style of effectiveness
regardless of cost with short-term horizons. The political rules informing
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managerial practice centre on the achievement of political goals and the support of
political objectives and policies. These goals are of political necessity vague,
complex and often conflicting with frequent changes. By contrast, the water
industry goals of big engineering projects require long term planning, which
conflicts with political ftinding arrangements. As a consequence strategy and
planning were historically poor; engineering projects were often split into small
pieces to accommodate the funding arrangements and capital was spent in the year it
was allocated (see 5.7.1; 5.8.1; 8.6.4).
9.2.2.2 the business ideology
The Business ideology has its roots in intellectual, political and economic systems.
This particular variant of the capitalist ethos draws its inspiration as much from the
new right politics of the 1 980s as in distancing itself from what it set out to replace.
In this sense it has developed much of its logics of action since privatisation from an
analysis of the shortcomings of the public sector, in contrast to current commercial
realities (see 4.11). The various writings by industry leaders on this topic (Carney,
1990, 1991a,b&c; Bellak, 1991; Brooker, 1991; Hood, N. 1991; Jones, 1990,
1991; Skellett, 1991) provide the historical continuity (Meyer, 1982) which justifies
the present ideology of the industry. The current commercial realities owe much of
their rules and resources to the evolving political and economic systems, while
managerial realities draw their inspiration from the current intellectual system to
which contemporary notions of management subscribe.
The industry characteristics (see 6.8.1) are derived from the capitalist economic
social system, very much shaped by their recent history of the private sector, where
a turbulent environment, many stakeholders and radical change have reinforced the
necessity for coherence within the companies and heterogeneity between them. The
rules of the private sector are profit, compliance with regulations and market
positioning. The resources are the capital markets which now make finance
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available for investment. Hence the industry has shifted from a local to regional and
global perspectives as to where it does business. The large regional entities have
attained a status as economic entities and also attempted to position themselves as
environmental and service businesses. The industry still faces public challenges
from a perceived contradiction in these three activities.
The industry values (see 6.8.2) of company ownership and competitiveness are also
derived from the capitalist economic social system. The intellectual social system
has contributed to notions of professional management and the twin goals of quality
and efficiency, alongside an increased responsibility on the part of the workforce. In
the private sector the water companies have gained the acceptance of their
regionality which was so long deferred after the formation of the Authorities. As
economic entities their status is indisputable to the personnel which now work
within these organisations. New capitalist priorities now exert themselves as the
utility companies seek markets abroad and new acquisitions at home. Recognition is
now global as well as national and management are engaged on behalf of their
companies, not their profession. The element of competitiveness introduced by
OFWAT has also contributed to a sense of organisational identity and purpose for
managerial realities, as the water companies seek to distinguish themselves from
each other. The water companies must also respond to the rules imposed by
investors and city analysts, the share price acting to affect managerial decisions
related to profitability. Similarly, profitability is linked to the acquisition of capital
and hence the ability to finance the expenditure required by the regulators. Thus has
privatisation introduced a heterogeneity into the industry which has fostered
separate company identities. Contemporary management theory imported by new
outside managers and consultants has played a large role in shaping managerial
values. Indeed, the whole notion of management has been extended and reshaped,
such that economy and efficiency have equal priorities alongside engineering
excellence. It is here that the economic and intellectual social structures overlap
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with economic rules around profitability and quality being enforced by the
managerial resources imported from outside the industry.
Similarly, the industry beliefs (see 6.8.3) are derived from economic and
intellectual social systems. The whole notion of government as a bad owner is
implicit in capitalist logics and the recent history of the water industry in public
ownership is held up to reinforce this view (see 4.11). The positioning of the new
WSCs as service and environmental companies display a marrying of the economic
and managerial social systems in defining a market niche to justify profits. In this
way, a total quality ethic may be used to assure OFWAT of concern for the
customer and the necessity for price increases. Managing risk combines notions of
cost effectiveness with environmental concern in order to achieve acceptable quality
at lowest cost. Thus the regulators' requirements are subject to management
solutions in the same way as engineering projects. It is this last belief in
management which underscores the whole logics of action within the industry and
legitimises vision, mission statements and constant change.
The management style of the sector has its roots in a contemporary academic
intellectual system which emphasises the learning organisation (Hedberg, 1981;
Garratt, 1987; DeGeus, 1988), managers as facilitators (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1995)
within a role culture enabled by a flat structure (Coulson-Thomas & Coe, 1991) and
employees as initiative seeking entrepreneurs. The resources which make this
contemporary organisation possible are the information networks supplied by IT
(Hedlund, 1994) and the human networks derived from a delayered organisation
(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1993). Capitalist logics inform the twin objectives or rules of
profit and regulation, the success factors of measurable outputs and the economic
and efficient use of resources.
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9.2.3 The Organisational Context
At the level of the organisation one can discern the ideological influences from the
macro and sector environments. But as the contrast of both ideologies will show, it
is the managerial social identities and multiple organisational memberships which
are pivotal in informing managerial action and ideas.
9.2.3.1 the PH organisation
Managers derived their social identities from their affiliation to professional bodies
and long sector experience. For instance, the Association of Water Officers was
formed in 1945 to promote the advancement of technical and administrative
knowledge in the industry. Such memberships provided them with resources of
expertise and legitimised their involvement in advising government on a policy for
the water industry. Managers could sustain their authority by virtue of long
experience in a locality under the old works and boards of the industry, thereby
appealing to the sector rules of knowledge of the patch. This intimate knowledge of
a locality was a particularly relevant resource during the post war years when public
sector organisations grew and a public service ethos was paramount. The
management also had a high degree of professionalism within their own specialisms
and there was a great emphasis on qualifications with doctorates common among the
scientists.
The three sub-sectors of the industry had their own structural intersections with the
MHLG, the local authority and industry bodies. These organisations were crucial in
determining resources and policy. Additionally, each sector had its own
professional bodies informing practice and imparting legitimacy. It was the
intersection of these organisations which made for the nature of the predecessor
bodies of the new water authorities.
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In sewage and river management, the community, legislative and political systems
overlapped in a way which madfe it difficult to reconcile the demands of increasing
population and industrial waste with national expenditure. The community
dedication would always be at odds with the lack of LA funding due to the low
priority afforded to sewage services. In this way the notion of a service was strictly
limited to the patch with little concern for neighbouring communities (see 5.6.1).
Administrative boundaries bore no relationship to the river catchments occupied.
For River Boards their adversarial powers could be weakened by LA board
membership and weaknesses in legislation (see 5.6.1). These were to a certain
extent righted by the 1963 Act which also introduced the WRB. However, the
failure of the WRB (see 5.6.3) as a national agency for the coordination of water
resources, and pollution control legislatiOn weaknesses, did not improve the
capacity and performance of sewage works in many LA areas. Consequently
Sewage Authorities and River Boards and Authorities had a history of conflict.
The water supply side consisted similarly of overlapping community, legislative and
political systems which could not address the perceived water resources issue, nor
the problems of inefficiency in supply and management (see 4.6.1). For instance,
the Water Resources Act 1963 undermined responsibilities of water undertakers as
spelled out in 1945 Act. The elected LA representatives were inefficient in
managing what was increasingly seen as a commodity.
The dominant rules of the PH organisations derived from their local authority
orientation and funding arrangements. These included providing the best service
within budget, cost of little significance, the local authority boundary is never
crossed, ie no joint schemes, no concern for the condition of the river downstream
from the community which is served (see 5.6.1) and professional codes of conduct.
Their resources were derived from their affiliation to their professions which
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provided legitimacy for conduct; historical experience which legitimised practices
and legislative authority which gave legal powers for pollution control.
As the new Water Authorities, these overlapping system boundaries became
transferred into one organisation. The preservation of the predecessor bodies in
divisional form ensured a continuation of these relationships with the internal
regulation of sewage by scientific services, the predominance of LA membership on
the board and DoE control, to be discussed in the next section.
9.2.3.2 the Business organisation
The Business ideology was most significantly imported into the case study
organisations from outside the industry. At the Board level new Chairmen brought a
background of private sector experience and expectations as did new members (see
4.8.5). The Board at the apex of the organisations could draw upon capitalist logics
of management to inform their rationale. In both case studies chairmen drew their
legitimacy from their experience in prestigious organisations (Royal Doulton and
British Airways). Likewise, the Boards came to be populated with similar people
who could draw on such experience to legitiinise their roles. In the case studies,
organisational stories of Chairman's experiences were common: for instance, Roy
Watts' reputation for axing jobs at BA (see 8.4.5) and Bellak's concern with
standards (see 7.4.5). In this way, learned cultural information was stored in sagas
(Clark, 1972) and the grapevine (Davis, 1953). In terms of resources, both men had
significant political contacts (Bellak had been a Conservative Party candidate) and
could count ministers among their friends. Also, Watts' social status was enhanced
by an OBE, Bellak's by the membership of the Institute for Economic Affairs. Key
organisational actors for both organisations were the CEOs appointed to drive
through privatisation (see 7.6.1, 8.6.1). Both came with extensive private sector
experience (British Oxygen and Perkins Engine Group) as resources and were
instrumental in importing capitalist and managerialist logics into the organisations.
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Additionally, new management teams have replaced the old authority ones and
brought with them new management resources.
At divisional level management were increasingly from the authority era having
started careers in WAs. They had experienced the turmoils of the new WAs and
were ready for change. As they were often appointed after new structural
reorganisations they could more effectively draw upon the principles of IRBM
which were for so long deferred under the old structures. More crucially, these
people were appointed for their management skills as opposed to engineering or
technical ones.
In the private sector the community, economic, political and legislative systems all
intersect and overlap to define the water companies' new status. The key social
systems for the companies are the economic and legislative as they intersect in
contradictory ways. The economic logic to make a profit is constrained by
regulation to maintain standards (see 4.11.2). There is also ongoing pressure from
the community to hold down prices, criticism over directors pay and allowances and
environmental concerns. The issue of pricing conflicts with that of standards and the
water companies' response is to shift the burden of responsibility back on to
government. This last move resulted in quadripartite talks with all parties and the
subsequent modification of EC regulations. In this way the political social system is
still much in evidence, particularly with public dissatisfaction with services. What is
clear is that the water companies may now exploit the contradictions within the
regulatory framework to both argue for increases in prices and abdicate from
responsibility for costs by pointing to Brussels.
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9.3 Ideological Preservation
The case studies have shown that despite radical sector changes the new
organisations persisted in management processes which undermined reorganisation
and the principle of IRBM upon which it was based. The relevant period here is
from 1974 to 79 during the convergent period termed integration. In assessing the
reasons for the failure of integration, the interest here is why the old ideology
remained entrenched contrary to organisational well-being. The preservation of
ideology will be discussed as a function of organisational formation, structure,
leadership, work practices and social identities. Within each will be explored
internal ambiguity and external contradictions giving rise to managerial agency or
inaction.
9.3.1 organisational formation
Big regional WAs were the largest organisations ever seen in the industry and
appeared suddenly. The time-scale for reorganisation once the Bill had passed was
incredibly short for such a massive undertaking. Okun (1977) writes of the creation
of these new organisations as a "challenge" particularly when, notwithstanding the
scale of the operation, these organisations would affect the lives of every person in
the country (see 4.6.5). It was precisely this last fact and the necessity for
coinciding with local authority and health service reorganisations on the same date
which dictated the speed of the reorganisation (see 4.6.2). There was no opportunity
for organic growth which would have allowed organisational members time to adapt
to increasing size and complexity.
Severn Trent and Thames had 9 and 8 months respectively in which to prepare for
R-day: long enough to establish a variety of working divisions but too short to deal
with the cultural and managerial changes required to establish large integrated
organisations. Therefore, both authorities had little choice but to heed the Ogden
report's recommendation that different water functions should be delegated to
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divisions to the fullest possible extent (see 4.6.4). Ogden emphasised a
multidivisional, multidisciplinary structure and a corporate approach to
management. But nowhere was there mention of the cultural shifts and managerial
processes required to form an integrated organisational entity. Indeed, the criticisms
from inside the industry about the report were far more concerned with operational
issues and regulation (see 4.6.4). Not surprisingly, such responses reflected the
ongoing concerns of an industry which had experienced more failures than
successes at the hand of government policy decisions, or non-decisions (see 4.12).
However, it was a curious omission on the part of Ogden, considering the bitterness
within the industry wrought by the 1956 regrouping of water supply (see 4.5).
Decentralisation was the hallmark then of the new authorities. Ogden reasoned that
it would encourage staff involvement (see 4.6.4) although they had not bargained on
divisional involvement at the expense of the region as a whole. Indeed, the
reasoning of the chief executives was sound, given the enormity of the task and the
time allotted. Thames had 200 and Severn Trent 242 bodies to incorporate into 9
and 28 divisions respectively. Both CEOs saw maximum delegation to operational
units as essential. What these arrangements did not take into account was how to
coordinate working relationships between divisions that would reflect the principles
of IRBM. Multifunctionalism was a step closer in merging different parts of the
industry for the common good of the river basin but there was no mechanism for
coordination between units that would generate commitment to the region as a
whole.
Another critical factor in these arrangements was the preservation of the largest
inherited bodies by both organisations. There was no doubt that the smooth
functioning of their services was required for April 1st, but left intact, they would
find it irresistible to do anything but function as they had always done. Morrison's
words (see 8.2.2) that to disturb these large organisations was at "your own peril"
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subsequently revealed the opposite with the power struggle between divisions and
the centre. The very strength of these organisations would also be the weaknesses of
the new authorities (see 7.3.3; 8.3.3). Their resources of expertise and knowledge
would remain divisionalised like their cultures while the regional authority acted
only as an umbrella for the disparate divisions. The divisions maintaining separate
work practices would prove the biggest stumbling block to rationalisation and fly in
the face of efficiency and economy assumed by Ogden.
Ogden had hoped that members of WAs would adopt a corporate approach and not
pursue local constituency or special interests (see 4.6.4). However, this is exactly
what happened with the large LA dominated Boards. The water industry was not
seen as a career posting for an ambitious politician (see 8.3.1) and so attracted low
key individuals with little management initiative or those with previous experience
of the industry and hence a traditional outlook. The very large member grouping
(43 for STWA and 52 for TWA) from numerous county councils and local
authorities would preclude any single minded drive to fashion a new organisation.
Most members would find it difficult not to represent local constituency interests,
particularly if this had been their role previously. After all, political accountability
was an issue at stake at the time (see 4.6.4) and local politicians were wary of these
large impersonal monopolistic organisations.
The emphasis on decentralisation, the preservation of the largest inherited bodies
and single issue local political membership, made the role of head office
management ambiguous. With organisational leaders hedged in from above and
below, the potential for a leadership vacuum was a foregone conclusion. The largest
inherited bodies, in particular, would be acting entirely as they had always done by
going over the Directors' heads to the members for policy decisions (see 7.3.3).
Indeed, decentralisation virtually mandated that they did so. In this way,
management structure and processes would be at the core of the reorganisation
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problems, discussed in the following sections. The multidisciplinary approach
recommended by Ogden was not in evidence at 1{Q. Directorates were divided
clearly along functional lines. As they were so often headed by the expert in the
industry in the two authorities, they would all the more reflect the continuity with
the established ideology. Such an arrangement ensured the failure of corporatism,
and nowhere was this more in evidence during 1973 than in Thames (see 8.2.1)
which three day retreat set the pattern for future tensions between operations and
the other directorates. It was precisely these sort of managerial processual problems
which had been overlooked or ignored by Ogden. Hender said as much in the
Surveyor (1974b), backed by Severn Trent's first Chairman who described the
corporate management team as "irrelevant" (see 4.7.1).
The reorganisation of the water industry had proposed the integration of the whole
water cycle to be undertaken by organisations previously specialist in one part only.
Organisations experiencing formerly adversarial relationships now found themselves
operating together under the umbrella of a single organisation. However, the
internal regulatory function contradicted the notion of integration by enhancing
internal differences in the policing role of Scientific Services. Pollution control
officers considered themselves apart from the organisation (see 7.3.7). These forces
for separation were enhanced by the historical emphasis on professionalism above
organisation.
The Ogden report had provided the organisational blueprint, its influential members
had been from the water industry (including the first CEO of Severn Trent), as were
the critics. The engineering orientation of the Public Health ideology could do no
more. What had been created were large monopolistic organisations, having no
clear organisational identity but with powerful and insular divisions. Management
were in an ambiguous position, with parochial Boards and functional directorates,
playing out traditional rivalries within one organisation, thereby undermining both
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corporate management and IRBM. The earliest days of the case study organisations
support Kimberly's (1975) findings that the aetiology of organisational
configurations may in part be a function of environmental influences, in this case of
a government committee and time.
9.3.2 structure
The Board in both authorities, being established along municipal lines set up a local
authority committee structure. This type of Board at the apex of the authority
structure ensured that the political context would remain the driving force of the
authority (see 6.2.4). Even in Severn Trent where labour and industry members
exerted a greater role, the LA members appeared to Okun (1977) to serve more as
representatives of their authorities than in other WAs (see 7.2.2). In Thames this
"vast collection of individuals" was seen to diffuse responsibility and lack coherence
(see 8.3.1). The sheer numbers making up these Boards seemed to necessitate the
formation of committees to give the members a role. This committee structure, with
its policy role, blurred the demarcation of power and influence between the
executive and the Board. Furthermore, the Boards became more interfering as they
got into their stride. There were powerful lobby groups in addition to the LAs, like
MAFF and the NFU, who could influence expenditure. The Board was also open to
external influence, as in the famous instance where the Severn Trent executive were
overruled in their choice of computer (see 7.3.5). This had been the work of ICL
who wrote to every member urging them to buy British.
Internally, divisional managers, well versed in local authority decision making,
worked the committees to retain power, as did the executive. The committee system
then became a forum for pushing preferred policy. Indeed, assistant directors were
seen to spend an inordinate amount of time writing papers for the Board, not all of
which were fully understood (see 7.3.4; 8.3.1). Committees also enshrined the
compartmentalisation of functions, by separating water quality, land drainage, etc.
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In this way the Board recreated traditional ideological principles of local interest,
community values, local knowledge and the public administration model of
management.
The executive officer structure was perhaps the most problematic in terms of role
and power. Both the Board and divisions were operating along familiar lines, albeit
on a larger scale. The rules of management practice and process were governed by
the political context of the PH ideology. The executive, however, were a new tier in
the water industry, presiding over a collection of individual units and constrained in
decision-making from above. This executive structure, organised as it was around
traditional departmental boundaries, mitigated against multidisciplinary, integrated
organisations and lacked the coherence necessary to drive them (see 8.3.2). The
executive officers left dormant any possible alternative structural properties which
could have been imported from other public sector agencies or the recently
reorganised local authorities. There was also an ambiguity surrounding the role of
assistant directors, which in Severn Trent resulted in separate management team
meetings for directors and assistants (see 7.3.4). These two layers of management
indicated overmanning as much as traditional empire building within departments.
The absence of a clear role for the executive left them as coordinators in the centre
(see 7.3.3) and prone to internal conflict. This was not helped by divisions gaining
a head start in operational functioning (see 8.3.2). The vacuum at the centre around
which departments conflicted did not provide any alternative to the public
administration model of management.
By 1975 Severn Trent had eight and Thames nine divisions. The devolution of
power to divisions was a huge resource and made their role crucial. In Thames for
instance, they were built around existing services (see 8.3.3) and confirmed for
divisional members their importance in service delivery. The reliance of the
authorities upon their divisions, particularly the largest predecessor bodies,
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perpetuated their local outlook and historical significance. It confirmed the necessity
for local knowledge and beliefs in diversified practices and engineering solutions.
The pioneering spirit evidenced from within Severn Trent (see 7.2.4) could only
reinforce beliefs around community dedication. The very notion of integration was a
threat to the identity of the largest divisions, manifesting in resistance to regional
policy (see 7.3.3). They naturally retained their old cultures and historical
knowledge (Douglas, 1986; Kantow, 1987), continuing an isolationist and
introverted tradition. This last would also encourage rivalry between divisions (see
8.3.3), particularly in relation to the capital programme and defer standardisation
for many years. In this way ideology was stored within the structural form of the
case study organisations and became an obstacle to change (Starbuck and Hedberg,
1977).
9.3.3 leadership
The MHLG plan was to create a self-financing water industry with management
having a higher priority and status, a part of the then fashionable managerial
revolution, to bring about a single comprehensive management plan for every river
basin and the commercialisation of water. This initiative would require that the
WAs had to balance the requirements of the river in the best overall interest, in the
knowledge that all were linked (see 4.6.3). The concept of corporate management
by Ogden was to ensure this transformation into IRBM (see 4.6.4).
The leadership of both authorities derived their managerial identities from their
previous experience in the industry and local politics. William Dugdale had been
head of Warwick County Council and Peter Black a member of the GLC. Likewise
in the CEOs, Morrison was from the GLC and Nixon from a River Authority,
Beddoes was a civil servant involved in reorganisation of the water industry and
Reeve a distinguished engineer. However, their experiences did not prepare them
for the managerial requirements of the new integrated authorities. For instance,
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Thames' Director of Operations was a good engineer but not a manager and as a
consequence headed up the weakest directorate with little impact on the divisions
(see 8.3.2). Reeve of STWA had professional and personal resources to command
but chose instead to raise the status of divisional managers by giving them a direct
reporting line to himself as CEO (see 7.3.2). Beddoe was perhaps the most detached
from the industry ethos and approached his leadership of STWA as an
administrator. In this way he was able to establish eight multifunctional divisions
and amid much conflict, abolish the directorate of resource planning (see 7.3.2).
With Beddoe ' s retirement there was a shift in the leadership from administrator to
engineering with the appointment of Don Reeve (see 7.3.2) and his belief in
decentralisation.
The executive response to their ambiguous management roles and conflict took two
main forms. In STWA management chose to selectively engage in other overlapping
systems by attending endless meetings and committees with other industry bodies
(see 7.3.4). There were also the internal conflicts between directors and assistant
directors. In Thames the conflict was decidedly acrimonious, occurring between
directorates and especially between personalities (see 8.3.2). Neither authority could
stem the conflict because they believed in decentralisation while establishing a large
central executive. Furthermore, the central directorates compartmentalised functions
without a mechanism for coherence between them. The executive did not deem it
necessary to explore alternative structural properties of management because they
still held the values of professionalism, technical excellence and experience
paramount. These values were further perpetuated by the authority structures which
decentralised power and authority.
The core of industry beliefs were held within divisions and emphasised by the
controlling presence of the I3oard. Some divisional Managers maintained the status
quo by employing personal resources of strength. They found it difficult to respond
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to change (see 7.3.3) and purposely left dormant the structural properties necessary
for integration: thus the refusal to use regional systems and the maintaining of
divisional cultures, the most blatant example being the Severn Trent division which
refused access to the HQ appraisal team (see 7.3.3). In this way the management
acted in the interests of their division at the expense of the region as a whole. This
was as much a reflection of beliefs in traditional practices as a resistance to change
itself. The executive of the two water authorities were thus left to coordinate policy
and with a fair degree of tension regarding even this role, as recognised by the ST
interviewee who remarked on the dividing line between coordination and
interference being a "fine line" (see 7.3.3). The more the executive showed interest
in divisions the greater their resistance. They had after all, perhaps the greatest
single resource, that of information. Prior to the introduction of IT and
computerisation the divisions could utilise their local knowledge and experience in
their bid for power (see 8.7.1).
The Board provided the familiar internal political context while the external political
context was as strained as ever, with financial restrictions serving to exacerbate
conflict at the centre and between the centre and divisions (see 8.3.2; 8.3.5). As
management spent more time fighting than managing, one response would be
empire building in the tradition of local government as a buffer for conflict (see
8.3.2). Therefore long lines of management evolved. Similarly, general objectives
remained the response to the internal political context and financial restrictions.
These restrictions not only influenced the speed of projects but also the notion of
"best overall interest" underpinning IRBM. This usually meant a scaling down of
standards while parsimony of resources was precluded by a funding arrangement
which necessitated expenditure of capital in the financial year it was received. The
long hierarchies meant a rule culture prevailed at divisional and executive levels. Of
particular importance in. this administrative model of management is the effect of the
financial arrangements in emphasising arbitration and rule interpretation. The
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capital programme was mostly at the centre of conflict: in its allocation between
divisions, the coding scheme and rules of prioritisation, all creating ongoing
tensions and game playing within and between hierarchical levels (see 7.3.3; 8.3.5).
Corporate management was thereby stifled by government control, from the setting
of prices to the execution of long term projects.
Thus there were two essential tensions or ambiguities for management. First there
was always the conflict between industry values and beliefs and Treasury
expenditure policy, which always saw water as a lower priority. Divisional rivalry
for resources was not conducive to integration and perpetuated their local outlook.
Second, a policy of decentralisation was inimical to the empire building at the
centre. There would always be a tension between the traditional role of divisions in
delivering a service and the desire at the centre to "manage" this process. These
twin conflicts, the first well known in the industry, the second arising out of the
new regional bodies undermined the possibility of managing these organisations.
9.3.4 work practices
The PH ideology was also preserved by the routinisation of work practices within
the authorities. Divisions maintained the procedures, specifications, suppliers and
systems from the previous era (see 8.3.3) which embodied their organisational
memories (March and Simon, 1958). In this way the workforce continued in much
the same way as they had prior to 1973. In particular, those divisions left intact
after reorganisation continued to exert the same cultural influences upon their staff.
The financial constraints also preserved work practices, as previously stated, when
large engineering schemes were approached in small scale stages to hedge against
the sudden withdrawal of government funds (see 8.6.4). The strength of the unions
ensured continuity with the Public Health ideology by negotiating for rewards via
the industry productivity scheme which was based on quantifiable inputs (see
6.1.2). The prevalent rule cultures with long hierarchies and limited delegation
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would make any other basis for reward impracticable. In this way it is possible to
envisage how, at even the lowest level of the new organisations, daily activities of
the most mundane nature could reinforce the prevailing ideology.
9.3.5 social identities
The constitution of the water authorities left them in an ambiguous position. They
were a hybrid organisation being part LA and part nationalised industry (see
4.7.10). This created tension between the call of LA policies upon WA resources
and Treasury policy to curb capital expenditure. The result was that the new
regional organisations could not flex their muscle as befitted all-purpose authorities.
Projects often had to be deferred in a current financial year so as not to over-
commit resources in subsequent years. Thus the big challenges which were seen to
be the raison detre of the new authorities could still only be tackled in a piecemeal
fashion.
Significantly, the Water Act did not change the relationship between government
and industry (see 4.7.2) although the WAs were supposed to have greater freedom
of action than previously. Even so, the national agencies set up to oversee national
policy direction could not override the controlling effect of the DoE: first in setting
the capital ceiling for borrowing (see always a compromise between the WA's
requirements and other national needs) and second in surveillance of the corporate
plans. The authorities still could not convince the DoE of the seriousness of capital
expenditure cutbacks as the results were so incremental. Also, the NWC, with no•
statutory powers apart from training, had to compete with a number of other
agencies in offering advice on a national policy. This dilution of its role at the
centre would weaken its efforts to provide a national identity and sense of purpose
for the water industry (see 4.7.2). In the absence of a new identity the old one
naturally contrived to assert itself.
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The control of finance by government linked the fortunes of the industry with that
of the economy as a whole. Thus inflation and inherited loans from predecessor
organisations increased charges at a most inopportune time when trying to gain
public favour (see 4.7.3). Furthermore, the charges, having until 1974 been
disguised in local authority rates made the WAs immediately unpopular with the
general public. Combined economic and industry inheritance problems resulted in
unprecedented price increases in the two authorities. This highlighted the anomalous
situation of the authorities (Thorpe 1975, see 8.7.4) with the belief by consumers
that the WAs were not accountable for their level of spending. The resulting furore
for Thames caused the organisation to be even more inward looking and was
considered a time of great trauma. This was compounded by the capital restrictions
which curtailed the investment plans of divisions and led to a feeling of
hopelessness (see 8.3.5). In. STWA it led to political problems with Welsh
Nationalists that caused an enquiry into the industry itself (see 4.8.4). For an
industry which had largely been taken for granted this new negative public exposure
had no precedents. Nor was there any coherent social identity to call upon to
counter the accusations of lack of accountability.
The lack of a revived industry identity to match the new reorganisation was
accentuated by the continuing lack of capital investment. By 1975 it was already
clear from the National Water Conference that crippling interest rates from
borrowing and the effects of underinvestment were undermining the potential for
economies of scale from reorganisation (see 4.7.5). It was therefore hardly
surprising that a degree of inertia was experienced at executive levels in Thames
(see 8.3.2). After all, there was no comprehensive national policy or industry
identity to drive organisational policy and no capital to execute it. The response of
authorities like Thames and Severn Trent was to carry on in the best way they knew
how, in the old traditions of the water industry.
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An additional complexity for these regional bodies was their self-regulatory status.
Not only did this create conflict internally for both organisations, but their statutory
responsibilities were not as clear cut as they had been with the River Authorities. A
Water Authority could not take action against itself and even-handedness was in
question. Additionally, self-regulation was seen to be an advantage to the Treasury
who didn't want to see costs increasing (see 7.3.7). The collusion by government in
compromising standards, particularly the delay in implementing part II of COPA
(see 4.7.7), could only create cynicism amongst those professionals who believed it
their role to protect the river. This contradictory role created its own tensions
between directorates (see 8.3.6) and within divisions (see 7.3.7).
9.3.6 conclusion on ideological preservation
The inertia of the integration period illustrates the importance of organisational
history in its future development and that organisations can only be understood in
light of their early phases and subsequent evolution (Stinchcombe, 1965; Kimberly,
1979; Lawrence, 1984; Zald, 1987). Despite the revolutionary character of IRBM it
could not realise its full potential within the regional bodies without a corresponding
change in management ideology. The timescale for formation necessitated a
decentralisation policy and structure which made the locus of power ambiguous.
This illustrates the importance of organisational form in the preservation of ideology
and power. The lack of coherence between and within the hierarchy was not helped
by the large member grouping which preserved a political context long familiar
under municipal ownership. These new organisations lacked new identities from
which management could draw alternative rules and resources to take action. Also
the leadership lacked experience of corporate management, let alone the skills
required for cultural change. The social identity of the authorities was poor and
bedeviled by a contradictory status. The response of management may be seen very
much in the fight-flight mode - turning inwards into political conflict, or fleeing to
national industry committees. This supports Selznick's (1957) findings that early
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political and social processes largely determine organisational strategy and patterns
of subsequent activities. The real problem was that the internal and external
contexts in replicating the past, appeared to provide no alternative social structures
from which managers could draw for inspiration.
From a Realist perspective, the principles of IRBM lay dormant during the
integration period, being overshadowed by opposing mechanisms maintaining
insularity and separation of divisions (Bhaskar, 1978). This supports the work on
ideological resistance to organisational change (Jonsson and Lundin, 1977;
Brunsson, 1982; Pettigrew, 1986; Starbuck, Greve and Hedberg, 1988) for fear of
dismembering organisational values, assumptions and paradigms. The founding
ideology in this study was as important as a founding strategy (Boeker, 1989) in
limiting or encouraging organisational change. In this way, ideologies may be seen
to fulfil the function of decisions and in so doing simplify choice and legitimise
action (Brunsson, 1982). If there was doubt about which course to take in the new
authorities, management needed only to look at tried and tested solutions, as they
did when deciding to preserve the inherited predecessor organisations.
9.4 Ideological Change
The ideological change evidenced after the privatisation of the industry took place
largely over 10 years from 1979 to 1989. This intervening period between the two
ideological systems occurred during the nationalisation, commercialisation and
privatisation phases, where the organisational ideologies are conceptualised as a
hybrid form. The current section discusses the suppression of the prevailing PH
ideology and the emergence of the Business ideology in the context of the wider
environment and organisational level developments. It is evident from the case
studies that the pace of ideological change accelerated markedly for Thames from
1985, with their privatisation campaign. This changed their relationship with the
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external environment and lent impetus to significant internal change. As in the
preceding section, ideological change will be examined as a function of the social
identities, structure, management and work practices of the regional authorities
(Brunsson, 1982). Additionally key organisational members will be considered and
their role in the promotion and suppression of ideology. Important in this are the
enabling rules and resources, or contradictions between them which inspired
agency.
9.4.1 social identities
Although Richardson et al (1992) argue that the seeds for radical change in the
water industry were sown in 1973, the notion of water as an 'economic good' did
not begin to bear fruit until the nationalisation period (see 4.9.6). There may be
discerned a distinct shift from 1979 towards a market approach in these
organisations (see 4.8.1-2), with at the same time a tightening of central
government control, culminating in nationalisation (see 4.8.5). Now the authorities
were truly state owned although their remit was still regional. The financial
restructuring devices to reduce costs had the effect of increasing water bills (see
4.8.2) and delaying capital works projects (see 4.8.3). Thus external perceptions of
the water industry did not improve. The removal of local authority membership also
lost the authorities any support they might have had against government control
(Kinnersley, 1989). The 1983 Water Act pushed the authorities towards an ethos
stressing commercialism. By excluding local authorities, economic considerations
became more important than technical ones and an enduring industry characteristic
was swept aside. This supports the findings of Shortell, Morrison and Friedman
(1990) where industry level changes were tightly interwoven with organisational
change and the aetiology of organisational change may be found in external political
and ideological influences.
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Internally, nationalisation was perceived by management as an increase in status
(see 7.4.5). New Chairmen were appointed from the private sector with the brief to
run the authorities like businesses and be commercial (see 4.9). However, this brief
was contradicted by the effect of the financial controls which acted to force up rates
to customers at prices faster than inflation (see 4.9). Also, levels of investment in
the industry were widely perceived as too low (see 4.9.1) and increased the
complaints about lack of accountability. Perhaps the only cost cutting measure
consistent with commercial business practice was the manpower reductions,
significant in both authorities and the subject of much distress. The most
pronounced effect of the new fmancial regime was a decline in the infrastructure
and the quality of effluents and rivers (see 4.9.4; 5.10.1; 7.5.4; 8.5.5). This not
only compounded the negative feelings in some quarters towards self-regulation and
the lack of accountability, but also contradicted the capitalist logics of the
authorities as businesses. Such contradictions were further reinforced by the notions
of capital and revenue derived from Treasury funding arrangements. Here the
authorities were required to borrow for maintenance and depreciation because
charges were being used to pay back government debt (see 7.5.2).
9.4.2 structure
A key characteristic of the emerging Business ideology was the propensity for
structural change within the organisations which is still evident in the private sector
(see 8.7.5). Throughout the 1980s both organisations increasingly centralised their
services, initially as efficiency measures and later to promote new management
styles as well. It required a number of major reorganisations on the part of both
organisations to make significant inroads into the dominant ideology.
The impetus to rationalisation in Severn Trent was the MMC report which had been
critical of decentralisation (see 7.4.3). This led to an initial restructuring with the
disbanding of Scientific Services in 1982, officially to rationalise resources but also
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with political motives (see 7.4.4). Despite the questionable nature of this regulatory
arrangement, it was a first step towards the integration of functions at headquarters.
At this time too, the Authority was shedding manpower in line with the required
efficiency measures (see 7.4.1) as was Thames, who reduced their divisions from
nine to six along geographical lines (see 8.4.2). Significantly for Thames, the MWB
was dismantled for the first time in this restructuring and, despite the culture
surviving for awhile, they lost an historic institution. In this way, both organisations
lost supporters of the PH ideology. Thames also integrated functions with the
merger of the operations and planning directorates. This served to neutralise much
executive conflict and resolved issues over big projects (see 8.4.2).
After the 1983 Act the commercialisation ethos gathered momentum within both
organisations. In Severn Trent the eight divisions were amalgamated into four
which became support for smaller operating districts (see 7.5.1). The Director of
Operations used the Gas and Electricity Boards as his models for creating centres of
excellence, thereby initiating one of the first moves from within that organisation to
adopt alternative structural properties for action. In dismantling the eight divisions
an important power base for the receptacle of the old ideology was lost. The
districts, in reducing costs and being required to interface with the customer, were
adopting the new rules of commercialisation.
In Thames similar efficiency measures resulted in reducing the divisions to four and
significantly, each was given its own profit and loss account. The new divisions
although more powerful in function were now controlled centrally by a support
services unit. Thames also established a marketing organisation to explore wider
commercial possibilities. This was combined with a wide ranging series of studies
to examine measures of operational efficiency (see 8.4.5). The transference of HQ
from London to Reading was a symbolic move as well as a cost saving one which
indicated a new era to the top management. Watts' idea to privatise all the
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authority's functions lay behind establishing a regulation and monitoring
department. The Conservancies were both reestablished to oversee leisure and
recreation on the rivers as growth businesses (see 8.5.3). This increasing
centralisation of both authorities undermined the power bases of divisions. Their
amalgamation into larger entities eroded beliefs around local knowledge while
rationalisation made diversified practices untenable. Increasingly, the structures
were being shaped around efficiency measures and enterprise possibilities as the
Authorities adopted capitalist logics of action.
The centralisation moves were not without their problems. In Severn Trent there
was the feeling that the four largest divisions could still "second guess" policy from
HQ (see 7.5.1). The situation was similar in Thames and two major reorganisations
following on from each other had meant a bewildering period for staff (see 8.5.3).
Ultimately both organisations increasingly centralised their non-operational
functions so that by privatisation the old divisional entities had disappeared (see
7.5.1; 8.6.1). They were replaced by more operationally focused districts
responsive to customer needs. The headquarters now assumed full responsibility for
planning, policy and finance, including all support functions. In this way both
Authorities created the basis for new organisational identities from capitalist logics
to lead them into privatisation.
9.4.3 management
The 1983 Act created an opportunity to initiate ideological change by removing the
political context of management and introducing outsiders into the organisations.
Both Bellak and Watts could utilise overlapping social identities to promote a new
commercial ethos. Similarly, during the privatisation process new CEOs from
outside the industry were crucial in driving the final transformations into private
sector companies (see 9.2.3.2).
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The influence of the LA Boards in preserving the old ethos is borne out by the
unsuccessful attempt of Thames' Chairman Edwards to operate without them (see
8.4.1). Also the failure of the CEO at this time, to unify the management team and
respond to problems, was indicative of his lack of any alternative management style
to call upon. Additionally both men lacked the psychological resources to inspire
change. In both Authorities in 1983 the new Chairmen made an immediate impact
upon management and staff. Both were very much "hands on". Bellak asked
questions about quality, customer service and the condition of underground assets
(see 7.4.5). Watts "hit the place like a bomb" with a programme of change and
massive redundancies (see 8.4.5). One of his first moves was to take 10% off
operating costs resulting in the first management cuts (see 8.4.5): in this way
hastening a rationalisation process which had begun during nationalisation (see
8.4.3), and supporting Pettigrew's (1986) contention that the first step in the change
process should build on existing processes. It is significant that both CEOs
withdrew from the new ideas. Don Reeve (STWA) increasingly became involved in
his professional association and Hugh Fish (TWA) resigned. However, the degree
of turbulence was far greater in Thames as they had many more changes of
management with external directors proving to be failures and two CEOs to Severn
Trent's one (see 8.5.1).
The new Chairs with backing from their Board now placed new demands upon
management. The rules of a commercial enterprise required the executive to think
in an entrepreneurial fashion (see 8.5.1) and to act on behalf of their organisations
rather than profession. In return, the executive were supplied with resources of
greater powers (see 7.4.5) and management style packages (see 8.5.1). In this way
the rule cultures were demolished and a commercial basis for managerial legitimacy
was replacing the technical and administrative ones. There was a clear demarcation
of power and responsibility between the Board and executive with greater policy
direction: thus the significance of the remark made by the Severn Trent interviewee
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that "one could almost physically see the organisation now" (see 7.4.5) and of
Thames "for the first time ever we had got direction" (see 8.5.1). A clarity of
management action, in contrast to the non-action of the previous era, may be seen to
foster the first dawnings of organisational identities: in this way, demonstrating the
importance of shared frameworks in storing cultural information (Duncan and
Weiss, 1979; Shrivastava and Schneider, 1984).
The transformation of the executive, then, was initiated by an increase in power and
responsibility. Lines of reporting were extended in Thames, destroying the tall tree
structure. The fmancial rules imported into the authorities also played a part, where
in Severn Trent they necessitated executive coordination (see 7.5.2). In Thames a
new Personnel Director aimed to build the capability of the management group so
that they might be "the engine house of change" (see 8.5.1). In line with
entrepreneurial developments management were required to develop growth
businesses and improve accountability. Other private sector principles involved
emphasis on planning and the customer (see 8.4.5) and the introduction, albeit
cautiously, of the notion of profits (see 8.5.1). Private sector style rewards followed
with Thames pulling out of national wage bargaining in 1987, allowing the
introduction of performance related pay, more tailored to business needs and
objectives (FT 5/12/87). These resources made available to management and
personnel served to reinforce the emerging ideology (Sewell, 1992).
Within divisions a similar transformation was occurring. There was a distinct move
from engineers and technical managers to heads with management skills (see 8.4.9).
The favourable redundancy packages cleared out managers committed to the PH
ideology. In their place younger men were promoted from within the organisation
thus ensuring their commitment to the new ideology: thereby supporting Pettigrew
and Whipp's (1991) findings that involving action by people at every level is a
critical leadership task in managing organisational change. Here too, the financial
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rules necessitated commercial practices. Each division now had to produce a
corporate plan for three years. Performance aims made divisions aware of costs and
they could now compete on this basis.
The commercial aspirations of both organisations were soon perceived to be
thwarted by government financial controls. Both Bellak and Watts began to be
concerned at financing arrangements which prevented the organisations from
meeting their long-term strategies. Indeed, finance was perceived as a stumbling
block to change (see 7.4.2) by preventing a "needs driven culture" from being
established. Although the organisations were moving towards self financing they
were not able to finance their capital programmes because they had to use the
money to repay debt. In Severn Trent the executive began to question Treasury
decis ions (see 7.5.2). The final straw occurred in 1985 when the government forced
the authorities to increase charges t short notice (see 4.9.7). This was described by
Bellak as "incredibly clumsy and hamfisted" (The Independent 15/12/86). Watts
went further and forced a debate on privatisation in the House. By claiming
government were using WAs as tax collectors, Watts was able to exploit the
contradictions between government attempts to commercialise the authorities and
their financial controls. As the first of the authorities to move towards debt
repayment, Watts could point to the success of the organisation' s efficiency
measures, while questioning government's motives. This initiative from one part of
the industry reflected the values of new managers (Richardson et al, 1992) who had
picked up the gauntlet of commercialisation laid down by government. Roy Watts'
thus demonstrates Whittington' s (1992) greater sense of managerial agency in
exploiting contradictions between the structural properties of the organisation and
the rules governing resources. In proposing privatisation Watts was defying
immediate system logics of a public service, intrinsic to water industry ideology and
promoting the very capitalist logics so clumsily grafted on to the authorities by
government.
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With Thames' privatisation campaign, the pace and depth of ideological change
accelerated considerably. In an organisation previously racked by bitter acrimony,
the campaign had profound consequences for organisational members (see 8.5.4). It
made significant inroads into the dominant ideology at Thames by transforming
their negative social identity. The previously passive water authority was now
challenging government and attracting positive public attention. The change in
image was perceived as "remarkable" and captured the imagination of management.
The stories told about Thames" privatisation campaign contained within them
elements of the new ideology (Clark, 1972): government a bad owner, Thames a
champion of the consumer, private capital could expand the base of business. The
various PR tactics used (see 8.5.4) were unknown in the water industry as the
previously introverted organisation was now looking outward and championing its
customers. These tactics were symbolic in compelling action and changing attitudes
(Pettigrew, 1979). Although regarded with scepticism by the rest of the industry, as
the privatisation debate gained momentum, Thames was seen to set the agenda with
external politics. The very notion of privatising water struck at the heart of PH
values. Where the rest of the industry saw Thames as "smashing the institution"
(see 8.5.4), management could argue the case for commercialisation on the basis of
their own achievements while at the same time, point to government as the
stumbling block to the fulfilment of these aims. Thus government was a bad owner
and privatisation would provide not only management opportunities but benefits to
the customer and the economy (see 8.5.4). The campaign therefore acted as a
symbolic crossing over to the new ideology and a means to encodify the problematic
nature of public sector ownership in organisational memory (Dandridge, 1983;
Wilkins, 1983).
The man behind the privatisation campaign behaved as a maverick, without
deference to the rest of the industry because he saw it as a personal crusade. As an
outsider to the industry Roy Watts was not concerned with the consequences of
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dismembering ideological principles. He had been embittered from his previous
experience with BA, was nearing retirement and wanting to reassert his capabilities.
He was therefore cavalier about possible government retribution (see 8.5.4) and his
lack of emotional attachment to the industry perhaps allowed him to take risks.
Watts thus had tremendous psychological resources alongside his managerial ones.
The same feelings underlay his determination to make the rivers private, so that
when his ideas for the tideway were thwarted by Ridley, it was more of a personal
disappointment than any ambitions which he held for Thames (see 8.5.5).
The managerial transformation within the authorities gathered apace during
privatisation, in both organisations hastened by the arrival of new CEOs from the
private sector. Despite the previous changes, both men discovered stark remnants of
the administrative management style. For instance, Rod Paul found decision making
cumbersome, being still bedeviled by intellectualism. There was also a resistance
from the management team to explain the details of their decision making (see
7.6.1). An inability to delegate, loose team working and a preoccupation with
getting things right, all called for new managerial instruments (see 7.6.2).
Similarly, Mike Hoffman found the withholding of information being used as a
means to retain power (see 8.6.4), together with a lack of delegation (see 8.6.1) and
ineffectiveness in dealing with organisational problems (see 8.6.4). Thames initiated
extensive management training programmes at all levels, project base roles and a
major IT programme. Both CEOs saw it as vital that managers who would be taking
these organisations into the private sector shared the cultural values of their
organisations. So it was that more changes in personnel were required to establish
appropriate management teams (see 8.6.1; 7.6.2).
Resources too were significant in increasing the pace of cultural change. The
availability of capital resources and the sheer size of the capital works programme
necessitated further centralisation of engineering. Both organisations could now
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adopt the full range of business activities from investment appraisal and planning to
levels of service targets and standards (see 7.6; 7.6.3; 8.6.1): the latter being
crucial for a private company to remain within the law. Directors now had to
manage within an appropriate level of risk, financial as well as quality, balanced
against expenditure. In this way, resources were critical in sustaining the rules of
the new structures into the private sector (Sewell, 1992).
9.4.4 work practices
The work practices of the water authorities followed many of the rules as laid down
by the NPM trend of the 1980s (see 6.4.2-3). These included explicit standards and
measures of performance, emphasis on outputs @erformance indicators) and greater
discipline and parsimony in resource (cutting costs, resisting union demands,
limiting compliance costs to business and raising labour discipline). The notion of
management increasingly permeated down to the lower levels of the organisations,
such that operatives now had a managerial component to their work. They were
required to feel ownership for their works performance, in Severn Trent managers
were put on a bonus to achieve levels of compliance (see 7.6.4), in Thames teams
of people were set to manage works (see 8.7.2) and compete on performance. The
structural properties of contemporary academic management have been utilised to
import empowerment, multiskilling and learning into the organisations. The very
language of which serves to store and reproduce learned cultural information
(Donellon, 1986) and support shared beliefs (Pettigrew, 1979; Pondy and Mitroff,
1979; Meyer, 1982; Pfeffer, 1981; Whipp et al, 1989). These structural properties
acted to engage staff on a daily basis with the new ideology.
9.4.5 conclusion on ideological change
Although much of the impetus for organisational change came from the new
financial rules, this could not have been so radical without the importation of
capitalist ideas by managers from outside the industry. Crucial to those ideas was
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the establishment of organisational identities by restructuring and the new
management processes. The ideological change was rendered complete with the
final transformation of identity into private sector organisations, also driven by new
leaders with personal and professional resources. There is some doubt within both
organisations of the wholesale acceptance of ideological change (see 7.7.2; 8.7.6)
and a certain degree of anxiety around the threat of redundancies. However it is
clear that above the middle tier, management must "read the creed" or leave.
Increasingly, technology structure and processes made it difficult for even
operatives not to work in prescribed ways. The privatised water companies are
centralised in terms of policy and planning and decentralised in terms of
responsibility and service delivery.
It has been borne out by section 3 that the duration of the commercialisation period
for the authorities was considerably shorter than the reorientation which preceded it.
In structuralist terms, the nationalisation phase installed the mechanisms (rules) for
the commercialisation of the authorities. However, the removal of the local
authority Boards, and the new financial controls, set in motion the basis for further
change because of the inherent contradictions between the ethos and government
imposed fmancial rules. In this way, the effects or resources of the nationalised
structures did not reinforce their continued existence (Sew elI, 1992). They became
vulnerable to further change, hastened by the ideology of the political context.
9.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, organisational ideology has been defined in terms of intersecting
structures at multi-contextual levels over time, to form a coherent set of beliefs,
values and management styles which underpin organisational action. In this sense,
ideology is the building block of structure, being comprised of the rules of
organisational life. This relates to Dunbar, Dutton and Torbert' s (1982) analogy
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between ideology and paradigm, thereby assigning fundamental and pervasive
attributes to this concept.
As social systems evolve so does the character of industry ideology. It has been
shown how the water industry cultivated an ideology over 130 years, influenced by
political and economic developments, and the emergence of professional bodies and
associations. The structural properties evoked by these overlapping social systems
were shown to influence the emergence of the PH ideology within organisational
forms, dominant at reorganisation. In particular, the intersection with the public
sector had been the most important factor in influencing the development of
management styles. The subsequent development of the case study organisations
over 20 years, indicates how the pattern and structure of organisations reflect the
value systems of the dominant social structures (Burns, 1967). The fashion for
corporate management in the 1970s was evident in the headquarters of the water
authorities, while the NPM movement and monetarist principles shaped the changes
in the 1980s leading to privatisation. In particular, the changes which occurred
during nationalisation and commercialisation show the relationship between the
dominant political ideology and the nature of management tasks and roles: thereby
supporting the early literature on the relationship between social structures and
organisations (Bendix, 1956; Crozier, 1964).
The inertia of the integration period demonstrates the powerful influence of
founding ideologies in shaping subsequent organisational activities and the
reinforcing effect of organisational form and work practices in perpetuating the
structure. The crucial difference in the capacity for change between the two
ideologies explored here suggests an important property of ideology. During
integration the case study organisations maintained the same structural arrangements
and working practices, unlike the commercialisation period which was characterised
by ongoing incremental changes toward further efficiency and effectiveness. The
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PH ideology was not conducive to adaption to environmental contingencies with its
emphasis on locality, introversion and insularity. This was manifested by the
overmanning and lack of rationalisation almost 10 years after reorganisation. In
structurationist terms, its rules were not easily transposable to the new context
envisaged by IRBM (Sewell, 1992). This lends support to Sewell's (1992)
contention that structures endure due to the power and depth of their rules
(schemas). In the same way that Sewell accounts for the durability of capitalism by
the exceptional transposability of its rules governing the conversion of use value
into exchange value, so too does the commercialisation of the case study
organisations in their intersection with capitalist log ics display similar properties.
Commercial rules respected no functional boundaries and could be applied to all
tasks at all levels of the organisations. For instance, once the notion of outputs
superseded inputs as the criteria for performance, then how tasks were delegated
and executed was open to a variety of interpretations and hence change. Similarly
managerial allegiance to the organisation, rather than their profession, was less
restrictive in accepting organisational change: particularly where change itself
became an inherent property of the new ideology (see 6.7; 7.6.2). In this way, the
rules adopted by the authorities were of a more transposable nature, supporting
Brunsson's (1982) assertion that the most stable ideologies are those which are
vague and widely acceptable, ie transposable to varying circumstances. In this way,
sharper, more definite and particular ideologies are easier to question and eventually
debunk in the face of a changing reality: as they were in the new political context of
the industry after 1979.
The development pattern of the organisations supports Jonsson and Lundin's (1977)
findings that organisations periodically jump from one predominant ideology to
another and that radical changes have to be preceded by and initiated by ideological
shifts (Pettigrew, 1986). This ideological shift began during nationalisation which
lasted some four years until removal of the local authority Boards, followed by a
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relatively short convergent period. However, this pattern of development suggests a
reappraisal of organisational evolution described by the punctuated equilibrium
model, where organisations pass through long convergent periods punctuated by
short periods of discontinuous change. The present study shows organisations
passing through longer periods of recreation than of convergence (Fig 9.1). For the
case studies, this reflected the influence of the external political context over several
years of public sector reforms. That the commercialisation period was curtailed by
privatisation has been discussed in terms of the inherent vulnerability of the
nationalised structure to change (see 9.4.5). The implications for the punctuated
equilibrium model are, firstly, that it must take account of the possibility of long
term external contingencies effecting extended change periods within organisations;
and, secondly, that the duration of the convergent periods are dependent upon the
stability of the organisational structure instigated by the previous change period.
This suggests caution in assuming the normative patterns of development suggested
by the punctuated equilibrium model: rather, that organisations may be subject to
unpredictable variations in the length of equilibrium versus change periods,
particularly in turbulent environments.
High
Change
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Change
Incremental
1973 7475767778798081 8283 8485868788899091 9293 94
Fig 9.1 Convergence and Change in Severn Trent and Thames 1973 - 1994
Key: ............failed change
change
The developments within the case study organisations demonstrate how an ideology
may used by management to Legitimise power, to create inertia, to avoid action, to
instigate and also implement change. Action arises out of the contradiction within
Chapter 9: Organisational Ideology Page 487
and between structural properties and this contradiction was shown to grow with the
changes in the political system after 1979. The water authority structure in retaining
so many of the properties from systems in the industry and external contexts of
previous decades, became increasingly ill-suited to their regional context, with their
ambiguous social status. They therefore failed to deliver effective services at a price
promised by IRBM and were vulnerable to change from the political system. The
impact of leaders from outside the industry was crucial in introducing new
structural properties which would underpin the new ideology. They derived their
agency from personal resources such as experience and status which were further
reinforced by the outcomes which they effected. In Watts' case the privatisation
campaign was a powerful rite of passage propelling Thames into the private sector.
But even more important was the ability to exploit the internal contradictions
between the PH ideology and integration to introduce a commercial ethos: then to
exploit the contradictions between the internal and external contexts posed by
nationalisation of the industry, to effect second order change or recreation.
The case studies illustrate how organisational contradictions and ambiguities may be
either accepted as forces for inertia or exploited as forces for change, as well as the
importance of leaders with personal and psychological resources to inspire and
revitalise. Foremost for the water authorities, ideological change required the
establishment of a coherent organisational identity. The PH ideology and structure
acted to fragment the authorities in the absence of organisational identities. The
Business ideology demanded integration as an intrinsic rule of its logics.
Organisational action is enabled by the resources of agents and properties made
available by the context. That is, when properties are sufficiently transposable and
where agents possess both personal powers and those conferred by the organisation,
then it remains only for agents to possess the capacity to utilise their agential
powers to effect the potential change inherent in the system.
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10. PROCESSES OF STRATEGIC AGENDA BUILDING
10.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to derive insights into the processes of strategic agenda building by
analysing the trajectory of the river water quality issue in the two case study
organisations. Here we go back to the questions originally inspired by Dutton's
(1988a) model (see 2.5.4). Specifically this study focuses on the question, what makes
different organisations attend to different strategic issues? This has implications for
the related question, how in the same organisation do different issues command
different amounts of attentional resources? Finally, the third of Dutton's questions on
the implications of the above for managing organisational change will be discussed in
the following chapter.
The analytical framework follows that of the previous chapter in employing a
structurationist account of strategic agenda building and, specifically, the means by
which managerial agency is derived for the promotion and suppression of strategic
issues. As an issue intrinsic to the functioning of the water authorities river quality
was inherently viable for agenda inclusion. The amount of attention allocated to this
issue at any one time would be indicated by internal reporting and the subsequent
achievement of river water quality objectives in the long term. Thus while river
quality may never actually leave the strategic agenda, its importance within the
agenda structure varied over time with the amount of attentional resources, manifest
in the results of survey data.
The chapter begins by conceptualising the trajectory of river water quality and how
this is manifested at both the industry and organisational levels drawing links between
them both. Conclusions are drawn as to the particular attributes of river water quality,
thereby highlighting the nature of the issue content survey. Next a case is put forward
for the basis upon which the two case study organisations may be compared in terms
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of their performance in attending to river water quality. The following section
conducts the comparative analysis and focuses on the way in which river water quality
was kept alive in Severn Trent. A section is then devoted to the way in which river
water quality was suppressed in both organisations. Finally, conclusions are drawn as
to the implications for a model of strategic agenda building.
10.2 The Trajectory of River Water Quality
The pattern of interest and exposure which the river water quality issue has aroused in
the case study organisations has been described as having a trajectory. This is
conceptualised as actions taken in relation to river water quality placing it higher or
lower on the strategic agenda. Important too is the temporal dimension which is
implicit throughout this study. In this way, the issue is analysed in terms of process
and context, the two being interdependent with each other. It is therefore important
that the trajectory of this issue is seen in its historical and industry contexts as these
relate to the organisational contexts. This refers to the propositions raised in chapter 3:
What are the links between the outer context and organisational context, and what
features of the outer context are responsible for increases or decreases in the degree of
issue receptivity over time (see 3.4)? Evidence for the trajectory of river water quality
is based on historical documents, interview analysis and the results of surveys
conducted by the MHLG in 1958; the Department of the Environment in 1970a, 71a,
72, 1975, 1979; the National Water Council in 1980; the Department of the
Environment in 1985 and the National Rivers Authority in 1990. The survey results
reflect changes into higher or lower river classes (Appendix 5.5) during the period
between surveys. However, the science of water quality is such that the causes of
quality changes may not always be attributed to events or actions during the period
surveyed (see following section) but must be seen in a longer time period. In this
respect water quality is not an exact science and requires taking many subjective
observations into account.
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10.2.1 industry context
At the industry level the trajectory of river quality has its origins in the conflict
between those who believe in absolute standards and those for whom standards are
relative to some other measure, such as average annual quality or stream usage.
Indeed, the definition of water quality described in chapter 5 highlights the fact that
different users may adopt different criteria. The concern with river water quality is a
communal issue which has conflicted throughout the history of the water industry
with the political and economic social systems and through their influence, the
technical and scientific evaluation of the issue.
From the emergence of the issue in the early 19th century, the conflict between the
desire for pollution control and the protection of industry from heavy costs by local
government was reflected in weak legislation which did little to improve quality until
the latter half of the 20th century (see 5.3, 5.4, 5.6). This situation was repeated in the
related issue of sewage effluent quality, where a lack of funding for municipal
authorities and a lack of political will, contributed to the deterioration of this sub-
sector (see 5.6). There was a further ambiguity surrounding the local authority remit
and the welfare of the river basin as a whole (see 5.6). Even in the transition from
single agency to river basin management, the institutions created from 1948 to
oversee the rivers were failed by weak legislation and economic expediency (see 5.5;
5.6.2; 5.7; 5.8; 5.8.6).
In 1958 with the formation of the DoE quality classes (Appendix 5.3), it had been the
intention to bring all streams to a class 1 state (see 5.7.4). Over the years the economic
consequences of this aim became evident, so that by the late 1 970s the goals of most
water authorities were the elimination of class 4 (grossly polluted) rivers and an
increase in class I and 2 rivers. Thus over time, the scope of actions in relation to
river quality was reinterpreted in line with economic expediency. Reorganisation of
the water industry served to combine conflicting interests around river quality within
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the same organisation (see 9.3.1). The internal tension thus created, not only
contradicted the traditional "policing" role of the regulators but also the process of
integration itself. During the life of the water authorities the economic system was
prominent in driving developments, including the deferment of COPA 2 (see 5.8) and
the technical measures instigated to establish a common quantitative philosophy. In
this, the collusion of the political system with the water authorities was instrumental
in weakening their self-regulating ability (see 5.8.7).
That the water authorities had a choice in addressing river quality has been defended
by Kinnersley (1988), who argues that their judgements were far from rigorous (see
5.9). Despite the constraints of the financial regime, Kinnersley points to the lack of
alternative sources of funding explored by the WAs, such as metering, particularly its
overseas experience, as well as the reticence in attending to improving charges for
trade effluent disposal to sewers, or promoting in Britain the concept of charging for
discharges direct to rivers (118-9). Thus the authorities chose to maintain their
dependence on local-authority type levies and constraining service-related charges.
Moreover, they ignored developing economic tools in their dependence on consents
(see 5.9). In this way it is evident that the water authorities did not seek engagement
with any structures outside their industry to combat their financial difficulties.
Kinnersley argues they were more concerned with demonstrating their maturity and
management competence to government (1988:120). They neither explored alternative
rules and resources, nor sought to right the internal contradictions of their existing
ones. In so doing they in effect limited their own choices (Bhaskar, 1978).
Survey Data
A steady improvement in the state of the rivers had occurred prior to reorganisation
(see 5.6.4) as evidenced by the 1970, '71 and '72 surveys compared to the first in
1958. However, these improvements were by 1970 deemed too slow to meet the
demand for water resources and were a key impetus for the formation of the regional
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authorities. Thus on reorganisation of the industry, river water quality was considered
an urgent issue. This was manifested during the integration phase by much discussion
and debate on the classification scheme, quality limits and river quality objectives (see
5.8.5). Although the sense of urgency would be somewhat abated by the discovery in
the mid-70s that the need for water resources was overestimated.
The first survey in the life of the authorities, conducted by the Department of the
Environment in 1975, shows an overall decline in total lengths of non-tidal rivers
classified as grossly polluted or in real need of urgent attention; although this was
offset by some deteriorations of quality in some stretches of high quality rivers, while,
non-tidal rivers showed a steady improvement in grossly polluted stretches
(Department of the Environment, 1975:6). The second survey, conducted by the NWC
in 1980, shows no change from 1975, indicating that RQOs set in 1977 had not been
achieved, although there were no deteriorations. However, the 1985 DoE survey
revealed the first significant deteriorations since 1958 throughout the country. In the
intervening years, limited progress had been made towards achieving RWQ
improvements and compliance with sewage works consents. This poor performance
was attributed nationally to cuts in capital expenditure and the delay in implementing
part 2 of COPA which would allow authorities to be prosecuted. It was only with the
introduction of part 2 in 1986 that capital spending within the industry was allowed to
rise.
Here the temporal nature of the river water quality issue is significant. Unlike many
definitions of strategic issues (see 2.5.1) which regard them as jolts (Meyer, 1982) or
crises, RWQ is very much a development or trend (Dutton & Webster, 1988), as
opposed to a single event. The cumulative and incremental nature of water quality,
apart from gross pollution incidences, does not signal immediate organisational action
and this fact was exploited by the DoE in deferring capital spending in that direction
(see 5.10.2 & fig 4.1). Deferment of capital spending by the DoE had the effect of
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RWQ being perceived, by those under pressure to curb capital spending and to
prioritise RWQ amongst many other issues, as a minor, long term and complex issue
(Huff, 1982). Thus the results of the 1985 survey may be regarded as a "jolt",
although to those in pollution control and regulation this was to some extent
anticipated.
With the advent of privatisation the industry changed from a focus on efficiency to
achieving consents compliance as part of the new capital programmes. The last survey
conducted by the National Rivers Authority in 1990 revealed that the pace of
deterioration had accelerated since 1985, which was attributed to reduced expenditure
on sewage treatment (National Rivers Authority, 1991a: 28). This survey was
conducted too soon to reflect the impact of the investment programmes of the new
Water Services Companies. Thus both the 1985 survey (showing a net 2% decline)
and the 1990 survey (showing a net 4% decline) reflect the reduced investment by the
water authorities between 1976 and 1985. In the same way as increased investment
from 1987 was not reflected in the 1990 survey, so the decline in investment in the
latter half of the 1970s was not reflected in the 1980 survey. What can be argued is
that the worsening trend of the 1990 survey reflects an increasing neglect of water
quality through the commercialisation period. These conclusions highlight the close
relationship of river water quality to the performance of sewage works and effluent
quality.
The results of surveys from 1958 to 1990 are summarised in Appendix 5.5. It is not
possible to compare the results from all the years directly, because the classification
systems were changed in 1980. However, there was a trend for a small but steady
improvement in water quality from 1958 through to 1980, but since 1980 this trend
has not continued. The three surveys carried out between 1980 and 1990 used
essentially the same classification methodology: it is therefore possible to compare the
results directly. The reports of the 1985 and 1990 surveys suggest a decline of nearly
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4% since 1985. These results suggest that a real net deterioration in river quality has
occurred over the last decade (National Rivers Authority, 1991a: 21-22).
10.2.2 organisational performance
The critical data for the organisational context are the 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990
surveys. They reflect organisational actions taken from the formation of the
authorities until the late 1980s. The case studies show a similar pattern of performance
to that of the industry as a whole (fig 10.1). They do, however, differ markedly in
their performance over time. For a meaningful comparison to be made between the
two organisations it is necessary to consider the baseline of quality from which both
began. The 1975 Department of the Environment survey shows that both Severn Trent
and Thames had made modest improvements since the 1972 survey in non-tidal rivers
(1.5% and 4.3% respectively: 8-9) and dramatic improvements in tidal rivers (26%
and 63% respectively: 11-12). Although this last is a small fraction of the total river
length in both authorities. However, it is evident that Severn Trent started life from a
much poorer base than Thames Water Authority. For while the Thames had shown
significant improvements since World War II (see 8.1), the Trent was historically a
heavily polluted river and markedly so in comparison to the Severn on reorganisation
(see 7.1). In both organisations inherited sewage works were poor, around half
producing unsatisfactory effluents (see 7.2.1; 8.2.3). However, the Midlands suffered
from the effects of industry and Severn Trent found it had, in addition, very poor
industrial effluents. Thames, meanwhile, had benefitted from the attentions of the
Thames Conservancy and Port of London Authority. In addition, the visibility of the
river in the capital and the far greater amount of recycled drinking water, made for a
greater concern for river water quality prior to reorganisation.
Annual reports for Severn Trent show modest improvements in river quality for the
years 1974-77, with significant improvements in the following two years. Thames
annual reports record quality being maintained from 1973 until 1986/87. Results from
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the 1980 NWC survey show no net quality changes for either authority (National
Water Council, 1980:14). The poorer baseline meant that Severn Trent was always
going to achieve improvements more readily than Thames. What is not obvious is
why there was a more dramatic decline in Thames' river quality throughout the 1980s
or, conversely, why Severn Trent's rivers did not similarly deteriorate.
Severn Trent from 1979/80 report RWQ improvement as steady until 1983/4 when it
slows for the remainder of the life of the Authority. Throughout, the performance of
sewage works in the effluent quality produced mirrors these developments. Thames
on the other hand report their river quality as "generally satisfactory" apart from the
1986/87 report indicating a downturn in RQOs achieved. They also report consents
failures from this time until 1992. By the 1985 survey the two organisations have
polarised in performance, such that Severn Trent exhibit a net 3% improvement of
rivers changing class (see 7.5.4), while Thames show a net -3% deterioration of rivers
changing class (see 8.5.5).
Within Severn Trent these results are perceived as poor as the achievement of
RWQOs have all turned down. Within the organisation pollution control attributed the
bulk of non achievement to the impact of sewage on the rivers (see 7.5.4). The DoE
reported that deteriorated works would be restored by the end of 1986, except where
capital works require a longer time scale (Department of the Environment, 1985: 22).
The result of the survey for Thames is somewhat worse given their initial better base
and the contrary information in their annual reports. The estuary had held its own but
the tributaries were affected by increasing urbanisation which the authority's sewage
works could not cope with. Prospects for Thames were for substantial river quality
improvements by 1990/9 1, the aim being to achieve RQOs (Department of the
Environment, 1985: 24). However, the 1990 river survey shows Thames with a net -
14% deterioration in river length changing class, while Severn Trent show a net 1%
improvement, due to improvements in sewage treatment. These last results are subject
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to some qualification: in the Severn Trent region the rivers were remeasured since
1985 and it was found that class 3 rivers had been underestimated. If the old incorrect
lengths had been retained in both the 1985 and 1990 surveys, the 1% net improvement
in river quality would be transformed to a 2% net deterioration (National Rivers
Authority, 1991a: 33-35). Thus in Severn Trent there is a slowing of the positive trend
in improvements since 1985.
In the case of Thames, their greatly increased monitoring programme since 1990 (575
sites compared with 213 in 1985) was seen to be responsible for over half the changes
in river class. Those stretches not monitored in 1985 were either assumed to be in
their target class or to retain the class assigned in 1980. Thus some of the changes
reported in 1990 could have occurred prior to 1985 (National Rivers Authority,
1991a: 3 8-39). It may therefore be assumed that an even larger net decline in river
quality occurred in Thames region between 1980 and 1985 with a correspondingly
smaller net decline between 1985 and 1990. Thames therefore shows a pattern of
steady deterioration since 1980. The last quinquennial deteriorations were attributed
to unusual weather, poor effluent quality and the increased monitoring programme.
The performance of the two organisations is depicted graphically in fig 10.1 and in
relation to industry trends. Although Severn Trent begins from a poorer base in 1973,
they showed initial improvements and subsequent performance in both authorities by
1980 is static. Between 1980 and 1985 there are marked deteriorations evident in
Thames while Severn Trent shows a small improvement. Between 1985 and 1990
both organisations show a declining trend, although Thames show far more significant
deteriorations. Thus given the relative baseline of quality from which both
organisations began, Thames has performed less well than Severn Trent in showing
significant and sustained deterioration in river water quality since 1980.
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Fig 10.1 Performance in river quality by industry 1973-1990 and Severn Trent & Thames,
1975-90.
10.2.3 issue attributes
The issue of river water quality was intrinsic to the role of the water authorities. It
gave impetus to the formation of the authorities and the principle of IRBM upon
which they were formed (see 5.7). In this sense river quality was not a new or
surprising issue. What was new was the responsibility for its guardianship by
organisations also involved in other aspects of the water cycle. This dual
responsibility was the source of much debate inside the industry and outside, in the
form of various stakeholder groups such as anglers and environmentalists (see 5.7.3).
The importance of river quality, then, lay in its management. Could the self regulating
organisations improve the rivers where the former River Authorities had failed? More
specifically, could the water authorities regulate their own discharges and that of
industry equally to improve the river? The challenge for the new water authorities was
to integrate all the functions of the water cycle for the benefit of consumers and the
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river. In this way, river quality was intertwined, initially with water resources (see
5.8.2) and always with effluent quality, the condition of sewers and the sewerage
infrastructure (see 5.8.5). Management of this issue would involve understanding the
effects of the different aspects of the water cycle upon the river: balancing priorities
and long term plans. Thus the questions for analysis are not about whether this issue
was on the agenda - reorganisation ensured that it would be - but the salience of river
quality in relation to other issues. In other words how high or low on the
organisations' agenda was the issue rated and why?
The river water quality issue has several key dimensions which must be
acknowledged. Taking consideration of Dutton's (1988a) issue characteristics:
magnitude, abstractness, simplicity and immediacy gives an indication of the potential
salience of the issue for the water authorities. The temporal dimension has been seen
to mitigate against action to sustain RWQ: the long time lags have tended to decrease
the urgency or immediacy of the issue for government and in turn the water
authorities. The assessment of water quality is not an exact science and its
methodology has been improved with successive surveys since the first in 1958
(Department of the Environment, 1985), while the complexity and evolving nature of
this science has meant that there is much scope for debate as to the magnitude of the
perceived impact of the issue. For instance will fish kills result? Also, RWQ may be
seen to be very abstract, ie non-specific in its determinants vis-a-vis effluent quality,
thereby activating a wide range of interest groups. However, the technical
sophistication involved in understanding the consent system, debates over river
classes and consent limits have ensured that the issue is not always easily
comprehended by organisational members. In this way river water quality came to be
seen as non-urgent, complex and abstract, with questionable magnitude.
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10.2.4 criteria for comparative analysis
A distinct difference in RWQ performance has been indicated between Thames and
Severn Trent during the 1 980s. Given the demonstrated time lag between action and
effect, the relevant time period for analysis covers the period of the organisations in
the public sector. It is impossible to give precise time frames for the relevant surveys
but a general pattern suggests a time lag of several years before the effects of
expenditure are revealed. Thus the 1980 survey must reflect the period from the
formation of the authorities until the late 1970s. The 1985 survey reflects that period
from the late 1 970s until nationalisation while the 1990 survey reflects the
commercialisation phase 1983-7. In line with the historical emphasis of this study it is
assumed that actions taken during one time period will have a bearing on the next.
Analysis of the industry and organisational contexts reveal a similar pattern in the
trajectory of river water quality. Only Severn Trent stands out as markedly different
from this pattern in the 1985 survey with a reverting to trend in the 1990 survey.
Given the similarity of the industry context for the case studies, an account of Thames'
poor performance relative to Severn Trent's requires a closer examination of the
internal context of the two organisations. At first glance these contexts show marked
similarities: the financial problems of the authorities, the inability to rationalise during
integration, lack of adequate regional information and problems of self regulation, to
name a few. Also the issue attributes themselves undermined its salience. It must be
emphasised that both organisations experienced problems with regulation in the
public sector and those whose job it was to maintain and improve quality always felt
compromised. How then might one account for the disparity in the trajectory of river
quality between Thames and Severn Trent? It is necessary to examine the career of the
issue within the two organisations more closely. For instance, what are the key
differences in how important signals are interpreted and acted upon? Which processes
of organisational life are significant? Also it is important to look at how river quality
was ignored or suppressed in both organisations, particularly during
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commercialisation. The question here is what elements of the agenda building process
elaborated in 2.5.5 are brought into play? The next section discusses how river
quality was kept high on the organisational agenda and is followed by a section
dealing with its decline on the agenda.
10.3 Maintaining the Salience of River Quality
An obvious starting point into investigating differences in performance between the
two organisations is the regulation function responsible for river water quality. Here
the leadership and actions on behalf of regulation are significant in issue sponsorship.
Equally important, however, is the managerial context in which this function must
operate. Dutton and Ashford (1993) have called for more research into understanding
how contexts affect processes of issue promotion: that is, the way in which the
organisational context facilitates or constrains the promotion of issues. The internal
context, in turn, may be seen to be influenced by the issue context itself. Thus these
contexts are conceptualised as interdependent and interacting over time but it will be
argued later (see 10.5.1) that there is much analytical value to be derived from
maintaining the distinctiveness of contexts. The initial favourable trajectory of Severn
Trent's performance and during commercialisation may be ascertained by a
comparison of the case studies' interdependent contexts.
10.3.1 issue context
It has been shown that at the formation of the authorities Thames and Severn Trent
had rather different river quality (see 10.2.2) and this had an inevitable impact on the
perceptions of management. Thames' CEO Morrison (1974), in an account to an
international symposium writes of the prior achievements of the Thames Conservancy
and the Port of London Authority as responsible for the current state of the Thames
being: ... cleaner than it has been for generations and the condition of waters is
improving every year (p55). Severn Trent's management, in contrast, were largely
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gloomy about the state of their inheritance, reflected in the first 3 years of Annual
Reports. Thus although both organisations had problems with their sewage works,
their resolution was perhaps more pressing for Severn Trent. As Dutton and Duncan
(1987b) suggest, organisations with prolonged periods of performance success have a
less radical response to a strategic issue than those which do not experience this
success pattern. The issue context at the formation of the authorities was therefore
important in shaping subsequent managerial perceptions of its future magnitude.
10.3.2 organisational context
The intertwining of river water quality with the other major functions of a water
authority makes consideration of the whole management context important. For how
top managers perceive strategic issues affects the range of solutions considered in an
organisation (Billings, Milburne, Schaalman, 1980) and influences the amount of
resources committed to a project (Staw & Ross, 1978). Severn Trent began life with a
history of problems in the rivers and a commitment to their resolution (see 7.3.7). In
Thames integration was described as a "passive" period (see 8.3.8) during which
management were preoccupied with internal conflicts and suffered from a sense of
inertia, attribued to a lack of external pressures (see 8.3.2). Thames' lack of historical
problems and introversion allowed their management to grow complacent, lacking the
drive and coherence necessary to anticipate and respond to problems (see 8.3.7). This
situation continued with new leadership, where under Fish the extent of the warring
intensified (see 8.4.1). Although he had been director of Scientific Services, Fish's
impact was seen as minimal. He had few personal resources to make inroads into the
prevailing culture, and as a scientist Fish lacked the management skills necessary to
unify a management team (see 8.4.1; 9.4.3). In this way Thames' organisational
context did not facilitate the promotion of river quality.
In contrast, Severn Trent, while experiencing similar internal conflicts (see 7.3.4),
never reached the same intensity of personal acrimony as in Thames (see 9.3.3).
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Severn Trent had also benefitted from an MMC enquiry during 1979-80, in which a
detailed investigation of their management processes led to a more objective view of
their strengths and weaknesses (see 7.4.3). Thus Severn Trent could instigate
managerial and structural reform at an earlier stage than Thames and also from within
the existing management team. The key difference between the organisations was the
perception of RWQ by Thames' managers, who by virtue of their glorious past, had
convinced themselves that sewage works problems were not a serious issue (see
8.4.4). This bears out the results of past research on the importance of history in
determining future organisational actions (see 2.3), and the theory that differences in
organisations' belief structures and levels of resources have a systematic influence on
organisational adaption (Dutton & Duncan 1987b). Given the similar levels of
resources in both organisations, a key variable here is the belief structure which
undermined organisational adaptation to deteriorating conditions. In this way, Thames
may have not been so prepared for the effects of the capital expenditure cuts in the
late 1970s.
10.3.3 the regulation function
Against the backdrop of the managerial context of the two organisations must be seen
the way in which they performed their regulatory function. In this respect there are
clear differences in terms of issue sponsorship between the two organisations. After
reorganisation river water quality is kept prominent in Severn Trent despite the water
resources issue falling off the agenda. This is due largely to the efforts of the Director
of Scientific Services who acted as a determined issue sponsor during the first ten
years of the authority. In terms of personal resources, Fred Lester of Severn Trent was
fairly evenly matched with his counterpart in Thames. Hugh Fish also came with a
distinguished career record and OBE. Both were considered as spokespersons within
the industry. The particular history of the Severn Trent region, and Lester's part in it,
lent him the image of a "crusader". In this he was supported by the first Chairman, Sir
William Dugdale, who had previously chaired the Trent RA and RA Pollution
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Committee and now persuaded the Board of the importance of river quality (see
7.2.1). In contrast, the suggestion by Fish to retain a firm of consultants as
"gamekeepers" was rejected by their water quality panel (see 8.3.6). The difference in
organisational actions to promote river quality must be seen in the light of these
divergent issue and management contexts.
Dutton (see 19 88a) has proposed that evidence for the allocation of an issue lies in its
being named, the commitment of managerial time, the collection of information on
the issue and that individuals are able to converse about an issue. Lester's initial
actions were to instigate the production of Water Quality reports (see 7.2.1),
something which few other water authorities did, a conduct:... which shone like a good
deed in a naughty world. Sadly this brave.and constructive initiative was scarcely
followed by others (Kinnersley, 1988:121). These reports, which continued
throughout the life of the authority, were both innovative and political. As one former
pollution officer and writer of these reports remembered: ... it was trying to show... the
brave new water authority was genuinely making some improvements. Certainly
Lester could appeal via these reports to his professional expertise and the undeniable
objective science upon which the data was based: and, in so doing, legitimise the
regulation function of the authority. As he himself stated: it gave strength to your
elbow (see 7.2.1). It is also significant that Lester championed the issue at formation
of the authority, for founding strategies play an important role in either limiting or
encouraging strategic change (Boeker, 1989). In this sense Lester mobilised his
resources of experience and expertise to produce a further resource in these reports.
In Severn Trent the collection of information was significant, for as Hilgartner &
Bosk (1988:62) testify:...the drama of an issue's presentation gives an issue life and
sustains its growth. More formalised data-based descriptions of an issue typically
follow such stories. Certainly the language of the early reports testifies to the drama
which was evoked around river quality: The Authority has a truly gargantuan task f
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the quality of our rivers is to be maintained and restored so that, where appropriate,
they may be used as raw water for safe and acceptable drinking water
supplies... (Severn Trent Water Authority, 1973b). Thereby they appealed to the public
health values of the organisation. Further, the Water Quality reports created a public
drama (see 7.2.1) by naming those industry and local authority dischargers who
refused to allow publication of their consents under the pre COPA II law. Indeed, the
public nature of this document meant Lester could hold up the imminent threat of
COPA 2 as a spur to action. In this way river quality became labelled as a threat. As a
result of the internal commitment to the rivers, resources were made available for
works improvements. Severn Trent also set river quality objectives with time limits in
1978, in response to the national initiative by the NWC. As capital expenditure plans
for sewage treatment were linked to the progressive achievement of RQOs (see 5.8.5),
this no doubt contributed to first dramatic and then steady improvements in river
quality throughout the 1 970s and early 80s, reported in the Water Quality reports.
Even the first structural compromise to regulation for Severn Trent, with the
disbanding of the two river divisions amid much furore in 1975 (see 7.3.1), did not
stem the interest in river quality. Within a year of reorganisation river quality was
very much an alive issue, the changes subject to considerable adverse criticism by
staff and NALGO. Even the Surveyor was somewhat cynical in its report as to the
organisation's motives. Despite these forces for integration, Severn Trent had a
champion for river quality in the Director of Scientific Services and the issue was high
on the agenda. The dominant PH ideology facilitated the maintenance of distinct
occupational territories between Regulation and Operations (see 9.3.1). In this way
Lester could continue as far as possible the previous style of regulation, emphasising
an audit role familiar to PH values, while at the same time exploiting the
contradictions of the new situation for his own ends. For instance, by "doing deals"
with the Director of Operations (see 7.3.7) on sewage regulations, Lester was
exploiting the contradictory gamekeeper-poacher status of the authority to ensure the
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allocation of resources. Thus, just as groups play an important role in getting issues
onto the agenda and in keeping them off it, they also play a crucial role in preventing
the removal of issues and policies from the political agenda (Richardson & Jordan,
1979). Here too is evidence of conflicting claims and empowerments being utilised by
an agent for his own ends (Sewell, 1992).
The Thames Conservancy by comparison, with its long and prestigious history of
cleaning up the river, was along with the rest of the organisation "living off the
tideway" (see 8.4.4). If they felt frustrated by the squeeze on capital expenditure, they
nevertheless maintained amicable relations with the divisions (see 8.4.4). The issue
was more or less buried by internal conflict and the subsequent history of the issue for
Thames is one of non-emergence or non-decision making (Bachrach and Baratz,
1963).
Within Thames information on river quality was not as extensive as Severn Trent.
Fish chose not to produce a water quality report, a data base on works performance
arid river water quality was maintained but no separate document for the public
domain. The Planning department's internal publication on quality matters was
disbanded by 1980. Indeed, Planning conflicted with Scientific Services and upset
Fish when they contradicted the possibility of achieving their quality objectives (see
8.3.7). Overall, the gathering of data was a lacklustre affair and divisions were
reluctant to fill in forms (see 8.4.4). Later, as CEO, Fish could not adopt a sponsor
role as he was constrained by conflict at the centre and pressure from the DoE (see
8.4.1). His new role did not allow the same sort of focus as a Director of Scientific
Services. Throughout the period in the public sector little monitoring was carried out
and there was little concern about meeting the EC directives (see 8.5.5). As the data
were never collected, management rarely received performance reports. River quality
objectives were set, but without time limits (see 8.8), thereby failing to give emphasis
to any sense of immediacy in river quality. Later, when problems became evident, a
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reluctance to accept these meant the authority could never convince the government of
the need for investment (see 8.6.3).
During commercialisation both authorities show a decline in standards, although for
Thames this is by far the most considerable decline. The National Rivers Authority
(1991a: 25) write in their 1990 survey: For regions reporting a decline in qualityfrom
1985 to 1990, South West and Thames stand out. Severn Trent's Fred Lester had
retired by 1983 and Scientific Services subsumed into the Operations Directorate.
Also, since 1982 pollution control had been compromised by their absorbtion into
multifunctional divisions (see 7.4.4). River quality had declined in importance,
beginning with the financial constraints of the late 1970s. In contrast, Thames had
always kept pollution control separate and close to the centre, in order not to
compromise regulation (see 8.6.3). To account for this incongruity between regulation
and performance one must consider the leadership and organisational contexts of both
organisations at this time.
10.3.4 leadership context
Following nationalisation the two organisations exhibit distinct differences in the
speed with which they embraced commercialism and the individual leaders who
would shape their development (see 9.4.3). Thames' leadership in the privatisation
debate resulted in a very external focus. Even the managerial changes and commercial
developments were part and parcel of the drive to ensure Thames' position as a viable
candidate for privatisation, if not the first. River quality and consents standards were
not important until privatisation made them so. In contrast, Severn Trent experienced
a more gradual change with far less turbulence. For instance, they largely retained
their existing managers, had fewer changes of CEO and fewer failed directors.
Severn Trent became mobilised into action around concern for standards by their
Chairman John Bellak. Thus when more capital became available with the
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introduction of COPA 2, Severn Trent began to take action and target money where it
was needed (see 7.5.4). In terms of river quality, Bellak's personal resources for
persuasion included his prior association with the Authority as a member of the
fisheries committee. He was known as a keen bird watcher with an interest in the
environment and had political connections (see 9.2.3): I knew a lot of the ministers
from old times and if I was a nuisance, at least they knew I was on their side.
On arrival, Bellak became very involved in the organisation (see 7.4.5), thereby
acquiring the resources crucial to having one's demands met: system relevant
expertise, political access and sensitivity, control over information and group support
(Pettigrew, 1977). He also brought his private sector experience to bear, via stories
and examples, in exposing what he saw as the contradictions between commercialism
and not maintaining standards (see 7.4.5; 7.6.7): Ipersonally promoted it... fyou have
consents on sewage works it seems to me that in principle you should try to meet
them. In this way he demonstrated the potency of metaphors and analogies for
ideological change (Meyer, 1982) and how language may compel action (Pettigrew,
1979). More specifically, in drawing upon the rules of capitalist logics as part of the
cultural change, Bellak may be seen to reconstitute a commercial ethos as well as
himself as promoter of it (Knights and Willmott, 1987). Bellak arrived in the
Authority at a time of low consensus and little team spirit, particularly within
divisions (see 7.4.4). Research into belief structures (Dutton & Duncan, 1987a) and
information gathering (Jackson, 1992) amongst managers show, the more
differentiated the beliefs, ie low consensus, and the more heterogeneous the team, the
greater the possibility of importing new information into the group and the greater the
feasibility of change. These findings support Dutton and Ashford's (1993) hypothesis
that issue selling is more successful at gaining top management's attention where they
have varied belief structures.
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Very early on Bellak promoted getting sewage works up to scratch and investment in
either renewing or relining pipes. In this he was challenged by, the Treasury but:
took advantage of the fact that Ministers changedfairly frequently and just went on
doing it. Bellak, with the STWA Directors, began to question the funding rationale of
the Treasury and challenge back (see 7.5.2). In utilising capitalist logics to support a
traditionally public sector function, Bellak was demonstrating that commercialism and
regulation could coexist, at a time when organisational members were deeply
suspicious of the new ideology and its potential effect on quality. In this way, the
Chairman was able to legitimise a new vision of the organisation by questioning
ongoing practices of adaptation at a time when the organisation was feeling the strain.
As in Kiesler & Sproull's (1982) work, exemplars and vivid stories make material
about an issue more salient, making it easier to encode and to retrieve such material.
Similarly, as with Dean's (1987) work on innovation champions, Bellak's actions
highlight the importance of using emotion and passion in successfully pushing new
ideas. The MD relates the positive influence that the Chairman brought in saying: If
there is a standard it must be met. There is no excuse to say that resources are not
available, we have to meet it. The main thrust of Bellak's argument was that quality
was everyone's responsibility in the organisation and not just an audit function (see
7.7.5). Here he was calling upon the rules of the New Public Management (see 6.5.2).
In particular the emphasis on performance indicators (see 6.5.3) could be employed to
insist on standards as one of the measurable outputs. This would later be used to great
effect during privatisation (see 7.6.4). In this way Bellak also reversed the trend of
subordinating river quality to finance and so emphasised its importance. Maintaining
standards was in many ways an opportunity to embrace the new ideology.
The drive for greater management accountability in the late 1980s may also have
contributed to the successful selling of the issue. Dutton & Ashford (1993) have
hypothesised that where an issue is framed through time in a manner that implies top
management's responsibility, the greater the level of attention will be invested in the
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issue. Thus issue framing is important because it shapes and directs subsequent issue-
relevant activity (Dutton & Ashford, 1993). The focus on meeting standards can be
seen as the beginnings of a quality ethic in the organisation (see 7.7). During
privatisation, Bellak utilised his contacts to obtain resources for quality: I think during
the privarisation period Nick knew that I was supporting his principles, therefore he
was prepared to listen.., and usually responded. The drive for compliance unearthed
the legacy of Fred Lester's reign in the form of many complex and varied consents
standards which had been ignored or misunderstood since his retirement (see 7.6.4).
New initiatives at Board level in the run-up to privatisation included the introduction
of performance related pay which provided bonuses for compliance with these
standards (see 7.6.4): We were well on the way to 100% compliance before a lot of the
other companies. And we got there first (MD). The NRA unit was set up earlier than
other authorities in 1987. Such initiatives gave the organisation the ability to solve its
problems. In framing river quality in a way which gave management a sense of
control over achieving compliance, its importance was enhanced (Dutton & Duncan,
1 987a).
10.3.5 summary
Dutton (1986) found the more an issue is perceived to be a crisis, the greater the
resources devoted to an issue and the greater the centralisation of authority by top
level decision makers in tasks related to the issue. Thus, for Thames, the issue context,
managerial perceptions and tasks related to the issue combined to keep river quality as
a non-urgent issue. Thames could never have a clear overview of the extent of their
deteriorations until the survey in 1985. This, combined with an inability or
unwillingness to acknowledge problems, resulted in the issue maintaining a low
profile on the agenda. As CEO, Fish had centralised pollution control at headquarters
in 1982 as part of his response to perceived sewage works failures (see 8.4.2).
However, he was never in charge of a unified management team (see 8.4.1) and a year
later the massive changes occurring with nationalisation eclipsed these moves. From
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within Severn Trent an issue champion chose to capitalise on the issue context and
keep river quality alive by providing information appealing to PH values and setting
timescales for improvement. After his retirement the issue was taken up by another
sponsor under the guise of commercialism. The linking of a total quality ethic to
regulation ensured Severn Trent could capitalise far quicker on the capital resources
for compliance presented with privatisation. In this way, both issue sponsors
maintained interest and action by linking river quality with the current organisational
ideology.
10.4 Issue Suppression
It will be evident throughout that quality was difficult to maintain for both
organisations and regulation was compromised by the dual role of the authorities in
the public sector. In this section the way in which river quality was undermined or
ignored in both organisations, leading to poor performance, will be examined. This
was particularly evident in Thames during commercialisation, attributable to its
leadership context and Severn Trent during nationalisation, when structural change
undermined the role and function of the regulators. But there were other factors to do
with the external context which conspired to make it difficult for the regulators to
exercise their profession in both organisations throughout.
10.4.1 leadership context
The commercialisation period for Thames was one of great turbulence and trauma.
Roy Watts had thrust the organisation into the limelight by proposing Thames as the
first water authority to be privatised (see 4.10.7). In this way the speed and depth of
ideological change was greater (see 9.4.3). As a man with a mission, Watts possessed
great personal resources (see 6.6; 9.2.3.2) and had made a big impact on the
organisation (see 9.4.2) in his ambition and drive to make the organisation more
commercial and ultimately to privatise (see 8.5.4). In line with his ambitions, Watts
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only became interested in the environment when it became important to the City (see
8.6.3). This despite being a champion of the consumer (see 8.5.4) and the rise of
environmentalism and its politicisation in the mid-1980s (see 5.10.5).
Managerial choice may be seen to be as much influenced by personal vision as the
organisational context which managers are helping to shape. Roy Watts took
leadership of an organisation which regarded itself as "the best" in the industry (see
8.3.8) and this included the belief in good river quality and no internal problems.
Management told Watts as much on his arrival (see 8.4.5). Watts' vision to create the
best water company in the world did not concur with a recognition of failing sewage
works and deteriorating river quality. Also, it is notable that his failure to convince the
government to privatise the rivers left him somewhat jaded about the whole
privatisation exercise (see 8.5.5). Eventually depression brought on by ill health
caused him to commit suicide in the River Thames. Severn Trent differed in their
ready acceptance of quality problems, thus marking out a distinction in terms of
organisational identity. This lends support to Dutton and Penner's (1994) proposition
that organisational identity provides a causal link between the interpretation of
strategic issues and the organisational context. One may then draw further links
between organisational identity, history and the perception of strategic issues.
For the large part, Thames was focused on efficiency and commercial opportunities,
evidenced by the fact that they were the first to repay back debt, their contract with the
Indian Government to clean up the Ganges and their new pier at Westminster (Thames
Water Authority, 1985/86). Consents compliance and river quality objectives were
secondary to the privatisation campaign, which consumed much of top management's
time during this period (see 8.5.4): hence the non-reporting of river quality problems
until after the publication of the 1985 survey (see 10.2.2). Indeed, Watts single
mindedly wished to keep the rivers in order to exploit them for their commercial
potential (see 8.5.5). In contrast, Bellak was quick to dissociate himself from this idea,
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on the basis that it would not have political support (see 7.5.3). Thames' leadership
had to a large extent focused on the external political environment and Thames' role in
setting the agenda for privatisation (see 8.6). In so doing, they had diverted their
attention from internal issues, particularly consents compliance and river quality (see
8.6). Hence the period was a poor one for pollution control, with efficiency drives
undermining the sewage works capacity, poor management and little monitoring (see
8.5.5). The contrast between the two organisations demonstrates the choice which
managers have to focus upon certain issues given very similar external environments.
Also, that the pre-existing structures selected by managers for action may be used for
different ends. In this way managers may selectively draw upon rules and resources
and so maintain: a critical distance for strategic manipulation (Whittington, 1992).
10.4.2 structure
A noticeable difference in the two organisations was the structural differences in
relation to the regulation function. Thames always kept pollution control separate
from the operational part of the organisation to maintain a proper division between
operations and the regulators: while for Severn Trent, the structural change in 1982,
whereby polluiion control were absorbed into divisions, was seen as a major
compromise to the integrity of the regulation staff (see 7.4.4). Dutton (1988a) has
hypothesised that the structural location of issue sellers would affect the probability
that an issue would be placed on the organisation's agenda. The period between 1982
and 1987, before the rise in capital expenditure for privatisation, was a difficult one
for both organisations in which to maintain the salience of river quality. Therefore it
may be concluded, given their poorer performance, that the organisational identity and
particular way in which the ethos of commercialism manifested itself in Thames (see
8.5), had an overriding effect on any structural advantages the organisation may have
had.
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The impetus for Severn Trent's 1982 structural change arose from the perceived need
to rationalise resources and the power struggle between Scientific Services and
Operations (see 7.4.4). If CEOs primarily interpret strategic issues and act to coalign
the strategy, structure and environment of the organisation to address these
interpretations (Ritvo, Salipante & Notz, 1979), then it is clear that river quality was
being framed in terms of its economic consequences. By subsuming pollution control
into divisions a necessary relationship was established (Tsoukas, 1994) in which the
emergent powers of control held by divisional managers were employed in the interest
of prioritising resources and compromising standards. The structure held far more
constraining than enabling rules and hence few resources for the regulators. There
were various aspects of this structural change which contradicted the regulatory
function. It had implications for the role of pollution control officers and the
regulatory activities of the organisation as a whole. Primarily, the move took away
PCOs' independence and gave them divided loyalties (see 7.4.4) between their
division and Scientific Services. The enforcement of standards by PCOs was
discouraged by divisional managers: a situation which PCOs felt very bitter about and
which effectively discouraged any highlighting of the issue. Dutton & Ashford (1993)
hypothesise that an individual's willingness to promote an issue may depend on
perceived power, being derived from both personal attributes and structural location in
the organisation. This supports the findings by Schillit and Locke (1982) that the
degree of supportiveness and open mindedness of the top management group should
affect lower level participants' motivation to sell issues.
10.4.3 sponsor role
There were a number of significant differences between those employed on the
regulation side and those people in operations. These differences were to some extent
exacerbated when regulation was felt to be compromised, particularly during the
1 980s. Those employed in pollution control were historically different. Many had
come from the old river authorities and pollution control was always professionally
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distinct from sewerage and sewage disposal. People were seldom members of both
professional institutions (see 6.2.2). Academically they differed in that pollution
control required more chemists and biologists while operations tended to be engineers.
These differences translated into perceptions around work practice. Pollution control
were always more protective and interested in the river than the organisation as a
whole. Essentially PCOs would regard their work as a vocation and hence take a very
"pure" view of their job while operations were perhaps more pragmatic (see 7.4.4;
7.5.4). Additionally, the complexity of water science meant that the standards devised
by many PCOs were not easily understood by management or operators at sewage
works (see 7.4.4; 8.5.5). The achievement of required standards often involved
designing works beyond the capability of the operational people (see 8.3.7). Pollution
control tended to regard quality as having an absolute standard and so were
discontented throughout much of the life of the authorities with the many
compromises made to consents. This was particularly noticeable in both organisations
on formation of the NRA when many personnel on the regulation side welcomed the
change (see 7.6.4; 8.6.2).
For Severn Trent, the 1982 move into divisions highlighted these personnel
differences, particularly the additional work of trade effluent control for PCOs
alongside operations people. There is evidence to suggest this situation created
interpersonal tensions (see 7.4.4). This combined with providing advice on works
standards and the successive reviews of consents meant their regulatory responsibility
was diluted. Dutton & Ashford (1993) have called for research into how the role
characteristics of the issue seller affect issue selling. As PCOs in both organisations
felt ambivalent about committing themselves to the organisation over their profession
(see 6.2.2), an organisational context not conducive to regulation would undermine
ambitions to seek innovative ways of promoting the issue. These findings suggest that
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organisational integration and congruence are necessary for individuals to feel
confident about promoting issues.
10.4.4 function
Prior to the formation of the water authorities, the River Authorities had clearly
defined statutory responsibilities within an adversarial system (see 5.6.2). Within
these organisations pollution control officers had free rein to practise their profession,
unhindered by the more diverse considerations of a water authority. After 1974,
appeals to the objectivity of standards and evaluative measures could always be
countered by the actions of the authority. This occurred with the larger, and at times
more favourable, sample sizes undertaken by divisions. Also, organisational loyalty
influenced the setting of RQOs in 1978, such that for example, standards were
compromised by Severn Trent being the biggest discharger (see 7.3.7). Furthermore,
in anticipation of COPA 2, the WAs were aided by the DoE in setting works consents
to their volume capability as opposed to the needs of the receiving stream. In this way,
the goalposts were set at what the current level of investment was capable of meeting.
All of these actions contradicted the rules of regulation and offended the professional
codes of conduct by which pollution control operated.
The water authorities increasingly found themselves under conflicting pressures, on
the one hand to make quality improvements and on the other to cut costs. The
organisations therefore built a priority system into the capital programme whereby
managers would code requests for finance according to priority. This was usually
accorded to drinking water quality (see 7.4.4; 8.3.7). Objectives were compromised,
deteriorations were not addressed and problems became locked into the capital
programme. The result was a limited movement towards long term consents and a
backlog of asset renewal work (see 7.5.4; 8.6.3). Another consequence of the focus on
costs was the contradiction between the policing role of the authority and income
from industrial discharges (see 7.4.4). A general lack of objectives meant unclear
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guidelines on practice and a lack of strategic direction. This lack of strategy is perhaps
one reason the issue could never be promoted by Thames during commercialisation: if
as Dutton & Ashford (1993) hypothesise, issue selling is dependent on whether an
issue is framed as strategic, then issue sellers may find it difficult to promote an issue
with no strategic framework to hang it on.
One result of divided loyalty and internal suppression was a lack of even-handedness
in the regulation of the authority and industry (see 7.4.4; 8.6.3). At times samples
were even removed from the register after it had been implemented. A former
pollution control officer in Severn Trent related how a colleague was so disillusioned
that he would write the numbers for consents on a playing card and spin it to arrive at
a decision. As Alvesson (1990) notes, where members find organisational signals
disaffirming or undesirable, they may reduce their commitment to the organisation
and withdraw from attempts to sell issues in the future. This finding also supports
Sewell' s (1992) third axiom on structural change (see 2.1.3) whereby regulation's lack
of validation by resources resulted in PCOs modifying their rules for action and hence
the schemas underlying regulation.
10.4.5 external context
The way in which the external context shaped organisational perceptions of river
quality is important in understanding the demise of the issue. It has been shown that
the economic system was pivotal in driving political and hence organisational actions
(see 10.2.1). RWQ declined in importance as the issue came to be seen as a function
of economic expediency and subject to the fortunes of the sewage works resulting
from capital expenditure cuts. The 1976 moratorium and the financial controls from
1979 served to undermine notions of an absolute standard for water quality. River
quality now became part of the package of operational activities, subject to
prioritising and reinforced by the integrated nature of these enterprises. There was
therefore a contradiction between economy and self regulation, evident in the
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deferment of COPA 2. Even the establishment of RQOs was made on the basis of the
purposes for which the water was used, with the effect that the DoE could allow
consent relaxations (see 5.8.7) to save money. These actions by government
diminished the causal powers of regulators which would weaken their function within
the authorities and in turn impact upon their tasks and hence roles (Tsoukas, 1994).
The uncertain economic climate of the 1 970s which then gave way to the rigid
economies of the 1980s made it difficult for organisational members to see an
opportunity for a resolution to the problems of declining sewage works. As Dutton &
Webster (1988) note, interest in issues declines with uncertainty and increases with
perceived feasibility of resolution.
The complexity of the issue and controversy surrounding the measurement and
evaluation of river quality would also serve to minimise its salience to organisational
members (Dutton, 1988a). The NWC classes were criticised as being too broad to
make changes in class meaningful and the 95% limits were also seen as a compromise
(see 5.8.7), thereby highlighting the controversy between purists arguing for absolute
standards and pragmatists arguing for relative standards.
10.4.6 summary
The contradiction between the financial predicament of the authorities and their role
as regulators resulted in managerial actions which undermined the importance of river
quality. In this way, management variously altered the mechanisms for issue
judgement and assessment, subordinated the issue to financial objectives, located the
regulators unfavourably and effectively ostracised the issue outside the strategic frame
of reference. The organisational structure of Severn Trent in this way formed a set of
simultaneously constraining and enabling rules and resources, implemented in the
interaction of organisational members (particularly where they differed), who in turn
shaped that interaction (Tsoukas, 1994). In this way, the regulators began a spiral of
decline in causal powers as they perceived the majority of the structural properties of
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the organisation to curtail their very roles as regulators which in turn contributed to
these perceptions. In Thames, the issue was effectively ignored during
commercialisation by a leadership devoted to ideological change and internal reform.
Strategic issues were important oniy insofar as they furthered these leadership aims
and river quality subsequently deteriorated.
10.5 Implications for a Model of Strategic Agenda Building
The present study on the trajectory of river water quality within two water authorities
has shown a variety of agenda building actions: those which maintained the salience
of the issue on the strategic agenda, actions which promoted issue interest and those
which ignored or undermined interest in river quality altogether. In brief, the focus
has been on the confluence of organisational tensions and actions which conspire to
give a strategic issue a higher or lower profile on the strategic agenda. As such, the
implications are for a model of strategic agenda building where tightly interwoven
contexts provide a range of structural rules and resources by which management
choice is possible. Three interrelated contexts have proved important for this study:
the issue context, the external context and the organisational context. Although they
are assumed to be interactional and interdependent, there is significant analytical
value in separating these contexts. The distinctive nature of the model's contexts are
discussed and analysed in turn. Finally, the implications for issue sponsorship are
considered.
10.5.1 the distinctiveness of contexts
The interlocking nature of the external, organisational and issue contexts is to be
found in their common socio-.structural roots, from which their structures draw
inspiration and causal powers. This was amply demonstrated with ideology in chapter
9 and illustrated by the way in which issue salience could be modified by rules and
resources emanating from all levels. Also contexts are interactive over time, such that
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the intersection of structures may take place in both the rules and resources dimension
(Sewell, 1992). Thus Bellak could appropriate rules from the private sector to argue
for standards in the public sector. However, to discuss agenda building purely in terms
of the operations of structures, is to ignore disparities between structures which
account for the magnitude and kind of influence upon the agenda building process.
The degree and pattern of structural influence may be attributed to four dimensions
along which contexts differ. These are temporality, dynamism, sphere of influence
and the modality of structures:
1. Temporality Bhaskar (1986) has distinguished between different modes of
temporality in social life, from the individual human being to the longer duration of
institutions, to the biological history of the human species. At each contextual level
different temporal modes account for the duration of structures and hence ability to
cast influence over the agenda building process through the cumulative effects of time
(Sztompka, 1991). Thus the external context has vested river water quality with
centuries of salience regarding pollution, largely from the communal structure. The
case studies on the other hand were influenced by developments in their region largely
since 1945. Whipp's (1995) discussion on the plurality of time, from three areas of
strategic change, provides evidence for the diversity of constructions and uses of time
at the industry and organisational levels. Thus the contextual location of an issue has
implications for its history and the durability and influence of the structures with
which it is connected.
2. Dynamism Following on from the last, each context will exhibit different
dynamics, ie the rate of temporal change: so that for example, at the level of the
industry, change in the form of reorganisation, nationalisation and privatisation were
the key events over 15 years, whereas the repercussions on individual water
authorities were additionally manifest in many discrete changes over this period. The
changeability of structures has implications for the durability of the rules and
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resources guiding action and to which issue sponsors may have access, and for the
durability of the configuration of necessary relations within the structures (see 4). This
may also in part explain differences in responses to issues by organisations from
different industries with different dynamics.
3. Sphere of influence Each context may be seen to differ in the focal range and hence
power of their relevant structures which gives rise to a different scope for the
phenomenon under investigation. In the external context, organisations like the DoE
and pressure groups are concerned with river quality as part of a package of issues
under the banner of environmentalism which impact nationally. At the industry level
it was a matter of regulation by individual water authorities. At the level of the water
authorities, river water quality is a management function, of concern only within their
region and as such their causal powers are relatively restricted. Thus change in the
social context vis-a-vis water quality will have a more significant impact upon the
water authorities than they themselves could effect upon a wider context. Similarly,
individual issue sponsors are simply concerned with river quality as it impacts upon
their organisation and their power is to some extent conditioned by their location in
this context.
CONTEXT PHENOMENA	 AGENTS	 STRUCTURES
Society	 Environmentalism	 DoE/Pressure Gps	 Political, Communal, Eco
Industry	 Water Regulation	 WAs/ Indus Bodies Professional
Organisation Mgmt Function 	 Regulators	 Industry
Issue	 Sponsorship	 Sponsor	 Organisation
Fig 10.2 Agenda Building Contexts
In this way, as demonstrated in Fig 10.2, agents at each contextual level will engage
with different social structures as part of their activities, although this does not limit
the range of structures which may be called upon to inspire action. However, the types
of structures with which they are engaged condition both the range of agential
influence and power to effect change: hence the advantage of membership of multiple
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structures which the water companies recognise when they arrange regular meetings
with environmental groups.
4. Modality of structures The different spheres of influence necessarily give rise to
different structural forms. For instance, regulation at the industry level may embrace
the communal, scientific and political structures of environmentalism but also
includes the properties of professionalism. Likewise, the water authorities may
embrace various rules and resources from all the proceeding contexts including the
industry structure rules which endow their managers with power. But the authorities
in turn created their own unique structural configuration, based on their history,
differences in personnel and development pattern. These structural configurations may
be seen in Tsoukas' (1994) terms of a configuration of necessary relations. Here power
relationships are expressed by the necessary interactions of agents, contingent upon
the properties of that structure. At the level of the issue context, sponsors acquire the
power of agenda placement via the mobilisation of the necessary relations within the
organisational structure. This is explained in fig 10.3 where particular positions within
the organisational structure endow sponsors with theoretically necessary ways of
acting. For instance, their role and status may be conferred by the structural form and
management perceptions. These organisational features are influenced by ideology
which also conditions the salience of an issue and the content of the strategic agenda.
If a sponsor manages to make the issue relevant to the organisational structure, he or
she will in turn be vested with a set of causal powers that define their role as sponsor
and hence the ability to effect action on behalf of the issue. Insofar as salience will
propel an issue higher up the agenda, so too does the activation of the rules and
resources of issue related activity reinforce its significance on the agenda. Conversely,
a sponsor wishing to effect industry wide change in relation to river quality would
have to engage with a wider set of structures.
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Fig 10.3 Relations of Causal Powers for Issue Sponsorship
adapted from Tsoukas, 1994
At each level then, structures owe something of their modality to wider contexts,
although these are not overwhelming, due to the ability to import alternative structural
rules (Whittington, 1992; Sewell, 1992) and because in each context structures adapt
and evolve to their circumstance. In this way each contextual level has its own nexus
of intersecting structures with their own sphere of influence, dynamism and
temporality. This has implications for the history of an issue, the durability of the
mechanisms underlying action, the breadth of structural influence and the
configuration of power relationships which sponsors must comprehend.
10.5.2 the issue context
The key features of the issue context are those dimensions which impact on the
salience of an issue. While core function was undoubtedly powerful in ensuring river
quality a place on the organisational agenda, it was not enough to ensure high agenda
placement. More important was the immediacy or the urgency of an issue in attracting
organisational attention (see 10.3.2), which could be facilitated by the way in which
the issue was presented and its historical associations. Also, the magnitude of an issue
will be enhanced by its links to organisational history and ideology (see 10.3.2;
10.3.3), thereby influencing the radicalness of response to an issue (see 10.3.1). In
contrast, the complexity or controversy surrounding an issue will be influential in
reducing its interest for organisational members (see 10.4.4; 10.2.3). Therefore, issue
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salience is crucial in shaping managerial perceptions and belief structures (Dutton and
Duncan, 1987b).
Labelling an issue either as a threat or as an opportunity affects both subsequent
information processing and the motivation of key decision makers (Dutton and
Jackson, 1987). It is evident that Lester presented river quality as a threat to the
authority (see 7.2.1). Later, when the authority became concerned with financial
constraints, these overshadowed the river quality issue. Particularly given its tendency
to possess long term, minor and complex attributes (see 10.2.1). In contrast, Bellakts
presentation of the issue as an opportunity for organisational change put river quality
on a par with current organisational events and linked it to action. In this way,
labelling an issue as an opportunity may have greater potential for sustained
organisational interest and action. These findings confirm the work of previous
studies, that perceptions of strategic issues shape organisational action (Billings,
Milburne, Schaalman, 1980; Dutton, 1986; Dutton & Webster, 1988).
10.5.3 the external context
The external environment at both the macro and industry levels has been instrumental
in shaping organisational perceptions about river quality. The historical conflict,
between the communal concern for the river and economic and political expediency,
continued with the formation of the authorities, with consequences for subsequent
issue related developments. Political and economic considerations have been shown to
influence the perception of issue dimensions by the way in which they framed river
quality. For instance, the linking of river quality to the fortunes of the sewage works
diminished the distinctiveness of the issue by subsuming it within operational
problems. This in turn presented organisational members with the dilemma of
attending to regulatory matters at the expense of other organisational functions (see
10.4.2). In this way, interest in the issue was diminished by affecting the perceived
feasibility of resolution or control.
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Also, actions from the political environment to defer legislation and alter standards
undermined the urgency of river quality (see 10.4.2). Similarly, at industry level, new
developments in river classification and assessment, with their accompanying
controversy, enhanced the complexity of the issue, thereby diminishing its salience for
operations personnel. The way in which internal policy-making or non-policy has
been shaped by external contingencies demonstrates how the micro-politics of the
firm are linked to the macro-politics of the firm (Pettigrew, 1985a).
In this way the external environment is important in shaping organisational members'
perception of issue salience and their ability to undertake any resolution of the issue
(Dutton and Duncan, 1987a). The way in which the external environment threw up
counter issues supports Dutton's (1988a) model in demonstrating how the inclusion of
a strategic issue on the organisational agenda is affected by the set of issues already
under consideration. Further, the way in which a strategic issue is linked to other
issues may serve to influence its salience for organisational members.
10.5.4 the organisational context
It has been shown that the organisational context is crucial in facilitating the
promotion or selling of strategic issues. Particularly important are the links between
strategic issues, managerial perceptions and belief structures: the role of ideology and
structure and the management of task related rules and resources by the organisation.
Managerial perceptions were significantly shaped by the external environment and the
issue context. The difference between Thames and Severn Trent illustrates the impact
of the historical context of an issue which in turn gives rise to belief structures about
the issue's magnitude (see 10.3.2). The contrasting case studies also demonstrate the
significance of the characteristics of the top management team in their willingness to
respond to issue signals. Thus, internal conflict and low consensus in Thames
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contributed as much to the denial of river quality (see 10.3.3) as low morale in Severn
Trent facilitated the importation of new ideas into the team (see 10.3.4).
Organisational ideology is also an important vehicle whereby issue sponsors may
maintain the profile of an issue (see 10.3.3) and promote it higher up the agenda (see
10.3.4). In particular, leaders are shown to play an important role in shaping and
promoting this ideological context (see 10.3.4; 10.4.1). Similarly, insofar as
managerial belief structures give rise to a distinct organisational identity, this may be
crucial in determining managements' choice of which issues to respond to and which
to ignore (see 10.4.1).
Although structure appears to have less influence on issue salience than organisational
identity (see 10.4.3), it nevertheless has important effects where it is manifest. For
instance, structure is important both in locating issue sellers with subsequent impact
on their role and task related activities and in sending signals which frame the issue
for issue sponsors (Dutton, 1988a). This gives support to Dutton and Duncan's
(1987a) proposal that organisational structures shape perceptions of strategic issues.
The way in which an organisation manages the rules and resource (Giddens 1984)
around issue related activities will influence a sponsor's commitment and ability to
promote the issue (see 10.4.5). In this way, the lack of evenhandedness towards
industry, compromises to standards and, at times, outright flouting of the rules, sent
signals which reduced PCO's commitment to promoting river quality: while the
priority system built into the capital programme reduced resources for river quality
objectives and so effectively forestalled any strategic planning by which PCOs could
promote river quality. In this way, the lack of resource accumulation in terms of the
regulators' status and role acted to diminish the reproduction of sound regulatory
activity. If the reproduction of rules depends on their continuing validation by
resources, the lack of validation will modify the rules (Sewell, 1992).
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10.5.5 issue sponsorship
The ability of organisational members to act on behalf of issues is conditioned by both
their organisational context and personal resources. Actions taken to promote issues
are most effective when they frame issues in ways which emphasise their salience are
congruent with organisational ideology and can exploit the rules and resources of
issue related activities to their advantage.
The difference between the case studies demonstrates the significance of managerial
perceptions and identity in providing a receptive organisational context for issue
sponsorship (see 10.3.3). Thames t management were focused throughout on
alternative issues (see 10.3.3; 10.4.1) and they adopted a more favourable perception
of their performance in river quality. Severn'Trent's management were conditioned by
a different historical context (see 10.3.1) and hence perceptions around river quality
(see 10.3.2). More importantly, there were issue champions from within the top
management team at crucial time periods (see 10.3.3; 10.3.4). It is not surprising,
given the difficulty within both organisations to maintain quality, that organisational
members lower in the hierarchy would have little impact. Thus status and
organisational identity are important for issue sponsorship.
Similarly, location and role within the organisation are important, evident in the way
in which structure diminished the ability of potential issue sponsors to promote river
quality in Severn Trent (see 10.4.4). It is clear that PCOs' diminished ability to act as
regulators was compounded by being absorbed into divisions. Their location
emphasised interpersonal tensions within their necessary relationships and reduced
their perceived power. This lack of integration with the organisation reduced
confidence to promote river quality, thereby emphasising the need for managerial
support for members lower in the organisational hierarchy. Location was also
responsible for undermining the identity and role of the regulators. They could not
exploit the gamekeeperpoacher contradiction of their role as Fred Lester had
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managed because they lacked status. This supports Dutton's (1 988a) proposition that
sponsors' efforts are more likely to be successful if they are strategically located and
have personal credibility. More significantly, the way in which the external and
internal contexts colluded to weaken the function of the regulators, with subsequent
impact upon their tasks and roles, supports the sedimented conception of management
advocated by Tsoukas (1994). In this way, one sees the profound undermining of
regulators' causal powers by political forces at the industry level.
The personal resources brought to bear in more favourable contexts have been
variously: experience, expertise, honours, recognition, political connections, ambition
and particularly, where new to the industry, systems relevant expertise (see 10.3.4).
Both sponsors in Severn Trent set about gaining organisational interest and action by
framing the issue in ways which reflected the organisational ideology at the time (see
10.3.3; 10.3.4). This ability to frame the issue in congruence with the current or
emerging organisational context, would underpin all sponsor actions and subsequent
issue relevant activity. Linking the issue with ideology is important in legitimising
organisational interest and involvement with the issue (Aldrich, 1979).
Various actions undertaken by Lester emphasised the immediacy of river quality,
thereby capitalising on its latent causal powers of pollution. Also, the presentation of
information or arguments in relation to the issue was strengthened by the use of drama
(see 10.3.3), emotion and passion (see 10.3.4) on the part of sponsors. In particular the
use of ideological rhetoric highlighted the advantages of linking strategic issues with
potent ideologies to lend them elan and drama (Meyer, 1982). In this way, the
significance of language and the imagery it evokes cannot be underestimated
(Pettigrew, 1979; Pondy and Mitroff, 1979; Meyer, 1982; Pfeffer, 1981; Whipp et al
1989). This implies that part of the skill or resources of issue sponsors lies in both the
intellectual capacity to frame issues in congruence with the organisational context and
the creative ability to present and argue for the issue. This supports the early work of
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Barnard (1938) and Simon (1948), both of whom envisaged the job of the chief
executive as one of managing the organisational context of the firm.
Legitimising organisational involvement through issue related activities is also
important for their recursive power of reinforcement. The Water Quality reports
served to underline the necessity for and importance of, a regulation function in the
organisation. The regulatory activities themselves maintained the salience of the issue
and reinforced the regulation function (see 10.3.3). Similarly, the management
accountability emphasised during commercialisation (see 10.3.4) legitimised action
by giving managers a sense of control over the issue and linking it to the new ethos. In
this way, the structure of regulation was present in its effect, that is, produced and
reproduced through the legitimate activities and necessary relationships of the
organisation (Bhaskar, 1978). This supports Pettigrew's (1985a) expression of strategy
as ultimately a product of a legitimisation process.
The issue sponsors were perhaps most effective in commanding organisational action
where they could exploit the contradictions between the rules and resources of issue
related activities, or those imported from other systems, to direct those activities
(Whittington, 1992). Lester had maintained an audit role within the authority in
separating regulation from operational activities. He exploited the internal
contradictory rules and resources to advantage. However, this role became diluted
with structural change and on his retirement, allowing the organisation to distance
itself from river quality. Bellak, however, in importing capitalist logics and the NPM
ethos to defend the maintenance of standards, was exposing the internal contradictions
at the same time as importing new structural rules. This lends support to Sewell's
(1992) contention that an important property of structure lies in the transposability of
its rules. That is, Bellak could apply the rules of a new ideology to the context of
regulation. The policy of organisation-wide responsibility for the issue defied the old
style system logics, as did challenging Treasury decisions. Now all organisational
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members were engaged in reproducing the structural effects of regulation as part of
the new ideology. In this way, Bellak demonstrated Whittington's (1992) greater sense
of agency.
The contrast between the two case studies demonstrates the importance of managerial
choice in attending to strategic issues and strategy making. Given the same external
environment and access to resources, the actions of management were a clear
expression of preference in whether or not they attended to the issue of river quality.
Non-action on the part of Thames during integration diminished the importance of
river quality and invited the authority to ignore the issue. Later, Roy Watts made a
deliberate choice to focus management time and resources on issues congruent with
his own vision of commercialisation. Where Bellak chose to integrate river quality
with the emerging ideology, Watts chose to ignore the issue, thus demonstrating the
way in which the properties of structure may be open to different interpretions
(Sewell, 1992). Timing may also be seen as an important aspect of sponsorship.
Bellak appeared at a critical time in the organisation and when environmentalism was
gaining in importance externally. Watts however chose to ignore internal and external
signals about river quality with subsequent deteriorations in quality.
From a realist perspective, the three separate domains of reality - real, actual and
empirical - create a distinction between causal powers and patterns of events. This
implies that the former may be out of phase with the latter and it is up to human
agency to construct the conditions of closure so that the domains of the real and actual
can be fitted together and thus for causal powers to give rise to patterns of events
(Tsoukas, 1994). Similarly, when events have not yet been detected and thus the
transition from the actual to the empirical domain has not yet been made, human
agency is required to identify correctly and transform events into experiences
(Bhaskar, 1978). In the case of Thames, river quality deteriorated (events) but failed
to be identified by management before it was made empirical by the publication of the
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1985 and 1990 surveys. It was therefore incumbent upon management to be alert to
the mechanisms of regulation inherent in IRBM and to utilise them in order to
maximise their effects. Instead Watts chose to exercise his causal powers of control,
efficiency and effectiveness to achieve commercial rather than environmental ends.
This illustrates that although crucial contingencies may be similar for organisations,
managers have a range of strategies to choose from in response to those contingencies.
The shift from the public sector to commercialism provided the water authorities with
a new ideology which was nevertheless open to varied interpretations.
Thus non-decision making about strategic issues is as important a managerial process
as issue sponsorship. For where organisational leaders have a vision which does not
incorporate a particular strategic issue, they may well shape the organisational context
in a manner not conducive to its recognition. In this way Thames' preoccupation with
privatisation and commercial ventures occupied management away from internal
issues in a campaign against the government. As Richardson and Jordan (1979) argue:
Power is involved in the definition of issues. The definition of alternatives is the
choice of conflicts and the choice of conflicts allocates power. One conflict can be
used to displace another, perhaps more important conflict. This account of issue
sponsorship supports the notion of agency as constituent of structure (Sewell, 1992).
Sponsors must be capable of exerting a degree of control over the necessary relations
within which they are enmeshed. They are empowered by structures which provide
the rules and resources for action. It is incumbent upon sponsors to be knowledgable
about the rules of structure in order to apply them in new contexts: that is, to bring
about the conditions of organisational quasi-closure which will enable generative
mechanisms to produce desired effects (Tsoukas, 1994). Agency, then, arises from the
agent's control of resources (Pettigrew, 1987). More specifically, it involves the
ability on the part of sponsors to acquire resources for issue related activity by
employing organisational rules in alternative ways, or importing rules from other
intersecting structures. As Sewell (1992:20) writes, it is: the capacity to reinterpret or
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mobilise an array of resources in terms of schemas (rules) other than those
constituted in the array.
10.6 Conclusions
Analysis of the trajectory of river quality in the two case studies has provided
analytically valuable insights into the agenda building process. The resulting model is
depicted diagrammatically in fig 10.4 and contrasted with Dutton's (1988a) model (fig
10.5). The chief difference between them lies in the positivist orientation of Dutton's
model in contrast with the realist premise underling the application of structuration
theory here. This has resulted in a model emphasising process rather than prediction
and where causal links are less important than significant relationships. A process
view recognises the complexity of organisational interactions and relationships, where
causal links are often two-way and feedback over time: so that the emphasis here was
in isolating those organisational variables with the potential to make a difference. The
Realist perspective does not assume the production of effects but emphasises
generative mechanisms which must be activated to produce organisational outcomes.
Also, the empirical grounding of this study, in the trajectory of one strategic issue
over time, has given greater credence to the findings than conclusions drawn purely
from a collection of isolated and theoretically diverse studies.
This study has extended the horizontal and vertical levels of analysis by the long term
tracking of the trajectory of a strategic issue. This has addressed the limitations of
Dutton's model which located phenomena solely at the organisational level. The
model therefore includes the external context as an important dimension. Further, the
parameters and interrelations of the organisational and issue contexts have been
explored in depth: thereby adding to the complexity of the original Dutton model. The
principal contexts were researched simultaneously while their separate analysis was
justified on the basis of their differing temporality, dynamism, sphere of influence and
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modality of structures (see 10.5.1). These dimensions were seen to have implications
for the history of an issue and the complexity and power of structures from which
sponsors may draw their agency. Nevertheless, the three principal contexts are tightly
interwoven and interdependent over time, so that to talk of one context is to also make
implicit reference to the other two.
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Fig 10.5 Dutton's (1988a) Agenda Building Model
The addition of the external context at both macro and industry levels is seen to
influence both issue salience and the content of the strategic agenda. The external
context serves to broaden the dimensions or content of a strategic issue and indicates
its relationship to other issues: thereby enlarging the array of structural influences and
their intersection which endow an issue with particular meaning for organisational
members. In this way the external context may be seen to be implicated in
organisational change via its influence upon issue salience. Thus the external context
not only influences the configuration of organisational structure but is also the source
of a range of alternative social structures upon which issue sponsors may draw for
action (Whittington, 1992).
The organisational context was largely untheorised in Dutton's model and the links to
the issue context underdeveloped. Here it has been extended to include the forces of
ideology and structure as these respectively influence issue salience and the ability of
the sponsor to act on behalf of an issue. Central to the organisation context are the
links between managerial perceptions, organisational identity, and the rules and
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resources made available for issue related activities. Issue salience has been shown to
influence management perceptions while issue related activity may in turn influence
issue salience thereby providing a feedback loop. This reinforcement process may be
managed by issue sponsors, either in accordance with the rules and resources or in
exploiting their contradictions: thereby legitimising organisational involvement. Thus
management plays its most important role by managing the context in which strategic
processes unfold (Bower, 1970; Bower & Doz, 1979; Burgelman, 1983a, 1983b).
The complexity of the strategic agenda process necessitates going beyond decision
making to include inertia and non-decision making. Here the inclusion of leadership is
vital, as strong leaders may re-direct attentional resources onto other issues. Their
impact on the strategic agenda to fulfil their own strategic vision is a powerful force in
ignoring strategic issues and br countervailing the actions of issue sponsors. In this
way the model accounts for the forces for issue suppression and acknowledges the
vital factors of status and role underlying agency in organisations. This study has
limited itself to the trajectory of one strategic issue and as such, the strategic agenda is
relatively unexplored. What may be discerned, is the influence of the external
environment on agenda content, and the way in which the agenda may impact on the
salience of an issue. In linking strategic issues to other agenda items, their salience
may be enhanced or diminished.
Dutton's model is most deficient in its account of managerial agency where sponsors
are restricted to the organisational and issue contexts. This has been redressed by
considering the influence of a wider set of contexts and in elaborating on sponsor
actions. The issue context is most developed as it provided the most opportunities for
an analysis of managerial agency. The salience dimensions have been extended to
include those particularly pertinent to river quality: historical association with the
issue and core function. Sponsor attributes, too, have been enlarged to consider not
only resources derived from the organisational context, such as motivation and
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perceived power but also personal resources. The ability and motivation of an
individual to promote issues will be dependent upon their perceived power within the
organisation.
The important activities undertaken by sponsors involved managing the organisational
context. This was attained by labelling the issue in ways which enhanced its salience
thereby providing another feedback ioop. Framing the issue in ideologically congruent
ways was also very important in motivating organisational action. This was
particularly relevant to the way in which the issue was presented or packaged for
organisational attention. The most powerful actions for sustained interest and
organisational response were where sponsors exploited the structural properties of
issue related activities, or employed rules and resources from external systems. In
influencing issue related activities in this way, a reinforcing effect was created which
enhanced the motivations of sponsors to continue in their activities. Finally, the notion
of timing is seen as an important prerequisite for maximum impact. Sponsors most
effectively promote issues when the organisational context is most receptive and when
they can align the organisation in response to environmental signals about the issue.
The capacity for agency therefore requires highly analytical and creative resources on
the part of sponsors.
To return to the questions posed in chapter two and in the introduction of this chapter:
different organisations attend to different strategic issues due to the influence of
ideology, organisational identity, the content of their strategic agenda, leadership bias
on managerial perceptions and their structural arrangements which influence the
personal resources of sponsors. A crucial difference between organisations in this
model is the fact that different managers have differential access to structural
resources and indeed, different interpretations of the same structures. Within the same
organisation, different issues command different amounts of attentional resources due
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to the salience of the issue, the capability of issue sponsors to act on their behalf and
to oppose countervailing forces of issue suppression.
This process model of strategic agenda building is underpinned by a structurationist
conception of organisational reality. It has resulted in a more complex yet holistic
model where links between variables are not so much causal as relationships with
potential for effect: that is, dependent upon the actions of agents to bring about
desired ends. Three feedback loops are to be found, two between the issue and
organisational contexts and one within the issue context. The first is between sponsor
actions regarding issue related activities, salience of the issue and managerial
perceptions which condition their further response to issue related activities. The
second is between sponsor actions, issue related activity and sponsor motivation. The
third is between salience, sponsor actions and enhanced salience. All suggest the
reinforcing power of structure, that is, the necessary relations which comprise its
configuration. While the links from and into the external context demonstrate the
vulnerability of structures to change from the intersection of others.
The most important contribution of this model lies in conceptualising a dynamic
model of agenda building whereby multiple contexts intercept and evolve over time.
The action dimension has been explored utilising structuration theory to account for
the power of agency and how it achieves its effects. Structuration has shown that
managers are endowed with the power of agency by their personal resources and
necessary relationships within the organisation structure and elsewhere. To achieve
desired ends, managers must create the necessary conditions which bring generative
mechanisms or potentialities from the domain of the real into the empirical domain.
This is made possible by the ability of managers to understand and utilise relevant
structural properties. That is, managers must be alert to the taken for granted,
routinised systems and relations within their organisations and be able to articulate
their properties, if they are to effect change. Further, by implication, management is
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most successful at bringing about desired ends when they have access to a multitude
of structural rules and resources for inspiration and the capabilities to take advantage
of their potential causal powers.
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11. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
11.1 Introduction
In this the last chapter, the findings of this study are brought together and the
objectives of the research assessed. Next, the strengths and limitations are
considered and the implications for future research. The chapter concludes on the
implications for the practice of managing organisational change.
11.2 Structure, Process and Performance
This section considers the insights which the use of structuration theory and
findings on the processes of strategic agenda building can lend to fulfilling the
objectives outlined in chapter one. These were to contribute to an understanding of
the relationships between a firm's administrative systems, decision processes and
competitive position; secondly, how the organisation can maintain effectiveness in
the above relationships and third, how an organisation modifies its administrative
systems and decision processes in response to environmental change and through its
own proactive actions. This research suggests that the key relationships of the firm
are influenced by its contextual reality and the modality of its structure, or the
power relationships arising from the necessary interactions of agents which are
contingent upon the structural properties of the organisation. Effectiveness may be
ascertained by agents' management of the causal powers of the organisation, that is,
their ability to bring about organisational outcomes by constructing the conditions of
closure which enable those causal powers inherent within the organisational
structure to give rise to desired patterns of events and experiences. Finally,
incremental organisational change requires sufficiently transposable rules, or
flexible logics of action inherent in its structure to adapt to an evolving context:
while transformational change owes as much to the agential powers of managers as
their ability to execute them.
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11.2.1 contextual reality
The use of structuration theory has provided a holistic account of organisations in
interaction with their environments. Here organisations are conceived of as
structural entities, influenced by wider structures yet devising their own unique
structural properties in response to their individual circumstances. Thus
organisations are seen as potentially complex and changing, having therefore the
possibility of a variety of structural forms.
The process model of strategic agenda building not only clarifies some important
organisational relationships but also includes some important external ones. In this
way organisations are conceived as existing within a multi contextual reality. Here
contexts are distinguished by four key dimensions characteristic of their structures:
temporality, dynamism, sphere of influence and modality. These key dimensions
have implications for the depth and breadth of influence by structures and hence
their potential power in relation to other structures. The history of structural effects
influences managerial perceptions and expectations, thereby conditioning decision
processes. The durability of structures will in turn contribute to their history and
has implications for their power of influence. The sphere of influence will be
important in decision making, as for instance when responding to actions from the
wider environment, it is often necessary to engage with a diverse set of intersecting
structures. This was evident when Thames had to engage public sympathy as part of
their challenge to government price rises. The differing modality of structures
within each context ensures a complex and diverse configuration of power
relationships at each level with the potential for differing effects. For example,
campaigners within an environmental organisation experience rather different
relationships with each other and in relation to an issue like river quality, which
commands centrality and importance for their organisation, from the relationships
which PCOs experienced when working for the case study organisations in the
1980s.
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That an organisation's structure owes something of its configuration to the industry
and the wider social context, of which it is a part, has been demonstrated in the
account of the origins of ideology in the water industry (9.2). The ideological basis
of the case study organisations was shown to derive in good measure from the
industry context and its historical development. The way in which ideology conveys
rules and resources from wider, more enduring and powerful structures accounts for
its potency as a legitimising force and role in organisational stasis and change.
Similarly, the external context was shown to shape managerial perceptions through
its impact on issue salience and the content of the strategic agenda. This has been
evident in the political influence on the strategic agenda of the water companies.
Time too is important, as the influence of organisational history on issue salience
has demonstrated. At industry and social levels then, a range of structural forms
provide rules and resources for managerial inspiration and choice. In consequence,
decision processes are conditioned by wider structures over time and in response to
changes in the environment.
The overlapping and intersecting nature of structures in each context provides for
contradictory or ambivalent rules and resources by which managers have the scope
for choice. However structures also have a constraining effect, as when a
constellation of structural forms over time evolves into an ideology. The subsequent
belief system delimits the rules and resources for action and hence choice. It is part of
management's role to understand the pattern of relevant structural intersections,
those which are habitually drawn upon and those potential structures left dormant,
and to make their judgements accordingly. This will in large part be conditioned by
their knowledge of the temporality, dynamism, sphere of influence and
configuration of power relationships within any one structure. For instance, this
knowledge was crucial in introducing commercialisation into the case study
organisations, where new managers realised the effects of a long history within the
public sector, the prevailing inertia of their cultures, their inward looking nature
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and hence limited sphere of influence and the dominance of the divisional form with
decentralised power relations. All called for restructuring, the use of delegation
instruments, notions of fast track and empowerment, to counter what was perceived
as a public sector way of operating, here described as the PH ideology.
11.2.2 modality of structure
Organisations' structural configurations were seen to be comprised of necessary
relationships, or interactions of organisational members, contingent upon the
properties of structure (Tsoukas, 1994). These interactions represent power
relationships based upon organisational rules and resources. The unique
configurations of organisations are seen to derive from their history, development
pattern, and the unique interpretations of structures by the individuals which work
in them.
The new and developed agenda building model (Fig 10.5) suggests the importance
of ideology, organisational identity, structural form, leadership (individuals) and the
strategic agenda, upon managerial perceptions which condition the amount of
attentional resources allocated to an issue. Thus decision making is based on a
confluence of factors which comprise different aspects of organisational structure
and interaction. Ideology at the metalevel influences the overall values, beliefs and
management style of the organisation. Organisation identity as a subset of the above
plays an important part in influencing the choice of issues to respond to and so
framing beliefs about action. The strategic agenda comprises the portfolio of
organisational concerns which influences the uptake of new concerns and decisions
about existing ones. The administrative system in this way conditions the perception
of agents and potential agents within the system: although leaders and strong
individuals may impose their own bias upon decisions, either in line with or
different from, established practices. All these organisational relationships thus far
discussed are potential rather than causal. That is, they are contingent upon the
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properties of the structure (Tsoukas, 1994). In this way, these relations will hold
good until either the rules or resources change: as for instance occurred within
Severn Trent when they changed their regulatory activity from an audit function to a
quality issue involving all organisational members, thereby initiating action on
effluent and river quality.
The discussion on ideology highlighted the importance of organisational form,
process and work practices as reinforcing mechanisms for organisational structure.
The three feedback ioops of the agenda building model all confirm the reinforcing
power of structure, that is, that necessary relations legitimise the structural
properties which govern their configuration. In this way, structure is present in its
effects, thereby confirming the dual nature of structure (Giddens, 1976, 1979,
1981, 1984). This explains the power of routinised behaviour and relationships
within organisations, particularly where the structural rules are deep, or,
unconscious and implicit (Sewell, 1992). It is because these relations produce
desired organisational outcomes that the structural properties are reaffirmed and re-
chosen by agents (consciously or unconsciously) and the structure is perpetuated. It
is the ability of structures to condition interpretations of desired outcomes by
organisational members that accounts for why economic rationalities do not always
prevail (Whittington, 1992). For instance, the preservation of work practices by the
predecessor bodies in divisional form was counter productive to IRBM.
Thus process reinforces or subverts structure by virtue of the outcomes it generates.
The particular causal capabilities of structures may or may not be realised due to the
abilities of organisational members to put the rules into practice by managing the
organisational context. The water authorities were unsuccessful at integration
because they did not utilise the inherent rules of IRBM. Furthermore, the
intersection of external structures with the organisation may also act to jeopardise
the realisation of structure, as did the political system in undermining the regulating
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authority of the water authorities. Structure is therefore dependent upon internal
processes and external relationships for its continuation and to realise its potential.
Therefore management must manage not only organisational processes but also the
organisation in the context of its wider relationships.
The structural conception of organisations explains the basic relationship between an
organisation's administrative systems, decision processes and performance. This is
illustrated in fig 11.1, where the organisational structure 1 (administrative systems)
is realised by the management of process (decision making) to produce a
performance outcome. Where the desired outcome occurs, the structure is
perpetuated and where it fails, changes to the structure are made such that new
properties are instituted in a modified structure 2. This may occur through several
alliterations until a desired structure 3 (indicated by performance) is attained. In this
way, accounting for the bias towards incremental change within organisations.
STRUCTURE I
	
PROCESS STRUCTURE 2
	
PROCESS STRUCTURE 3	 PROCESS
PERFORMANCE	 PERFORMANCE	 PERFORMANCE
Fig 11.1 Relationship between Structure, Process and Performance
For instance, the case study organisations both went through several structural
changes during commercialisation: first reducing the number of divisions, then
expanding the operating units with increasing centralisation and rationalisation of
support services. This continued until privatisation when desired levels of efficiency
and effectiveness, as evidenced by performance outcomes became evident.
Conversely, where poor performance outcomes are ignored, as in Thames, the
legitimacy of the structure may be weakened by subsequent events (COPA II,
Privatisation) in response to and tangentially related to the poor performance: thus
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allowing the importation of radically new properties and instituting major
organisational change.
This relationship between structure, process and performance, leads to the second
general question about maintaining organisational effectiveness. Managers achieve
and maintain effectiveness by the ability to make incremental changes or
adjustments to organisational structure, when so indicated by performance. By
being constantly alert to changes or short-comings in performance, managers may
make structural modifications in advance of substantial deteriorations. It is also
incumbent upon management to understand the potential of the organisational
structure (ie the causal powers of the administrative system). Both Lester and Bellak
recognised the contradictory status of regulation within the authority given their
relationship with government. Where one sought to work within the system's rules,
the other introduced new rules into the organisation. But the potential to maintain
river quality and self regulate was limited in the public sector. Thus managers must
be aware of both the potential and limitations of their administrative systems when
undertaking modifications.
Moreover, the organisational configuration must be managed. The empirical reality
of the administrative causal powers is only made possible by the agency of
managers, who having correctly recognised the potential of the system, are able to
fit the domains of the real and actual together and subsequently turn events into
experiences (Tsoukas, 1994). We have seen that this contingent accomplishment
(Outhwaite, 1983, 1987) owes as much to an understanding of the organisation's
contextual reality as to its own internal causal capabilities and this must be
conveyed to organisational members. In this respect, the purpose of ideology is to
convey, via values, beliefs, management styles and the social context of the
organisation, the implicit rules of the structure.
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Additionally, the structural rules so conveyed must be congruent with the ongoing
organisational practices, in the sense that the practice must be a true interpretation
of the properties of the system if organisational members are to adequately perform
their roles and tasks. The condoned flouting of the regulatory rules by the water
authorities served to undermine the role of pollution control officers and led to poor
task accomplishment. Thus management must be capable of implementing processes
consistent with structure. This involves the ability to convey the intended meaning
of the structural properties, that all organisational members might understand and
participate accordingly.
11.2.3 managerial agency and change
The modification of administrative systems and decision processes in response to
environmental change is shown to be conditioned by the transposability of an
organisation' s rules, or ideological malleability to changing environmental
circumstances (Sewell, 1992). This study has demonstrated how an organisational
ideology may be relatively impervious to environmental contingencies, but that this
will only endure until the organisation becomes untenable in the face of wider
contextual realities. Similarly, organisational change which does not create a viable
entity will itself be vulnerable to further changes as the water authorities were to
privatisation. The commercial ethos imported into the authorities did not of its own
create a structure which was free from the inherent contradictions of the previous
era. Nationalisation merely harnessed the authorities closer to Whitehall and
intensified their ambiguous status.
The discussion on changing ideology in the water authorities and the promotion of
strategic issues demonstrate the leverage to be gained from exploiting the
contradictions between internal structural properties and between those properties of
the organisation and of external structures with which it is intimately engaged
(Whittington, 1992). The internal contradictions of the water authorities were made
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more acute by political change in the wider environment after 1979. In the absence
of reform from inside the system, these organisations were vulnerable to change
from outsiders, as occurred when Bellak challenged regulation practices with
alternative systems logics. In this way, social structures are significant because they
make a difference to strategic choice.
It has already been argued that management is empowered by the set of necessary
relations of which it is a part (Tsoukas, 1994). Additionally, managers bring to the
organisation personal resources of a psychological and experiential nature. Different
managers have different access to structural resources and different interpretations
of the same structures. The difference between what leaders chose to focus on in
Severn Trent and Thames illustrates this plurality of interpretations. The status of
managers within organisations is conferred by what they bring, their location in the
organisation, their role and their identity in that role.
The most potent force for action on behalf of strategic issues was where sponsors
framed issues in ways which emphasised the dominant or emerging ideology of the
organisation. By framing and labelling issues in a way which has a resonance with
the property of the structure, managers could capitalise on
their causal powers: in particular where they could exploit the structural properties
of issue related activities, as for instance, when Severn Trent gave a bonus to all
managers whose sewage works complied. In this way they sustained the new rules
with complementary resources. This was particularly powerful when explicitly
linked to organisational ideology. In the same way that ideology has powerful
reinforcing and constraining effects, so too can it be powerful in mobilising
alternative actions and change. Old issues could be promoted in the cause of a new
ideology, thus indicating that a powerful route to change might be to repackage
familiar issues in new rules and resources. In this way, managers act to legitimise
organisational involvement in action (Pettigrew, 1985a).
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However, managers cannot be complacent about their organisation but must be alert
to the vulnerability of structure as links from and into the external context provide
the potential for change. In this way managers may be seen to have a choice of rules
and resources internal and external to the organisation. Here the access to
alternative structural properties is a key resource of agency. Choice is then
dependent upon the difference between what managers seek and what they can
realise (Whittington, 1988). They must be aware of the limitations of structure and
of their own agency in constructing mechanisms which will render the appearance
of certain sets of effects possible (Tsoukas, 1994). Roy Watts had to retreat from
his second challenge to government over the rivers as it was politically and legally
untenable. Further, managerial choice is complicated by the internal contradictions
of structures which managers may manipulate, thereby extending choice. Also the
intersections of structures present managers with a range of constraints and
resources from which to pick and choose (Whittington, 1988).
The intersection of structures also means structures may overwhelm or cancel out
other structures thereby preventing change. The failure of integration for the water
authorities was due to the dominant PH ideology, particularly residing in the
divisions which overshadowed IRBM. The new structure did not have the history,
psychological commitment or legitimacy to assert itself. Regionalisation was
represented by corporate management at the centre who lacked alternative structural
properties in support of IRBM. Its non-execution was in large part due to the early
history of the organisations.
In summary, it is the very ordering of structures which confers the ability to
generate transformations. The 5 key axioms proposed by Sewell (1992) (2.1.3) were
borne out by the findings of this research. Conflicting claims and empowerments
within the water authorities, and between industry and government, afforded a
complex and diverse range of different and even incompatible rules and resources in
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a multiplicity of structures, thereby providing opportunities for choice. Inherent in
the knowledge of organisational structure is the ability to transpose rules, the
effectiveness of which was seen to be determined by managers' access to multiple
structures. Limited access to alternative structures in many respects accounted for
the failure of the integration period. Structures were seen to depend for their
continuation upon their reinforcement by resources. Here the demise of the
regulation function within the authority can be accounted for by a continuing spiral
of lack of resources and rule fudging, leading to diminished organisational
legitimacy: in this way demonstrating how the unpredictability of resource
accumulations might lead to structural modification.
Sewell's definition of agency as the capacity to transpose and extend schemas to
new contexts makes inherent the ambiguity of resources. Given their multiple
meanings, resources are capable of empowering different actors and teaching
different schemas. This (re)interpretation of resources in another context is an
important skill in organisational change. This is made possible by the intersection
and overlap of structures. By far the greatest skill was the ability by managers to
exploit the intersection of structures. This ability to claim and mobilise different
resources in different contexts, and transpose rules from one structure to another,
was seen in the commercialisation of the water authorities.
11.3 Limitations and Contributions of this Research
A critical examination of this research has shown weaknesses in research design,
data set and type, the reliance on a single model and limited variable analysis. This
research can, however, make claims for the veracity of its findings due to its
holistic, contextualist approach and comparative case study method which has added
to the agenda and attentions field: while the employment of structuration theory
from a Realist perspective has given insights into the relations between context,
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process and action. This is also one of the very few attempts to empirically
operationalise and interpret the Giddens and Sewell positions on structuration and
agency.
11.3.1 limitations
The research design has several inherent limitations. For instance, this study has
only focused on one industry which has shown particularly close relationships with
the external political context. The comparability with other public sector industries
and particularly the private sector is therefore open to question and would
necessitate comparative research. Further, only two organisations were studied of a
possible ten in the industry. Although their choice as a matched pair is explained
(3.7.4), they were notably similar in retaining large predecessor bodies as divisions
during integration. Their ideological entrenchment may well have been more
pronounced than within other water authorities and so represent extreme types.
Equally, the focus on a single issue has limitations for the study of change
(Pettigrew et al, 1992): although this has been somewhat mitigated by efforts here
to show the issue in the context of a wider change arena, exploring interrelated
agenda issues and the historical evolution of the issue. Therefore what has been
achieved in depth is lacking in the breadth required for comparability with other
enterprises in other sectors.
The interview data itself have largely been confined to managers accounts, although
these were chosen for their involvement in change and proximity to action. Also
many had long histories within the organisations useful to this research and had
been junior members of their organisations previously. However, a shortfall has to
be the lack of contributions from workers lower in the hierarchy who could verify
the changes since privatisation. Also, the lack of time and restrictions of access, due
to a preoccupation with industrial secrecy precluded any observational data. A
further criticism might be that the number of respondents, 40 in all, was too small
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for such an in-depth study. This would be a cause for concern where there were
widely differing views but it is acknowledged that any less would have been
problematic.
The reliance on one model may also be considered a weakness as it channels the
researcher to focus on a set of pre-determined factors which may obscure more
important ones. Here too, several factors emphasised in Dutton' s (1988a) model
were not included within the scope of this study. First the content of the strategic
agenda of the case study organisations over 20 years was not explicitly analysed. In
relation to this last, Dutton's hypothesis on the links between the size and variety of
the agenda and organisational culture was considered beyond the scope of this
research. Additionally, the influence of strategy on the agenda building process was
not a primary focus. All these factors may be considered significant omissions and
the subject of further research.
11.3.2 analytical contribution
This study has sought to right the balance of much work which has been described
as ahistorical, aprocessual and acontextual in character (Pettigrew, 1 985b).
Therefore a study of development and change has been conducted that allows the
change process to reveal itself in a substantially temporal and contextual manner. In
exploring organisational development over 20 years in the context of an industry
history over a century, the study gains a richness of meaning not possible with
single change event studies or a set of contextually discrete episodes. This research
has sought to trace out the developmental process to its historical antecedents and to
locate change eras in the context of wider social structures. The findings have
sought to explain the mechanisms and processes by which change and inertia are
created within a multi-contextual reality and in this way this research has been
concerned with the holistic and dynamic analysis of changing.
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A contextualist approach has been used which is underpinned by five main
principles (Pettigrew, 1990a, 1992): (1) the importance of embeddedness, implying
a need to study change in the context of interconnected levels of analysis; (2) the
importance of temporal interconnectedness, with the need to locate change in the
past, present and future time; (3) the need to explore content and action and how
one is implicated in the other is crucial; (4) the central assumption about causation
in this kind of holistic analysis is that causation of change is neither linear nor
singular. The goal has been to identify the variety of influences on change and
inertia and explore through time some of the conditions and contexts under which
these influences occur. Finally (5) there has been an explicit attempt to link process
analysis to the location and explanation of outcomes.
The fifth principle determined the choice of a comparative case study to engage the
question of 'performance' on a strategic issue. This has forced a compare and
contrast analysis, with the result that shared patterns of development and process
between the two organisations gave rise to the notion of the sector and
organisational ideology implicated in the development process: while contrasting the
cases was used as the basis for theory building on processes underlying strategic
agenda building. The contrasting inner contexts of the organisations permitted
differentiating between organisational responsiveness to the issue context, and so
highlighted the importance of history, content of the strategic agenda, leadership
bias and management perceptions.
The contextualist theory of method has been used to extend and develop Dutton's
(1988a) model of strategic agenda building to include sector and social contexts at
the macro level and their relationship with internal processes of patterned activity at
the micro level. In this way, process and context have been introduced into the
agendas and attention area which has hitherto been characterised by contextually
isolated and episodic studies (Huff & Reger, 1987). This study has also made a case
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for the analytical distinctiveness of contexts which has been based on incorporating
the key concepts of this research (time, change, power and structures) in this way
refining further Sewell's structural dimensions of depth and power. This has
allowed contexts to claim a distinct role in organisational life while recognising
their interdependence.
The emphasis on process has meant conducting an in-depth study which has resulted
in a model showing complex relational links. Those factors and relationships which
have emerged have been identified as those with the capacity to make a difference to
process. The emphasis on time has involved the tracking of a strategic issue over 20
years and in relation to the historical context of the sector over a much longer time,
thereby demonstrating the cumulative effect of historical association and meaning on
organisational processes. In terms of temporal analysis, the punctuated equilibrium
theory (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) has proved useful in explaining conjunctions
of events, discriminating between phases or eras at the sector and organisational
levels and distinguishing between high and low levels of change. This lent a more
dynamic and historically informed model of organisations (Kimberly and Miles,
1980). The theory also revealed a bias towards temporal determinism in the
assumption that change periods are of briefer duration than periods of continuity.
For instance, Quinn (1980) has highlighted that large-scale change in major
organisations may be prolonged and protracted. This finding was the pointer to an
interesting property of structure, that is, its vulnerability to further change
following incomplete or ambiguous change.
Organisational transition processes are an important topic of study as revealed in
this research. The emergence and early development of the water authorities and
transformation from public to private sector represent distinct chapters, with periods
of transition in between. The emergence of the authorities was a transition phase
from the predecessor organisations, and a period of drift followed where there was
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a gap between the ideals as originally conceived via IRBM in the water industry and
the organisations as enacted (Lodahi and Mitchell, 1980). The punctuated
equilibrium theory with its theoretical links to other disciplines of study such as
human development (Gersick, 1991) has similarities with the tracing of
organisational biography (Kimberly, 1987): an approach which Pettigrew, et al
(1992) view as shaped by a series of strategic decisions that unfold.
The use of structuration theory (Giddens, 1979) and of Sewell's development of
Giddens, has provided explanatory force for relations between organisations and
contexts and its dual nature revealed insights into the relationship between action
and context. The contribution has been to operationalise and apply these very
abstract ideas. By conceptualising organisational context in terms of structure, and
ideology as both an implicit and explicit harbinger of its rules, it has been
demonstrated how action may reinforce structure by its effects. The notion of
effects has been explained in terms of performance outcomes which act as
organisational resources. The Realist perspective (Bhaskar, 1978) underpinning this
research explains the potential of structural effects via the concept of generative
mechanisms, which causal powers enable structural effects. That these effects are
not necessarily realised allows the preservation of agency and prevents the
domination of structure.
At the same time, the power of agents is explained by the notion of necessary
relations. These are an important element of the rules of structure, in that their
configuration comprises a modality of structure unique to each organisation, despite
similar contextual influences. It is these necessary relations which impart the power
of agency and which must be negotiated and engaged with in the agenda building
process. Also, structuration demonstrates how managers access inspiration and
ideas for sponsorship and acquire agency outside the immediate organisational
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context. In this way the theoretical basis of this research has sought to provide a
series of explanatory concepts linking structure (context), process, and action.
11.4 Implications for Future Research
The model of agenda building developed in this research has identified some
important links between the external, organisational and issue contexts. There is
now ample scope for broadening and developing these relationships. The issue
context has highlighted the important salience dimensions but there is potential for
further development in this area: for instance, how different conceptualisations of
an issue (ie resource vs moral) may lend different force and interest for
organisational members and how issue sponsors may align organisational members
to a conceptualisation which lends an issue the greatest salience.
This research has explored an issue which was a core function of the organisations
and hence the importance of manipulating the rules and resources of issue related
activities. Future studies could usefully explore new and unfamiliar issues,
particularly the process by which issue related activities are established and nurtured
within organisations.
The role of sponsor has concerned very senior managers in this study and more
research into the mobilisation of interest by lower level members is needed,
together with the process by which coalitions of interest groups are galvanised by
issue sponsors to promote and disseminate organisation wide interest in an issue.
This would involve an examination of group politics and processes. This study has
also shown how sponsorship can be suppressed by the role and structural location of
sponsors. More work is required to understand how organisations might encourage
sponsorship of strategic issues and innovative responses.
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As discussed in the last section, more work on the nature of the strategic agenda is
needed. Specifically how culture and or strategy may influence the size and variety
of issues under attention.
In terms of the organisational context, this study has not looked at strategy, human
resource programmes or technology for instance, all important features of modern
organisations, in relation to the agenda building process. Similarly, the importance
of organisational form in the agenda building process suggests the need for a
comparative study on the relationship between the uptake and promotion of new
issues and structure. How, for instance, might organisations develop a context
which facilitates the capacity of individuals to promote issues, seek innovative
solutions and participate in transformation and change?
Comparative studies of the external context are also suggested: for instance between
sectors such as those experiencing decline versus growth. Also in terms of the
relations between organisations and context, it would be useful to compare this
study with a sector less dominated by the external political context. This might take
the form of comparison between the public and private sectors. In the same vein is
the question of the effect of organisational boundary activities on agenda building.
For instance, are looser, networked organisations more open to new strategic
issues?
The findings in relation to organisational change suggest some avenues for further
research: for instance, more exploration into the nature of the transposability of
structural rules which facilitate environmental adaption. More empirical support is
required to develop SeweIl's (1992) notion of depth and power as they apply to
structural rules. So far Sewell has applied these concepts to language, nation states
and capitalism and now concrete analysis of social and organisational change and
reproduction is called for. In terms of contextual analysis more work is needed to
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elaborate on the notions of temporality, dynamism, sphere of influence and modality
of structures identified in this research. What systems and processes are required to
grant an organisation greater flexibility without diluting their primary purpose?
Further, what are the generic qualities of transposability which might be reflected in
the values, beliefs and management styles of the organisation?
The cultural perspective of organisational change has been implicit throughout with
the exploration of ideology (Pettigrew, 1979, 1985c). This raises issues of the
representation of ideology expressed in symbolic terms through symbolism,
language, belief and ritual. This study has only touched on the significance of
language and drama in the promotion of river quality and Pettigrew, et al (1992)
note that shifting language systems are themselves interesting objects of study, as
they provide order and coherence, describe relationships and because of the politics
of competing language systems. There is much more scope for exploring more fully
the language of new ideologies, its role in change and the empowerment of agents.
11.5 Implications for the Management of Change
The importance of managerial perceptions and identity in providing a receptive
organisational context for issue sponsorship is supported by work on change in the
NHS by Pettigrew et al (1992) with its emphasis on receptive and non-receptive
contexts for change. This study shares three of the eight findings considered
important in the NHS study: the importance of sponsors as key people leading
change, the influence of long term environmental pressure in triggering radical
change, and finally, the notion of a supportive organisational culture is similar to
the role of ideology in this study. The concept of a flexible culture emphasised by
Pettigrew et a! (1992) is echoed in the transposability of rules concept here.
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The agenda building model has provided strong pointers to the requirements for
issue sponsorship. The location and role of potential sponsors is key in terms of
perceived power and motivation to act. Sponsors must be strategically located, both
structurally and with access to knowledge. The importance of role also highlights
the need for integration with the organisation and the requirement for management
support in promoting issues.
Sponsors must be equipped personally for the challenge of change management.
This means an analytical capacity for understanding the subtleties of organisational
ideology and the ability to convey issue infonnation in those terms. Further, good
judgement is required to assess which external structures to access and which to
leave dormant. Ultimately, the potential of the prevailing structure must be
understood when making decisions about the type of change, for instance
incremental versus transformational. Also necessary is a creative ability to utilise
cultural artefacts such as language and imagery which finds a resonance with the
prevailing belief system. Related to this is the ability to package or reinterpret
issues in terms of alternative structural rules and resources which have meaning for
the organisation. This last implies agents with a greater access to alternative
structures outside the system have far more resources to call upon in change
management. Managing the context of the firm is thus both an analytical and
creative exercise.
Receptive organisational contexts in this study were found to be those with flexible
ideologies expressed as having transposable rules. Also receptiveness was found to
be related to organisational identity, the character of which was influenced by
history and early developments. That successfi.il issue selling is linked to ideological
congruence has similarities with Pettigrew and Whipp's (1991) notion of coherence
in the management of change. This is the same way that the removal of local
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authority Boards from the water authorities allowed a more unitary sense of purpose
and belief among senior management and paved the way for commercialisation.
Another important feature of the organisational context for change is the ability to
link issues to task related activities. This reflects Pettigrew and Whipp 'S (1991)
fmdings on the importance of linking strategic and operational change. In Severn
Trent putting works managers on a bonus for achieving compliance was a crucial
step in harnessing vested interests at lower levels.
Finally, for change to stick, the organisational processes which are implemented
must reflect the formal rules of the new structure. This depends in large measure
upon organisational coherence and the ability to manage the new processes.
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Deputy Chairman
Planning & Support Manager Regulatory
Former Planning & Regulation Unit Manager
Remuneration & HQ Personnel Manager
NRA Manager
Head of Legal Section
General Manager Water
Environmental Science Director
Regional Scientific Manager NRA
Administrator Accomodation Works
Network Services Manager
Group Managing Director
Planning & Support Services Manager
Director of Techology
Former Chairman
Strategic Planning Manager
Manager Sewage Operations
90 mins
90 mins
75 mins
60 mins
60 mins
60 mins
90 mins
75 mins
60 mins
75 mins
90 mins
60 mins
120 mins
90 mins
20 mins
105 mins
105 mins
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SEVERN TRENT
Director of Environmental Affairs 100 mins
Head of Quality and Environmental Services 75 mins
Principal Advisor Effluent and River Quality 120 mins
Managing Director	 60 mins
Director of Planning	 120 mins
Senior Quality Officer NRA
	
90 mins
Head of Technology Dept
	
60 mins
Director of Finance and Regulation 	 60 mins
Regional Water Quality Manager NRA 	 60 mins
Quality Planner NRA	 60 mins
Director Customer Service	 60 mins
Manager Quality Assurance	 60 mins
Chief Executive	 90 mins
Former Group Deputy Chief Executive 	 150 mins
Former Director Scientific Services 	 90 mins
Former Director of Finance	 20 mins
Former Chairman	 90 mins
Former Divisional Manager 	 110 mins
Chairman	 60 mins
Director of Services	 105 mins
1. David Woods
2. Bob Breach
3. John Martin
4. Vie Cocker
5. John Hall
6. Jeff Dolby
7. Mike Farrimond
8. Brian Duckworth
9. Dave Brewin
10. Pete Whally
11. Mike Upstone
12. Vince Howell
13. Roderick Paul
14. Frank Earnshaw
15. Fred Lester
16. Cohn McMillan
17. Sir William Dugdale
18. Bob Hattersley
19. John Bellak
20. Joe Stephens
THAMES
1. Bill Harper
2. David Stratford
3. Bill Stanley
4. Tony Turton
5. Les Jones
6. Graham Johnson
7. Geoff Littlewood
8. John Sexton
9. Ian Adams
10. Ron Howes
11. David Turnball
12. Mike Hoffman
13. Ian Benstead
14. Mike Ribbins
15. Peter Black
16. Peter Spillett
17. John Lawrence
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WSA
Peter Hall
	
Deputy Director	 40 mins
OFWAT
Alan Booker	 Deputy Director General
	
60 mins
DoE
John Hall	 Senior Executive Officer Water Services Division 30 mins
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APPENDIX 3.2: INTERVIEW PRO FORMA
1. PERSONAL DETAILS
Current job title and duties
How long with organisation
Academic background
Employment before this organisation
1.1. Career
Positions occupied within organisation
Location at HQ/ Divisions
How long
Involvement in policy (level and influence)
2. ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Key changes within STW/TW since 1974
- comment on reorganisation
- comment on main structural changes
- comment on MMC referral (STW)
- comment on 1979 change of government
- comment on 1982 structural changes
- comment on 1983 Water Act
- comment on main changes/developments during 1980s
- comment on privatisation
- comment on NRA
- comment on 1989 Water Act and after
What were the different management styles and working practices in each period?
What were the types of cultures which existed?
What was the political atmosphere like?
3. LEADERSHIP
What were the main attributes of the different CEOs
What characterised their style of leadership
How much control over the strategy of the organisation
What were the attributes of the different Chairmen
What characterised their style of leadership
How involved in policy of organisation
How significant was the Director of Scientific Services
How significant was the Director of Operations
How significant was the Director of Finance/Planning
How significant were Divisional Managers
- which were the powerful ones
- style of leadership
- control over policy
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4. POLICY MAKING IN PUBLIC SECTOR
How much was organisationally defined/driven as opposed to externally driven
What were the key changes to policy during the period as an authority
How proactive/reactive was the organisation
What were the management goals
How much consensus was there within the organisation
What key issues were on the agenda during key periods: formation, integration,
nationalisation, commercialisation, privatisation
How did coding of the capital programme influence policy
Relations with the DoE/Treasury
How did this change over time
4.1 RWQ Issue
How did RWQ feature as an issue over time
- at what time was it important/high on the agenda
- why was this
- at what times was it less important! low on the agenda
- why was this! what issues were more important and why
Was the importance of RWQ driven by internal or external events
4.2 How did Policy Making Work
- at divisional level (comment on before and after 1983)
- how important were divisions in policy making
- at HQ (before and after 1983)
- who was driving policy
4.3 Effects on Policy making from:
- local authorities
- the LA Board
- Directorate of Scientific Services
- the Water Quality Advisory Panel
- the restructuring of divisions
- smaller Boards
- preparations for privatisation
4.4 The Political Behaviour of Management
How much consensus between management
Did they operate as a team
changes during key periods
preparation for privatisation on team
Comment on group behaviour, conflicts, power, tactics to gain resources
5. REGULATORY ROLE
How effective over time
Were there divisional differences
Did regulation conflict with divisional/authority policy
Were there tensions and conflicts
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Was this role ever compromised
- effect of 1975 & 1982 structural changes in STWA
- comment on DoE special ruling on consents
- the effect of resetting consents
- the effect of delaying RWQOs
- the effect of the delay in implementing Part II COPA
How evenhanded was the organisation in dealing with industry and external
polluters
The impact of EC directives
The influence of pressure groups
How did organisation's performance in regulation compare with other WAs
Reaction to NRA announcement
5.1 Water Quality Advisory Panel
Its role during the time of the authorities
How effective in support of the regulation function
How useful in pushing RWQ as an issue to management
The significance of the Water Quality reports in STWA
5.2 Pollution Control
What did your work entail
Did you feel an important and central part of the orgariisation
Comment on experiences of 1982 move into divisions in STWA
- did performance in role change
- relations with staff
- relations with trade effluent control
- relations with operations
-relations with management
The main changes to working practice
Changes to policy on RWQ
Power to promote concerns
How were concerns promoted - examples
The main constraints upon action
6. DIVISIONAL CONTEXT
Who was your divisional manager - what sort of leadership
What was your experience of divisional management
Relations with the big Board/small Board
- influence on policy
How was policy and decision making carried out before 1983
- how were issues presented for discussion
- how much consensus
- how was conflict managed
- strategic issues the same or different between divisions
- how important was RWQ
- how important was DWQ
- how important were effluent standards
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- how important were RWQOs
Main constraints on policy making
The impact of the structural changes before 1983 on decision making
6.1 Divisional Culture
How powerful was your division
The extent of the influence of an earlier culture in predecessor organisations
Main differences between the divisions
How important and powerful were divisional managers generally
6.2 Policy Making After 1983
How was policy and decision making carried out
- how did this affect relations with HQ
- what were the key issues during the 1980s
- how were issues presented for discussion
- how much consensus
- how was conflict managed
- strategic issues the same or different between divisions
- did these issues change as privatisation came on the agenda - how - examples
- how important was RWQ
- how important was DWQ
- how important was effluent standards
- how important were RWQOs
7. RWQ PERFORMANCE
What/who were the main drivers for the establishment of RQOs
How do you view the performance of the organisation in achieving RQOs
How does this compare to other WAs
What was your impression nationally of RWQ
To what do you attribute the initial steady improvement of the rivers
What were the main causes of the improvement/deterioration in the 1 980s
- did this concern the authority
- what actions were taken
What were the main causes of the slowing trend, deteriorations in 1990 survey
8. STANDARDS
What was the main driver for the debate over standards
- the role of the NWC
What was the impact of the NWC classification scheme
The impact of the change from BOD to BOD (ATU)
The implications of the move to the 95th % standard
The implication of the DoE ruling on consents
- how viewed by operations
- how viewed by pollution control
Was it a fudge to set consents to the capabilities of the works
- how was this viewed generally within divisions
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- by the industry
How do you view the problem of setting effluent standards
- is it a precise science
9. STAKEHOLDERS
Who were the main stakeholders with an interest in RWQ
- the influence of the DoE
- the influence of angling groups
- the influence of environmental groups
- the influence of EC legislation
- the role of HMIP
10. SUMMARY OF PUBLIC SECTOR
How would you describe the importance of RWQ for organisation at this time
- type of issue: technical, economic, scientific, engineering?
The effectiveness of the regulatory role in the public sector
11. POLICY MAKING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
What have been the main changes to policy and decision making since 1989
- the most important issues on the agenda
How important are divisions now
How much is organisationally defined/driven as opposed to externally driven
How proactive/reactive is the organisation
What are the management goals
How much consensus is there within the organisation
Relations with the City
11.1 Structure
Key changes since privatisation
- impact on work practices
11.2 River Water Quality
How has the issue changed for the organisation in the private sector
- how high or low on strategic agenda
What are key drivers for compliance now
Expected performance in achieving RQOs
12. NRA
What happened to relations initially on formation of the NRA
- how did relations develop
Relations after privatisation and now
How are agreements negotiated
- what tactics are used to bargain on both sides
- power relations between the WSCs and NRA
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13. REGULATION
Relations with OFWAT
- development of that relationship over time
Relations with DWI
Relations with DoE
Relations with HMIP
How does the organisation manage its regulators
How are relations between regulators
Impact of Environmental groups
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APPENDIX 4.1: HTSTORY OF TilE WATER INDUSTRY
1843 -19 94
Pre-industry Developments
1843-45 Royal Commission enquired into the water supplies of large towns and populous districts in
Eng & Wales. Resulted in:
1847 Waterworks Clauses Act covered such matters as rights to break up streets and obligations to
supply water constantly in sufficient quantity and at reasonable pressure to all houses
demanding it and for cleansing sewers and fire fighting. Another clause made it an offence
to foul drinking water supplies.
1848 Public Health Act established a Central Board with power to set up Local Health Boards.
1865-67 Rivers Pollution Commission recommended legally controlling the management of rivers
and their watersheds.
1867 Franchise Reform Act gave LAs powers.
1869-71 Royal Sanitary Commission advocated watershed areas controlled by an authority.
Emergence: 1867-85
1870, 73 Gas & Waterworks Facilities Acts.
1875 Public Health Act.
1876 Rivers Prevention Pollution Act.
1878 Public Health (Water) Act made it duty of all rural auth to provide supply of water to houses in
their area.
1882, 88, 94 Local Govt Acts created urban and rural district councils.
1885 Royal Commission on the Housing of the Working Classes
1885 Provincial Water Companies Association formed
Continuity: Municipal Consolidation 1885-1942
End C 19th Formation of British Assoc of Water Works Eng & Assoc of Sewage Managers
1893 Rivers Pollution Prevention Act
1900-10 three Royal Commissions recommended the need for a central auth to control rivers for
conservation.
1910 Lord Desborough's Water Supplies Protection Bill - Pant dissolved before it could be
introduced.
Indus: In Eng & Wales 2.160 water suppliers. 152 statutor' companies established by
parliament. Three quarters of Eng & Wales had piped water supply of which two thirds
provided by municipal auth. Led to:
1911 Formation of Municipal Waterworks Assoc.
1914 Outbreak WWI, all schemes for new water supply legislation halted.
1922 Water Power Resources Committee recommend Water Commission resp to Mm of Health.
Constituted an advisory committee of engineers, the driving force for a national water
policy.
1925 Measures for the Protection of Underground Water Report suggested new legislation.
1927 Water Pollution Research Lab established by Govt.
1931 Economic crisis - Advisory Committee on water suspended.
1936 Public Health Act enabled Minister to constitute Joint Board to control water supply,
CAWC re-established: advised Minister's powers be extended to authorise amalgamation
and acquisition of water undertakings (municipal or private).
1937 Public Health Act enabled LAs to enter a premises and sample effluent. The resulting analysis
could then provide the basis for legal proceedings against the discharger, the penalties for
which were also laid down in the Act.
Indus: Approx 1.000 water undertakings in Eng and Wales: 50 county
 councils. 150 borough
councils. 300 urban district councils. 300 rural district councils. 33 joint water boards and
173 companies with Statutory powers. Pop of 27 million supplied by
 LAs and Boards. 6
million by private water companies.
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Reorientation: A National Water Policy 1943-48
1943 CAWC issued 3rd report recommending formation of River Boards
1945 Water Act: groupings of smaller water undertakings into Joint Water Boards, under political
control of MHLG. Assoc of Water Officers formed to promote advancement of technology
and administration.
1948 River Boards Act created 32 Boards covering whole of Eng & Wales except Thames and Lea.
Continuity: Rationalisation 1949-71
1951 Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act instead of relying on the identification of damaging
discharges as and when they occurred, required would-be dischargers to apply for permits
(consents) to River Boards before making any new discharge. Required each RA to maintain
a register of conditions attached to consents but restricted persons from inspection of
premises.
1958 First DoE RWQ Survey: poor RWQ.
1961 Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act was essentially designed to bring the 1951 Act up to date
by ensuring the upkeep of cleanliness of rivers and other inland or coastal waters in England
and Wales. Acts were concerned with the issues of: (i) criminal offences for polluting
rivers, and (ii) the licensing of outlets and discharges to streams (Hanley et al, 1991).
Within the Acts, provision was also made to lay before Parliament the annual reports of the
river boards (Tearle, 1973). It also made it a criminal offence to disclose any information
obtained in connection with an application for consent to discharge, the imposition of
conditions on a polluter, or information concerning a sample of effluent. Both Acts,
however, preserved the common law right of a riparian owner to obtain an injunction against
an upstream polluter without having to prove actual damage.
Until passage of the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Acts 1951 and 1961, the river boards' powers
embraced only the limited scope of the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1876. These new Acts:
to make new provision for maintaining or restoring the wholesomeness of the rivers and other
inland or coastal waters of England and Wales (Okun, 1977:21), put restrictions upon the discharges
of pollutants to rivers and established a system of consent by river boards for discharges to rivers.
Essentially, these Acts applied to discharges to non-tidal rivers. Control over tidal rivers and
estuaries under the Clean Rivers (Estuaries and Tidal Waters) Act 1960 was restricted to new or
substantially altered discharges. All discharges could, in theory, be controlled with a Tidal Waters
Order but, up to 1970, only 14 such orders had been made and none on any of the major polluted
estuaries.
1963 Water Resources Act created 29 river authorities (RAs) with responsibility in their areas for
land drainage (including flood control), fisheries and prevention of pollution, as performed
by the river boards and would add responsibilities for the development of water resources.
They also were to initiate hydrologic data collection programs and surveys of current
resources and anticipated requirements prepatory to initiating programs of development.
Most important, while continuing to have power to grant consents for discharges into their
rivers, the new river authorities were to have, through licensing, and charges for licenses
and abstraction, complete control over the abstraction and impounding of waters in their
domains. Govt established WRB to plan nation's future requirements.
The RAs were to control discharges of sewage and trade effluent or any poisonous, noxious, or
polluting matter into underground strata by means of well, borehole or pipe; in a way similar to the
consent procedure used to control discharges of effluents to streams under the Rivers (Prevention of
Pollution) Acts 195 1-61. RAs may revoke or vary consents, and have to keep a register of consents.
They were also to have the power to acquire land and control new discharges into underground
strata.
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Recreation: Reorganisation 1968-73
1969 Royal Commission on Local Govt recommended reorganising municipal bodies and water
supply service as they were inadequate to cope with inc water pollution.
1971 CAWC report called for sweeping reduction in number of separate units in sewage disposal and
water supply.
1973 DoE RWQ Survey: slow but steady improvement.
Conmiunity Action Programme on the Environment had the following 3 specific aims. First, to
prevent or reduce pollution and nuisances, next to husband natural resources and the balance of
ecological systems; and inally, to improve the quality of life and working conditions. Improvements
in WQ were given further potential impetus when the UK joined the EC (Hanley et al, 1991).
Indus: 29 EAr. 160 water undertakings. 1.300 sewerage authorities.
1973 Water Bill: 10 regional auth created. WRB abolished and NWC created. RWQ, standards of
sewage tmt and potential for water resource now linked.
Convergence: Jntegration 1974-79
1974 new units in operation just as Labour Party gain office. WRC established Control of
Pollution Act Part II . . . complements the Water Act 1973 to provide a fairly radical
reform of the control ofpollution of waters. It brings a wider class o1f waters under
control, and gives increased rights to the individual. The Rivers (prevention of Pollution)
Acts are repealed almost entirely, and most of their provisions re-enacted in amended form
(McLoughlin, 1975).
The major contribution of this Act was to add statutory control of underground, tidal, and coastal
waters (as far as the territorial limits) to the inland waters previously controlled, all termed 'relevant
waters'. An important element in the Act is that a known discharge of poisonous, noxious or
polluting matter to the relevant waters is an offence unless the discharge was authorised by statute, a
consent granted under the Dumping at Sea Act 1974. The most important part of the Act is in the
extended powers given to the WAs to control discharges of municipal and industrial wastewaters. The
consent conditions procedures which had been part of the administrative structure for discharges for
many years, are strengthened under the Act. The teeth of the Act apply primarily to industry, as the
control of the WA's own discharges will inevitably fall under internal WA regulations.
Consents are to be subject to review over periods of not less than two years, when changes in the
consent conditions can be made. Consents for the WA discharges from its own treatment facilities
may be given by the Secretary of State for the Environment, but this is uncertain as the poacher-
gamekeeper relationship of the WAs is not addressed in the Act. As with authority for metering in
the Water Act 1973, the Act authorises the Secretary of State, after consultation with the NWC, to
enable WAs to impose effluent charges on industrial effluents discharged direct to rivers and widens•
their existing powers to charge for effluents discharged to sewers. These charges would be imposed
according to the character and volume of the discharge.
1975 DoE RWQ Survey: continued improvements.
1976 Drought in SE, SW & Midlands, public resp showed recog of water as a variable resource.
1976-77 Moratorium on capital expenditure due to BOP difficulties.
1977 White Paper proposed inc local govt infi and privatising statutory water cos - never legislated.
NWC consultation paper and problems with implementation of COPA.
1978 NWC consultation doc on RWQ.
Reorientation: Nationalisation 1979-83
1979 Conservative govt elected, WAs approve revised list of NWC 's WQO5. Intention by govt to
bring part 2 of COPA into operation by end of year.
1980 NWC RWQ survey: continued improvements. EEC drinking water directive.
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1981 Wildlife & Countryside Act, Govt decide water indus borrowing should decrease: financial
restructuring.
1983 Water Act: LA majority on WA Boards abolished, NWC abolished, WAs set up non-statutory
WAA.
Continuity: Commercialisation 1984-87
1985 Jan, House of Lords ques water price inc above rate of inflation. Roy Watts presses for
consideration of privatisation.
end Jan, Thatcher issues cautious speech on privatisation.
Feb 7, Ian Gow announces possibility of a measure of privatisation.
April, discussion paper published.
June-July, govt completed review of quality of all drinking water.
1985 RWQ survey: showed for first time deteriorations since 1958.
1986 Feb, White Paper: Privatisarion of WAs in Eng & Wales.
Mar & Apr, Green Papers: Water and Sewage Law & The Water Env: the Next Steps.
1986 COPA II Act consolidates various existing powers for pollution control. Extends control to
existing discharges to tidal waters (estuaries and coastal waters) previously only new
discharges to tidal waters as well as all discharges to rivers, were controlled. Act also
makes provision for control or prohibition of specific activities or use of specific chemicals
either nationally or within specific areas. Also opened pollution control to full public
participation. Allows public access to information and prosecution by private individuals.
The main pollution control power is the consent. Only those discharges which have a consent are
allowed. Applications for consent to discharge must be advertised. Representations may be made by
the public who have right of appeal to the Secretary of State if they object to intentions of a WA, as
does the discharger. Appeals by the public may result in a Public Inquiry. However, advertising is
not required if the discharge does not have an 'appreciable effect'. Such an effect is defined by the
DoE.
Consents are issued by the Secretary of State for WA discharges. WAs for all other discharges. Two
types of consents are allowed:
1. Descriptive consents applying to works - serving a population of less than 250, receiving no trade
effluent; having no significant effect on the quality of the receiving watercourse. These consents do
not quantif' the quality of the discharging effluent. Generally works serving a population of less than
250, which have numeric consents are those upstream of an abstraction plant.
2. Numeric consents which state effluent discharge quality. (Neither COPA II nor any other
legislation gives guidelines on how standards for discharges should be set). Only EEC directives
provide such guidelines. The 1973 Water Act does however state a general duty of WAs of restoring
or maintaining the wholesomeness of rivers. It is only via this general duty and the ability to give
consents that pollution is controlled and EEC directives are implemented.
(UBS Phillips & Drew, 1989:21&108; Mathews and Mance, 1986)
COPA provides some interesting powers to combat pollution. Section 46 allows pollution to be
remedied or forestalled. For instance, the powers allows authorities to re-stock rivers after pollution
and to recover costs; this is a useful addition to the opportunities to recover costs under Civil Law
(Mathews & Mance, 1986).
Recreation: Privatisation 1987-89
1987 May, Ridley announces Govt revised plan for privatisation: NRA.
July, discussion paper: The NRA: the govt's proposals for a regulatory body in a
privatised water industry.
Dec, govt reaffirms intention to create NRA.
1988 Water Bill: The Public Utility and Water Charges Act.
Dee, RSPB & CPRE commissioned report published: Liquid Assets.
1989 July, Water Bill receives Royal Assent.
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Water Act: Under section 84 the NRA is specifically responsible for WQ in all controlled waters.
This includes the determination arid issuing of consents for discharges into controlled waters, the
monitoring of the extent of pollution in such waters, plus achievement of WQOs. The NRA has
number of interrelated tasks to accomplish over the next 10 years in relation to WQ: 1. assess the
current status of controlled waters; 2. assist the DoE in production of a classification scheme for
controlled waters and in derivation of WQSs and WQOs; 3. review and where necessary revise,
consents for discharge to ensure that WQOs are met. The purpose of River Quality Survey in 1990 in
relation to 1 above, was in part to implement the requirements relating to the classification of
controlled water and the need to derive SWQO5. Under section 145 the NRA is entitled to make
charges for consents to discharge.
Nov 22 WSPLCs floated on stockmarket
Continuity: Private Sector 1990-9 5
1990 RWQ survey by NRA: deteriorations since 1985. Environmental Protection Bill.
1991 Water Inclus Act, Land Drainage Act & Water Consolidation (Consequential Provisions) Act.
EC Directive on Urban Wastewater Treatment requires all sewage works discharges serving
an equivalent pop of 2,000 or more discharging to rivers or inland tidal waters to provide
secondary treatment to a 95 percentile standard of 25 mg/1IIOD (ATtJ) and 125mg/i COD.
It also requires that surface waters sensitive to eutrophication or, if abstracted for potable
use, liable to fail nitrate limits in the Surface Abstraction Directive, be designated as
"Sensitive Areas". Discharges to such areas are liable to require nutrient removal. The
provisions will come into effect between 1998 and 2005 (FWR, 1991a).
1991 EC Directive on the Control of Nitrates from Diffuse Sources provides protection of drinking
water from nitrate contamination. Areas at risk have to be designated as 'vulnerable zones'.
Member States have 2 years to identif' zones and further 2 years to draw up action
programmes to reduce nitrate leaching. After this a 4yr implementation period is allowed
(FWR, 1991b).
1992 Decision to establish new Envtal Agency combining NRA and HMIP.
1994 Periodic Review.
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APPENDIX 4.2: LEVELS OF SERVICE INDICATORS IN TIlE
WATER INDUSTRY
Different levels of service indicators applied to different activities carried out by
WAs. However, they all followed the same rationale. A formal definition of level of
service was the extent - stated in percentage or number terms - that a particular
service aspect (pressure, quality etc) failed to meet a reference standard of service.
In some cases the reference standard of service was nationally set such as drinking
water quality. In other cases the reference standard was set regionally. The table
shows the level of service indicators that were required by the DoE from each WA.
WAs used these indicators (along with others to cope with regional peculiarities) to
measure the service they gave customers.
DoE - Level of Service Indicators
Service	 Indicators
Water supply
- Connections	 Number of new properties connected.
Number of new connections not made in due time.
- Quantity	 Population whose water resources are unreliable.
Population with inadequate pressure.
Population losing supply for more than 12 hours.
- Quality	 % samples failing bacteriological quality*.
Volume supplied failing chemical standards*.
Volume supplied failing acceptability standards .
Sewerage -	 Number of new properties connected.
Number of properties flooded from sewers.
Number of unsatisfactory storm overflows.
Environmental	 River quality - % not satisfying objectives.
Estuarial quality - % not satisfying objectives.
Population connected to unsatisfactory sea outfalls.
Pop whose sludge is disposed unsatisfactorily*.
Sewerage treatment works failing consents.
Land drainage!	 Area with unsatisfactory drainage/flood protection.
Flood protection	 Km main river with unsatisfactory flood defences.
Km tidal sea defences unsatisfactory.
Area not covered by flood warning scheme.
Customer Contact	 Measures of timely response - emergencies,
correspondence, administration, billing.
* Standards related to EC directives 	 Source: UBS Phillips & Drew, 1989:14
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APPENDIX 5.1: THE ROYAL COMMISSION STANDARD 1912
Sewage Effluent Quality Standards
The quality of discharge was determined by the degree of dilution available in the
receiving watercourse to avoid nuisance. For differing dilutions the acceptable BOD
of the treated sewage effluent would vary accordingly (Mathews & Mance, 1986).
These criteria held for the concentration of suspended solids and biochemical
oxygen demand in treated sewage effluents: Thus for a 8:1 dilution, a sewage
effluent of 20mg. 1-i BOD discharging to a clean river water of 2mg. 1-i BOD would
only cause an increase of river water BOD immediately downstream of the
discharge to 4 mg. 1-i; subsequent self purification processes would reduce this
towards the "unpolluted " criterion of 2 mg. 1-i BOD (Tetlow, 1985: 2.3.1). In effect
this was an early application of achieving desirable environmental quality objectives
by providing a degree of sewage treatment that related to the dilution of the
receiving watercourse in order to prevent the development of an unacceptable RWQ
(Mathews & Mance, 1986:2).
Because the cost of conventional biological 'secondary' treatment facilities to meet
this standard was not regarded as unreasonable, local authorities had the burden of
justifying a more relaxed consent condition. Where the dilution was not available,
where the quality of the diluting water was not satisfactory, or where the use to
which the water was to be put required a stream of exceedingly high quality, the
proof for a more stringent standard was on the regulatory authority. However, over
the years, sewage treatment processes tended to become standardised to achieve a
general sewage effluent quality of 30mg/i suspended solids and 20mg/i BOD,
irrespective of the dilution provided by the receiving watercourse. This became
known as the Royal Commission Standard (Mathews & Mance, 1986; Okun,
1977:206).
Potable Water Quality Standards
The absence of formal standards laid down by regulation has been regarded as
advantageous. The results of new research indicating the significance of the
concentration of any particular constituent in water can be considered and
implemented without having to wait for the revision of a Statutory Instrument.
Furthermore the circumstances of the individual supplies may sometimes have to be
taken into account in determining a practical solution. There is inevitably a large
arbitrary element in the setting of any standards since the determination of border
line cases between the concentrations which have no effect, those which might have
an effect and those which have a demonstrable effect is a difficult medical problem
and adequate evidence is frequently not available. (Department of the Environment,
1973; Okun, 1977:185)
Because of the difficulties associated with deciding upon appropriate levels to be
included in publications of standards, the practice in the UK has been to rely on the
description of 'wholesome'. While 'wholesome' was not defined in the Water Act
it had been taken to imply clear, palatable and safe and the final decision as to the
wholesomeness of any particular water supply would rest ultimately in the hands of
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a court of law. In practice however:. . . authorities have utilised published works of
reference including in particular the World Health Organisation 's European
Standards... (Department of the Environment, 1973). To provide guidance as to
bacteriological quality, the DoE and Department of Health and Social Services have
recommended standards for micro-organisms in potable waters. Some WAs used
these standards while others adopted a different approach. International standards
for chemical quality were generally used as guidelines. Each WA was free to use
these standards as guides as it wished and to apply them differently within their own
areas. One tactic often used for setting standards for organic chemical contaminants
is the dilution of water that fails to meet standards with water from a purer source,
so that the final distributed product meets the standards. As the areas served by a
single authority become larger, such flexibility becomes greater.
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APPENDIX 5.2: TIlE CONSENT SYSTEM
1. As a result of the 1951 and 1961 Acts, consents can be granted either
unconditionally or conditionally, with respect to the siting of the outlet, its
construction and use and to the nature, composition, temperature, volume and rate
of discharge of the effluent. These prescribed conditions of maximum flow rate and
minimum quality, are aimed at insuring that effluents do not cause an unacceptable
depreciation in the quality of the receiving streams. If the quality of the stream is
not satisfactory below the point of discharge, while remaining satisfactory upstream,
then either compliance with consent conditions has been unsatisfactory and remedial
action at the works is needed, or the consent conditions themselves require
modification (Okun, 1977:207). Also, dischargers assumed an obligation to allow
the sampling of effluent by the relevant authorities. Whilst the 1951 Acts applied to
new discharges only, the 1960 Acts extended control to existing sources as well.
There have been criticisms of the consent system as a defacto right to pollute
(Pezzey, 1988).
As a result many polluting trade effluent discharges were diverted to sewer for
treatment in admixture with domestic sewage under the provisions of the 1937
Public Health (Drainage of Trade Premises) Act and later amendments.
2. From 1977 the NWC classification scheme adopted a system of consents based
on an annual 95th percentile compliance. This was a new special rule invented by
the DoE for the consents related to WA's own discharges. This arose from the
Secretary of State's role in authorising those discharges, and took the form of a
condition requiring only 95 per cent compliance on average in a year. The time
period is usually 12 months but not necessarily so for certain discharges, a shorter
period of 6 or.even 3 months may be required. This meant in effect, that excessive
pollutions on any given day were only offences if evidently committed in more than
5 per cent of the samples taken, and that no offence could be proved or punished
(unless the authority pleaded guilty) until the end of the year, or the averaging
period in which it occurred (National Rivers Authority, 1990).
3. This system was in some people's eyes a device to shut out prosecutions and, as
approval related only to sewage works discharges, it appears a special benefit to the
WAs as sewage works operators. On the other hand, there is an argument that the
biological processes of sewage works are more likely to vary for external reasons
(such as temperature) than chemical processes (from which many factory effluents
arise). Thus sewage works consents need, it is said, to be more flexible and it is the
average impact on the river which is significant.
The argument for such an averaging of standards was taken up by Warn (1989) who
was against accepted quality standards being defined as Absolute Limits or Maxima
(Barnden et a!, 1986; Ellis, 1988). Failure to follow this line leads to a risk of
misleading assessment of performance and as a consequence, a waste of resources
on undeserving sites and projects, and failure to detect more important cases.
Absolute standards also produce arbitrary planning. From the point of view of
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efficient use of resources spent on monitoring, RQ standards should have been
defined as averages. The 95 percentile was chosen instead because it embodies in a
single number, a description of average quality and spread about average and lies on
the poor side of average quality and so approaches extreme values which might
cause events like fish kills. The low precision with which the 95 percentile can be
estimated from 12 samples taken in a year is caused by an element of chance in
sampling. Sampling error has the potential to ruin any ill-considered and untested
scheme for classifying RWQ because it leads to hundreds of false declarations of a
change in class.
The latter part of this argument, that it is the average impact of the river which is
important, does not really convince Kinnersley (1988:124). He argues that the
natural regime is endlessly varying. If the major discharges are also authorised to
vary greatly, there is no link co-ordinating the discharges of the greatest polluting
loads with the periods of maximum flow and dilution. Water damaged in quality
certainly flows on, but its malign effects on fish life and vegetation - and on
abstractions made from it - are not cancelled out. Moreover, the variability of
sewage works performance, especially at small works, argues strongly against
removing from them the staff who could respond to varying conditions of
performance.
4. The concept of 95 percentile compliance was formally embodied in the new
consents in 1985 by incorporating in the consents the "look-up-table t' which
specifies an allowed number of failures depending on the numbers of samples taken.
This is essentially a statistical test for non-compliance. In the assessment of NWC
class there is a strong element of subjective opinion as rivers are highly variable and
if sampled punctiliously on data from existing sampling regimes, many stretches of
rivers would jump from Class to Class from year to year. As this behaviour is
unacceptable it is avoided by allowing the assessor to use his or her judgement. The
correct procedure is to make a proper statistical assessment of class. A Look-Up-
Table, derived in conjunction with the DoE, decides whether a works has failed.
This table controls the effect of sampling, so that a works is classed as failed only if
there is a fair degree (95%) of confidence that it really has failed. As a result, there
is a definite risk (<5 %) that money will be spent on improving a works which did
not fail. This risk can be made as small as necessary by choosing the appropriate
statistical confidence level (Tetlow, 1985:2.3.7).
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APPENDIX 5.3: DoE RIVER CLASSIFICATION SCHEME
In its classification of rivers, the DoE established four quality classes:
Class 1 - Rivers unpolluted and recovered from pollution
Includes rivers that are known to have received no significant polluting discharges
or, through receiving some pollution, have a BOD of less than 3 mg/i and are well
oxygenated.
Class 2 - Rivers of doubtful quality and needing improvement
Includes rivers not in class 1 on the basis of BOD and which have a substantially
reduced DO level at normal dry summer flows or regularly at other times; or which
irrespective of BOD, are known to have received significant toxic discharges which
cannot be proved to have had harmful effects.
Class 3 - Rivers of poor quality requiring improvement as a matter of some urgency
Includes rivers not in class 4 on BOD grounds, and which have below 50 percent
DO saturation for lengthy periods; or which contain substances which are suspected
of being actively toxic at times; or which have been affected by the discharge of
solids in suspension; and which have been the subject of serious complaints.
Class 4 - Grossly polluted rivers
Rivers having a BOD of 12 mg/i or more under average conditions; known to be
incapable of supporting fish life; which are completely deoxygenated at any time,
apart from times of exceptional drought; which are sources of offensive odours; and
which have an offensive appearance.
Source: Department of the Environment, Report of a River Pollution Survey of
England and Wales 1970, HMSO, Vol 1, 1972; Vol 2, 1972; Vol 3, 1974; updated
1973, 1975.
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APPENDIX 5.4: TIIIE NWC RIVER CLASSIFICATION SCIIEMIE
Class 1A Rivers - Good Quality suitable for potable supply abstractions and contain
no signfi cant polluting discharge
Average BOD less than 3mg/i. Oxidation of settled sludge almost complete. Widely
diverse invertebrate fauna. Game fishery or good mixed coarse fishery. High
amenity value.
Class lB Rivers - Less High Quality than 1A but usable for substantially the same
purposes.
BOD not greater than 5mg/I. Visible evidence of pollution should be absent.
Class 2 Rivers - Fair Quality with substantially reduced dissolved oxygen content at
times.
BOD not greater than 9mg/i. Contains significant polluting discharges. Suitable for
potable supply after advanced treatment. Reasonably good mixed coarse fishery.
Moderate amenity value.
Class 3 Rivers - Poor Quality with dissolved oxygen concentration less than 50%
saturation for considerable periods.
Contains substances suspected of being actively toxic at times. Variety of
macroscopic invertebrate fauna restricted. Moderate to poor fishery. May be used
for low grade industrial abstractions. Considerable potential for further use if
cleaned up.
Class 4 Rivers - Bad Quality with BOD greater than 12mg/I under average
conditions.
Incapable of supporting fish. Completely deoxygenated at times. Source of offensive
smells. Offensive appearance. Macroscopic invertebrate fauna restricted to pollution
tolerant organisms.
X - Insi gnfi cant watercourses and ditches not useable, where the objective is simply
to prevent nuisance developing.
DO greater than 10% saturation.
Sources: Woodward, 1974; Kinnersley, 1988
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APPENDIX 5.5: RIVER QUALITY SURVEYS 1958-1990
Former Classifications	 New Classification
1958 - 1980 Surveys	 1980 - 1990 Survey.
NON TIDAL RIVERS AND CANALS 	 FRESHWATER. RIVERS AND CANALS
1958	 1970	 1975	 1980	 1980'	 1985	 1990
Class	 Class
km	 9	 km	 9	 km	 9	 km	 9	 km	 9	 km	 9	 km	 9
Unpolluted 24950 12 28500 74 28810 75 28810 75	 Good Ia 13830 34 13470 33 12408 29
Doubtful	 5220 15	 6270 17	 6730 17
	 7110 18	 Good lb 14220 35 13990 34 14536 34
Poor	 2270	 7	 1940	 5	 1770	 5	 2000	 5	 Fair 2	 8670 21	 9730 24 10750 25
Grossly	 2250	 6	 1700	 4	 1270	 3	 810	 2	 Poor 3	 3260	 8	 3560	 9	 4022	 9
Polluted	 Bad 4
	
640	 2	 650	 2	 662	 2
X - 	 	 -	 -	 39
___________ ______________________________________________ Unclass 	 -	 -	 -	 -	 17	 -
Total	 34690	 38400	 38590	 38740	 Total	 40630	 41390	 42434
TIDAL RIVERS	 ESTUARIES
1958	 1970	 1975	 1980	 1980'	 1985	 1990
Class	 Class
km	 9	 km	 9	 km	 9	 km	 9	 __________ km	 9	 km	 9	 km	 9
Unpolluted 1160	 41 1380	 48 1360	 48 1410	 50	 Good A
	
1870	 68 1860	 68 1805	 66
Doubtful	 940	 32	 680	 23	 780	 27	 950	 34	 Fair B	 620	 23	 650	 24	 655	 24
Poor	 400	 14	 490	 17	 420	 15	 220	 8	 Poor C	 140	 5	 130	 5	 178	 7
Grossly	 360	 13	 340	 12	 280	 10	 220	 8	 Bad D	 110	 4	 90	 3	 84	 3
Polluted_________________________________________________ ________ _______________________________________
Total	 2850	 2880	 2850	 2800	 Total	 2730	 2730	 2722
* As revised in 1965'
All figures, except those for 1990, are from Table 6 in the 1985 Report'
Unclass. stands for Unclassified River
Water Quality in England and Wales: 1958-1990
Region	 1980	 to 1985	 1985 to 1990
______________ Up	 Down	 Net	 Up	 Down	 Net
Anglian	 21	 13	 +8	 9	 11	 -2
Northumbria	 4	 1	 +3	 2	 5	 -3
North West*	 4	 12	 -8	 7	 11	 -4
Severn Trent	 10	 7	 +3	 10	 9	 +1
Southern	 19	 20	 -1	 23	 16	 +7
South West	 4	 45	 -41	 18	 40	 -22
Thames	 15	 18	 -3	 19	 33	 -14
Welsh*	 22	 21	 +1	 20	 18	 +2
Wessex	 27	 10	 +17	 4	 3	 ^ I
Yorkshire	 +2	 4	 9	 -5
England&Wales	 12	 14	 -2	 11	 15	 -4
Figures for 1980 - 1985 are from the body of the 1985 Survey Report'
* Figures for 1980 - 1985 are for both rivers and canals
Percentages of River Length Changing Class: 1980-1990
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APPENDIX 6.1: PRIVATISATION 1979-1990
1979 to 1983	 1984 to 1986	 1987 to 1990
British Petroleum (1979)
Tech Group Holdings (1979)
British Aerospace (1981)
British Sugar Corp (1981)
Cable & Wireless (1981)
Amersham International (1982)
National Freight Company (1982)
Britoil (1982) (1989)
Associated British Airports (1983)
International Aeradio (1983)
British Gas Corp Onshore
Oil Assets (Wytch Farm) (1984)
Enterprise Oil (1984)
Sealink (1984)
Jaguar (1984)
British Telecom (1984)
British Shipbuilders (1985)
National Bus Company (1986)
British Airways Helicopters (1986)
British Gas (1986)
British Airways (1987)
Royal Ordinance (1987)
British Airports
Authority BAA (1987)
British Steel (1988)
Rover Group (1988)
General Practical
Finance Corporation
Harland & Wolff (1989)
Short Brothers (1989)
Water plc (1989)
Electricity pIes (1990)
Source: Maloney & Richardson, 1992
